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Abstract 
Ethiopia is one of the poorest countries in the world.  Since the mid-twentieth century, it has been 
recurrently hit by severe droughts and famines. Attempts have been made since the 1960s by 
successive governments to tackle the problem of poverty and famine among the rural population 
which unfortunately did not yield a substantial breakthrough. The efforts of the government to 
ameliorate the conditions of Ethiopians were supported by non-state development actors, of which 
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) are currently the most visible part.  
Concentrating on selected cases of national and international NGOs, this study examines the role 
played by NGOs in the fight against rural poverty since the 1960s and the changing circumstances 
in which they operated. More specifically, it explores how NGOs managed their difficult 
relationships with state actors and with each other with a view to advancing their cause. Thus, this 
study investigates the contradictions and collaborations NGOs have had with successive 
governments, international funding agencies, and project participants. In doing so, the varying 
interests as well as the activities of the different parties that have affected the discourses and 
outcomes of NGO’s involvement in development activities are examined. These aspects are 
investigated in such a way that the broad spectrum of interests and parties involved in local and 
national development becomes clearly identifiable. These interests and the extent to which these 
parties acted to satisfay these interests witnessed change over time. Moreover, there has been an 
interplay between the past and the present in that the activities of NGOs in the 1980s has shaped 
the attitude of officials of the incumbent government. To comprehend the nature of relations that 
NGOs have established with the Ethiopian government since the early 1990s, it is important to 
study the context in which NGOs interacted with the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), 
then a rebel organization. To that end, this study has adopted a historical approach that draws 
attention to the internal dynamics of NGOs in Ethiopia and to the changing contexts in which they 
operated. This work would, thus, assist a variety of development actors including NGOs not only 
to consider current and future activities but also to reflect on their relationships in the past so that 
they may deal with each other more competently for a better result in achieving developmental 
goals. 
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Chapter One  
Background to the Study 
 
1.1. Problem Statement  
Today it appears odd to think of “development” in the developing world without due regard to Non 
Governmental Organizations (from now on NGOs)1. This prominence of NGOs has triggered a 
debate on the capability of NGOs to manage “development”. Many Western governments, 
multilateral organizations, church institutions, and other interested groups presently advance the 
view that NGOs are effective and efficient in meeting “development” goals, and are thus credible 
actors2. These groups have in recent decades attributed to NGOs many vertues; it is widely held 
that in dealing with “development” problems, NGOs have the advantage of being independent, 
small scale, participatory and non-bureaucratic. In 1983, the President of the Canadian 
International Development Agency (CIDA) summed up the positive attitudes that many Western 
governments and private institutions hold toward NGOs in the following way:  
NGOs…have some very practical, as well as visionary virtues: they are human, personal and 
unbureaucratic; they are low in cost and high in dedication; they are flexible, fast and innovative; 
they can work effectively in fields and places where governments cannot operate; they have the 
knack for building partnerships and for getting aid to the grassroots, to those who need it most3.      
The above list of organisations and their representatives have added to this list of attributed virtues 
by arguing that NGOs are likely to identify local needs and constraints much better than local 
governmental organizations4.  
Favorable views of NGOs and their activities are subject to serious questions. To begin with, some 
of the qualities attributed to NGOs could be interpreted as weaknesses. Shaldon Annis argued that 
“small scale” could mean “insignificant”, “politically independent” could imply that NGOs were 
“powerless” or “disconnected” and “low cost” could mean that they were “underfinanced or poor 
quality”5. Moreover, some studies conducted on the performance of NGOs have shown that NGOs 
                                                          
1
 Tegegne Teka, International Non-Governmental Organizations in Rural Development in Ethiopia: Rhetoric and 
Practice (Peter Land, Frankfurt am Mein, Germany, 2000), P. 13 
2
 Tegegne Teka, International…, P. 232 
3
 Ibid, P. 15  
4
 Ibid, P. 15  
5
 Shaldon Annis cited in John Farington et al (eds), Reluctant Partners? Non-Governmental Organizations, the State 
and Sustainable Agricultural Development (London, Routledge and Overseas Development Institute, 1993), P. 23 
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are not as effective as their supporters have argued. A study conducted on NGOs and innovation 
in Gambia concluded that although NGOs may be internally structured in such a way as to facilitate 
innovation, in fact they have performed more poorly with regard to innovation than their popular 
image would suggest 6 . Some scholars like Dieter Neubert argue that NGOs have remained 
ineffective as they lack a societal base and hence they depend heavily on foreign donors for their 
resources. This dependency on foreign donors weakens NGOs’ bargaining position, making them 
dependent in terms of their agenda and increasing their vulnerability to manipulation by the same 
foreign donors7. In agreement with Neubert, Meyer has argued that NGOs operating in developing 
countries should be viewed either as independent entrepreneurial economic entities that produce 
international public goods or opportunistic pretenders8.  
Certainly in poor countries like Ethiopia where the chance to mobilise resources locally has 
remained limited, the majority of NGOs depend on foreign donors for support. This has caused a 
number of pro-NGO scholars to be concerned that NGOs are, in fact, abandoned the poor people 
on whose behalf they operate. In a major contribution published in 1997, Hulme and Edwards 
asked “Are NGOs losing the special relationship with the poor, with radical ideas, and with 
alternatives to the orthodoxies of the rich and powerfull, that they have claimed in the past”9.  
However, NGO leaders or at least some of them may have the conviction to be true to their founding 
principles. As a response, donors may inevitably be bound to hold varying degrees of understanding 
of the need for NGOs to build and expand their own organizational integrity10.  Moreover, donors 
often lack the consensus between them that would be necessary to impose a monolithic view11. 
Donors consider also the reactions of states that NGOs relate to. The state was in retreat in many 
African countries by the end of the 1970s. These circumstances started making the actual and 
potential role of NGOs to be more visible12. This, however, does not imply that NGOs were granted 
space to operate to realise their visions. Governments insist that the function of NGOs is to carry 
                                                          
6
 Daniel Sahleyesus, Non Governmental Organization in Ethiopia: Examining Relation between Local and 
International Groups (Ontario, the Edwn Mellen Press, 2005), PP. 1-2  
7
 Dieter Neubert cited in Daniel Sahleyesus, Non Governmental..., P. 2  
8
 Carrie Meyer cited in Daniel Sahleyesus, Non Governmental…, P. P.2  
9
 David Hulme and Michael Edward quoted in Jim Igoe and Tim Kelsall, “Introduction: Between a Rock and a Hard 
Place” in Jim Igoe and Tim Kelsall (eds), Between a Rock and a Hard Place: African NGOs,Donors and the State 
(USA: Carolina Academic Press, 2005), P. 16 
10
 Daniel Sahleyesus, Non Governmental Organization…, P. 2 
11
 Robert Pinkney, NGOs, Africa and the Global Order (Macmillar Publications Ltd, UK, 2009), P. 61  
12
 Jim Igoe and Tim Kelsall, “Introduction: Between a Rock and a Hard Place” in Jim Igoe and Tim Kelsall (eds), 
Between a Rock and a Hard Place: African NGOs,Donors and the State (USA: Carolina Academic Press, 2005), P. 17 
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out state development policy. Therefore, NGOs should be directly “accountable” to African states. 
For a long time, most African governments were successful in coopting NGOs. This is related to 
global power politics and the ideologies and interests that sustained it. For much of the the Cold 
War years, the policies of Western countries were informed by the need to either weaken or 
frustrate the alignment of African governments with the Socialist Camp. As the policy did not 
intend to reduce the power of states, African leaders had the chance to exercise various degree of 
state power, often oppressive in nature against the civil society13.            
NGO leaders saw that global politics has shifted since the late 1980s and that this has held important 
opportunies for improving conditions in their communities. Thus, they started to negotiate their 
space with governments through the intermediary of foreign donors. This marked a major 
difference from the nature of relationship that NGOs had developed prior to the early 1990s. In 
Ethiopia where this research was done, for instance, NGOs generally adhered to official 
governments’ policies during the imperial (1960s-1974) and the military (1974-1991) periods. This 
was the course that many NGOs in Africa took for a variety of reasons. NGOs seek access to the 
state to influence its policies as well as to avoide conflict or secure protection. As Fowler noted in 
his study of Kenyan NGOs “…it appears that more can be achieved by appearing to support, respect 
and improve prevailing systems, rather than openly agitating against them”14  
NGO leaders may also work in line with government policies recognising the existence of 
asymmetrical power relation. Under this circumstance, NGO leaders may endorce the same state 
they want to reform. Concerning this, Morris Suzuki noted that “NGOs may pursue change, but 
they can maintain existing social and political systems”15. This attests to the existence of two 
courses that NGOs could take. These courses are what Michael Edward called “development 
imperatives” and “organisational imperatives”. “Developmental imperatives” refer to the degree to 
which NGOs analyse social concerns, articulate and pursue visions of their own and act accordingly 
to “empower” the public for independent action. Conversely, “organizational imperatives” are 
                                                          
13
 Tony Vaux, The Selfish Altruist: Relief Work in Famine and war (USA and UK, Earthsscan, 2001), P.48 
14
 Alan Fowler, “Non-Governmental Organsations and the Promotion of Democracy in Kenya” (Doctoral Dissertation, 
Sussex, 1994), 293  
15
 Morris Suzuki quoted in David Lewis and Naznee Kanji, Non Governmental Organizations and Development 
(Routledge Publishers, London and Nework, 2009),  P.4   
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those whereby the leaderships of NGOs aspire for organizational survival and growth, income, 
publicity, prestige, and profile, and act for the attainment of these objectives16.  
 “Developmental imperatives” and “organizational imperatives” may not necessarily contradict 
each other. In some circumstances, they even support each other in that while vision requires 
organization, the latter requires vision to give it direction, meaning and purpose. NGOs have 
articulated and re-articulated development visions since the rise of their visibility in the 1960s. The 
global arena continues to provide NGOs with diverse models of development in line with what are 
considered to be the main social concerns in certain operational areas. NGOs pick models that suit 
them accordingly. An NGOs’ articulation of certain visions does not mean to say that they will act 
accordingly; further, a range of factors may cause NGOs to act in ways that come to influence their 
vision as originally articulated. These vision-altering factors had to do with changing broad socio-
economic and political contexts as well as internal dynamics of NGOs themselves. Individuals at 
least initially holding key positions within NGOs responded to this changing contexts because they 
may well be driven not only by developmental visions but also by a number of organizational 
imperatives, which may come to  pose serious questions as to whether such NGOs are visionary – 
or acting in accordance with their own stated visions – or not. In the context of this research, the 
accountability and transparency of NGOs has been so questioned. In 1996, Addis Zemen, a 
government-owned Ethiopian newspaper, reported on a perceived lack of transparency in the 
financial management of NGOs in the country17. Also, informants who worked for NGOs and 
interviewed for this study criticize what they describe as undesirable conduct of NGOs. For 
instance, an informant interviwed for this study narrated his own experience in the following way:      
When we come to NGOs…everything has been built upon individuals’ interest. There are 
conditions created by unethical practices such as nepotism. Sometimes, they produce rigid laws 
and regulations. They issue their own laws apart from what the law of the Ethiopian Charity and 
Society Proclamation says. This does not create good working relations. That is the only reason 
for me to resign from my job18.  
Graham Hancock, author of the influential book Lords of Poverty, tells similar stories about 
corruption within NGOs. He mentions that in 1985, Christian Aid, a British NGO working in 
Ethiopia, was accused of not having sent a single cent to Ethiopia out of $18 million raised for 
                                                          
16
 Mikael Edwardsm, “How NGOs Made a Difference? From Manchester to Birimingham with an Elephant in the 
Room” in Bebbington, A. J., Hickey, J and Mitlin, D. (eds), Can NGOs make a Difference? The Challenges of 
Development Alternative (London, ZED Books, 2008), P. 48, P. 48 
17
 “Ethiopian NGOs” Addis Zemen, Teqmt 25, 1996 (November 5, 2003), P.2   
18
 Informant, Ato Fekadu Bezuneh  
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famine relief by the UN and the US State Department19. It is also worth noting that, according to a 
2004 survey, many of the ordinary citizens of Ethiopia chiefly associate NGOs with the personal 
benefit of the individuals that work for them, such as good salaries and luxury cars, much more 
than with the good services they might provide20.  
Corruption and malpractice stem from a crisis of accountability that refers to “…the process 
through which an organisation makes a commitment to respond to and balance the needs of its 
diverse stakeholders in its decision making processes and activities, and delivers against this 
commitment”21. Accountability framework incorporates accountability for what? Accountability 
for whom? Accountability how? As Ebrahim argued, the practice of NGO accountability put accent 
on “upward” and “external” accountability to donors and governments while “downward” 
accountability to poor people remain poor. He also argues that NGOs and donors have mainly 
concentrated on short term “functional” accountability responses instead of longer term “strategic” 
processes necessary for lasting social and political change22. Ebrahim’s arguments run the risk of 
simplifying efforts underway within NGOs to account themselves to and reflect aspirations of their 
constituencies since the mid 1990s. NGOs in Ethiopia, for instance, imposed in 1999 self regulation 
by signing a “Code of Conduct” with a view to improving their performance and accountability23. 
The signing of the “Code of Conduct” was a deliberate act to deprive the government of the long-
standing execuse to intervene in the internal affairs of NGOs. That deliberate act together with the 
influence of donors that forced the government to allow a degree of public space shifted NGOs to 
be advocate of change. However, in 2009 the government issued the Ethiopian Charity and Society 
Proclamation that, according to NGOs, restricts their active engagement in advocacy rather than 
makes them answerable to their stakeholders24.The action of the Ethiopian government to restrict 
NGOs may be linked with state centralism rooted in the political history of the country. However, 
state has been unable to offer services to citizens and this has opened space in which NGO operated. 
Moreover, the triumph of the neo-liberal order worldwide caused NGOs to become active 
                                                          
19
 Graham Hancock, Lords of Poverty: The Power, Prestige, and Corruption of the International Aid Business(London, 
1989), P.6  
20
 Horn Consultant, “Constituency Building: Diagnostic Survey of Ethiopian NGOs Prepared for Oxfam GB and 
CRDA” (Addis Ababa, November 2003), P.35 
21
 Hammer M et al, 2008 Global Accountability Report (One World Trust, London, 2008), P. 10 
22
 Ebrahim A cited in Solomon Belete. “NGO Accountability: The Case of “Charities” in Ethiopia” (MA thesis. 
Kimmage Development Study Center, Deblin: Development Studies,  2011), P. 22  
23
 CRDA, “Minutes of the Executive Committee” (June 30th, 1998) 
24
 Solomon Belete. “NGO Accountability: The Case of “Charities” in Ethiopia” (MA thesis. Kimmage Development 
Study Center, Deblin: Development Studies,  2011), P. 22 
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participants in policy-making. NGO leaders who saw the global and national systems shifting from 
the early 1990s started to negotiate their space with governments. NGOs have thus operated in 
plural organisational contexts, and the interactions with donors, governments, and project 
participants offered NGOs challenges and opportunities. This research has positioned NGOs in 
Ethiopia within a more political or historical setting and explained how they relate to state, donors, 
project participants. However, due to methodological infeasibility, this research has selected Agri-
Service Ethiopia (ASE), Oxfam GB (Oxfam) and the Consortium of Christian Relief and 
Development Association (CCRDA) and addresses their shifting furtune that stem from multi-
dimentional relationships with the Ethiopian governments, their donors and project participants. In 
order to address the research problem and contribute to scholarly debate, the following basic 
research questions have been developed: 
 What were the origins of the selected NGOs’ visions of “development”, and to what extent 
have these visions been influenced by or negotiated with dominant actors such as the state 
and donors?   
  How have changing historical contexts, including regime change, shaped the selected 
NGOs’ space of action?  
 What are the landmark events in the history of the expansion and contraction of ASE, 
Oxfam GB and CCRDA?    
 To what extent have the NGOs’ leadership responded to internal and external stimuli by 
adapting the structure of their organizations?  
 What has been the impact of the selected NGOs on the social groups they have worked for, 
mediated by outside influences and negotiations?  
1.2. Research Methodology 
1.2.1. NGOs as a methodological challenge  
In the second half of the twentieth century, the number of NGOs operating in Ethiopia, as in other 
African countries, grew exponentially. During the Ethiopian famine of 1973–1974 and throughout 
the 1970s, about twenty-five NGOs were operative in the country25, and this number doubled in 
response to the outbreak of the Ethiopian famine of the 1980s26. By the mid-1990s, the number of 
registered NGOs in Ethiopia reached 35027. Recent statistics show that the Ethiopian Charity and 
                                                          
25
 Desalegn Rahmato, “Civil Society Organizations in Ethiopia” in Bahru Zewde and Siegfried Pauswang (eds), 
Ethiopia: The Challenges of Democracy from Below (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikaninstitute and Addis Ababa: Forum for 
Social Studies, 2002), P. 106 
26
 ASE, “ASE’s 30th Anniversary”, Agri-Drum (Addis Ababa, February 2000), P.8 
27
 Desalegn Rahmato, “Civil Society…”, P. 106 
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Society Agency, an official coordinating body, registered 2776 humanitarian and development 
NGOs currently in operation28.  
NGOs are too diverse to be considered as a homogenous set of organisations as they uphold varied 
ideologies and represent different interest groups29. In Ethiopia, the origins and ideologies of those 
NGOs present may usefully be categorised as either national or international; secular or religious30.  
The diversity of NGOs poses profound methodological challenges to their study. Diverse attributes 
of NGOs might influence their activities and the failure to consider this might limit out 
understanding about NGOs. A historical approach could overcome the methodological challenge 
that diversity posses. A historical approach recognises diverse attributes and draws attention to the 
influences of these diverse attributes on decisions that NGO leaders passed in response to changing 
contexts. NGOs have operated in changing contexts and, in the process, will have experienced 
changes themselves, as they continue to pursue their stated aims. As a result, throughout their 
activism, NGOs may be characterised as much by continuity as change, and these changes and 
continuities constitute a distinctive phenomenon. To put it in context, Ethiopia has passed through 
profound socio-economic and political changes since the 1960s, born out of regime changes. The 
country has witnessed three ideologically different forms of governments come and go since the 
1960s.  Some of the key moments during this time that shaped NGOs in Ethiopia were the 
“development” rhetoric and practice that has started since the 1960s, the social revolution that 
erupted in 1974, the famine of the 1970s and 1980s, the “New Economic Policy” of 1990, the 
prevalence of relative liberalism that followed regime change in May 1991 and the Parliamentary 
elections of 2005 and the violence that followed them.  
Certainly, not all NGOs operative have experienced the same span of events as the NGOs present 
each began their activities at different times to one another, depending on the date of their 
establishment (especially national NGOs) and / or their initial entry (international NGOs) into the 
country. NGOs that started to operate in the 1960s and early 1970s have taken a strong interest to 
engage with other actors and to draw meanings out of their intentions, interpretations and strategies. 
They have then acted accordingly, based on their own meanings. It is thus clear that drawing 
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attention to and investigating intentions, interpretations and strategies of actors of which NGOs are 
a part is key research strategy to understand NGOs and their activities. This is because, as Daniel 
Sahleyesus stated, the orientation and intentions of actors may play a much more decisive role than 
they do in organizations whose dynamics are primarily determined by the logic of the market as in 
the business sector or the logic of hierarchy as in the state31.  
1.2.2. Sample size and selection criteria  
There are only a limited number of studies on NGOs in Ethiopia, and most of them focus on the 
activities of the organisations. In doing so, they focus on a wide number of NGOs within a 
particular sector32. This makes it so difficult to study individual NGOs in detail that certain aspects 
of NGO behavior such as internal decision-making is left out. Moreover, many of the studies relied 
heavily on interview method. Although it is important to address some aspects of NGOs, interview 
method alone would not sufficiently address key issues related to NGOs. This is particularly true 
with regard to historical studies. There has been serious staff turnover within NGOs, making the 
interview method insufficent. This signifies the need to access and analyse a variety of primary and 
secondary documents stored in the archives of NGOs themselves, governmental organisations that 
have had the mandate to supervise NGOs and academic institutes.                    
This research has selected only a handful of NGOs for analytical purpose as it is methodological 
infeasible to consider all NGOs operative in the country. The profiles of NGOs in Ethiopia were 
reviewed to select relevant subjects for addressing the research questions. To this end, various 
sources of preliminary data on NGOs’ profiles were referred to, including the directories of NGOs 
compiled by CCRDA in 1988 and 201133. Similarly, a recent list, with profiles, of NGOs compiled 
by the Ethiopian Charity and Society Agency was also referred to34. The researcher also brought 
his own previous research experience into NGOs to bear as an aid to understanding the profiles in 
context. 
The data sources were considered within the framework of the list of criteria that had been 
developed earlier in order to select NGOs as subjects. The first criterion was each NGO’s central 
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activity. Most of the NGOs in Ethiopia offered humanitarian assistance in time of crisis from the 
late nineteenth century; their orientation towards long term “development” only began in the 
1990s35. Generally, these NGOs distanced themselves from getting involved in major events that 
occurred in the country. Conversely, some NGOs that emerged in the 1960s and early 1970s 
showed a great deal of interest in “development” in that they had their visions and developed 
strategies to translate them into action. Inevitably, these NGOs had varying degree of convergence 
and divergence of views and relationships with those of the state and donors. In investigating these 
views and relationships in a plural context, this research therefore found their orientation towards 
“development” to be more suitable as a major criterion by which to select and consider NGOs as 
subjects.  
Diversity in terms of origin (foreign or national) and orientation (ecumenical, secular or a 
combination of both) was also considered as a major criterion. Due regard to diversity is essential 
in order to investigate the range of dynamics that have informed the ideas and actions of NGOs.  
The availability of relevant sources, the access granted the researcher to particular NGOs through 
personal contacts, and the willingness of NGOs’ officials and employees to cooperate with the 
researcher were also factors considered in selecting case studies.  
The researcher selected a range of as many as ten NGOs, of different origin, to approach in advance.  
The then NGOs that the researcher initially considered are shown in Table 1 below. The table also 
shows those NGOs that were finally included in the study, and gives the reasons why others were 
not. 
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Table 1 Sampling of research subjects considered and selected 
No NGO 
Category 
NGOs Consulted 
for willingness  
Country 
of Origin 
The beginning of 
Intervention in Ethiopia 
Remark 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
International 
Secular 
 
 
 
 
 
Oxfam Great Britain  UK  1964 Selected 
Welthungerhilfe 
(“German Agro 
Action”) 
Germany  1972  
 
 
Ignored the 
request to 
cooperate  
 
Lay Volunteers 
International 
Association 
Italy  1972 
Menschen für 
Menschen (“People 
for People”)  
Austria  1981 
 
 
2 
 
Lutheran 
World 
Federation  
Sweden-Switzerland  1965   The data was 
found to be   
insufficient to 
support the 
main argument 
and it is ignored 
World Vision 
International 
USA 1972 Ignored the 
request to 
cooperate   
 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
National-
secular  
 
 
 
Agri-Service 
Ethiopia  
Ethiopia  1969  Selected  
 
Organisation for 
Rehabilitation and 
Development in  
Amhara 
Ethiopia  1984 Ignored the 
request  to 
cooperate 
 
 
Relief Society of 
Tigray 
Ethiopia  1977  Ignored the 
request to 
cooperate 
4  Consortium 
mingling a 
set of 
dynamics  
Consortium of 
Christian Relief and 
Development 
Association  
Ethiopia  1973  Selected 
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Seven of the ten NGOs (see the table above) turned down the request for cooperation. Conversely, 
the officials of the three NGOs that did become the subjects of this research were extremely willing 
to cooperate and assisted the researcher whenever needed. Officials of ASE, CCRDA granted 
research permits as soon as they were approached. Oxfam granted the research permit later than 
ASE and CCRDA. The reason for this was that the person who granted the permit wanted an 
assurance that the research did not have an objective other than the academic one.  
Happily, the preliminary data collected in the early stages of the first fieldwork confirmed that 
these three NGOs, in fact, fulfilled the criteria developed for the study. The data generated from 
the three NGOs showed that all three were oriented towards long term development. Towards the 
end of 1997, Oxfam looked back at its own activities in relation to that of its British counterpart, 
Save the Children Fund (SCF). In its own assessment, Oxfam stated that “SCF are great at 
emergencies and poor at development in Ethiopia. We are better in some ways the other ways 
round”36. Likewise, the “development” orientation of ASE had been attested to by a number of 
independent observers. In a letter addressed in 1990 to Nederlandse Organisatie voor Internationale 
Bijstand (NOVIB), a Holland-based NGO that funded ASE, a certain consultant discussed the 
activities of ASE in the following way:   
ASE is clearly almost the only agency in Ethiopia which is operating development work without 
having a relief element to their programmes…Although some agencies are operating what they 
describe as development programme[s], they are in fact either simply doing relief, as in food for 
work, or doing very small single sector programmes like Oxfam with water in Boditi area37.  
 
Though it had its origins in the famine that occurred in Ethiopia in 1973, CCRDA first de-
emphasised and then abandoned the mandate of relief operation and shifted to assisting NGO 
members to improve the lives of the poor38.  
Not only their mutual orientation towards “development” but also the volume of available sources, 
and the ease with which the researcher was able to gain access to these sources made  ASE, CCRDA 
and Oxfam to be the subjects of this study.   
After the matter of subjects for case study was settled, the next task was to identify interview 
partners from NGOs and competent governmental organisations. Locating certain individuals for 
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interview was often a difficult task due to staff turnover.  Staff turnover was so rapid in these NGOs 
that some of the individuals who had been interviewed had resigned by the time the researcher 
returned to perform the second bout of fieldwork. However, some individuals working at NGOs 
and government offices were successfully identified and interviewed. The number of respondents 
and their organisations are shown in the tables below: 
Table 2 Category A Informants (Insiders of the concerned NGOs) 
 
 Table 3 Category B Informants (outside the concerned NGOs) 
1.2.3. Sources  
The study relied on a wide range of sources to answer the research questions. These sources 
included different kinds of archives, the written and oral reminiscences and reflections of 
individuals, and documentary films and photos.  
No Category  
NGOs  
Data collection  
Methods  
Number of  
Respondents 
Remark 
 
1 
International 
Secular 
 
Oxfam  
Interview 3   
  
  
  
 
Composition include 
top management body 
and middle rank 
professionals who 
worked at the Head 
quarter and 
programme offices  
 
 
2 
 
National 
Secular   
 
ASE 
 Interview  7 
 
 
3 
 
Consortium  
CCRDA  Interview 7 
No  Respondent  
Category 
Data collection  
Methods 
Number of  
Respondents 
Remark 
1 NGOs employees outside 
of the selected NGOs 
 
Interview 
3 
 
They discussed 
general issues that 
influence NGOs  
 
 
2 Government Bodies Interview 2 They took the 
perspective of the 
government on NGOs  
Focus Group 
Discussion 
3 
Observation 
 
By the 
researcher 
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1.2.4. Data collection   
In investigating the above-mentioned sources, various methods of data collection were employed. 
These were archive research; consultation of primary and secondary materials, interviews, focus 
group discussion, informal talk and observation. Excepting focus group discussion, these methods 
were employed during both periods of fieldwork that the researcher carried out in Ethiopia. The 
first fieldwork lasted two and half months, from the first week of October 2012 to mid-December 
2012. The intention was to make an assessment of the actual situation in the field. During this 
period, the researcher identified the case studies and familiarised himself with key informants. 
Moreover, some preliminary oral and written sources were reviewed. The second fieldwork lasted 
five and half months, from early July 2013 to mid-December 2013. Most of the data on which the 
main arguments of this study depend were collected during the second fieldwork.  
1.2.4.1. Archival research and its challenges    
Relevant archival materials existed in greater volume than the researcher had initially thought. 
NGOs themselves, competent governmental organisations and academic institutions have kept 
such archives. During fieldwork, the researcher was able to visit and review archival collections 
kept by ASE, CCRDA, Oxfam and the Lutheran World Federation in Addis Ababa in Ethiopia. 
The researcher also visited and reviewed archives at the National Library and Archive Agency of 
the Ministry of Culture and Sport, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and at the Library and Archives 
of the Institute of Ethiopian Studies of Addis Ababa University.   
Though they contain valuable sources, the archives of the NGOs were not found to have been kept 
in a proper, orderly condition. The archives were found to be scattered here and there, rather, and 
the NGOs did not have anything like a comprehensive record of their contents. Access to archives 
was not initially easy, as NGO officials were reluctant to allow an “outsider” access to files whose 
contents they did not know themselves. This was particularly true for the archives of Oxfam and 
CCRDA. Moreover, there were no responsible employees assigned to take care of the files. Due to 
this, the researcher was told initially to pick the information he wanted from the sources locked in 
the rooms. Later, the development of personal relationships with those individuals temporarily 
assigned to the task facilitated access to archives. By the end, the researcher reached the stage 
where he held the key of the archival rooms himself, and so could enter them whenever he wanted. 
NGO officials wanted to censor the content of the data. In one case, the sources were censored by 
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a man in charge and the researcher was refused permission to take out historical photos for 
publication. The reason given was that the persons pictured in the photos might accuse the 
organisation of allowing the researcher to publish their photos without their consent. Gradually, 
however, the man in charge stopped checking the contents of the materials, as he found all the 
reading tiresome.   
The problems encountered at the archives of various governmental offices were quite different 
from those at the NGOs’. The first problem arose from a lack of proper coordination of the NGOs 
in the country, as the responsibility to manage NGOs and coordinate their activities has shifted 
from one government office to another. Indeed, a senior official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
opined to the researcher that “NGOs are the most mismanaged sector in the country”39. As a result, 
the researcher had to seek out various government offices that were, or had been, responsible for 
various aspects of coordinating NGOs. The first of these was the former Ministry of Interior, which 
had held the mandate to register NGOs. As the Ministry has not existed since the ministerial 
reorganisation of the mid-1990s, however, its archives are held by the National Library and Archive 
Agency. Unfortunately, the Agency did not finalise cataloguing the files before handing them over, 
thus the archives are not currently available to researchers. The Relief and Rehabilitation 
Commission (RRC) took over the mandate to coordinate NGO activities in 1974. Its archive had 
previously been accessible to researchers, however in 2005/2006 the main archive centre was 
demolished following the restructuring of the RRC into Disaster Risk Management and the Food 
Security Sector. The archives are now locked in a room and gaining access to them was impossible. 
Repeated requests to access them were turned down. Likewise, the Ministry of Justice took over 
the mandate to register NGOs in 1996 until the establishment of the Ethiopian Charity and Society 
Agency (ECSA) in 2009, as per Proclamation No. 621, at which point the Ministry handed over all 
the files to the Agency. The Agency has begun the process of cataloguing the files, however it has 
not yet developed any regulations with regard to access to the files or how they may or may not be 
used for research purposes. It was surprising to hear, from officials of the Agency, that each NGO 
concerned must be asked for permission by the researchers in order to access their Agency files. 
Thanks to the kind cooperation of certain officials and employees of the Agency, only files related 
to the case studies were presented to the researcher. However, many of these files turned out to be 
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identical to those maintained by the NGOs themselves, which the researcher had already consulted. 
Moreover, it was absolutely forbidden to copy any of the files.    
In order to offset the problems encountered with regard to government archives, the researcher 
extended his fieldwork in the archives of NGOs, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the library and 
archives of the National Library and Archive Agency, and the Institute of Ethiopian Studies of 
Addis Ababa University, collecting voluminous data in so doing. The review of these documents 
has generated data on diverse issues. The data from NGOs’ Memorandum of Associations and By-
laws together with data from reminiscences and publications on the backgrounds of NGOs and 
their founders set the basis for reconstructing the origins of the NGOs and their changing visions. 
Reports and speeches recorded in the form of minutes were also reviewed, and data related to the 
organisational structure, management and history of the NGOs was collected. Minutes kept by the 
NGOs themselves were reviewed carefully to better understand the internal set-up of NGOs, their 
relations with donors and the state and with project participants. Letters and reports were also 
reviewed with a view to understanding the way NGOs have been perceived by the three successive 
forms of government in Ethiopia. Data on the nature of the relationships between NGOs and local 
communities was collected from need assessment reports, strategic plans, field reports, minutes 
and research works carried out by NGOs themselves. Also, field reports were reviewed for 
information on the progress of projects and programme implementation, and the responses of the 
local people to the projects or programmes.  
1.2.4.2. Interviews  
The context in which the fieldworks were carried out influenced the type and nature of interview 
method. An important contextual factor is that the Ethiopian Charity and Society Proclamation No 
621, 2009 put a strain on relations between the Ethiopian government and NGOs. As a result, a 
number of informants delivered a great deal of data on the consequence of the proclamation on the 
NGO sector. Informants that discussed the proclamation from the position of the government, 
however, gave a different interpretation. They rather emphasised the importance of the 
proclamation in dealing with NGOs who, by their assessment, had been driven by external neo-
liberal forces. Some informants also discussed the specific context in which the law was put in 
place. This last point was what interview partners from NGOs wanted to discuss in most depth, 
however, they were held back from delivering as much data as they would otherwise have liked to 
for fear of the prevailing political circumstances. Informants that narrated the perspectives of NGOs 
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spoke at length of what they described as the very humble lives the founders and early leaders of 
NGOs had led, as well as the ideals driving them. These data, together with the data collected 
through review of written primary and secondary archival materials, came to form the basis by 
which an attempt to reconstruct the factors driving the founders was undertaken.  
However, informants were Ethiopians with limited knowledge about the experiences of the 
founders outside of Ethiopia. Informants also talked a lot about the “success” they have registered 
in carrying out “development”.  
 
1.2.4.3. Focus Group Discussions   
Forums where informants would discuss issues related to the research were organised. Based on 
these, a focus group discussion was organised and held in Addis Ababa, in which officials from 
the public relations office of the ECSA participated. They delivered data on the genesis of the 2009 
proclamation, by which the Agency was established, and the overall perspective of the government 
with regard to the accountability and operational transparency of NGOs. This data collection 
technique therefore initially appeared promising, and attempts were made to organise similar 
forums in which NGO employees would participate, whether exclusively or together with 
government officials. However, this did not work out for two main reasons. Firstly, as a result of 
the general uncertainty and lack of trust that prevailed between NGOs and the government, NGO 
employees were not willing to discuss their positions in the presence of government officials.   
Secondly, as in the case of personal interviews, above, NGO employees found it difficult to allot 
any time for these group discussions.            
1.2.4.4. Informal Talks 
An important issue that emerged during the course of personal interview with informants, 
especially those from NGOs, was that they would not discuss certain issues, as much as they may 
have wanted to, for fear that such discussion might lead to actual violence. It was surprising to 
discover that they feared not only government repression, but also their own employers, who, they 
felt might terminate their contract if they were to say something critical about their organisations. 
In light of such concerns, the researcher opted to follow up with interview partners and focus group 
participants informally, in settings where they felt safe to talk further. Data was thus generated on 
both conflicts within NGOs, and government-NGO relations.   
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1.2.4.5. Forms of Observation  
The researcher spent eight months in total undertaking the two fieldworks, observing many issues 
of relevance to the study. In the early phase of the fieldworks, each of the archivists assigned to 
assist the researcher assumed that the period of archive work would be brief, thus instructing the 
researcher to take notes and promptly return materials. The researcher, however, anticipated that 
much more time would be needed to complete this phase of the research. Sourcing and processing 
materials was also time-consuming, and the archivists themselves noted the difficulties involved 
in locating relevant sources. After the sources were found, the next step was to photocopy them, 
but even this required negotiation with those officials responsible. Gaining permission to copy and 
scan sources was dependent on the discretion and cooperation of particular individuals. So, for 
example, while CCRDA staff worked according to the principle that researchers were free to use 
the data as long as it was to be used for academic purposes only, and the fact that there was a 
commercial copy shop within the CCRDA compound meant that scanning and copying of the 
documents started easily enough, soon a person who was in charge of managing documents 
announced rather arbitrarily that “many” documents had now copied, and there should be a limit 
to it. In the course of the negotiation that followed, the researcher realised that their intervention 
was driven by an underlying motivation, exemplifying the typically high regard in which current 
employees and leaders of NGOs seem to hold to the founders of the NGO they work for. This 
person, for instance, stated that she and the entire staff of CCRDA were grateful for the 
“achievements” of the founders of the organisation, and that the archival “treasures” they had left 
behind were testimonies to these “achievements”. Accordingly, these testimonies were to be 
protected, and it was feared that moving them might cause damage. This conviction was strongest 
within ASE, whose leadership and employees seem truly fascinated by the dedication with which 
the founders had built up the organisation, and the ideals which, they argued, still inform their own 
current actions.  
Eventually, after senior officials and friends intervened, the archivest of CCRDA withdrew her 
objection. The researcher’s personal friendship with officials and employees of ASE was an aid to 
gaining access to ASE archival materials, including historical documents and photos that long-
serving individuals of the organisations had collected themselves, which they copied for the 
researcher with their own, ASE photocopy machine. Perhaps most importantly, permission for 
copying and scanning archival sources outside of the organisation was granted.  As with ASE and 
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CCRDA, staff and officials of Oxfam are generally proud of what Oxfam has done. As a result, 
they welcomed this research, and, after the relevant archival materials were identified, the 
researcher asked for permission to copy them. All the materials were copied and returned to the 
organisation on time.  
The archivists of governmental organisations were quite inflexible. Use of the archives of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the National Archive and Library Agency and Institute of Ethiopian 
Studies is subject to heavy restrictions. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has a regulation stating 
that while researchers may review its archives and take notes of their own, they are not allowed to 
copy them. The same is true with the Archive and Library of the Institute of Ethiopian Studies. The 
situation at the National Archive and Library Agency was better than at those two organisations, 
allowing researchers to copy up to ten pages per each of their folders. The problem with this was 
that the files in a folder sometimes discuss a sequence of events related to the same issue, thus 
running for far more than ten pages.   
1.2.5. Data Analysis   
The data collected were analysed qualitatively. The analysis is made in a way that emphasise 
contexts in which NGOs have operated. Detailed dsscriptions of contexts drawn from the sources 
are put in a chronological framework to show changes and continuity of the tope under discussion.  
1.3. Theoretical Perspective 
The 1990s saw a growth of writing about development NGOs in developing countries. Many 
conferences have also been convened as a result of the new spotlight focused on NGOs40.  
Much of this work tended to present a fairly positive picture of the work NGOs were doing, and 
was often written by people directly involved with, or symphathethic to, the world of NGOs41. 
Many of the studies attempted to address same research questions such as what type of support, 
what type of project and what type of organization will achieve particular development 
objectives42. This implies that NGOs have been associated more with development practice than 
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with development theory43. Neubert called this the “limitation of perspectives in development 
policy”44. As Neubert pointed out further “The problem of the current research on NGOs is the 
orientation towards implementation theory and questions of effectiveness and efficiency”45.  
In an effort to have broader perspective, it is essencial to view NGOs in relation to the state, donors 
and project participants. In Ethiopia where this research was conducted, there has been a century 
long interaction between NGOs on the one hand and the state, donors and project participants on 
the other hand. These interactions need to be understood with reference to the broad trends in the 
evolution of thinking about development. NGOs and a variety of actors have shared development 
vision. Many NGOs in Ethiopia have aspired for the alleviation of poverty. Others have envisaged 
a situation where communities enjoy the full spectrum of human rights. These visions are not too 
distant from those of various forms of government in Ethiopia during this period, although official 
discourses on human rights are only a recent phenomenon. However, there have always been clear 
differences between governmental actors and NGOs with regard to their strategic preferences on 
how to achieve “development”.  
The actor-oriented perspective formulated by Norman Long offered usefull analythical principles 
to understand the interface between NGOs and a variety of actors over a range of issues such as 
resources, meaning, institutional letimacy and control. On the basis of data obtained from some 
African and Latin American countries, Norman Long asserted that all forms of intervention 
necessarily enter the existing life worlds of the individuals and social groups concerned, and in this 
way these are mediated and transformed by these same actors and structures46.  
NGO intervention models, policy measures or rhetoric are locked in an arena in which they 
establish a multi-level relationship with a variety of actors. On the one side, NGOs deal with 
Western donors, on whom they depend for support; on the other they must deal with government 
officials who feel threatened by their activities and who may be competing with them for legitimacy 
and/or funding. Jim Igoe and Tim Kelsall have described the difficult situation of NGOs in Africa 
as being that of “between a rock and hard place”47. 
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Actor-oriented theory offeres useful concepts as to whether NGOs process information and devise 
strategies in dealing with local actors and outside institutions and personnel or they just submit to 
the interest of dominant actors. One of these concepts is agency. Agency attributes to the individual 
actor “knowledgeability” and “capability” to attempt to solve problems, learn how to intervene in 
the flow of social events around them, and, to a degree, monitor their own actions, observing how 
others react to their behaviours and taking note of the various contingent circumstances48.      
Many NGOs in Africa, whether headquartered abroad or within Africa, have significant allies and 
resources for influencing African citizens and bargaining with African states. Their economic clout 
alone makes NGOs important actors in African States49. However, the agency of NGOs hardly 
exists in a vacuum; its presence/absence is measured in the characters of other actors. As such, the 
agency of NGOs is created, transferred and lost depending on the contexts in which they operate50 
1.4. The social, economic and political context of Ethiopia  
Ethiopia is a country located in the Horn of Africa with an area of 1,127,127 sq.km51. With nearly 
100 million inhabitatnts, Ethiopia is the second most populous country in Africa next to Nigeria52. 
The population of Ethiopia grew at an average annual rate of 2.6% between 1994 and 2007 and 
45% of the population is under age 1553. The population of Ethiopia is composed of eighty diverse 
ethno-linguistic groups that live in diverse agro-ecological zones54.  
1.4.1. Socio-economic context 
NGOs have operated in Ethiopia to deal with poverty that resulted from poor economic 
performance and lack of development. Ethiopia is one of the poorest countries in the world, with a 
per capita annual income of about US$ 380 in 2010 despite high GDP growth (10.8 percent and 
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8.8 percent in 2008 and 2009 respectively). In 2005 39% and 77.5% of the population was living 
below $ 1.25 a day and $ 2 a day respectively; i.e. below the international poverty line55.  
The Ethiopian economy is based on agriculture. Agriculture constitutes 43% of GDP in the year 
2007/08 while the service sector and industry account for 44% and 13% of the GDP respectively56. 
Partly because of the recognition that agriculture is the mainstay of the economy and partly due to 
the commitmen to assist poor house-holders in rural areas, NGOs prioritised agricultural and rural 
development. For instance, in 2000 alone, NGOs allocated 47% of their resources on agricultural 
and rural development programmes in Ethiopia57.    
In fact, it is not only NGOs but also successive governments of Ethiopia have worked hard on 
agriculture since the 1960s to increase productivity. However, there has never been major 
breakthrough in this regard. Conversely, crop production fluctuates widely according to rainfall 
patterns, leaving the country subject to recurrent and often catastrophic drought and famine. 
Present-day Ethiopia, largely identified with widespread food insecurity, was self-sufficient and 
classified as a net exporter of food grains up to the late 1950s. The annual export of grains to the 
world market rose to the extent of 150,000 metric tons in 1947/48. On the strength of its natural 
resources, many used to refer to the country as a potential bread basket for the sub-region58. 
However, especially since the early 1960s, food production has failed to meet even domestic 
demand and the country has relied on food aid and commercial imports. In any one year, more than 
4 million people on average face food shortages and need relief assistance. The nutritional status 
of the population has continued to deteriorate. General malnutrition increased from about 37% in 
1983 to a high of 47% in 1992. The average per capita calorie consumption rate is below the 
recommended minimum59.   
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1.4.2. Political context 
Excepting the brief period of Italian Occupation (1935–1941), Ethiopia has remained independent 
from colonialism. Thus, the Ethiopian idea of statehood is not derived from colonialism as may be 
the case in some African countries60.  
Home-grown statehood had profound implication on NGOs as the state took controlling NGOs as 
part of the effort to defend the Ethiopian sovereignty. Moreover, political centralism that remained 
a hallmark of the Ethiopian state system has left little room in which NGOs have operated. 
Monarchs and their entourage rigidly controlled the political and economic structures of the state 
until the Ethiopian revolution of 1974. Junior military and non-commissioned officers usurped 
power in the midst of the Revolution of 1974. The Derg accepted socialism as the only ideology 
to shape state and society61. 
Ethiopia’s long history as a monarchy and its subjugation by a brutal and doctrinaire Marxist 
regime left most structures of civil society stunted. Ideed, by the time the military government 
collapsed in May 1991, virtually civil society entities had been coopted or barred from meaningful 
existence by the regime62.   
The 1990s saw the resurgenc of civil society entities of which NGOs have been the most visible 
part. The Ethiopia People Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) defeated the military 
government in May 1991 and ratified a new constitution in 1994 and created nine and two city 
administrations that shared a great deal of legislative, executive and judiciary powers with the the 
central government. By any measurement, these progrsses visible since 1991 laid the foundations 
that made NGOs vibrant and active in the nation’s political and economic rivitalisation. This was 
particularly true with national NGOs63.    
However, not only changes but also continuities marked the political development since 1990s. 
The process in which elections were held as well as the results was always controvercial. This was 
particularly true in 2005 elections when opposition parties performed very well, but they accused 
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the ruling party for vote rigging. In the violence that followed, close to 200 people were killed, 
thousands were injured and put in jail. A series of measures that the government introduced 
thereafter are indicative of reversal of progresses that the country witnessed since 1991. One of 
these measures is the promuligation of the Ethiopian Charity and Society Proclamation. NGOs 
state that this proclamation restricts their advocacy to bring about meaningful change in the 
political and economic life of the people64.     
1.5. Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs): An Overview  
The magnitude of poverty in countries like Ethiopia has been beyond the capacity of state actors. 
This has caused the exstablishment of non-state actors that could complement efforts of state actors. 
Non-state actors could be numerous in a country and are different in objectives and the forms of 
organisation. NGOs have their own characterstics that distinguish them from other forms of 
organisations. This sub-section presents an operational definition of NGO. It also overviews the 
emergency of NGOs in both developed and developing countries. This is to show that the 
emergences of NGOs in Ethiopia that will be discussed in this work are not a unique phonemena.           
1.5.1. Defining NGO 
Providing one standard definition of NGOs is difficult. This is due mainly to the diversity of their 
purpose, interests and ideologies65. Scholars have defined NGOs differently depending on which 
issues they have wanted to address. Broadly speaking, they have defined NGOs in line with two 
major approaches. The first, which could be called a general approach, assumes that there exist two 
power groups in any society, namely governmental and non-governmental organisations. Thus, any 
organisation that exists outside of the government could be referred to as a non-governmental 
organisation. For instance, M. Padron has defined NGOs as all organisations located outside the 
state’s domain and the structure of government66.  
Defining NGOs as organisations existing outside the government has a major limitation in that the 
universe of non-governmental activities is so wide, large and all-inclusive. In fact, any form of 
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contact or relationship with the wider society and/or environment outside of the state, whether in 
developed or developing countries, could be called a non-governmental activity67. 
There is also an established concept, that of the third sector, that assists in the effort to define 
NGOs. Third sector defines NGOs as distinct not only from the state, but also from businesses and 
corporations whose major orientations and activities are predicated on profit motives 68 . But 
describing NGOs as third sector still does not tell us what they are. This is because the third sector, 
otherwise called civil society, also involves a variety of organisations other than NGOs. The nature 
and purpose of these organisations differs significantly from place to place. Dessalegn Rahmeto 
tells us that four broad groups of organisations form civil society in Ethiopia. These are NGOs and 
advocacy organisations (rights-based institutions, institutions committed to the protection of the 
environment, wildlife, etc.), interest group institutions (professional societies, trade unions, 
cooperatives, chambers of commerce, employers associations) and cultural societies (including 
community organisations)69. Dessalegn tells us further that these organisations are autonomous, 
voluntary organisations that provide services to individuals and articulate public interests. As 
intermediaries between the state on the one hand and the society at large on the other, civil society 
institutions bring forward demands on the state for goods and services, promote the broad interest 
of their constituencies and help extend the social space between the state and the individuals70. 
When mentioned in this study, civil society organisations mean organisations with these attributes. 
However, one of the limitations of the classification of civil society organisations is that it does not 
define with precision each of these groups of organisations that together constitute civil society 
organisations. 
As civil society organisations, NGOs have their own unique features. Based upon these features, 
we might discern an operational definition of NGO. One of these distinctions is the characteristics 
of beneficiaries. According to Freyold, NGOs are those organisations whose goods and services 
are targeted at non-members. This distinguishes NGOs from a number of other civil society 
organisations (e.g., the interest group institutions mentioned above, self-help organisations)71. As 
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shown by Dessalegn, their field of action, such as that of human rights, can serve to distinguish 
between NGOs and other civil society organisations such as advocacy organisations. It is not, 
however, entirely useful in this study to use fields of action as a criteria by which to divide 
organisations into NGOs and rights groups. As Dieter Neubert tells us (staying with the example 
of advocacy), NGOs might also advocate non-organisational member’s interests72. Indeed, as will 
be shown in this study, over the last few decades, NGOs in Ethiopia have shifted from delivering 
goods and services to acting as advocates for the public interest.  Ultimately, this researcher has 
settled upon using the term NGOs here as defined by Sarah Michael in her study of NGOs in Africa. 
Michael states that NGOs are:  
Development actors existing apart from government and corporations, operating on non-profit or 
not for profit basis with an emphasis on voluntarism, and pursuing a mandate of providing 
development services, undertaking communal development work or advocating on development 
issues73.      
Even assuming a minimum criterion of voluntariness, non-profit, charitable status, different 
organisations with different objectives and purposes could fall into the NGO category. In order to 
encourage the study of NGOs, a number of useful attempts have been made by a number of scholars 
to further classify NGOs based on a number of criteria. Bratton has suggested classifying NGOs 
according to a number of attributes such as size (big, medium, small); origin (national, 
international); behaviour pattern (regime-conforming, regime-critical); central activity 
(relief/welfare, development); and orientation (secular, ecumenical)74. In this study, a distinction 
is made whenever necessary between NGOs of different origins, specifically between national and 
international NGOs and between religious and secular NGOs. 
1.5.2. The NGO Phenomenon 
Charity, as the social response to vulnerable groups, has existed across millennia. NGOs are 
organisations that assist vulnerable groups to tackle their problems. Thus, NGOs as we know them 
today are modern forms of charity. The institution of NGOs is regularly presented as something 
new, active in the 1960s, linked to a new post-colonial order and rejecting older structures of power. 
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In reality, however, the NGO sector active in the 1960s forms part of a long continuum of the relief 
of poverty that stretches back into history75.   
NGOs showed up first in the developed world. Tegegne Teka identifies three phases of NGO 
formation that are important to observe here. The first phase was marked by the emergence of 
NGOs driven by religious and ethical factors in various regions of the developed countries prior to 
the outbreak of the First World War. Their religious and ethical philosophy was mainly 
Christianity, and as such they stood for, among other things, the equality of human beings in the 
eyes of God; helping the weak, the needy and the disabled, etc. This attitude has been a constant 
amongst faith-based NGOs and it still exists today76.  
Mikael Jennings argues that the origins of modern NGOs lie in the 19th century, starting with the 
formation of the World Alliance of the Young Men’s Christian Association, established in 1855. 
Jennings also states that the Japanese Society of Gratitude, established in 1929, may be considered 
a forerunner of the NGO movement. In the following decades, the formation of NGOs became an 
accepted tradition in different parts of the developed world. By the end of the 19th century, about 
130 international NGOs existed77.  
The second phase of NGO formation was what Tegegn has called the era of relief, welfare and 
philanthropic organisations that came into being in the context of the First and Second World Wars. 
Especially, the immediate aftermath of the Second World War was a landmark in this regard. The 
war’s massive dislocation and destruction transcended the reparative capacities of states, leading 
to a rapid proliferation of NGOs whose stated goal was to extend support and assistance to people 
in need78. Christian Aid and Oxfam GB were founded in the early 1940s to provide relief, initially 
for Greece, and expanded their mandates in the aftermath of the war. Care was founded in 1946 to 
send food aid to post-war Europe. World Vision was established during the Korean War of the 
early 1950s. Concern had its roots in the Nigerian Civil War79.  
For most modern NGOs the shift from relief of suffering to “developmental” objectives occurred 
in the 1960s. This marked the beginning of the third phase of NGO formation. John F. Kennedy’s 
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announcement of the first Decade of Development signalled a transformation of the voluntary aid 
industry. During the 1960s and 1970s NGOs in the developed world gradually turned away from 
their origins in relief (in rhetoric and intention, if not always in practice) towards a focus on 
development80.Concurrently, the place of advocacy and campaigning began to assume greater 
importance. The NGO sector was influenced by not only broad trends in international development 
and the realities in the field, but also by the social movements that emerged in the 1960s and 1970s: 
liberation theology and conscientisation in Latin America, Ujjama and Pan Africanism in Africa, 
the peace and civil rights movements in North America, and the growth of radical institutions, 
publications and politics in Europe81.    
1.5.3. NGOs in Africa 
NGOs emerged in Africa in the context of struggles for independence. In the next decade, these 
nascent NGOs suffered the impact of various types of undemocratic regime,82 while at the same 
time, many African countries saw a drop off in public services that came with the withdrawal of 
colonial powers, whereafter the capacity of African states to provide services was greatly 
diminished in the period that followed independence. In many of the newly independent countries, 
expatriate Church organisations and missionary societies tried to bridge the gap by running schools, 
hospitals, vocational training centres, etc. To this end, they made use of their connections with 
philanthropic organisations and foundations in developed countries83. 
The coming of international NGOs to work in Africa provided some local initiatives with the 
incentive to establish NGOs by imitation. The adoption of multiparty democracy in the 1990s, the 
downsizing of the role of the state together with economic liberalisation and privatisation policies 
also prepared the ground for the rapid growth of NGOs, both in number and function. Structural 
Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) that the World Bank and the International Monitory Fund 
imposed on African countries as part of the liberalisation programme resulted in the retrenchment 
of a huge labour force. In addition, social and economic stress was experienced by many families. 
The number of national NGOs increased following these events. This increase occurred partly to 
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deal with these negative consequences of programmes such as SAP and partly due to the growing 
interest of donor organisations to work with national NGOs84.  
1.6. Conclusions 
NGOs should be taken taken as actors in that they could influence a variety of actors as much as 
they are influenced by the same actors. Ideals of NGOs and their translations into actions have been 
shaped by their interactions with donors, national governments, and project participants. This 
evolving interaction that offered NGOs challenges and opportunities may be studied from a 
historical perspective. A historical approach has been deemed best suited to addressing the 
methodological challenge that arises from the diversity that exists between NGOs, and to 
contributing to the theoretical formulation about NGOs. In practical terms, it has been determined 
that this should be accomplished using a case study approach that allows for intensive investigation 
of inter-agency relationships between NGOs and diverse actors.  
The evolving interaction between NGOs and a variety of actors have had political and socio-
economic contexts. Ethiopia is now one of the poorest countries in the world in that its per capita 
income has been one of the lowest in the world, and its agriculture that remains the backbone of 
the economy has been dependent on rain. As a result, the country has remained vulnerable to 
periodic food insecurity.  
The vulnerability of the economy and the recognition of state actors that they alone could not tackle 
poverty set the context in which NGOs in Ethiopia, as elsewhere in the developing countries, 
emerged and operated. However, centralisation of power that defines the Ethiopian politics cast its 
long shadow on the performance of NGOs. Thus, centralisation of power is to be taken into account 
while we try to understand articulation of NGO development visions as well as translating them 
into actions. In doing so, “knowledgeability” and “capability” are to be attributed not only to 
dominant actors such as the state but also to NGOs. Actor-oriented theory of Norman Long offers 
useful analythical principles in understanding the agency of actors (in this case NGOs) even in the 
most difficult circumstances such as that of centralization of power and authority.       
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Chapter Two  
Actors and their aspirations 
2.1. Introduction 
Ethiopia is a textbook example of structural poverty that has left the majority of the people in abject 
misery, hunger and backwardness. This has been particularly pronounced since the mid-twentieth 
century as the country has been recurrently hit by severe droughts and famines. A number of actors 
have been involved in attempts to tackle the problem, and efforts to ameliorate the conditions of 
Ethiopians have been underway since the 1960s. Governments have been the major actors in the 
fight against poverty, while NGOs have been the second most, operating alongside with 
government organisations (GOs). As a result, there have been continuous interactions between 
NGOs and GOs. Donors are the third most significant actors, influencing both GOs and NGOs. 
This chapter first identifies actors involved in the activities of NGOs in Ethiopia and discusses the 
interplay between aspirations of NGOs on the one hand and that of other actors on the other.    
2.2. State actors  
NGOs define themselves in relation to the governments they interact with. This is because, as Clark 
remarked, NGOs can, “….oppose, complement or reform the state but they can’t avoid it”85. This 
implies that state has influence on NGOs and their activities and thus it is identified as one of the 
actors NGOs interplay with. However, state is not a monolithic and cohesive entity and can’t easily 
be understood without referring to the roles and activities of a broader set of non-state actors86. 
Thus, state actors must be understood to have been, effectively, more than one actor, given regime 
change, the plurality of governmental organisations and the diverse programme that NGOs 
managed. 
The governmental organisations in Ethiopia that interact with NGOs have existed since the end of 
the Italian Occupation in 1941. Decree No 3, 1943 designated the types of governmental 
organisation that would supervise the registration and activities of NGOs. The decree established 
a committee comprising the Ministries of Education and Fine Arts, Interior and Foreign Affairs 
were represented87.  
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The institutional arrangement reflects two major concerns of the imperial government. Firstly, the 
inclusion the Ministry of Education into the committee mentioned above to supervise NGOs 
running educational programmes shows that education was a top priority of the country. Secondly, 
the representation of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Interior attests to the fact that security 
was accorded primacy over and above any other consideration. Although the way in which it 
evolved is not clear, what is today the International Organisations Affairs Directorate General of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs began to investigate the backgrounds of NGOs before they were 
certified to start operation in Ethiopia88. Via its missions abroad, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
undertook to investigate the histories of those international NGOs seeking to operate in Ethiopia 
and presented its recommendations to the Ministry of Interior, which based its decisions on whether 
or not to register particular NGOs on these recommendations. The Ministry of Interior used to 
register and oversee all forms of associations in the country as part of its broader mandate, and not 
just NGOs alone. The Ministry of Interior then had jurisdiction over the entire administration and 
security of Ethiopia. The Ministry’s Public Security Department held this earliest mandate to 
register and oversee the activities of those numerous associations in the country, including NGOs. 
In 1960, this mandate was given specific legal support through the promulgation of the Civil Code 
of the Imperial of Ethiopia89.  
During the imperial regime that came to an end in 1974, the organisations created to register NGOs 
and oversee their activities were under the influence of the monarch and the Ministry of Pen, to 
both of whom NGOs would turn whenever they had unsettled questions, according to the hierarchy 
within the imperial state system90.      
Certainly, the earliest institutional arrangement outlined above was not responsive to the diverse 
programmes NGOs were running in the country. As time went on, a number of governmental 
organisations emerged to work with NGOs. Four different phases can be discerned. During the first 
phase that started in the early 1960s, the Ministry of Agriculture became chief actor interacting 
with NGOs. The Ministry was set up in 194391. Although charged with a great number of functions, 
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it was initially provided with limited resources and staff. In the 1950s and 1960s, however, it 
expanded, in part due to aid received from bilateral and multilateral aid organisations which helped 
train research and manpower92.  
Decentralising reforms in 1963 and 1964 led to the establishment of regional agricultural offices, 
each headed by a provincial officer who supervised the ministry’s activities in the area and its field 
agents. Occasionally, there were disputes with regard to the control of agricultural activities in the 
provinces. While the Ministry of Agriculture claimed to have mandate over technical matters, the 
provincial administrators argued that they had control over overall activities in their respective 
territories. In these disputes, provincial administrators used to win the argument, largely because 
they were closely tied with the Ministry of Interior, the most powerful ministry during the imperial 
period. This contestation gave NGOs the chance to choose which of the Ministry of Agriculture 
and the provincial organisations they wanted to work with93.            
During the second phase that coincided with the emergence of the famine in 1973-74, the Relief 
and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) was set up and came to exercise a great deal of authority 
over NGOs. One of the reasons for this was that RRC was led by a prominent Ethiopian, Ato 
Shimeles Adugna who successively won the confidence of the monarch and his prime minister 
during the imperial period, and that of heads of state such as General Aman Andom Michael, 
General Teferi Benti and Megistu Haile Mariam during the military period94. This gave the RRC 
the opportunity to influence the Public Security Department of the Ministry of Interior. The RRC 
used to issue travel permits to NGOs’ representatives; these were sensitive during the entire period 
of the military government, due to ongoing wars in the country95.  
From the early 1980s on, the central government had a quarrel with the RRC blaming its 
distribution of free food rations for encouraging people to be dependent. This marked the beginning 
of the interference of the central government into the affairs of the RRC96. From this point onwards, 
the RRC no longer remained a semi-autonomous professional organisation as it was staffed by key 
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party officials, and became one of the major actors leading controversial projects such as forced 
relocation of people from food-insecure areas to areas that could produce agricultural surplus97.        
During the third phase, a number of technical governmental organisations came to play an active 
role in NGOs’ activities. The RRC lacked the technical expertise to oversee diverse NGO activities. 
As a result, the Ministries of Agriculture, Health and the National Water Resources Commission 
came to play an active part in their areas of competence, especially after the famine that occurred 
in 1983-84. However, NGOs continued to deal with the RRC, both formally and informally, as it 
was still one of the signatories to the project agreements that NGOs and technical organisations 
had to sign98.  
The competition between technical governmental organisations on the one hand, and the RRC on 
the other was quite visible during and after the 1980s famine period. Many governmental 
organisations wanted to become counterparts to NGOs, not really because of their concern to tackle 
rural poverty but rather due to their bureaucratic and organisational self-interest in growth and 
expansion. Those governmental organisations whose mandates included working on rural 
development tasks were entangled with complicated claims by legal and jurisdictional powers, their 
rivalries and conflicts over NGOs99. The conflict between the Ministry of Agriculture and the RRC 
over who had the right to oversee developmental NGOs in rural areas was the most pronounced of 
all. An evaluation conducted at the beginning of 1990 noted the rivalry between the RRC and the 
Ministry of Agriculture and foresaw that “One area which will continue to hinder development 
activity for NGOs is the continuing rivalry between government bureaucracy, particularly that 
between MoA [Ministry of Agriculture] and RRC”100. 
After a regime change in May 1991, the governmental organisations that had interacted with NGOs 
went through a profound restructuring process. To begin with, the former RRC went through a 
decentralisation process in 1995 and became the Disaster Prevention and Preparedness 
Commission. Moreover, the former Ministry of Interior was dissolved, and, through its 
Associations’ Registration Office, the Ministry of Justice took the mandate of the former Public 
Security Department. As a result, from the mid-1990s on, more than any other organisation, the 
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Associations’ Registration Office came to be one of the chief actors influencing the activities of 
NGOs until 2009 when a new agency, Ethiopian Charity and Society Agency was set up by the 
Ethiopian Charity and Society Proclamation (Proclamation No 625/2009).   
2.3. Non-state actors         
2.3.1. Foreign donors 
Ethiopia has been heavily dependent on foreign aid. The amount of aid flowing to Ethiopian has 
increased. The country received 0.01 billion US$ in 1960. In 2007, the volume grew to 1.181 billion 
US$101 . Similarly, the amount of money raised by NGOs has increased. From their humble 
beginnings in the 1960s, with small subsidies donated from individuals and organisations, NGOs 
are now able to source 20% of Ethiopia’s annual revenue from abroad102.  
Foreign donors have influenced successive governments and NGOs in Ethiopia. During the 
imperial period, the influence of the World Bank, USAID, and SIDA was considerable. These 
organisations exercised a great deal of influence on agricultural policy-making. This policy choice 
was informed by modernisation theory103. The second phase, which began with the collapse of the 
military government in 1991, witnessed a number of donors that later set up the Donors Assistance 
Groups (DAGs). DAGs pressurised the new government to liberalise the economy and society by 
adopting a number of measures such as regionalisation, decentralisation, etc104. From the mid-
1990s, members of DAGs served as intermediaries between NGOs and the Ethiopian government. 
This increased the profile and visibility of NGOs.  
The influence of donors on NGOs has also been significant. Most NGOs in Ethiopia mobilise 
resources from foreign donors. A number of scholars have argued that this dependency caused 
NGOs to drift from their founding visions. However, most donors recognise that NGOs sought 
autonomy to decide their policy. This stems from the assertiveness of NGOs themselves. There are 
NGOs that refuse to accept conditions set by donors. Oxfam, for instance, does not receive any 
assistance that it considers compromising to its internal policy105. This has partly to do with the 
capacity which Oxfam has to mobilise resources. Oxfam mobilises resources from three different 
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sources: donation from individuals, shops, and financial support from donors that share value with 
Oxfam 106 . Similarly, CCRDA depended mainly on the donations of churches and missions 
overseas until the beginning of 1990s. Avariety of donors who were enthusiastic about regime 
change in May 1991 increased their contribution to CCRDA.  However, these donors were large 
in number and different in policy and they lacked the consensus to impose a policy that CCRDA 
was to persue107.  
However, it is difficult to argue that NGOs were immune from the influences of donors. This is 
because there has been close partnership between NGOs and their donors. NOVIB from Holland 
and Evangelische Zentralstelle für Entwicklungshilfe (hereafter EZE) from Germany have 
remained important long-term partners of CCRDA and ASE. NOVIB had been actively supporting 
local initiatives in Ethiopia since the famine of 1973-74 in Ethiopia108, around the same time that 
EZE also started operating in Ethiopia109. The third most important actor that has influenced ASE 
was INADES-Formation. It was a Catholic NGO based in Abidjan in Ivory Coast. There was 
significant difference between INADES-Formation on the one hand and NOVIB and EZE on the 
other hand with regard to their notion of “development”110.             
2.3.2. NGOs in Ethiopia 
NGOs in Ethiopia have assumed a greater role and profile from the early 1990s. NGOs had, 
however, evolved in response to diverse influences within Ethiopia and outside of it. Daniel 
Sahleyesus identified six modes of NGO formation in Ethiopia. These are a) NGOs formed out of 
church and mission-related works; b) NGOs set up due to the personal, moral and/or religious 
motivations of their founder/s; c) NGOs formed as a response to a humanitarian crisis; d) NGOs 
set up due to donors’ policies that encouraged NGO formation; e) NGOs set up due to founder/s 
exposure to similar initiatives and; f) NGOs evolved from the relief and development wings of ex-
rebel movements and from current political parties111. In fact, these modes of NGOs formation are 
not exhaustive. For instance, a new generation of NGOs that have worked on policy advocacy and 
human rights has emerged in Ethiopia since the early 1990s.      
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The formation of NGOs in Ethiopia should be put in context. Although the idea of self-help is not 
strange to Ethiopian culture, the emergence of NGOs in a modern sense is a recent phenomenon, 
going back to the first quarter of the twentieth century. However, the humanitarian practice goes 
as far back as the spread of Christianity. Churches and missions pioneered the humanitarian 
practice in Ethiopia. The Ethiopian Orthodox Church has been taking care of people in need since 
its introduction in the 4th century112 . It was, however, only in the 1970s that the Church’s 
humanitarian effort took an organisational form. Concerned by the famine of the 1970s, in 1972 
the Church set up an NGO called the Development and Interchurch Aid Commission (DIDAC). 
DIDAC has currently focused on integrated rural development, food production, reforestation, 
water and health113. Likewise, Catholic missionaries started the earliest modern education project 
in Ethiopia in the 16th century114. This effort did not continue, however, due to the rebellion that 
erupted in response to the conversion of the monarch, Susenyos (1607–1632) to Roman 
Catholicism. As a result, the monarch abdicated in favour of his son, Fasiledos in 1632. The new 
monarch expelled foreigners from the country, marking the beginning of Ethiopia’s “closed door 
policy”115. The country only opened its door again to foreign influences in the 19th century, when 
large numbers of Catholic and Protestant missionaries started to promote welfare, education, 
health, and community development activities along with their main agenda, evangelisation116.   
A new generation of national NGOs emerged in the first quarter of the twentieth century. Members 
of the ruling class who had experienced exposure to the outside world set up NGOs. An important 
historical factor in this was the threat Italians posed to Ethiopian sovereignty. Worried by the threat 
of Italian invasion, some members of the political elite formed the Ethiopian Red Cross Society on 
July 8th, 1935 in preparation to relieve victims of the anticipated war117. In the same way, women 
members of the royal family set up two more NGOs: the Ethiopian Women’s Welfare Association 
and the Ethiopian Women’s Association for Good Work Service118.  
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After a quarter of a century had elapsed, a number of development-oriented NGOs emerged due to 
the rise of a professional class. Emerging graduates of high school and university believed that 
neither the government nor self-help systems could address poverty in the country. Thus, national 
NGOs began to help fill the perceived void119. These NGOs were of two types: philanthropic NGOs 
and single-issue development NGOs. The monarch himself pioneered the effort to set up 
philanthropic organisations. In 1955, he set up the Haile Selassie I Foundation to set an example 
that would encourage other well-to-do citizens to take as a model120. The emerging urban middle 
class such as teachers, civil servants, military officers and their spouses, politicians and artists duly 
modelled their organisations on that of the Haile Selassie I Foundation121. Though they did not 
have regular income of their own, students who later played a significant role in the socio-economic 
and political lives of the country also pooled their pocket money to relieve destitutes. The 
Association for the Destitute set up in 1964 by a group of high school students is an example of 
this group of NGOs. These students started by relieving those destitute patients waiting their turn 
to be admitted for medical treatment by St. Paul Hospital by providing tea in the evening122. This 
effort evolved into an NGO that came to have legal status in 1964123. Single-issue NGOs included 
the Family Guidance Association of Ethiopia (FGAE) and Agri-Service Ethiopia, both of which 
were set up in 1969124.  
The two famines that occurred in 1973–1974 and 1983–1984 attracted international NGOs in large 
number. Impressed by the number of international NGOs operating in the country, Kurt Janson, 
the United Nations Assistant Secretary General for Emergency Operations in Ethiopia has 
remarked that, “For a Marxist government to permit so many Western NGOs to function in all parts 
of the country was highly unusual”125. Although international NGOs were much more visible, 
Ethiopians who were shocked by the two famines also set up NGOs. The earliest of these was the 
Haile Selassie I University Famine Relief Committee that was set up in 1973 by faculty members 
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of the Haile Selassie I University126. Other Ethiopians in private business and civil service also set 
up NGOs of one kind or another to deal with the recurrence of disasters throughout the 1980s127.  
The relative liberalism that followed the collapse of the military government and the rise of donor 
support encouraged citizens to set up various forms of NGO in the country128. While those NGOs 
set up earlier were still operational, dealing with emergency situations that occurred following the 
fall of the military government, three new types of NGOs emerged in the 1990s. The first group 
was NGOs that aspired to defend human and democratic rights. The earliest of these were set up 
by vocal critics of the government and lawyers. The Ethiopian Human Right Council is the case in 
point. The Ethiopian Women Lawyers Association was also part of this group of NGOs129. This 
group of NGOs was much more visible from the late 1990s due to donor mediation that came about 
as part of the liberalisation process130 . The second group of NGOs was policy research and 
advocacy organizations. The Ethiopian Economic Association sat up in 1992 was a pioneer in this 
regard. This was followed by the Forum for Social Studies (FSS) that was registered by the 
Ministry of Justice in 1998. The FSS organised public debates based on research findings on 
development, gender, education etc. The third group of NGOs came into existence out of the 
concerns of the government. Concerned especially by the rise of human rights NGOs, the 
government set up pro-government NGOs. Firstly, the former relief organisations of rebel 
movements such as Relief Society of Tigray, the Oromo Relief Organisation, the Ethiopian Relief 
Association (later the Amhara Relief Development Association) were promoted into NGOs131. 
Secondly, the government created ethnically-based development associations in different parts of 
the country such as the Amhara Development Association, the Tigray Development Association, 
and the Oromo Development Association etc132.  
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2.3.2.1 Origins of the selected NGOs in Ethiopia 
The earliest development discourse and practice of the 1960s and the food crisis in Ethiopia of the 
1970s set the contexts in which Agri-Service Ethiopia (ASE), the Consortium of Christian Relief 
and Development Association (CCRDA) and Oxfam GB emerged.  
Inspired by the ongoing development discourse and practices in the country, two groups of actors 
set up ASE in 1969. Expatriate teachers who were affiliated to the Catholic Church constituted one 
group of actors. Fr. Henry Ravain, a French Catholic priest acted as chief spokesperson of this 
group of actors. He had compared the living conditions in rural Ethiopia with those in France where 
he was born, with French Catholics in Addis Ababa, Nazareth and Paris. They had reached an 
agreement that the living conditions in rural Ethiopia were morally unacceptable and that efforts 
should be made to improve them133. In doing so, this group of actors gave up their personal luxury 
and comfort. Concerning their commitment, one of the founders explained that “…our desire was 
to be– to make ourselves humus of the indigenous growth of the rural population” 134 . The 
commitment of this group of individuals surprised even their own close relatives back home, who 
would to tell Ethiopians studying in France that the founders of ASE were much more concerned 
about Ethiopian poverty than the founders’ concern about their own country 135 . Ethiopians 
themselves had deep appreciation for this group of individuals. In 2009, one of the founders of 
ASE, Fr. Henry Ravain, passed away. When the news about his death was heard, ASE issued a 
summary of his biography that described the extent to which he was appreciated by Ethiopians, 
part of which stated that:   
ኣባ ሄነሪ ራቫን በተማሪወቻቸው በስራ ባልደረቦቻቸው በኢትዮጵያና ውጪ ባፈርዋቸው ወዳጆች ዘንድ ለኢትዮጵያና 
ለህዝቦችዋ በነበራቸው አድናቆትና አክብሮት ለታሪኳና ባህሏ በነበራቸው ጥልቅ እውቀት እንዲሁም ለሰወች ሁሉ ባሳዩት 
ፍቅር ደግነትና መልካም አርዐያነት እንዲሁም በመለካም መንገድ አመላካችነታቸው ሲታወሱ ይኖራሉ ። 
Fr. Henry is remembered forever by his students, friends, and colleagues in and out of Ethiopia 
for his respect and appreciation for Ethiopia and its people as well as for his profound knowledge 
about their histories and cultures and for the love, humility he showed throughout his life as well 
as for the exemplary job he did and for his readiness to show the right direction136    
The founders of ASE grew up with, and lived by Christian values. Some of them were priests 
affiliated to the Catholic Church137. However, they did not intend to place their initiative to deal 
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with poverty under the auspices of the Catholic Church. The first project agreement, signed on June 
1st, 1969 stipulated that the project would operate autonomously, detached from the Catholic 
Church138 . Two factors explain this decision. The protagonists intended to pursue their own 
development approach with a view to dealing with what they called “social evils”. More 
specifically, they were concerned about the perception of peasants in Ethiopia of their own 
potential to improve their socio-economic status. Concerning this problem, an earliest source tells 
us that “Experience shows us every day to what extent peasants underestimate themselves and 
easily take refuge in fatalism”139. The founders of ASE intended to address this social problem in 
order to tackle the challenges of poverty. To that end, they aspired for organisational autonomy 
that would avert the influence of the Catholic Church. Secondly, the founders of ASE were 
concerned that putting ASE under the influence of the Catholic Church would create an impression 
that ASE only stood to assist poor Catholic people140. This was partly informed by the bitter 
memories Ethiopians held about Catholicism. As Alemayehu rightly states, “…the civil war which 
[had been]…caused by the [Catholic] missionaries [in the 17th century]… inculcated hatred in the 
minds of the Ethiopians”141.     
The second group of actors that played an active part in the formation of ASE was senior politicians 
of the imperial government. They were part of the progressive group within the imperial state 
system. Two officials in particular played an active part with regard to the formation of ASE. The 
first one was Däjjazmač Girmachew Tekle Hawariat who was then Minister of Agriculture. He 
was appreciated by university students in favour of radical political change for his critical stance 
towards the government. While the Ethiopian revolution was underway, the minister was 
approached by a group of revolutionaries. The point he raised in the discussion shows his alienation 
from the imperial government in consequence. He asked them, “Do you [revolutionaries] know 
what a maid-wife is? She is a woman in traditional Ethiopia who at certain time acts as a wife of a 
man, and at other times is treated like his maid. That is me”142 . In his ministerial capacity, 
Däjjazmač Girmachew invited development organisations from abroad to come and complement 
efforts underway in the country. In 1965, he invited a French Catholic NGO called Institut Africain 
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Pour le Développment Economique et Social-Centre Africain de Formation (INADES-Formation) 
to run the same rural educational programme on offer in other Francophone countries in Ethiopia. 
Sometime before he made this invitation, the founders of ASE had already established a 
relationship with INADES-Formation; INADES-Formation influenced the founders of ASE in a 
number of ways, including their formulation of similar visions and modality of development143. 
The invitation of the minister, however, consolidated this relationship and the interest that he 
showed created a situation whereby ASE easily gained legal recognition. This was because the 
Minister of Agriculture served as an intermediary between the founders of ASE and senior 
government officials including the monarch. The monarch was fully convinced that ASE could 
assist peasants to improve their living condition. Concerning this, one of the founders of ASE 
himself said that ASE was established on, “June 6, 1969 at the feet of H.M. [His Majesty] Haile 
Selassie I”144. The approval of the monarch was formalised by the Ministry of Interior on December 
24, 1969 when ASE was given legal certificate145.   
The governor of Wollaita, Däjjazmač Wolde Semait, was the other senior government official who 
influenced ASE. There had been duplication of effort between the provincial administration in 
Wollaita province and the Catholic Church which the founders of ASE were affiliated to. For 
instance, once the administration had built a school nearby the Catholic school where Fr. Henry, 
one of the founders of ASE was teaching. Fr. Henry argued with the Wollaita administrator, saying 
that in a country like Ethiopia where many people had no access to education, it was not fair to run 
two schools in the same locality. The administrator advised Fr. Henry to incorporate agricultural 
courses to teach not only the youths but also the peasants. This changed the career of the founders 
of ASE. The former teachers of the Catholic School in Wollaita now started agricultural courses, 
evolving gradually into an NGO called ASE that stood for “…the social and economic 
advancement of the rural poor”146.  
The cooperation that government officials showed the founders of ASE also had a broader 
explanation that went back to the Italian Occupation (1935–1941). The Italians had decimated 
educated Ethiopians especially after an attempt was made to kill the Italian Viceroy, Marshal 
Graziani, in Addis Ababa in 1937. Restored in 1941, the government started pursuing a policy that 
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encouraged NGOs, especially to launch educational programmes to satisfy the new demand147. 
This resulted in a number of NGOs many of which had religious origins148.  
When famine broke out in 1973–74, NGOs that had existed since the defeat of Italians started 
operating together under the umbrella of the Consortium of Christian Relief and Development 
Association (CCRDA). This was to deal with the looming famine. The idea to bring NGOs under 
the umbrella of CCRDA was informed by experiences from the Nigerian Civil War (1967–1970). 
Fr. Kevin Doheny, one of the Catholic priests who had been involved in a joint relief operation 
during the Nigerian Civil War proposed that NGOs should put collective actions in place to deal 
effectively with the famine in Ethiopia. Doheny wrote in his memoir that, “For me, it [Christian 
Relief Fund, the precursor of CCRDA] was an outgrowth of the Biafran [Nigerian civil] war. I 
would not have got the idea were it not for Biafra”149. 
The formation of CCRDA constituted a significant progress for and by NGOs in Ethiopia. For the 
first time, NGOs with diverse backgrounds came together for a common purpose. The founders 
were tied together by Christian values. Describing the role of Christianity, one of the earliest 
publications of the Association tells us that “…CRDA [CCRDA] is solidified by the basic Christian 
commitment to serve [the poor]”150. However, the leadership of CCRDA went to great lengths to 
make sure that religion would never intervene in the way CCRDA acted. This was because the 
founders were divided over the interpretation of Christianity and this influenced all the discussions 
held to set up CCRDA. Even after a consensus had been reached to set up CCRDA to coordinate 
the relief operation, a representative of the American Lutheran Mission rejected the idea of joint 
NGO operation. His justification was that the proposed organisation would be dominated by the 
Catholics and that this would undermine the religious freedom of its members151. Moreover, the 
Ethiopian Orthodox Church had from the start rejected the idea of creating an all-inclusive 
consortium152. However, Christianity was used as a means to mobilise resources. In a memo he 
circulated on October 9th 1985, the chairman of the Association told members that “…if we look 
at the roster of donors, they are church related organisations who see in CRDA [CCRDA] an 
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ecumenical experiment that is working” 153. It is, thus, possible to argue that although they were 
inspired by Christian values, representatives of 13 faith-based NGOs set up and sustained CCRDA 
to, “…relieve human suffering and improve the standard of living for the underprivileged people 
in Ethiopia”154.                    
The food crisis that brought NGOs under the umbrella of CCRDA also attracted international 
NGOs in large numbers. One of these was Oxfam GB. The origins of Oxfam GB go back to the 
Second World War. The Oxford Committee for Famine Relief (OCFR), the precursor of Oxfam 
GB, was set up by a handful of individuals including the Mayor of Oxford in October 1942 to 
rescue victims of the war in Greece155. From the early 1960s onwards, Oxfam expanded the scope 
of its operation and took on a global mandate156. Oxfam’s presence in Ethiopia goes back to the 
early 1960s and when the Ethiopian famine of 1973–1974 reached a critical stage, the organisation 
sent Mr. Toby Gooch to open an office in Ethiopia157.    
To sum up, NGOs were formed and evolved according to diverse influences within shifting 
national and international contexts. Individuals of good intentions together with state actors were 
involved in the formation of NGOs. Development visions that the founders of NGOs articulated 
confirm that even those NGOs whose formation was real due to Christian values were more 
preoccupied with tackling social concerns than spreading a particular religion.   
2.4. NGO visions of development and state  
2.4.1. Introduction  
NGOs are capable of articulating development visions. Concerning this, the President of the 
Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) has rightly said that “NGOs….have some 
very practical, as well as visionary virtues”158. This ability stems from the fact that NGO leaders 
have had access to education and information. Education and information give these leaders 
advantage to understand the environments in which they live and to develop strategies to change 
their environments159.  
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However, development visions are translated into actions within a given political environment. In 
Ethiopia, these visions have evolved through the imperial (collapse in 1974), the military (1974–
1991) and the current federal (since 1991) governments. These three forms of government have 
exercised varying degrees of control over public discussions on issues such as how to “do” 
development. Concerned by the repression of the governments, NGOs have usually confined their 
discussions within themselves. Oral narratives and archival transcripts show that NGOs had an 
intention to “empower” poor people to negotiate with governments. Conversely, the three forms of 
governments have invariably insisted that the function of NGOs is to carry out state development 
policy. However, there has been difference between the three forms of government. NGOs 
articulated their visions during the imperial period. The junior military and non-commissioned 
officers who seized power in the midst of the 1974 revolution stifled alternative model of 
development. In the face of this, NGOs drifted from their visions. In the 1990s, the leaderships of 
NGOs developed unprecedented assertiveness, not only in rearticulating development visions but 
also speaking openly about these visions. This resurgence is seen in relation to changing national 
and global contexts. Nationally, the military dictatorship was violently overthrown and a new 
government was set up in May 1991 on the basis of some liberal principles. Globally, the Soviot 
Camp scrumbled and a new form of relationship was established between the national government 
and Western donors. Motivated by the relative liberalism, the leaderships of NGOs in which 
Ethiopians were represented in large number came up with political visions.       
2.4.2. The roots of NGO visions and their opportunity in Ethiopia    
There have been differences between NGOs with regard to their strategic preferences on how to 
achieve “development”. NGOs also share common features in analysing social concerns that they 
intend to address. This stems from the fact that they put the poor people and their contexts at centre 
stage. NGOs intend to “empower” the poor people to negotiate with dominant actors. This stands 
contrary to other ways of changing politico-economic structures such as the Marxist class struggle, 
revolutions, wars, coups and counter coups160.  
NGOs were not alone in pioneering the effort to address the socio-economic concerns of poor 
people. State actors also have worked on programmes that intended to improve the socio-economic 
conditions of poor rural population since the early 1960s. When the earliest development rhetoric 
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was heated in the early 1960s, officials of the imperial government believed that NGOs aspired to 
realise the same visions that the imperial government aspired to. As a result, NGOs were able to 
get the encouragement of the imperial government. The reason is that      “development” was 
accepted as morally “good”.  
However, there were marked differences between the government and NGOs with regard to how 
to achieve “development”. Influenced by American planners, the imperial government was driven 
by modernization theory that intended to promote quick macro-economic growth until the end of 
the 1960s. There was a shift towards assisting the small-hold farmers to improve their socio-
economic status by the end of the 1960s. The theoretical basis of the intervention remained 
unchanged, although there was a shift towards assisting small-hold farmers. The imperial 
government believed that for rural residents to improve their status, they should abandon their 
tradition and culture that impeded their development161 . NGOs, like officials of the imperial 
government, were concerned about rural poverty. However, the strategy NGOs crafted to deal with 
poverty in rural setting was different from that of the imperial government. The major difference 
lies on how NGOs looked at the role of poor people in tackling their own problem. NGO leaders 
believed that poor people had untapped potential to be active players to improve their socio-
economic and political status. The leaders of ASE were the earliest that came with this ideal. In 
1974, the leaders of ASE published a document in which they summed up their confidence about 
the capability of poor farmers to uplift their living standard. Part of the document stated that:     
No one can develop small farmers. It is up to the farmers to develop themselves. Other people 
and development organisations [NGOs] can help them but in the final analysis it is the farmers 
themselves who are the agents of their own development162. 
The conviction that poor farmers had the potential to improve their living standard raises a question 
related to the role that NGOs would play in the process. The response of ASE to this issue 
predicated on the way the organisation understood the causes of poverty in rural Ethiopia. The 
founders of ASE witnessed that rural residents accepted their poverty as something given; rural 
residents believed that they could not change the overall environment in which they were living. A 
text written in 1975 describes the extent to which rural residents reconciled themselves with their 
own problem, stating, “Experience shows us every day to what extent peasants underestimate 
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themselves and easily take refuge in fatalism”163. This attitude, leaders of ASE argued, stifled the 
peasants’ potentials to improve their socio-economic status. As a result, peasants would remain 
poor unless the problem was addressed164. 
The founders of ASE stated that the kind of poverty that they witnessed was too complex to be 
tackled by “external” intervention. As a result, they rejected any intervention that could be run by 
expatriates. According to the founders of ASE, “external” intervention mixes up “development” 
with equipment which would, in the end, fail to address the root causes of poverty. Instead, they 
called upon Ethiopians themselves to be an active force in the development process. On one 
occasion, one of the founders of ASE, Fr. Henry, himself an expatriate, summed up the two 
premises summarised above. Part of it reads: 
We Frenjis165, we mix up “development” and “equipment”…Our [humans in developed world]  
true development is not given by our having more but our own efforts to live a better life 
together…You, you, you know…Here [humans in developed world]  we don’t [know how you 
develop]. You have, you the Ethiopian people, a deep wisdom the world needs to become 
conscious of its being a family, a human family…and to direct its entire doings to build it. This 
is the way, the only way to true development166.  
Basing their premise on the potential of Ethiopians, the founders of ASE came to hold ideal 
situation that would come into existence. They envisioned an Ethiopia wherein rural peasants had 
reached the stage of “adulthood”, capable of negotiating with governments167. They believed that 
a human being reaches adulthood when s/he becomes fully conscious of her/his value as well as 
the social, economic and political environment in which s/he lives. To that end, ASE put in place 
resources, “…to help arouse in them [project participants] a greater awareness of their dignity as 
human being”168 . The strategic choice of ASE suggests further the confidence that it of the 
capability of project participants. ASE adopted correspondence education to reduce the influence 
of “experts”. This was because the founders of ASE argued that “experts” tended to act as if they 
had solutions to the problems confronting the peasants, and that this would stifle the peasants’ 
initiative to solve their own problems169.  
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ASE’s development vision and its strategic choice were nurtured by INADES-Formation, which, 
in many ways, considered itself as a “parent” of ASE. INADES-Formation believed that the 
peasantries of the developing world had the potential to develop themselves and that rural 
correspondence education was the only realistic way to true “development”170. This conviction also 
originated from the global self-help development discourse of the 1960s that argued that human 
beings have untapped potential to deal with the socio-economic and political constraints that have 
led to their underdevelopment171. There was, in fact, one major difference between ASE and 
INADES-Formation with regard to the role an organisation should play in the development process. 
While INADES-Formation argued for the provision of technical information and advice to project 
participants, ASE opted for an inclusive approach to assist the poor. Concerning this difference 
that it had with INADES-Formation, ASE once stated that it was, “…because we [ASE, unlike, by 
implication, the INADES-Formation] are not only concerned with do’s and don’ts but also to 
achieve his [a peasant] fulfillment as a human being. Ours [ASE’s] is an integrated approach to life 
in all its complexity”172.  
Like ASE, Oxfam believed in the potential of poor people to change their status. Oxfam stated in 
1975 about its confidence about the potential of poor people. One of the documents states that 
“Oxfam believes in the essential dignity of people and in their capacity to overcome the problems 
and pressures which can crush and exploit them”173.   
In order to identify its role, Oxfam analysed the nature of poverty in areas where it operated. Oxfam 
believed that poverty had structural causes. It argued that power holders controlled the structures 
with which they underdeveloped the powerless. As a result, the structures were either to be 
bypassed or reformed and new structures were to be created or adapted174. Maggie Black called 
this position Oxfam’s “anti-institutionalism”175. Oxfam identified itself as a partner of poor people 
who struggle to overcome problems and pressures that threatened them. Oxfam itself asserted that 
it “…is a partnership of people – people who, regardless of race, sex, religion or politics work 
together for the basic rights of food, shelter and reasonable condition of life”176.    
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Basing its premise on the structural poverty and the capacity of poor people to dismantle this 
structure, Oxfam articulated in 1965 a broad vision. The 1965 Memorandum of Association 
explained that Oxfam stands:         
To relieve poverty, distress and suffering in any part of the world (including starvation, sickness 
or any physical disability or affliction) and primarily when arising from any public calamity 
(including famine, earthquake, pestilence, war or civil disturbance) or the immediate or 
continuing result of want natural or artificial resources, or the means to develop them, and 
whether acting alone or in association with others177.   
Oxfam analysed the causes of poverty and the way to tackle it driven by development rhetoric. In 
the 1960s, the global discourse turned to ensure that the new nations emerging from colonisation 
could be developed rapidly and poverty could be overcome. The optimists of economic modelling 
in the 1950s had given way to a new generation of development planners and theorists who saw 
the developmental objectives as the elimination of poverty, rather than just the elimination of 
economic bottlenecks to rapid industrialisation. This led NGOs to turn towards promoting more 
sustainable livelihoods, increased production and improving the standard of living as preemptive 
measures against disaster, rather than reacting when disasters occurred178. In 1960, Dr. Binay 
Ranjam Sing launched the Freedom from Hunger Campaign (FFHC). Its aim was to reduce the 
impact and frequency of famine by increasing food production in developing countries, thus 
preventing disasters from occurring rather than simply reacting when they did179.   
National FFHC committees were established throughout the world in order to coordinate the 
fundraising and activities of the various NGOs engaged in this work. Oxfam’s association with the 
FFHC was one of the significant factors in influencing the emergence of a development vision 
within the NGO. In early 1961, the Director of Oxfam, Leslie Kirkley explored the possibility of 
establishing an FFHC programme in the three British High Commission territories of Basutoland 
(Lesotho), Bechuanaland (Botswana) and Swaziland, to be both funded and run by Oxfam. Having 
realised, through his experience during the Congo famine, that direct supervision was beneficial in 
coordinating action, Kirkley appointed Jimmy Betts as field director to personally oversee the 
programme. Over the next decade this system expanded to cover the major areas of Oxfam 
interest180.  
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Like ASE and Oxfam, CCRDA had the intention to deal with poverty that dehumanised the 
peasantry during the 1970s food crisis. Although they represented NGOs of various backgrounds, 
the founders of CCRDA were bound together by a, “….collective vision of improving the plight 
of the poor in Ethiopia through the willingness of working together”181. As with other NGOs in the 
country such as ASE and Oxfam, CCRDA emphasised that project participants had the potential 
to develop themselves and that the role of NGOs was to be limited to provision of materials and 
technical skills182.   
It could, thus, be stated that NGOs of the 1960s and 1970s aspired for visions that were informed 
by political content. ASE’s vision for changing power relation and Oxfam’s structural analysis of 
poverty and the strategy it suggested were highly political. The next two decades from the collapse 
of the imperial regime in 1974 saw NGOs drifing from their radical ideas. A major historical factor 
for this was the revolution that erupted in 1974. The junior military and non-commisioned officers 
who seized power in the midst of the revolution set up the Provisional Military Administrative 
Council (Derg). The Derg pursued a series of nationalisation measures, which were to be based on 
a political and economic programme183. To that end, the Derg announced “Ethiopian Socialism” 
on December 20th 1974184. This was followed by a series of measures. In February 1975, the Derg 
issued the Ownership and Control of the Means of Production Proclamation Act, by which private 
firms like banks and insurance companies were nationalised. A month later, the government 
introduced the Rural Land Proclamation that abolished the land tenure system. In July 1975, the 
government nationalised urban lands and excess houses previously owned by individuals185.  
In early 1975, the Derg sent out high school and university students and their teachers to re-
organise rural residents, educate them about the ideals of socialism and redistribute land to each 
household186. Various forms of organisation were soon set up at different levels throughout urban 
and rural areas. In spite of the early-stage rhetoric that they would serve their constituents, the new 
organisations came to be an implementation arm of the military government. Subsequently, when 
government officials were asked about the neutrality of these organisations, they responded that, 
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“Those organisations set up so far and to be set up in the future would never be politically 
neutral”187.  
While residents in urban and rural areas were expected to participate in organisations set up in the 
revolutionary context, conversely, the Derg discouraged alternative forms of organisation. Any 
form of organisation over which the government had no direct control was considered as 
reactionary and it was disbanded188. Even self-help systems rooted in the Ethiopian culture that had 
flourished during the imperial period were considered to be a remnant of the old regime. Due to 
this, they were closed down189.  
The government did not spare NGOs. It took two measures with regard to NGOs in the country. 
Firstly, it banned the NGOs set up by members of the royal family. These included the Haile 
Selassie I Foundation190. Secondly, the government introduced the institutional arrangement with 
a view to ensuring that NGOs could have neither the autonomy nor the agency to influence the 
government or society. This created a situation whereby, as noted in an evaluation undertaken by 
a group of consultants contracted by Oxfam in 1990, the, “…working environment in Ethiopia has 
enforced NGOs into close relationship with government organisations with the result that donors 
[NGOs] are viewed by peasants as part of the implementation arms of the government”191.  
NGOs offered four types of responses to the military government that asserted such strong authority 
in the country. Some international-cum-religious NGOs withdrew from the country at the early 
stage of the revolution for they believed that freedom of religion was suppressed192. Médecins Sans 
Frontières was overtly opposed to official policies like resettlement. As a result, it was expelled 
from the country by the government193. National NGOs adhered to official policy lines and adjusted 
themselves to them. While international-cum-secular NGOs were internally debating the 
government’s attempts to build a strong socialist state, their covert resistance remained ineffectual; 
they in practice allowed themselves to be instrumentalised by the regime194. 
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The submission of national NGOs resulted partly from the way they looked at the revolutionary 
measures. The revolution had wide popular legitimacy. The land reform in particular was well 
received by people all over the country and resulted in equitable resource distribution. This has 
been witnessed even by strong critics of the military government. A leader of the Ethiopian People 
Revolutionary Party (EPRP) that fought the military government described how, “…in one stroke 
[the] land reform addressed both the economic problem of the people and the economic aspects of 
the national questions”195. Like other sections of the society, national NGO leaders welcomed 
major radical changes, including many that were directly related to their own specific activities. 
For instance, influenced by INADES-Formation, the leaders of ASE received the new 
government’s rural land reform, and its intention to make education available to all citizens of the 
country – including rural residents – very well. Previously an advocate for an “empowered” peasant 
class, ASE now believed that there was no basic difference between its own rural education 
programme and the massive rural education programme started by the Ministry of Agriculture. A 
note circulated in the mid-1970s when ASE sought to work alongside the Ministry of Agriculture 
clearly shows the attitude of ASE’s leadership. Part of it reads:   
ድርጅቱ ለገጠሩ የሚሰጠው ትምህርት እርሻ ሚኒስቴር ከሚሰጠው አገልግሎት የአሰራሩ ዘዴ የተለየ ቢሆንም አላማው 
ተመሳሳይ ስለሆነ የበለጠ ሊያበረክት የሚቺለው ከግብርና ሚኒስቴር ጎን ለጎን ለመስራት ሲቺል ነው ብሎ INADES-
Formation ስላመነበት ድርጅቱ ለጊዚው በእርሻ ሚኒስቴር  ሆኖ የሚሰራበት ስምምነት እንዲደረግ እ.አ አ በሃምሌ ወር 
1975 አ.ም ጥያቄ በደብዳቤ አቀረበ 
 
Though the rural education the organization (ASE) delivers to the rural residents is different [from 
that of the Ministry of Agriculture] with regard to the method, they both have the same aim. Thus, 
INADES-Formation submitted a draft agreement in July 1975 based on which ASE would 
operate alongside the Ministry of Agriculture196.    
 
The leadership of ASE argued that organisations running educational programmes were to adjust 
themselves to changing socio-economic and political contexts. This argument was set out in 
summary in one of the earliest documents. Part of it described that “Any organisation with an 
essentially educative nature such as ASE is necessarily concerned by the major socio-political 
events which are in the process of transforming”197.  
The evolving socio-economic changes in rural Ethiopia were palatable to the leaders of ASE. 
Moreover, they fully believed that the leadership of the new government was committed to 
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managing these changes in favour of the poor people. This assessment resulted in a situation 
whereby ASE’s leadership aspired for a semi-governmental status. A text published at the early 
stage of the revolution attests to this attitude of the leadership. It says that “Legally, it [ASE] has 
so far been a private organisation; in practice it has been semi-governmental”198.  
Governmental organisations involved in the revolutionary process welcomed NGOs that supported 
official policies. Moreover, governmental organisations ran short of resources to implement the 
massive rural programme. As a result, they welcomed NGOs largely because they saw in NGOs 
the resources that they required to undertake their programme. By the time ASE showed a great 
deal of interest in operating alongside the Ministry of Agriculture, a senior official of the Ministry 
published a note in which he described the resources ASE commanded. It stated that “The facilities 
and experience that ASE has created over many years in Ethiopia could complement the efforts of 
the Ministry of Agriculture that has already created an extension network covering most parts of 
the country”199.  
Although it favoured the new revolutionary measures, ASE maintained its autonomy. An 
evaluation report that studied the relation between ASE and governmental organisations stated that 
“ASE’s cooperation with the government structures…is of a rather functional nature: it concerns 
delivery of services and support in both directions. But ASE runs its own programme”200. This 
functional relation defined the relationship that other national NGOs developed with governmental 
organisations as well. From the start, for instance, CCRDA saw no difference between its own 
programme and that of the government (RRC). CCRDA believed that both organisations promoted 
food security in the country. As a result, it saw the need to, “…assist the government by sharing 
the common problems concerning the welfare and development of the Ethiopian people”201.  
While the positive aspects of the revolutionary measures and the institutional arrangement were 
important factors, internal dynamics also pushed NGOs to lean towards governmental lines. The 
dynamics differed from one national NGO to the other. For instance, ASE lacked the capacity to 
cope with the rapidly changing rural context. The organisation that had operated in a relatively 
stable rural setting was now overwhelmed by profound changes. As a result, it lacked the authority 
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to mobilise the masses and it felt that it lost its organisational relevance. In order to have the 
necessary authority, ASE argued for integration of its educational programme into that of the 
Ministry of Agriculture that was a leading actor for mass mobilisation202. Likewise, CCRDA lacked 
sufficient authority. Members of CCRDA believed that it competed with them for resources. As a 
result, they at the early stage stood against CCRDA. One of the founders of CCRDA tells us that 
“it [CCRDA] was seen as a threat”203. In a situation where it shifted its priority to rehabilitation 
works in 1974/1975, CCRDA described the lack of harmony within itself. It stated regrettably that 
the, “…CRF [precursor of CCRDA] does not speak with a corporate voice on behalf of its 
members”204. Thus, CCRDA gave up the mandate to the RRC. Concerning this, the same source 
quoted here states that, “…each of our constituent members should be approached for information 
individually by the Commission [RRC]”205.  
In a sharp contrast to national NGOs, international NGOs were against the domination of the 
government. They argued that the heavy hand of the government stifled project participants who 
would otherwise have played a key role to solve their problem. This went along with the visions 
that they had aspired toward206. These criticisms were being discussed among leaders of each of 
the international NGOs, and came to inform the actions of each NGO as a result. The way Oxfam 
saw this governmental domination and how it reacted to it exemplified the response of international 
NGOs. Informed by its vision for poverty alleviation, Oxfam had taken an active part, running 
long-term development projects. The speed with which it turned to “development” proved that the 
organisation was, in fact, putting aside emergency operation, in favour of addressing factors that 
created this emergency. This was a lesson the organisation had drawn from the Freedom From 
Hunger Campaign. While relief operations by other NGOs, were still underway, e.g., Oxfam UK 
notified the RRC that, “... as of the end of April 1974, it would no longer conduct any medical and 
nutritional activities in Wollo because the emergency period was over”207. The first operational 
agreement signed in April 1975 with the RRC shows that Oxfam was, in fact, committed to carrying 
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forward its vision. The agreement stated that Oxfam would carry out projects including agriculture, 
health, education, training, water development and social welfare208.  
However, the socio-economic reorganisation from the early 1975 onwards and the centralisation 
of power thereafter convinced Oxfam that Oxfam, in fact, would not “do” development in the way 
it understood it. Contrary to Oxfam’s strategic direction that necessitated public space in which 
project participants would be active in the development process, the government asserted its 
authoritarian rule through a network of organisations. This, according to Oxfam, stifled the self-
help spirit of the people. Frustrated by the situation, Mr. Stephen LIod, Deputy Country 
Representative of Oxfam in Ethiopia reported that, “…it is very difficult to find ways of working 
here which are not top-down. The heavily directive nature of official intervention leaves little room 
to develop a particular milieu”209. Oxfam argued that this heavily directive condition not only 
narrowed the space but also contributed to weaken the country’s economic performance and 
exacerbate the agricultural crisis of the 1980s. Oxfam’s Field Director reported to the Oxfam office 
in Oxford that the erroneous economic policy of the government was the prime factor behind the 
agricultural crisis that was apparent in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Preference for large scale 
commercial agriculture, controlled pricing, lack of incentive to small-holding agriculture were 
some of the factors that he emphasised210. Similar criticisms within Oxfam continued throughout 
the military period. A policy discussion within Oxfam reached its peak level in the middle of the 
1980s211 . Stephen LIoyd enumerated a wide range of structural constraints that, he believed, 
traumatised the poor people. He said, for instance, that farmers were forced to pay excessive tax 
and contribute to mass organisations, service cooperatives, etc212. He also discussed the paradox 
wherein the governmental Agricultural Marketing Corporation was imposing quota systems on 
farmers for supply, while, on the other hand, the Ministry of Agriculture and the RRC were 
appealing for food aid to relieve these farmers213. The market for the remaining surplus was 
severely restricted. The result of all these, Mr. LIoyd concluded, “…greatly reduces not only the 
incentive to increase output, but also the ability to invest in inputs and land improvement”214. 
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As a response to the prevailing socio-economic and political conditions that it criticised, Oxfam 
kept a low profile. The intention of Oxfam to keep a low profile was quite apparent from the 
beginning. A senior official of Oxfam advised the organisation in 1975 in the context of the Ogaden 
region that “We [Oxfam] should not err on the side of instigating too large a project…I would feel 
that the lower figure is the more sensible; with tentative commitments by us to remain involved in 
an extended scheme”215. The last phrase, “…tentative commitment to remain involved” suggests 
that Oxfam developed a survivalist attitude. This was, however, a universal attitude of international 
NGOs, and as one of the sources shows, “Those [international NGOs]…adopted low profile”216. 
The government noted this reaction and encouraged NGOs to develop their welfare commitment 
even further to …[be] allowed [by the government] to function in the new society”217  
However, international NGOs turned down the government’s request to increase their profile. 
Rather, in order to deal with the anticipated anger of the government, they were engaged in trying 
to build up their image. In a massive rehabilitation programme that UNHCR had launched in the 
Ogaden in the late 1970s and early 1980s, Oxfam was selected as one of the partner NGOs. The 
reports that Oxfam’s liaison officer submitted show that Oxfam still wanted to keep its profile low. 
In the rehabilitation process in the Ogaden, organisational rivalry between UNHCR, the RRC and 
the Red Cross was evident. UNHCR developed a strong leaning towards the Red Cross League. 
Rather oddly, it began to criticise nearly everything that the League did and yet sent its staff to 
imitate the League’s work218. The extraordinary care that Oxfam’s field officer took shows the 
extent to which Oxfam cared about possible threats to its image. He reported that “I have refused 
several times to do things which I believe would prejudice Oxfam’s relations with the authorities 
here”219 . This made the organisation almost idle in the ongoing rehabilitation process in the 
Ogaden. The field officer reported that, “We have stood on the sidelines watching the play”220. 
However, the marginal role of Oxfam itself posed a potential threat to its image. The RRC had 
profound expectations of Oxfam and it had informed Oxfam about this221. As a result, the field 
officer was concerned that the minor role Oxfam was playing in the Ogaden could tarnish its image. 
Due to this, he called up on his superiors to step up the commitment of the organisation. He 
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recommended in one of his reports “I believe that it would stand Oxfam’s image in Ethiopia much 
good [better] if we were seen to be taking some responsibility for apart…indirectly of the returnees 
programme” 222 . He also specified the type of activities and the area where they would be 
implemented. He suggested water and sanitation to be implemented in Aysha that would “…help 
restore and better the living condition of people who have been much abused by war [the Ethio-
Somalia War of 1977–1978]”223.  
The outbreak of the famine in 1983–1984 and the solution that the government proposed triggered 
debate within and between NGOs in the country. In its early stage, international NGOs 
underestimated the famine and played an insignificant role in the relief operation. The main factor 
here had to do with the development ideology that they pursued at that time. By the early 1980s, 
student radicalism had merged with socialism to produce a particular ideology among NGOs which 
can be called developmentalism. This focuses on increasing agricultural production, the 
construction of schools, hospitals, and water wells but also assumes that this process can lead to 
the transformation of the state. The idea was revolution through development. There was a firm 
belief that groups of people involved in development projects could transform economic 
relationships and ultimately the state itself224. A number of NGOs including Oxfam were driven 
by this ideology. Individuals sharing this ideology took over the leadership of Oxfam in Oxford. 
Driven by this ideology, Oxfam was opposed to managing the relief operation when the famine 
occurred in 1983–1984 in Ethiopia. This was the main reason why Oxfam’s trustees decided in 
early 1984 that in Ethiopia “…relief projects should be avoided and development projects 
sought”225.  
The intention to avoid relief operation had a profound consequence. Unlike Oxfam, a number of 
NGOs notably the SCF took an active role in the relief operation and this was praised by the media. 
Conversely, Oxfam was criticised for failing to play an active part in the relief operation. This 
created disagreements within Oxfam. Concerned by the grave consequences that a media report 
could have on Oxfam, a senior official in Oxford criticised the Oxfam Field Director. He told the 
Field Director that:   
The problem over the Ethiopian situation was of curse the unsuspected and sudden showing of 
the television films with the very strong SCF bias. It would have been of great help to us if you 
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could have sent us a telex informing us that those films were being made and that they were going 
to be shown very shortly. We were also very taken aback by Mike Wooldridge’s wild and 
hysterical statements that we could not ignore226.  
Under pressure from the media, Oxfam abandoned its survivalist attitude and started playing an 
active part in relief, rehabilitation and development activities. These activities were carried out in 
a context wherein the government was undertaking a number of controversial projects to follow. 
International NGOs were involved in these projects and in doing so, they allowed themselves to be 
surrogates of the military government.  
The government started agricultural and environmental rehabilitation programmes that included a 
massive resettlement programme from the mid-1980s. The government believed that relocating 
people from famine-prone areas in the north to surplus producing areas could ensure food security. 
In 1988, the RRC addressed a letter to Oxfam where it summed up the viability of the resettlement 
programme. It states that “…the settlement programme is and will continue to be a viable 
development scheme and designed and carried out by our government to improve the lot of our 
people and thereby extricate them from dependency”227. However, the resettlement programme 
had political motives as well. The military government used raw force to resettle people in food 
insecure regions, although the government always argued publicly that resettlement was 
voluntary228 . The reality was different. The governor of Wollo, from which the people were 
resettled in large numbers, told officials of Oxfam and SCF that “…given the natural attachment 
of people to their homes resettlement could not succeed as a voluntary activity”229. This forced 
relocation of people was in fact aimed at meeting a political end. The regions of Wollo and Tigray, 
from where the majority of the people were relocated, were threatened by rebel organisations such 
as the Tigray People Liberation Front (TPLF). The government wanted to drain the social basis of 
the rebels by relocating the people from these regions. Thus, relocation of the people was part of 
the counter-insurgency strategy of the military government230.   
Médecins Sans Frontières dared to publicly denounce the government’s use of force and tried to 
mobilise other NGOs in the country to stand together against the government policy231. Other 
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NGOs took the opposite side. Oxfam, who took the lead in supporting resettlement, clashed with 
Médecins Sans Frontières. Oxfam justified itself by arguing that as long as resettlement was 
inevitable, it was important to assist the people during the process. Oxfam became an easy target 
for criticism by Médecins Sans Frontières, largely because it was the only agency that was 
providing water in the resettlement sites232. Although its rationale is not clear, Oxfam also endorsed 
the villagization (resettlement of people in designated villages during the military period in 
Ethiopia), at least in areas where it operated. Its own evaluation report stated that “…Oxfam has 
tacitly gone along with the government villagization program which was not popular with the 
peasantry, donor agencies or NGOs”233.  
Oxfam was not the only agency that supported the resettlement and villagization programme. In 
fact, it was CCRDA that convinced its own members, including Oxfam, to support the resettlement 
programme. In a situation where Médecins Sans Frontières condemned Oxfam and other NGOs, 
CCRDA issued a position statement. CCRDA (then CRDA) condemned Médecins Sans Frontières 
for criticising the government’s policy that, it said, was sensible. Part of it reads “CRDA’s position 
is that it does, through its members, support the general policy of resettlement as this is a defensible 
policy in the light of chronic drought conditions of northern Ethiopia”234. CCRDA also rejected the 
accusation of Médecins Sans Frontières that the government committed gross human rights 
violations in the name of resettlement. Concerning this, the same statement quoted above states 
that “CRDA members would point out that it is impossible to prove or disprove their allegations, 
as many might have died of starvations or related diseases if they have stayed either in their own 
villages or in the relief camps”235.  
Resettlement in which NGOs were involved was only one way of dealing with the food crisis. The 
Ministry of Agriculture started a massive agricultural and environmental relief programme, with 
which it called upon NGOs to get involved236. The Ministry found it easiest to convince ASE to 
get involved in this programme, as the leadership of ASE itself saw that the correspondence 
education ASE had been supplying could not address the socio-economic crisis that the famine 
created. This was a big strategic shift, as ASE had previously held the firm belief that 
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correspondence education was a reliable strategy for achieving the objectives of development. A 
statement made at an early stage shows the extent to which the organisation believed in the validity 
of this strategy. It stated that:  
We are utterly convinced…[that]…correspondence course…can achieve their educational aim 
and provide learning experiences for groups of people. And they [beneficiaries] can do so by 
themselves. It is not necessary for one to go on the spot to set up groups and teach them237.  
In the midst of food crisis, the leadership of ASE concluded that correspondence education alone 
could no longer be the only strategy employed. Due to the environmental crisis, the leadership of 
ASE believed that unless otherwise supported with intervention projects, education and training 
alone would never address the poverty that had resulted in famines238. Like those NGOs that argued 
for the resettlement programme, ASE argued for a modification of its strategy. One of ASE’s 
donors, the INADES-Formation openly rejected the argument put forward by ASE’s officials on 
the basis of its own development philosophy. INADES-Formation strongly believed that though it 
appears to be sluggish and cumbersome, rural education through correspondence is the only 
feasible approach to carrying out sustainable development in African and Latin American 
contexts239. INADES-Formation continued with this argument for the next ten years, while ASE 
was similarly determined to carry forward the ideas it had proposed. On closer observation, ASE’s 
confidence originated from the strong interest NOVIB and EZE (ASE’s major donors) had shown 
since the early part of the 1980s in modifying ASE’s development strategy. Thus, when the conflict 
between ASE and INADES-Formation became evident, the two donors allied with ASE240. Thus, 
a split apparently emerged, between ASE officials and their major donors EZE and NOVIB on the 
one hand and INADES-Formation on the other. As far as this is concerned, a senior INADES-
Formation official said that:  
I had the opportunity to meet the two main donors of ASE, EZE and NOVIB, to whom the 
position of the head office [INADES-formation] was explained. They expressed concern about 
the position of IF towards ASE and also about the fast growth of ASE241.  
In rejecting the new development approach pursued by ASE, INADES-Formation made its position 
clear, stating that, “…rural development takes more than three years project to yield significant 
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results” 242 . In this INADES-Formation remained adamant, despite the fact that it saw some 
impressive changes wrought by ASE’s strategic shift. A field visit by INADES-Formation’s 
mission in 1994 concluded that “ASE’s… intervention appeared to be responsive to the local 
needs…”243. Regardless, not long after this report was made, INADES-formation sent another 
mission that still argued that ASE was to focus on rural education and training. This contradictory 
position taken by INADES-Formation, and the methodology with which this last evaluation was 
undertaken angered the leadership of ASE greatly, and did nothing to weaken their determination.  
They issued the following response:    
We would like to point out that re-evaluation of evaluation without full cognition of ASE’s 
development philosophy, objectives, strategies like the case of the IF [INADES-Formation]  
mission, clearly shows lack of professionalism and premeditated interest and outright rejection 
of other development option. It should be born in mind that, socio-economic environment that 
ASE operates is quite distinct with that of other INADES-formation offices and global 
recommendations of adult education through correspondence is not acceptable by ASE244  
The leadership of ASE warned that “…If the condition set by the mission to abandon the new 
orientation is endorsed by the IF, ASE shall remain holding fast to its development and operational 
objectives regardless of dissociation with IF”245.  
In summary, NGOs proposed radical ideas that were opposed to the orthodoxies of dominant actors 
such as the state. While the state argued for conventional intervention driven by modernization 
theory, NGOs considered themselves as allies of the poor and pledged to “empower” them so that 
they would have the capability to negotiate with dominant actors. NGOs deviated from this vision 
during the military period. Two factors are mentioned for this. To begin with, the military 
government that secured its legitimacy from the revolution of 1974 ensured its dominance through 
a series of measures. Secondly, NGOs’ internal weaknesses induced them to consider the 
revolutionary government as a useful ally. As a result, NGOs endorced official policies and acted 
accordingly without bothering much about the implications of their decision and actions on their 
development ideals.   
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2.4.3. A New Order, a Quest for New Visions and State Action 
NGOs have shown an impressive progress with regard to re-articulation of their vision and to act 
accordingly since the beginning of 1990s. Both external and internal environments are to be 
explored in order to analyse the content of this new vision. Externally, the Soviot Camp on which 
the military regime had depended collapsed and under pressure from donors who now became 
powerful, the new government took a series of measures that favored NGOs. The issue here is how 
NGOs understood the context in which donors and the Ethiopian government negotiated and how 
they seized this opportinuty in in reformulating their vision. Before addressing these issues, we 
should discuss the “indeginisation”. Indeginisation was a process that goes back to the beginning 
of NGOs’ activities in Ethiopia. However, reaching a new height in the 1990s, “indeginisation” 
placed to the leadership of NGOs Ethiopians who played an important role in the articulation of 
the new visions.   
2.4.3.1. “Indigenisation” of NGOs 
In the 1960s and 1970s, expatriates were heavily represented in the leadership positions of NGOs. 
NGO leaders noted very well that this did not go along with their visions. This led them to varying 
degrees of “indigenisation”. Differences did exist between NGOs with regard to the degree and 
pace of “indigenisation”. For instance, ASE went through the earliest rapid and complete 
“indigenisation” process. The process started with the leaders of ASE trying to resemble the 
locality where they were operating. Expatriate ASE staff were able to speak Amharic, the official 
language, translated the French texts for teaching project participants into Amharic 246 . They 
prepared close to 50 training manuals in Amharic for training farmers and development agents. 
The Ethiopian Ministry of Agriculture duplicated these materials to serve the Agarfa Farmers 
Training Center and other agricultural training institutions in the country247. Moreover, as per the 
agreement reached with ASE, the Ministry of Education introduced an agricultural syllabus into 
the Ethiopian elementary school system with a textbook prepared in Amharic by leaders of ASE248.  
“Indigenisation” of ASE had an organisational dimension as well. “Indigenising” ASE was 
conceived of as soon as ASE became operational. Ato Zeleke Dessalegn, a service student249 at 
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Alemaya University whom the Ministry of Agriculture assigned to serve ASE in 1971, narrates 
that he, “…was a director almost half of the period [totally more than a year]” he worked for 
ASE250. Indeed, Ato Zeleke was assured by the director that he could take over the leadership if he 
wanted to work for ASE. However, he declined to accept the offer for personal reasons251. The 
rapid expansion of ASE due to the willingness of some donors to support ASE’s activities in the 
context of the revolution of 1974 also facilitated the “indigenisation” process. This was because 
ASE employed a number of Ethiopians. In 1975, it had 22 staff, 16 of whom were Ethiopians252. 
Due to the difficulty of finding qualified candidates, the leadership positions were still occupied 
by expatriates. However, the organisation planned that, “Ethiopian counterparts work alongside 
foreign personnel and will eventually take over, some as early as next year [1976], others after a 
period of further training here or abroad”253. This was fully achieved. By recruiting experienced 
Ethiopians who had worked for the Wollaita Agricultural Development Unit (WADU) and by 
sending competent Ethiopians abroad for study, the transfer of responsibility from expatriates to 
Ethiopians was completed in 1977; the transfer included the direction of ASE at the management 
and section level254. Ato Tilahun Haile became the first Ethiopian executive director of ASE in 
1977255.     
While it was achieved relatively easily in the case of ASE, “indigenisation” was influenced by the 
origins of a number of other NGOs in Ethiopia, some of which encountered structural problems in 
carrying the “indigenisation” process through to enlisting Ethiopians to fill leadership positions. A 
good example of this was CCRDA. Ethiopians played a significant role in establishing the Christian 
Relief Fund (CRF), the precursor of CCRDA. In fact, it was an Ethiopian, Ato Berhe Beyene, who 
together with the Irish priest Fr. Kevin Doheny, first proposed the idea to set up the broad-based 
organisation that eventually became CCRDA. Ato Berhe himself tells us that, “If one asks Berhe 
who was the brain behind the establishment of CRDA, Berhe would say Dohney. If one asks 
Dohney the same question, he would certainly say Berhe”256. Ato Berhe was the first chairman of 
CCRDA257, while representatives of certain Ethiopian NGOs such as the Haile Selassie I Famine 
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Relief Committee were also founding members of CCRDA. The Haile Selassie I Famine Relief 
Committee was one of the organisations that had presented the earliest report about the Ethiopian 
famine of 1973–1974 258 . However, expatriates were much more visible in the leadership of 
CCRDA. This was because the executive committee was elected from the members of CCRDA, 
and foreign NGOs were predominant in Ethiopia. This was considered to be of major concern. The 
vice chairman of CCRDA, Fr. Doheny was always concerned about the problem and encouraging 
member NGOs to bring Ethiopians into the leadership in their respective NGOs. Ato Berhe tells us 
about the consistent concern of Fr. Doheny. He says that:   
በክርስቲያን በጎ አድራጎትና ልማት ድርጅት ወርሃዊ ስብሰባወች ላይ የፈረንጆች ቁጥር ከኢትዮጵያውያን ቁጥር በዝቶ የተገኘ 
እንደሆነ በጣም ያዝኑ ነበር። የሚስዮን ድርጂቶች ኢትዮጵያውያንን በመሪነት በየስብሰባው መገኘትና ማስተማር እንዳለባቸው 
ምክር የሚሰጡ ናቸው።  
He [Fr. Dohney] was sad whenever the number of foreigners was greater than the number of 
Ethiopians in the monthly meeting of CRDA. He used to advise the missions [NGOs] that they 
should let Ethiopians take the lead259.   
The situation started to change towards the end of the 1970s and the early 1980s. Though their 
number was still fewer, Ethiopians in the leadership were more assertive and were involved in 
major decisions. This could be seen from the debate that followed the decision of CCRDA to get 
involved in the relief operation in 1984–1985. Ethiopians, spearheaded by the chairman Ato Asrat 
Gebre, argued that as an Ethiopian organisation CCRDA had a direct responsibility to relieve 
Ethiopians stricken by the famine260 . Representatives of some 20 foreign NGOs argued that 
CCRDA’s mandate should be limited to coordinating the work of its member organisations261. In 
the context of this heated debate, the chairman reminded expatriates that they were in Ethiopia just 
to assist, and warned them not to argue further. He told them that:    
Since this is [our] home, most of you have come to help, and since many of you are new to 
Ethiopia, we will not disappoint you with a schism. I hope this way of doing business is not 
repeated again simply because the thread that holds us together is very thin and weak”262  
The outbreak of the famine itself caused the establishment of national NGOs. These NGOs became 
members of CCRDA and their representatives occupied positions in the executive committee, the 
general assembly as well as in the secretariat. However, the position of the executive director that 
symbolised CCRDA was still held by an expatriate. The “indigenising” of CCRDA was completed 
after a further regime change in 1991. The new government developed a policy of reducing foreign 
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influences. In response, Brother Augustus O’Keeffee, a French expatriate who had served CCRDA 
as executive director for 20 years, resigned in 1995263. A committee set up to recruit a candidate 
stipulated that his incoming replacement, the British expatriate John Roberts, was to hand his post 
on to an Ethiopian. Roberts agreed that he would train an Ethiopian as his successor. However, this 
did not work out because the government refused to grant a work permit to Mr. Roberts. It was 
under this circumstance that CCRDA came to have its first Ethiopian executive director, Ato 
Kebedde Asrat, and with this it was fully Ethiopianised264.  
The policy that the government pursued to reduce foreign influences influenced international 
NGOs as well, which also went through some degree of “indigenisation” in response. One of these 
was Oxfam, which recruited Ethiopian managers as well as Ethiopian employees. However, a 
report published in 1990 stated that, “There is too big a gap in experience and qualifications 
between the expatriates at management level and the Ethiopian staff”265. As in other parts of the 
world, Oxfam’s office in Ethiopia came to have some degree of autonomy. This followed the 
regionalisation process that started in the mid 1990s. As a result, Ethiopians started holding key 
leadership positions. For the first time in its history, Oxfam came to have the first Ethiopian resident 
representative, Ato Gezahegn Kebede, who served Oxfam as Country Director from 1998 to 
2003266.   
2.4.3.2. NGOs between opportunity and challeng in relative liberalism 
Although they have provided assistance of one kind or another, donor organisations have not 
necessarily aimed to influence the state to grant NGOs space where they could argue for alternative 
development paradigms. This was particularly true in the context of the Cold War when 
governments in Africa aligned themselves with either the socialist or the capitalist camp, which 
often led to African leaders abusing their power over their own peoples267.   
Towards the end of the 1980s, the context changed with the collapse of the socialist camp. The 
then-current Ethiopian government had been dependent on the socialist camp, and could therefore 
no longer get any form of assistance. This, together with its military defeats at the hand of armed 
opposition forces in the north, forced the military government to negotiate with the Western 
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powers. As a result, in March 1990, the government announced the “New Economic Policy” that 
intended to liberalise the economy268. Just over a year later, the military government collapsed and 
a new transitional government was set up by ex-rebels who had embraced Albania’s version of 
Marxism together with political parties that represented various ethnic groups269.  
In what could be described as a step toward significant progress, the new government, as 
represented by the RRC, began to drive NGOs to adopt long term perspectives, by guiding them to 
abandon their relief orientation. To this end, the government issued a series of legislations, 
including a ban on importation of goods, including food, from abroad270. Moreover, in order to 
stifle free distribution of food, the government introduced a new national policy on disaster 
prevention, preparedness and response that argued for the integration of food aid with development 
work271 . In order to follow up the implementation of this national policy and as part of its 
reorganisation of central governmental offices, the government decentralised the RRC272.   
For highly centralised NGOs namely CCRDA, the decentralisation of governmental organisations 
posed a serious problem. This was because CCRDA did not have regional structures to negotiate 
with newly created regional governmental organisations. Moreover, the government introduced a 
series of legislations that affected NGOs without consulting NGOs themselves, on e.g. NGOs’ re-
registration, duty free status, legislation on micro finance etc273. In protest, leaders of CCRDA 
resigned one after the other. This put the association in a critical condition. The chairman of the 
association summed up the prevailing frustration within CCRDA, telling the Executive Committee 
that “It is critical to ensure that the integrity of CRDA [CCRDA] is… [maintained] during this time 
when we are facing big challenges and are in a difficult moment”274.  
CCRDA adjusted itself through a strategic planning exercise and embraced a broader vision in 
1997. The strategic planning document described how CCRDA envisioned a poverty-free 
Ethiopia275. This vision was widely debated by the Executive Committee of CCRDA. A sub-
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committee set up to follow up the strategic planning exercise consulted every member of the 
executive and management committees and came to a conclusion that poverty alleviation and 
collective actions were common denominators276.  Poverty alleviation had long been supported by 
donors. On the eve of the collapse of the military government, a group of donors such as NOVIB 
and EZE met the Executive Committee of the CCRDA, “…to find the vision which CRDA 
[CCRDA] has for the future”277. NOVIB and EZE also told the Committee that, “…sustainable 
development by local NGOs is their priority”278. Thus, in order to carry forward its vision, CCRDA 
adopted capacity building for members and creating an enabling environment as its key strategic 
directions279.   
Poverty alleviation was advocated as well by donors who funded ASE. This was the result of a 
shift in donor policy after the cessation of the war in the country, during which NOVIB, as one of 
the chief donors of ASE, had limited its provision of funds. A few months after the regime change 
of May 1991, the Africa Desk officer of NOVIB told the acting executive director of ASE that 
“Novib’s policy with regard to Ethiopia was based on the reality of the wars”280. Following the end 
of the military government, NOVIB increased its financial commitment in an effort to alleviate 
poverty. Thus poverty alleviation in Ethiopia was again part of NOVIB’s priority at the 
international level. In the early 1990s, NOVIB noted that the end of the Cold War would give way 
to market-led economic systems in developing countries and the market would never address 
poverty and hunger. As a result, NOVIB concluded that poverty alleviation and gender equality 
were to be their priority281. In doing so, NOVIB had conducted consultations with its partners 
including ASE. In a letter addressed to NOVIB, the Executive Director of ASE stated that he fully 
agreed with the poverty alleviation agenda in Ethiopia282. Thus, in 1996, ASE came up with a 
broader vision of a happy (desirable) rural Ethiopia that would be realised by eradicating 
poverty283. Like CCRDA and ASE, Oxfam was influenced by changes taking place in and outside 
of Ethiopia. In June 1990, Oxfam contracted a group of consultants to evaluate the opportunities 
that the “New Economic Policy” of March 1990 would create for NGOs. Two years before the 
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Policy was announced, Oxfam had articulated a sentiment that development in the way it 
understood it could not be “done” in Ethiopia. These consultants challenged this tendency within 
Oxfam, arguing that the contention put forward by Oxfam that development could not be “done” 
in Ethiopia rested on a “too narrow” definition of development in the Ethiopian context. In their 
final report, the consultants appealed to Oxfam to “…develop and feel comfortable with a long 
term perspective”284.     
Motivated by the end of the Cold War, the international office of Oxfam conducted a strategic 
review and reaffirmed that Oxfam stood to relieve poverty and suffering in any part of the world. 
In its strategic review document, Oxfam stated with a new sense of conviction that “The continued 
existence of poverty on the eve of the twenty-first century is a scandal which shames us all. Its 
elimination is the greatest moral, political and intellectual challenge that the world faces”285. 
The government encouraged NGOs to adopt a long term perspective largely because the 
government itself took poverty alleviation as its top priority, introducing various strategies of its 
own to that end, at different times. In 1993, it introduced what is known as Agricultural 
Development Led Industrialization. Sponsored by the World Bank and the IMF, the government 
also introduced the Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Programme in 2001/2002286.         
The Ethiopian government and NGOs, thus, reached a tacit agreement, with the government 
assuring NGOs that they would be part of the effort toward alleviating poverty287. The government 
was, however, concerned by the impact that NGOs could create on the government. In 1993, the 
ruling party stated its concerns on the growth of NGOs and its political consequences, stating that: 
We should not try to bring in outsiders to lead the peasants. In the rural areas, there are an 
increasing number of governmental and non-governmental development workers. These lower 
level members of the intelligentsia can undermine our influence and development programme if 
they oppose our political line288.   
The government seem to have got evidence from the mid-1990s that NGOs could, in fact pose a 
challenge as a number of NGOs adapted the “rights-based approach” to development, which itself 
gained impetus in the early 2000s. As a study sponsored by CCRDA and Oxfam shows, “The 
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rights-based approach had become the main development agenda in order to increase people’s 
claim for their basic and human rights”289. However, NGOs were cautious with regard to acting 
within the framework of this “rights-based approach”. CCRDA in particular pursued this with 
excessive caution. In July 1996, the secretariat of CCRDA together with Fund for Peace planned 
to organise an advocacy training program with regard to women, children, the disabled and those 
with HIV/AIDS. To that end, the secretariat asked the Executive Committee for advice as to how 
to run the training. The response of the Executive Committee shows the policy of extreme caution 
that CCRDA was pursuing, advising the secretariat to act in close collaboration with the relevant 
government offices like the Women’s Affairs Office of the Prime Minister290.  
Despite their apprehension, NGOs hoped for mediation by foreign donors. In the early 1990s, major 
donors, World Bank and the IMF had focused more on grand reforms such as liberalisation of the 
economy and reorganisation of governmental institutions, and it was not uncommon for NGOs to 
approach representatives of major donor organisations. In January 1997, e.g., the leadership of 
CCRDA met Mr. J.D. Wolfenson, the then president of the World Bank, and made a presentation 
to him on NGO-government relations in Ethiopia291. A decisive move came about in the early 
2000s when the World Bank and IMF came with the preoaration of the Poverty Reduction Strategic 
Paper (PRSP) for Ethiopia. Government officials had earlier argued that the government was the 
sole body responsible for preparing the PRSP. NGOs who knew that the stated terms of the IMF 
and World Bank called upon the government to include NGOs in the preparatory phases had taken 
the proactive step to discuss amongst themselves the PRSP. The government thus necessarily 
decided to include them, as both were required to prepare one document292.      
When the PRSP document was eventually finalised in 2002 (and came to be known as the 
Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Paper, SDPRP), it contained a few statements 
indicating goodwill on the part of the government towards NGOs. It noted that NGOs could become 
development partners in activities related to poverty reduction and in service delivery in the core 
areas of agriculture, health, education and water. SDPRP was willing to grant NGOs at the local 
level the role of monitoring poverty reduction fund management. The document also envisioned a 
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greater role for the organisations in the democratisation process begun via the poverty reduction 
and decentralisation processes293.  
Once they trusted that a plurality of views was allowed for in the country, NGOs articulated 
political visions in the framework of poverty alleviation. As the representative of a substantial 
number of NGOs in the country, CCRDA took the leading role in promoting a new political vision 
of, “…the Ethiopia society which is poverty free and empowered in handling its own affairs”294. 
Oxfam in Ethiopia upheld a similar vision to CCRDA, which they articulated in terms of, 
“Empowered citizens enjoying fundamental and democratic rights…”295 This reflects the fact that 
Oxfam, had come to the conclusion that governance in Ethiopia was a key strategic issue in moving 
the effort toward creating a poverty-free Ethiopia forward296. ASE argued that the people had to be 
“empowered” in order to make poverty eradication sustainable297.  
The NGOs’ new sense of purpose aimed to redress the power inequity that existed between citizens 
and the government. This was based on the conviction that poverty results from the power 
imbalance that exists between rulers and the ruled. As a result, it was held that no technical solution 
would address the problem; it rather required major changes in governance. In a Position Statement 
that was circulated to various organisations, the Executive Committee of CCRDA pointed out that 
democracy was a key issue for addressing poverty in the country. Part of it stated that:    
The long aspired desire of the Ethiopian people…is to see an enabling environment for their 
active involvement in the development endeavors of the country. This stems from the desire to 
extricate themselves from the quagmire of poverty and destitution and thereby lead a dignified 
life. This…can’t be realized without the prevalence of peace, stability and no less 
importantly/quite critically democracy298  
This interpretation of poverty originated from the global development discourse of the 1980s. The 
development as “empowerment” approach began to emerge as a part of a new formula that 
challenged “top down” development policies and engaged relationships of power and inequality. 
The emphasis was on grassroots work and collective action, through which marginalised 
communities could take autonomous actions to assert greater control over the environment in 
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which they lived299. While they analysed the Ethiopian situation in the light of this framework, 
NGOs were also influenced by ideals of a group of individuals who wanted to see change in 
Ethiopia. In other words, the new visions of NGOs were supported by a group of Ethiopians in the 
opposition party who were connected to CCRDA, which articulated the visions that the majority 
of NGOs in Ethiopia upheld. The “empowerment” discourse within CCRDA was well articulated 
in 2003/2004 by a British organisational development advisor, Allan Kaplan. He was contracted 
by the Executive Committee of CCRDA to study the future role and place of CCRDA within civil 
society. The resulting report, published in March 2004, triggered debate at various levels. 
Members of the Executive Committee endorsed the recommendations of Mr. Kaplan. The position 
of the Executive Committee, as summed up in one of the documents, stated as follows:  
CRDA would like to enable its members to become leading exponents of a civil society; to see 
themselves as participating and contributing towards such a civil society. This is a far cry from 
seeing NGOs simply in the role of relief and service delivery towards poverty reduction. It 
recognizes that fostering of a civil society includes actions towards justice, social transformation 
and the dimension of marginalization and social exclusion wherever it is found in society. It will 
strive as central to its vision and mission to enhance the capacity of civil society organisations to 
engage with social transformation and good governance300  
For organisations like CCRDA that had remained docile throughout the military period, this 
strategic shift was, in fact, a bold decision. The consultants themselves were impressed by the ease 
with which the new strategic direction was endorsed by the Executive Committee as well as by 
members of the Secretariat. They reported that “The conversations that took place allowed the 
groups [Executive committee and members of the secretariat] to engage critically and openly with 
the issue at hand, to move beyond defensiveness and fear and to arrive at a point of understanding 
and clarity in relation to the issue at hand”301. 
The main reason the new strategic direction was received enthusiastically was that politicians who 
were critical of the government were well represented in the Executive Committee. The 
Memorandum of Associations that the organisation endorsed at various times did not forbid 
politicians to be members of the Executive Committee. As will be discussed below, in the context 
of violence which emerged in Addis Ababa following the 2005 elections, CCRDA was to be 
accused of circulating an “illegal” position statement. In clarifying the position statement, 
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incoming Executive Committee members discussed the representation of these political party 
members therein, stating that:  
As we have come to understand after the issuance of the [Position] Statement, the presence of 
political party leadership in the CRDA Executive Committee at that time, and the issuance of the 
Position Statement under such circumstance, could have undermined the credibility of the 
Executive Committee as well as the Position Statement302.  
While members of the Executive Committee and the Secretariat were fully committed to the vision 
they articulated, some members of the CCRDA stood against the speedy endorsement of the new 
political vision. Members of the secretariat organised meetings in which they discussed the new 
sense of purpose. The initial and general response of the membership was one of high emotion and 
defensiveness. Members of CCRDA argued that the report detailing the new strategy which the 
membership was provided with was blunt and direct, and that the new strategy was a political 
direction303. Members of the Secretariat also reported that they were unfairly attacked by some of 
the members for presenting the new strategy for open discussion304. However, some members also 
supported the new strategic direction305.  
Imbued with a new sense of purpose, NGOs were driven into the national Parliamentary elections 
that took place in Ethiopia on May 15th, 2005. This election was the most contested that the country 
had ever experienced. Under the auspices of CCRDA, NGOs were variously involved throughout 
the election process, in the pre-election, election and post-election phases. Prior to the election, 
CCRDA published brochures on the basic tenets of democracy, and its leaders gave a series of 
interviews to private newspapers. CCRDA also sponsored the publication of civic education 
materials in weekly newspapers 306 . During the election day itself, CCRDA dispatched 104 
representatives from member NGOs whom it had recruited and trained to observe the fairness of 
the election307. Concerning their neutrality, the ex-executive director of ASE stated that:  
እኛ ምንም ስለ መንግስት አንናገርም ። ግን ህብረተሰቡ ራሱ መብቃት ያለበትን ምን እንደሆነ እናስተምረዋለን ። እኛ እከሌ 
መጥፎ ነው እከሌ ጥሩ ነው የማለት መብቱም አቅሙም የለንም። የራሱን ምርጫ ይወስዳል።ያን ትምህርት ‘ቤዝ‘ አድርጎ 
ሚ.ር ‘X’ ወይ ሚ.ር ‘Y’ ፓርቲ መምረጥ የራሱ ጉዳይ ነው። አግሪ ሰርቪስ ይሄን አድርግ አይልም።  
We don’t speak about the government. But we teach the society about how to empower itself. 
We do have neither the right nor the capacity to label this or that party as good or bad. Let he/she 
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[member of the society] takes his/her choice. It is up to him/her to choose Mr. ‘X’ or Mr. ‘Y’ on 
the basis of that education. ASE does not say do this or that one308. 
In the tense and violent post-election period, CCRDA called upon both the ruling and opposition 
parties to respect the verdict of the people. To that end, the organisation issued two position 
statements, both of which were circulated to the contending parties, donors and embassies, NGOs 
and the wider public. The first CCRDA position statement was issued on May 21st, 2005. The 
statement first praised the active public participation that attested to the desire of Ethiopians to 
handle their own affairs. The statement pointed out its concern that the looming tension would 
stifle the enthusiasm of the people and called upon the contending parties “….to adhere to the lofty 
ideals of democracy, which involves, among others, accommodating, tolerance, and respect for the 
views of others and ironing out of differences through negotiations and resorting to constitutional 
and legal provisions of the country to iron out the problem”309. Their second position statement 
was issued a month after that, on June 20th, 2005. In the interim, the security forces had committed 
grave human right violations. Demonstrators were arrested in their thousands, human rights 
defenders were harassed, quite large numbers of people were killed and a controversial state of 
emergency was declared by the prime minister. This position statement condemned all of those 
acts and called upon the government to set up an independent investigation inquiry mission, of 
which NGOs should be members, to investigate whether the security force used excessive force or 
not310.  
In the post-election period, the government came up with the Ethiopian Charity and Society Act 
approved in 2009. The law classifies NGOs into three categories based on nationality and income. 
“Ethiopian Charities” are those formed under the laws of Ethiopia, all of whose members are 
Ethiopians; which generate more than 90% of their income from Ethiopia, and are wholly 
controlled by Ethiopians. These NGOs may work on governance and rights issues. The category 
of “Ethiopian Residents Charities”, on the other hand, refers to national NGOs that receive more 
than 10% of their funding from foreign sources, and these are unable to work on human rights and 
governance issues. “Foreign Charities” are defined as charities that are formed under the laws of 
foreign countries, or which consist of members who are foreign nationals, or are controlled by 
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foreign nationals, or receive funds from foreign sources311. Like Ethiopian Residents Charities, 
“Foreign Charities” may not work on governance and rights issues. This proclamation was a heavy 
blow for the flourishing civil society sector in the country312.     
2.5. Conclusions  
In this chapter, we have explored the contexts in which the selected NGOs in Ethiopia have 
articulated and rearticulated development visions. These visions contained ideas, ideologies, 
policies, strategies; approaches that focused on the structures of poverty and the potential of project 
participants to change these structures, the means to exploit their potential such as public 
participation, empowerment and equality.  
The NGO leaders demonstrated their ability to analyse the national and global contexts while 
articulating their development visions. However, as a number of scholars rightly argued, the ideals 
held by NGOs have failed to transform the wider scope of poverty or social inequality313. The 
Ethiopian case has shown that ideals that NGOs held as to how to manage development enjoyed 
only limited opportune to flourish. Certainly, successive governments tolerated NGOs out of 
necessity. They saw that NGOs could mobilise resources that the country needed to tackle the food 
and agricultural crisis since the 1960s. Moreover, the government that seized power in May 1991 
was bound to tolerate NGOs due to the influence of donors. However, none of the three forms of 
government allowed NGOs ideals either to coexist with their own views on development, or to get 
the upper hand. This has had to do with clear differences between governmental actors and NGOs 
with regard to their strategic preferences on how to achieve “development”. 
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Chapter Three  
Space of Action 
3.1. Introduction  
NGOs operate in multiple-organisational contexts. As a result, NGOs space of action is determined 
by their continuous interrelationships with these organisations. Space of action here refers to the 
extent to which NGOs have freedom to translate plans that they design to achieve the objectives 
for which they operate.  
Governments determine the scope of space in which NGOs operate. The extent to which 
governments determine this scope depends on the attitude that they hold towards NGOs.  
Governments’ attitudes to NGOs vary from place to place, and tend to change with successive 
regimes. These attitudes range from active hostility, wherein governments may seek to intervene 
in the affairs of NGOs or even to dissolve them (with or without good reason), to periods of active 
courtship and partnership (and sometime cooptation), as governments may, alternatively, seek to 
incorporate NGOs into their own policy and intervention processes314.  
A range of factors might nurture the attitudes of governments towards NGOs. For instance, 
governments feel threatened when e.g., international resources, previously provided as bilateral 
aid, are given over entirely to NGOs. In this case, governments tend to control NGOs, insisting that 
NGO governance and finances be monitored in order to ensure honesty, and that there should be 
proper coordination of activities, both between their government and NGOs, and among NGOs 
themselves. As a result, relations between NGOs and the state are often tense and unstable315. On 
the other hand, NGOs may tend to favour an operating context that provides an enabling 
environment in which the state provides sound management of the economy, provides basic 
infrastructure and services, and maintains peace and the democratic rule of law. And depending on 
the context, this too may also strain relations with the government or governments in question316.  
Generally, the NGOs in Ethiopia operated in a hostile political environment. As Fowler has stated, 
“…the official perspective [of the regimes] is one of NGOs as less desirable elements within 
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wider…forms of civil society as preferred development partner”317. However, political regimes 
have not been the only factor that has determined NGOs’ space of actions in Ethiopia. The military 
period (1974–1991), saw perpetual conflict. This determined the NGOs’ space of action in two 
ways. To begin with, the mobility of NGO staff was constrained by the government. Secondly, 
armed groups, notably the TPLF, took NGO workers as hostages and threatened their development 
works.  
The presence of difficult circumstances does not necessarily suggest the absence of venues in which 
NGOs operated. In spite of their hostility, none of the Ethiopian regimes attempted to outlaw the 
existence of NGOs, as a consequence of their utilitarian attitude towards them. On the other hand, 
they did force NGOs to refrain from intervening in “hot” issues. To that end, they introduced 
administrative and legal mechanisms that made NGOs accountable to government offices. Thus 
while NGOs adhered to official policies, they also used various tactics to survive during the 
imperial and the military period. Change came with the regime change in the 1990s when NGOs 
went into high gear in terms of both seizing and creating opportunities to speak on behalf of the 
people and stand with them. This was particularly true in the context of the parliamentary elections 
of 2005. 
3.2. Policies of governments towards NGOs in Ethiopia 
3.2.1. Religious hostility of governments and NGOs  
The policies of governments in Ethiopia have been motivated by various factors, starting with 
religion, which has informed official attitudes of all the three regimes in Ethiopia, whose common 
attitude has been to stand against such evangelisation as comes under cover of “development”. 
However, they have nonetheless each recognised the contributions of faith-based NGOs. The 
imperial government realised that faith-based NGOs could support efforts to reconstruct the 
country after the damages inflicted by the Italian occupation. That government planned to 
undertake massive infrastructural development, for which it required the raising of educational 
standards. Missionaries became involved in the process. However, the official body of the 
Ethiopian Orthodox Church (EOC) was opposed to the proliferation of missionaries. In order to 
appease the national Church, the government introduced Decree No 3, 1944 whereby the country 
was divided into Christian and non-Christian zones. The missions were then allowed to build 
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churches in the non-Christian areas where each of the missions would be allotted specific areas of 
influence, but the decree barred foreign missions from converting adherents of the EOC. They 
could build hospitals and schools in Christian area as long as they were not engaged in 
evangelisation318.  
Clearly, the decree was the first legal document that created opportunities for faith-based NGOs to 
start operating in the post-Italian period. However, in line with the position of the EOC, the 
government intervened in the religious affairs of faith-based NGOs. In July 1960, the Adventist 
Mission applied to the Ministry of Interior for permission to open schools and clinics in three places 
in Kambata province, in the south-west of Ethiopia. The Ministry told the Adventist Mission that 
it had to comply with two preconditions: a) that the mission would not preach orally or in written 
form against the observance of the national holidays, especially Sunday; b) that the mission would 
not baptise any person who was already a baptised member of the EOC before the individual 
concerned was above 21 years of age and thus mature enough to make their own choice319. On 
another occasion, however, the Ministry of Interior may be seen to have acted in a way that 
sidelined the provision of Decree No 3, 1944. By the early 1960s, the American Lutheran Mission 
planned to start schools, clinics and agricultural development project in Ella, in Awsa province in 
the Wollo region. According to Decree No 3, The American Lutheran Mission could run the 
proposed programmes in Ella, as it belonged to the non-Christian area. However, senior 
government officials argued that the project should be started in Wuchale, an area that remained 
under the influence of the EOC, despite the fact that the Mission clearly stated that the primary 
objective of the project was to preach the Gospel. In a letter it addressed to the Ministry of Pen, the 
Mission stated that “….we are primarily concerned with bringing the advantages of civilization 
and the Gospel of Jesus Christ to people such as the Danaklies that is to those who don’t yet know 
Christ”320. The government nonetheless insisted that the American Lutheran Mission could run the 
programme it proposed, without evangelising. The two cases show two important things. The first 
is that because of the official policy that favoured the EOC, the government intervened in the 
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religious affairs of faith-based NGOs. The second issue is that the government nonetheless 
welcomed the contribution of NGOs.      
The military government that seized power in 1974 soon accepted socialism as a state ideology and 
discouraged the influence of religion on public life. NGOs responded in two ways: some faith-
based NGOs left the country321, while others remained quiet and refused to make public statements. 
This was intentional and necessary, “...to avoid the provocative nature of the repressive Communist 
regime of Mengistu [the president] whose hatred to religion and the West was loudly 
pronounced”322.  
A decisive incident occurred in 1983–1984 when NGOs rushed into Ethiopia to rescue famine 
victims. The government believed that these NGOs had a hidden agenda. The ex-chief 
commissioner of the RRC stated that, “They [NGOs] were looked up on [by the government] 
as…religious organisations that dampened the militant spirit of the people”323. As if to confirm the 
perception of the government, some faith-based NGOs were caught distributing Bibles and 
pamphlets and preaching in relief shelters. This provoked the regime. In March 1985, the regime 
issued a decree that closed down about 700 places of worship in the southern provinces of Sidamo 
and Shoa and a number of clergymen and followers were put in jail324.    
The end of the military government reduced significantly state intervention on affairs of NGOs that 
predicated on religion. This has been enshrined in the constitution that Ethiopia ratified in 1994. 
Article 27, No 1 of the constitution recognised that “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion”325. However, the Ethiopian government has expected that faith-based 
NGOs should have programme that could assist the effort of the government. Two issues stand out 
here. The first one has to do with the difficulty to decide whether programmes of NGOs have been 
supportive to the development of Ethiopia or not. Secondly, the government has been concerned 
that faith-based NGOs could dissiminate extreme version of religion. The two issues could be 
shown in connection with the Kenyan Gospel of God Church that applied to the Ethiopian Embassy 
in Harare to get legal permission to operate in Ethiopia. The Ethiopian Embassy in Harare 
supported the application of the Kenyan Gospel of God Church on the grounds that its plan went 
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along with the “development” underway in the country, as the Church stands to fight laziness and 
theft326. Conversely, the Ethiopian Embassy in Kenya that was approached to comment by the 
International Organisations Affairs Directorate General sent a report that was opposed to the 
recommendation of the Ethiopian Embassy in Harare. The Ethiopian Embassy in Kenya stated that 
the Church would not contribute to “development” in Ethiopia at all. Instead, the Embassy stated 
that adherents of the Church shave their hair and grow their beards, and that over time might pose 
a serious threat to Ethiopia 327 . The International Organisations Affairs Directorate General 
automatically rejected the application of the Kenyan Gospel of God Church and informed the 
Ministry of Justice that it was not in favour of the registration of the Church328. Moreover, using 
the case of the Kenyan Gospel of God Church as an opportunity, the Directorate General 
summarised the long-standing policy of the government. In a letter addressed to the Ethiopian 
Embassy in Kenya, the Directorate Generate stated that:  
ድርጅቱ ያቀረበው የፈቃድ ጥያቄ አገራችን የምታደርገውን የልማት እንቅስቃሴ የሚያግዝ ባለመሆኑና ከዚህ ቀደም በተመሳሳይ 
መልኩ ሀይማኖታዊ ተግባር ለማከናወን የመጡ መንግስታዊ ያልሆኑ ድርጅቶች በመስሪያ ቤታችን በኩል ድጋፍ ያላገኙ 
መሆኑና የዚህም ድርጅት ጥያቄ ለመደገፍ የምንቸገር መሆኑን እየገለጽን፣ ለወደፊትም ቢሆን በተመሳሳይ መልኩ በብቸኝነት 
በሃይማኖት ስራ የተሰማሩ ድርጅቶች የማናስተናግድ መሆኑን ተገንዝባችሁ ተመሳሳይ ጥያቄ ለሚያቀርቡ እንድታሳውቁ 
እንጠይቃለን።    
As it was not supportive to the development that the country has been undertaking and as similar 
other organizations failed to get our organization’s approval, we hereby let you know that we 
decline to accept the request of the organization [the Kenyan Gospel of God Church] and that 
you inform in the future similar organizations engaged solely in religious affairs that their 
applications would not be endorsed329    
3.2.2. Ethnicity, governments and NGOs 
Ethnicity is also one of the major factors that influenced the attitudes of government officials. A 
number of ethnic/region based NGOs have been operational since the 1950s: the Guraghe Road 
Construction Organisation (renamed the Gurage People’s Self-Help Development Organisation), 
the Gojjam Development Organisation, the Gonder Development Association and Mecha and 
Tulama Self-Help Association among the most prominent330. Their primary objective was to build 
schools, clinics, and feeder roads with funds from their members. However, they were looked upon 
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with suspicion by the imperial government for conducting anti-government activities. As a result, 
they operated under restrictions331. Concerned by the growing influence of these ethnic/region-
based NGOs, the imperial government promulgated the Legal Notice 321 of 1966. According to 
Legal Notice 321/1966, registration regulations for associations were incorporated into the 
“Internal Security Act”332.  
The first victim of the sensitivity of the imperial government was the Mecha and Tulama Self-Help 
Association set up in 1963 mostly by Oromos in Addis Ababa. The Association did not have any 
political ambitions amongst its official objectives333. However, the organisation could mobilise its 
members to a large extent. As a result, it remained under the watchful eye of the security persons. 
Finally, the organisation was outlawed and its leaders were accused of attempting to overthrow the 
government and they were sentenced to various punishments334.  
This skeptical stance towards ethnic / region-based NGOs only intensified during the military 
period (1974–1991). The formation of ethnic-based development associations was strongly 
discouraged by the government. Thus, the approach of people organising themselves along ethnic 
or locality lines stayed out of favour up until 1991335.  
The Ethiopian People Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) that seized power in May 1991 
used ethnicity as a guiding principle to restructure the governmental system. As a result, the 
government encouraged ethnic/region based NGOs to flourish. Concerning this, Mr Tony Vaux, a 
senior official of Oxfam who met with the new official of the RRC in 1991, reported that, 
“NGOs…are…welcome to set up programmes [operational or otherwise] wherever they wish, and 
it seems that the TG [Transitional Government] will not at all object to the adoption of specific 
areas for comprehensive development”336.  
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3.2.3. Security and Accountability of NGOs in Ethiopia   
NGOs are accountable under the relevant laws of the particular country in which they operate, and 
states have legal powers to intervene if, e.g., NGOs transgress laws relating to accounting rules, 
bureaucratic procedures and registration obligations337. The term accountability is used here as 
defined by Edward Hulme and Hugo Slim. According to Edward Hulme, accountability refers to, 
“The means by which individuals and organisations report to a recognized authority [or authorities] 
and are held responsible for their action”338. As Hugo Slim has rightly said, accountability is more 
than financial reporting and includes, “…reporting on relationships, intent, objectives, method and 
impact”339.  
NGOs in Ethiopia had existed long before a governmental organisation to which they were 
accountable was designated. The Ethiopian Red Cross Society, the Boy Scouts Association, the 
Ethiopian Women Welfare Association, the Minelik II Memorial Fund, the Haile Selassie I 
Foundation and the Young Male Christian Association of Ethiopia had all been set up, governed 
and regulated by Charters enacted by imperial Order340.  
In the 1950s, when ethnic-based NGOs emerged in large number, the imperial government saw the 
need to recognise and account for them. Thus, Article 47 of the revised 1955 constitution granted 
the right to form or join associations341. In 1960, the Ethiopian Civil Code was promulgated, which 
stipulated that an Office of Association would be set up within the Department of Public Security 
of the Ministry of Interior to administer NGOs342. The Department came to have excessive power 
to intervene in the internal affairs of autonomous associations. A legally registered association had 
to report to the Department of Public Security whenever it held a meeting343. The Department of 
Public Security might also be represented by an observer at such a general meeting. Any such 
association was also to inform the Department about the decisions taken within a month following 
the holding of such a meeting344.     
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This institutional arrangement suggests that security was a primary concern to the imperial 
government. The Public Security Department exercised strict control over NGOs from the early 
1970s onwards due to the outbreak of the famine in 1973–1974. On 14th April, 1973 three staff 
members of Haile Selassie I University visited famine-stricken areas of Wollo and submitted a 
report in which they described the state of famine and presented photos of victims. Students of 
Haile Selassie I University reacted to the disaster instantaneously, trying to assemble to address the 
problem. Facing the government’s determination to hide the famine, students were confronted with 
concerted attacks by university guards and police who had invaded the campus345. To complicate 
the situation further, radical students prepared for armed struggle against the imperial government. 
From 1974 onwards, their struggle was directed against the military government that had seized 
power in the midst of the revolution346.  
The ongoing conflict had profound implications for NGOs. When students protested against the 
government, the Public Security Department refused to grant permission for NGOs to come from 
abroad to help famine victims347. Eventually, however, the fact that the famine grew beyond the 
ability of the state to manage it, “…forced the imperial government to open its doors to NGOs”348.  
During the military period, the government carried out a profound restructuring of NGO 
accountability. This was particularly true in the context of the famine that occurred again in 1983–
1984. Two factors stand out here. To begin with, armed groups operated in Northern provinces 
where the famine was much more serious. Moreover, the government was openly hostile to the 
Western countries from which 48 NGOs staffed by 500 expatriates came. The head of state, 
Mengistu Haile Mariam argued that NGOs posed a security threat and that they were to be chased 
out. The chief commissioner of the RRC argued back, however, insisting that, “…if we were 
suspicious about the activities of…foreigners, the solution was not to get rid of them, but to 
strengthen our security agencies”349. The commissioner’s argument saved the NGOs. NGOs were 
allowed to relieve famine victims and continue operating after the relief operation was over, and 
the RRC retroactively legalised the presence of those expatriate staff of NGOs that had entered 
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Ethiopia without the necessary documents due to the famine350. Concerning this, RRC told NGOs 
that:  
There is no other better way to legalize the participation of each expatriate in saving human lives 
and to protect the validity of their humanitarian endeavors in our country than to assure that each 
and every expatriate of each NGOs possess all the necessary legal documents which justify 
his/her presence in the country for undertaking his or her assignment351.     
This legalisation of expatriates should not, however, be taken to suggest there was any relaxation 
of control of NGOs. As will be discussed below, the RRC imposed heavy restrictions on NGOs. 
Although motivated by security concerns, these restrictions were also used by the RRC to control 
NGOs’ resources. These restrictions were included in an agreement NGOs signed in June 1984352. 
Two issues therein remained controversial. The first issue was that resources connected to projects 
were under the custody of the RRC353. The second was that the salaries of NGO employees were 
to be made public354. NGOs argued that these provisions constituted government control over their 
activities355. The commissioner argued that the intention of the new agreement was to standardise 
the agreements held between the government and all NGOs present in Ethiopia. He further stated 
that: 
We have found out that these agreements [earlier agreements between RRC and NGOs] need to 
be standardized. The non uniformity of these agreements has sometimes been a major cause of 
misunderstanding and their uneven applications have been a source of unnecessary discussion 
and correspondence356.  
However, provisions in the agreement also suggest that the RRC wanted accurate accounts of 
NGOs’ financial activities. According to No 1 of Article VII, NGOs were expected to keep genuine 
income and expenditure accounts. No 2 of the same article empowered the RRC to review and 
verify the financial management of all NGOs. Article 8 stipulated that external auditors should be 
jointly appointed by the RRC and NGOs357. Moreover, RRC wanted to have control over NGOs’ 
resources. Article II, No 3 stipulated that NGOs would have to hand over all their assets to the RRC 
at the end of their operation358.  
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Although they were opposed to this, all NGOs except the Ethiopian Evangelical Church Mekane 
Yesus (EECMY) signed the general agreement with the RRC. Since it was a national NGO, the 
EECMY refused to sign the general agreement prepared for foreign NGOs. The Aid Coordination 
Department of the RRC subsequently refused to grant work and travel permits to expatriates 
employed by EECMY. The EECMY could no longer resist. In 1985 it was finally forced to come 
into line with the RRC and sign the general agreement359.  
After signing the agreement with the RRC, NGOs were required to present a detailed plan of the 
operation/s to be undertaken. Based on this information, a draft project agreement would be 
prepared and signed. This specific agreement included a detailed description of all project activities 
to be carried out, the amount of relief and rehabilitation goods to be distributed, the number of 
beneficiaries to be assisted, the number of expatriate and local staff to be employed and the total 
budget to be allocated. Like the general agreement, the project agreement consisted entirely of the 
obligations and responsibilities of NGOs. The main responsibility of the RRC was to supervise and 
follow up project activities. NGOs, on the other hand, were committed to providing the required 
funds for the implementation of a project, to employ expatriate (if need arose) and local staff and 
to supply the necessary goods and tools360.  
However, undertaking hectic emergency operations in the country, NGOs failed to send reports to 
the RRC. As RRC told NGOs, “The Relief and Rehabilitation Commission has not been receiving 
reports from the agencies [NGOs] on their relief and rehabilitation programmes”361. In order to 
deal with the problem, the RRC set up five teams within its Early Warning Department and grouped 
the 42 NGOs into four categories. Each of four teams in the Early Warning Department would 
control one group of NGOs and one team would supervise the whole362.  
When the emergency period was over towards the end of 1986, the same modality of controlling 
NGOs was maintained. Depending on the type of projects that they wanted to run, NGOs were 
entering into partnership with technical line departments together with the Relief and Rehabilitation 
Commission363.  
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To conclude, the policies that the three regimes followed in collection with NGOs were nurtured 
by factors chiefly religion and ethnicity. The imperial and military governments developed systems 
whereby they accounted NGOs. This was for three main reasons. To begin with, they were against 
religion. The imperial government was in favor of the national Church. Partly because of this, 
imperial government stood against evangelization by faith-based NGOs that came from abroad. To 
make things wose, the military government stood not only faith-based NGOs that came from 
abroad, but also the national church. The same was true with regard to ethnicity. Due to their pan-
Ethiopian agenda, the imperial and military governments discouraged ethnicity as away of 
organizing society. Secondly, NGOs were considered to be a security tread and hence the imperial 
and military governments accounted NGOs. Thirdly, the military government wanted to control 
the resources that NGOs mobilised. It is, thus, clear, that the continued existence of NGOs 
depended to a larger extent on how skillful were NGOs in maneuvering during the imperial and 
the military period.  
3.3. NGOs’ maneuvering and its effects  
NGOs used numerous tactics to tackle administrative, legal and political constraints, once they 
realised that the imperial and the military governments held strict control over their activities. In 
response, the NGOs operated in ways that built up the confidence of governments in them. NGOs 
believed that their objectives would be met only when they worked closely with authorities of the 
two regimes. This remained unchanged throughout the imperial and the military periods, however 
a significant change NGOs experienced with the transition from one to the other was to the form 
of their relationship with each government. During the imperial period, NGOs generally had a form 
of relation with the government that could be called courtship. This was the time when NGOs went 
to great lengths to assure the imperial government that they were working in support of them. The 
most commonly-used tactic of those national NGOs that emerged prior to the 1960s was to enlist 
high-ranking officials in the leadership of their organisations. Concerning this, Kassahun tells us, 
“This first generation [national] NGOs in Ethiopia functioned in close cooperation with 
government departments. Government officials presided on the organizations’ decision making 
bodies as presidents and board chairpersons and members”364.  
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The close relation between state and NGOs continued throughout the 1960s and 1970s. NGOs that 
showed up during this time secured the favour of government officials although they did not place 
high-ranking government officials in their leadership. As they began to recognise the role of NGOs, 
officials of the imperial government showed a great deal of interest in assisting them. Sometimes, 
this led to stiff competition between officials. For instance, due to the role of government officials 
during its establishment, ASE secured various form of support from the Ministry of Agriculture. 
This was in line with a project agreement signed on June 1st, 1969 whereby ASE would operate 
under the “sponsorship” of the Ministry of Agriculture. The Minister of Agriculture, Dejjazmach 
Germachew Tekle Hawariat, believed that such “sponsorship” gave the Ministry of Agriculture a 
ground upon which to guide ASE. When, before long, he insisted that ASE was to withdraw from 
Wollaita and start to operate in Harar, his birthplace, this was resisted by Dejjazmach Wolde 
Semait, the administrator of Wollaita. The two officials finally reached an agreement that ASE 
would operate chiefly in Wolliata, and then expand towards Harar depending on its resources365. 
Dejjazmach Wolde Semait was grateful to ASE’s decision to operate in Wollaita. As a result, ASE 
secured all of his authority’s administrative and technical support. As Fr. Henry stated, “…We [the 
founders of ASE]…together gave life to ASE, backed as we were, by the local authorities of the 
government”366.  
The leaders of ASE were not mere observers in the conflict of interest between the Minister of 
Agriculture and the administrator of Wollaita. Recognizing the favour that they had secured from 
the administrator at the provincial level, the leaders of ASE told the Minister of Agriculture that 
they wanted to operate in Wollaita. When the disagreement became heated, they considered 
petitioning to the monarch to settle the matter367. This supplication was a usual option to which 
NGOs resorted in order to resolve the problems they faced during the imperial period. Specific 
cases suggest that this tactic was effective. Frustrated by the bureaucratic hurdles thrown up by the 
Ministry of Education and Fine Arts, a representative of the Baptist Bible Fellowship appealed to 
the monarch, stating, “…I have striven to get the business finalised so that the new mission might 
begin working, but without success”368. On July 25th, 1960, this representative of the Fellowship 
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managed to meet with the monarch, who consented to consider the project. Permission was soon 
granted and the organisation continued its religious and educational activities369.  
ASE’s readiness to use the same means influenced the Minister of Agriculture to allow ASE to 
operate in Wollaita. Mollified, also, by the promise that ASE would expand towards Harar, the 
Minister of Agriculture assisted ASE’s activities. This was in line with the “sponsorship”, a form 
of relation between ASE and the Ministry of Agriculture. ASE duly asked the Ministry to provide 
technical cooperation and organisational assistance. This was granted. Organisationally, ASE 
depended on the network of rural governmental organisations. Extension workers of the Ministry 
assisted ASE’s project participants by explaining concepts370. Ato Dessalegn Tanga, one such 
extension agent, played a significant role in this regard. He personally believed that teaching, 
“…scientific agricultural system not only the youths but also the farmers’ would eventually address 
the structural problems in the region371. The Ministry also seconded staff to work for ASE. Run by 
expatriate volunteers in its early stages, ASE was understaffed. As a result, it applied to the 
Ministry to assign a service student from Alamaya University372. Thus, Ato Zeleke Dessalegn was 
seconded373. The assistance of the Ministry had an organisational dimension as well. Organisations 
under the management of the Ministry of Agriculture –the Extension and Project Implementation 
Department (EPID), which was the official agricultural extension service; the Wollamo 
Agricultural Development Unit (WADU), and the Kenbata Agricultural Development Unit 
(KADU) – served ASE as channels through which teaching materials of ASE used to reach project 
participants 374 . ASE also made use of other channels, such as missionary offices in ASE’s 
operational area375.  
The revolution that erupted in 1974 was a landmark event with regard to the NGOs’ space of action. 
Coordinated by CCRDA, NGOs in the country had played a pivotal role in the relief operation in 
1973–1974. The military government, which condemned the imperial government for failing to 
avoid the famine, appreciated NGOs, particularly CCRDA, whose fame became widespread. Ato 
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Berhe, one of the founders, described how, “…the credibility of CRF [precursor of CCRDA] grew 
beyond the imagination of its members”376. 
CCRDA used its credibility to negotiate with the authorities of the military government. Two points 
were important here; the first was how to legalise CCRDA. CCRDA started its operation without 
any legal basis. Authorities of the imperial government had permitted CCRDA to open a bank 
account to mobilise resources for relief operations377. The legal status of CCRDA became a top 
priority when the relief operation was over. Legal experts of the government argued that CCRDA 
was quite unique, and as such could not easily be accommodated by the existing legal framework. 
Finally, as informants in CCRDA recall it, the chairman of the Provincial Military Administrative 
Council (PMAC) gave a special order for the registration of CCRDA as an NGO378.  
Putting itself on firmer legal ground, CCRDA started to negotiate with officials of the RRC with 
regard to NGO’s entitlements. The response of the RRC was positive as the government expected 
NGOs to play their own role in building a new socialist society379. As a means to encourage NGOs, 
the RRC accepted the demands of CCRDA and for the first time, the RRC introduced a list of 
privileges NGOs were entitled to. These privileges came to be part of the first agreement NGOs 
signed with the RRC in 1975. Article IV was about the most important privileges of NGOs. It stated 
that NGOs would have custom and tax exemptions. The extent to which the RRC followed up on 
the implementation of the legislation was impressive. The RRC had secured the consent of senior 
government officials with regard to NGOs’ privileges 380 . However, leaders of governmental 
organisations were not consulted about it. For instance, Article IV, No 2 of the agreement signed 
between the RRC and NGOs in 1975 exempted expatriate staff of NGOs from income tax and other 
fiscal charges and levies in respect of any and all emoluments paid to them from external sources 
by the NGOs of any sort381. Soon after the agreement was signed, however, the Ministry of Finance 
informed CCRDA that its expatriate staff were exempted from payment of income tax, “…only if 
they come to Ethiopia in a bona fide member of the Voluntary Agency”382.  In defense of NGOs, 
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the RRC argued that, “…expatriate staff assigned to projects approved by the Commission were 
exempted from paying tax on income obtained from external sources”383. The RRC then asked the 
Coordinator of CCRDA to send a list of expatriate staff to aid their negotiations with the Ministry 
of Finance and the RRC was successful384. Likewise, according to Article 4, No 1 of the agreement 
signed every three years from 1975 on, Article 3, No 4 of the agreement signed every three years 
from 1984 on, and according to the procedures and guidelines issued in February 1983, expatriate 
staff of NGOs were exempted from payment of customs and import duties of materials and 
equipment for personal use and use for projects and programmes approved by the Commission385.  
Towards the end of 1987, these privileges were conditioned by two requirements that NGOs could 
easily meet. In a circular letter, the RRC informed NGOs that, “…all NGOs, prior to the termination 
of any project period should submit an annual inventory report to the RRC”386. The RRC said also 
that, “The Logistic and Aid Department of RRC should be notified about the sale or export of 
personal effects which have been brought into the country duty free”387.  
However, such privileges were not enough to guarantee the continuation of NGO activity. The 
revolution created uncertainty in a number of ways. The military government came to be the sole 
body to lead the revolution. Due to the unjust land tenure system, the revolutionary government 
mobilised the general public in the south and NGOs in the region were overwhelmed by the 
intensity of the revolutionary process. In the north and north-western parts of the country, counter-
revolutionary forces and left-wing armed groups emerged to fight against the military government. 
The war going on between the government forces and rebels influenced the operation of NGOs in 
the regions. NGOs in the north, e.g., suffered frequent disruptions as they were threatened by 
rebels. As exemplified by referring to ASE that operated in the south and Oxfam in the east and 
the north, the NGOs pursued similar tactics to cope with the two source of uncertainty: they 
sheltered themselves in the structures of the military government, and they secured the cooperation 
of government authorities.   
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In the revolutionary context, NGOs in the south such as ASE were concerned about their 
organisational relevance. The structures on which ASE had based its educational programmme 
were dismantled due to rapidly changing rural circumstances388. Project participants of ASE were 
themselves mobilised to join the revolution by high school and university students and their 
teachers, and ASE became almost idle. In fact, the organization believed that due to the fact that 
the revolutionary process was being led exclusively by military officers, ASE did have neither the 
authority nor the capacity to mobilise project participants389. For the loyalty that it demonstrated in 
trying to get this authority to mobilise project participants, ASE was rewarded with ample 
opportunity. Soon after the outbreak of the revolution, INADES-Formation passed a resolution. 
The resolution was to work out a framework in which ASE would operate alongside the Ministry 
of Agriculture390. ASE took a series of measures to implement the resolution, beginning with the 
opening of ASE’s branch office in Addis Ababa in November 1974 391 . In April 1976, the 
headquarters of ASE was shifted to Addis Ababa392. This was a response to an evaluation done in 
1976, which recommended that, “The correspondence course system [strategy of ASE] 
could…only benefit from merging of the education programme within a single public institution 
with the required authority and resource”393. In order to realise this, the evaluation recommended 
moving the headquarters to the capital394.  
INADES-Formation had officially requested the Ministry of Agriculture to design a framework in 
which ASE would operate alongside the Ministry in July 1975395. However, the request did not 
fare well. Soon after the request was submitted, the Minister of Agriculture, Dejjazmach 
Germachew instructed a comprehensive evaluation to be carried out on ASE. However, the 
minister himself was then removed due to a reshuffling of government officials396 . The new 
minister was preoccupied with ministerial reorganisation and the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Settlement resulted from the process397. When the reorganisation was over, INADES-Formation 
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submitted its official request again, along with a model framework, to the Minister of Agriculture 
and Settlement in January 1977398.  
INADES-Formation proposed a modality that would recognise ASE as having organisational 
autonomy. As in a related memo, the Amharic phrase, “…ጎን ለጎን ለመስራት…”, signifying “To 
operate alongside” the Ministry of Agriculture, attested to this autonomy. But ASE’s programme 
would be integrated with the Ministry of Agriculture399.  
The Ministry of Agriculture considered the request which INADES-Formation had presented in 
January 1977. The Ministry of Agriculture and Settlement was the leading governmental 
organisation actively involved in the revolutionary process, and was badly in need of resources; 
financial as well as organisational assistance400. The officials of the Ministry saw in ASE a wide 
range of resources they were aspiring for. Thus, they favoured the proposal put by INADES-
Formation. In one of the publications, their attitude towards the resources of ASE was summed up 
thus:  
Its [ASE’s] programmes, the production of teaching materials and aids, its rural radio forums and 
farmers newsletters are invaluable for the dissemination of ideals and methods. Even its 
programme of training farmers though on a limited scale has provided an opportunity for ASE to 
gain practical experience with the needs and conditions of farmers in rural Ethiopia. The facilities 
and experience that ASE has created over many years in Ethiopia could complement the efforts 
of the Ministry of Agriculture that has already created an extension network covering most parts 
of the country401.  
Officials thus expressed the, “…desire of the ministry to give direction to ASE…”402  In order to 
legitimise such claims, officials praised the role the Ministry of Agriculture had played in 
establishing ASE in Ethiopia, even dismissing the role of key personalities in the process403.  
A series of discussions and consultations were held among the governmental departments 
concerned. In 1980, the final draft was submitted to the National Revolutionary Campaign and 
Central Planning Supreme Council (NRCCPSC) of the Ethiopian Government404. The NRCCPSC 
referred the proposal to its Department of Agriculture, which commented on the proposed 
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agreement405. The Department of Agriculture referred the proposal to the NRCCPSC Department 
of External Affairs, which presented comments and questions to INADES-Formation406 . The 
representative of INADES-Formation then submitted his explanations and answers to the 
NRCCPSC on January 12th, 1982407. After incorporating the explanations and answers of the 
representative of INADES-Formation, the NRCCPSC referred the final draft agreement to the 
Council of Ministers for approval408 . However, the Council of Ministers did not discuss the 
proposed agreement. On June 29th, 1982, the Minister of Agriculture wrote a letter in which he 
stated the problem that the pending agreement created for the Ministry as well as on ASE. He said 
that, “ስምምነቱ ውሳኔ ሳያገኝ በእንጥልጥል ላይ በመቆየቱ ምክንያት በስራ አፈፃፀም በኩል ለድርጅቱም ሆነ ለመስራቤታቺን 
ቺግር ፈጥሮብናል። i.e. Because of the fact that decision was not passed on the agreement, it created 
problem to the organisation [ASE] as well as to our organisation”409. On October 20th, 1982, the 
office of the Council of Ministers asked the Minister who himself was a member of the Council to 
bring the draft for endorsement with him410. However, the Minister did not submit the draft to the 
Council of Ministers. The reason for this is not clear; one of the sources simply says that, “…ሆኖም 
ባልታወቁ ምክንያቶች ጉዳዩን ሳያቀርቡ ቆይተዋል። i.e. For unknown reasons, he [the Minister of Agriculture] 
did not present [the draft to the Council of Ministers]”411. However, we can assume a broader 
explanation for this. The Minister saw that senior government officials appreciated NGOs managed 
by Ethiopians. A later evaluation shows this appreciation of government officials for ASE. The 
report stated that “Government officials…show respect and appreciation for the rather rare species 
of authentic Ethiopian NGO”412. As a result, government officials were against the tendency of 
INADES-Formation to undermine the Ethiopian character of ASE. One of the documents summed 
up a provision included in the draft agreement that undermined the autonomy, as an Ethiopian 
entity, of ASE. It stated that:  
The autonomous status of ASE granted by its registration with the Ministry of Interior as a non-
profit making association is repealed and replaced by the [proposed] agreement….as a 
consequence of the agreement, ASE is no more an autonomous Ethiopian entity…It become 
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obvious that ASE will not be any more registered with the Ministry of Public Safety and State 
Security as an association413.         
Its appreciation by government officials, coupled with the readiness that ASE showed to adhere to 
government policy, provided ASE with ample opportunities to run its programme. After the 
massive reorganisation of rural society, peasant, and women’s associations became the most 
important structures for local government. This led ASE to believe that the educational programme 
should be based on them414. Officials of these local level structures considered ASE as an extension 
of the Ministry of Agriculture. As a result, service cooperatives, peasant associations, women’s 
associations, and youth associations served ASE as a channel through which educational materials 
were passed to project participants 415 . In fact, ASE had used similar structures since its 
establishment. The difference was that ASE now came to have a great deal of authority over 
officials of these local level organisations. An indication of this was that these officials were now 
expected to mobilise project participants for ASE’s educational programmes416. Towards the end 
of the 1970s, as one of the sources shows, project participants “…no longer come on individuals 
basis to take training from ASE; rather, ASE approached project participants through “production 
cadres”, whose number ranged from three to five in every peasant association”417.  
ASE’s authority over local level organisations originated from the strong relationship it developed 
with governmental offices in Addis Ababa. Government officials themselves noted the resources 
that ASE commanded. In his 1978 annual report, the Executive Director of ASE stated that various 
offices in the Ministries of Agriculture and Education, “…have started to believe…in ASE 
educational materials for different purposes”418. This opened up ASE’s space of action. This was 
because these offices argued that ASE should be permitted to, “…prepare a series of educational 
materials in different subject matters…as [it has profound experiences] and it has qualified 
personnel as well as other facilities for this task”419. This positive attitude encouraged ASE to take 
the initiative to convince various departments of the Ethiopian government to launch a radio 
transmitter in Wollaita province. Soon after the necessary technical and social prerequisites were 
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met, a tripartite programme that included ASE, the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of 
Agriculture started in 41 centers in the Sidamo region of Wollaita province420. 
Clearly, ASE went to great lengths to secure official favour. Other NGOs pursued similar courses. 
Although they did not seek a structural integration with governmental organisations, many NGOs 
in the country noted that operating along official lines was the only realistic way to cope with 
difficult circumstances. This was particularly true with NGOs operating in the eastern and northern 
parts of the country where insecurity was widespread. In order to gain protection, NGOs sheltered 
themselves under governmental organisations. Oxfam was one such organisation, operating under 
the protection of the RRC. Oxfam had previously opened an office upon the invitation of the 
imperial government; this had given NGOs, of which Oxfam was one, a strong influence over the 
young RRC. These influences were apparent in 1974 during the relief operation in the Ogaden in 
the east. Oxfam advocated on a number of issues to relieve famine victims in the region. When 
NGOs arrived in the region in 1974, no one exercised authority over relief shelters in the Ogaden. 
Thus, Dr. Lusty of Oxfam called upon the RRC to take over the leading role in coordinating the 
relief operation421. He also engaged the RRC to ensure that, “…the number of feeds for the severely 
malnourished…be stepped up to 4 times daily and a high energy food [be] used”422. The main 
challenge for the RRC at the regional level was that decision-making within the RRC was in the 
hands of senior officials in the head office in Addis Ababa. Oxfam, thus, recommended that:  
The administration at Dire Dawa [provincial capital] should be strengthened both in personnel 
and power: It should not have to refer to Addis for approval of every decision. Additional 
personnel should be seconded to Dire Dawa: where possible these people should have previous 
experience as in Wollo. Many workers in Wollo could be spared even if only briefly to help set 
up the programme in the south. The administration in Dire Dawa should also have more money, 
fuel and transport423.  
 
In order to strengthen the RRC at the provincial level, Oxfam recommended that one health officer 
and one nutritionist were to be based in each of the five districts in the Ogaden province that would 
travel around the relief centres in the region424.  
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Some of Oxfam’s proposals were taken up. The RRC proposed that three mobile teams be deployed 
in each province. This was soon realised; each team was respectively stationed in Degahbour, Kebri 
Dahr and Warder. Progress was observed also in the general situation in the shelter. Some months 
after his recommendations, Dr. Lusty found the situation in Warder to be, “…well set up with 
improvement since April [1974]425.  
The RRC accepted Oxfam’s proposals out of mutual concern. Thus, the RRC facilitated Oxfam’s 
activities. In line with Article 3, No 2 and 3, expatriate staff of NGOs were entitled to get entry and 
exit visas, resident and travel permits, and tax-free importation goods426. Although security issues 
were the prerogative of the Public Security Department of the Ministry of Public Safety and State 
Security, the RRC used to issue travel permits. However, traveling in Ethiopia was still extremely 
difficult due to wars and conflicts, with Ogaden being the most troubled area, as the Somalia 
government had territorial claims over the region. As a result, the Ethiopian forces were always 
suspicious of any movement in the region. Due to this, even the travel permits that RRC used to 
issue to NGO expatriate staff were not a guarantee. In July 1975, the East Africa Regional 
Representative of Oxfam, Malcolm Harper visited the Ogaden to assess Oxfam’s relief operation. 
In his final report, Mr. Harper summed up the sensitivities of the Ethiopian army, due to long 
standing tensions, and the difficulties he and his team encountered in one of their visits. He reported 
that:  
We were searching Dellyn’s house and taking the wrong turning, ended up at the bridge. The 
troops on guard kept us in our vehicles until an officer from the nearby base had been telephoned 
and had come to release us and to guide us to Peter’s house. Although we were able to produce 
letters from Ato Shimeles [RRC’s chief commissioner] in Addis Ababa justifying our presence 
in the Ogaden, nevertheless the military situation is sensitive enough for this sort of incident to 
occur427.  
Insecurity was even worse in Tigray, Gonder and Wollo. Assisted by the United States, the 
Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU) had fought against the government since the mid-1970s428. 
Towards the end of the 1970s, the power of EDU was weakened and the Tigray People Liberation 
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Front came to be a formidable political force, first in Tigray and then in neigbouring provinces 
such as Gonder and Wollo, where Oxfam had been operating since the mid-1970s429.  
Security was tight in conflict areas, which made Oxfam’s operations difficult. Oxfam thus resorted 
to cultivating personal friendships with decision-making bureaucrats. This facilitated getting travel 
permits. At this early stage, getting travel permits was quite important for NGOs like Oxfam. This 
was because the organisation had limited its role to funding projects. The agreement signed 
between the RRC and Oxfam in April 1975 stated that, “…it [Oxfam] provides financial and 
material assistance to organisations and agencies engaged in relief and development activities”430. 
In order to assess these projects and follow up on their implementation, the field director of Oxfam 
had been travelling back and forth to the project sites for which he needed travel permits. The above 
approach of Oxfam was successful, to the extent that the Field Director of Oxfam was able to get 
travel permits to visit and assess projects in areas where even the government did not have effective 
control. On a visit to Gonder in 1981, for instance, the Field Director of Oxfam reported that:   
It was an extremely interesting visit…because Gonder region has become in recent years one of 
the least known regions for voluntary agency [NGOs] representatives and even government 
officials. Both in Addis and Gonder, I was told that I was extremely fortunate in having been able 
to visit so much of the region431.  
The assistant commissioner of the RRC’s branch office in Gonder made the trip possible. In his 
appreciation to the chief commissioner, the field director reported further that, “The credit for this, 
and for the free way in which I was able to discuss problems with officials [I] met, must go to Ato 
Adane [assistant commissioner] of the RRC in Gonder”432. This appreciation led the Field Director 
to trust that the RRC’s Gonder branch office would faithfully implement projects with Oxfam’s 
funds. In the same report quoted above, the Field Director proudly said that, “I have a lot of 
confidence in the ability of the RRC Gonder office to disperse approved funds according to budgets 
agreed”433. The Field Director’s trust was so high that Oxfam did not even follow up on how funds 
were used. In the early 1980s, there was a debate within Oxfam. Senior officers in Oxford 
questioned the lack of follow up with regard to project implementation, as well as financial 
utilisation. In defence of the RRC’s officials in Gonder, the Field Director told his superiors that, 
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“There is not much to show for our series [of] grants to the RRC in Gonder over the years, and this 
is not really the fault of the excellent assistant commissioner, Ato Adane who has been there for 6 
years. The real problem is the lack of follow up of grants made, either by us or the RRC”434.  
The Field Director worked closely with officials of the RRC. Senior officials of Oxfam believed, 
however, that the Field Director became an apologist for the government. Tony Vaux, chief Oxfam 
official in Oxford said that, “In the early 1980s, Oxfam…became alarmed that its own 
representative was acting as an apologist for the government”435. Despite this criticism of the Field 
Director, Oxfam pursued a policy that necessitated that the organisation must operate alongside the 
government. One of the documents summed up the advantage of this. Part of it stated that:   
A general recommendation, applicable to works in all part of the country, is that time spent talking 
and introducing programmes and ideas to all levels of the administration and staff members of 
technical ministries is never wasted and hopefully can avoid potential mistrust later on in the 
implementation of such programme436       
Assisted by the assistant chief commissioner of the RRC in Gonder, Oxfam launched its own water 
programme in Ibnat district in Gonder in 1983. Oxfam’s programme was most welcomed by local 
officials. Concerning the response of officials, one of the sources stated that, “…we should report 
that the proposed programme met with considerable enthusiasm from all those with whom it was 
discussed”437. The extent to which local officials went to protect and encourage Oxfam to work on 
water wells was impressive as well. On May 25th, 1983, Zway Hammused town in Libo district 
was ransacked by the Tigray People Liberation Front. This raised the level of vigilance of security 
officials of the government; the local administration took a very restrictive attitude towards 
expatriate movements outside of Ibnat, the main town438. Even in this tightened security situation, 
however, local government officials allowed Oxfam to operate. This surprised even employees of 
the RRC. Oxfam’s Field Director stated of the situation that, “…all the RRC staff in Ibenat were 
surprised that we were given permission to go there at all…” 439  The main reason for local 
authorities to allow Oxfam to operate even in difficult times was that water was a chronic problem. 
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Concerning this, the source quoted above further stated that, “…Ato Workeneh [the administrator 
of Ibnat], defended [Oxfam] on the grounds that water was essential for Kwalates [a village]…”440. 
NGOs were not only influenced by the ongoing war, but also threatened by armed groups. Various 
factors motivated rebels, particularly the Tigray People Liberation Front, to target NGOs. The first 
motive was publicity. In order to bring their cause to the attention of the international community, 
the TPLF ransacked towns where NGOs carried out relief and development activities. An attack 
conducted by the TPLF against Korem town on April 12th, 1983 was motivated by this factor. The 
TPLF captured the town, seized humanitarian supplies and took seven relief workers hostage, 
including two British citizens from the Save the Children Fund441. The attack was also aimed at 
frustrating the government’s counter- insurgency strategy. The government was maintaining 
famine victims in shelters such as Korem in Tigray indefinitely. In doing so, the government 
wanted to weaken the social bases of the TPLF442. The second motive was that the TPLF believed 
that locally recruited employees of NGOs were “collaborators” of the government. In a report 
submitted to Oxford House on the attack in Ibnat on May 25th, 1983, Oxfam’s Field Director stated 
that, “At present I gather they [local staff] are all treated as though they are ‘collaborators’ of the 
Durg [Derg]”443. Thirdly, the TPLF ransacked relief shelters and stores for food444. Fourthly, the 
TPLF believed that projects that NGOs were running might legitimise the military government. 
For instance, the Kobo Alamata Agricultural Development Project (KAADP) that GTZ-RRC had 
been running since 1976 was frequently ransacked by the TPLF. The most serious of these attacks 
took place in July 1983, when the TPLF looted and burned the equipment of the project in Kobo 
town445.  
These attacks had grave consequences for the movement of NGO employees. In the process of its 
counter-attack on the rebels, the government tightened its security measures, making efforts to 
assess the famine conditions difficult. The Field Director of Oxfam reported on the difficulties he 
faced after the Korem incident thus:  
After the attack on Korem, there has been even less news about the drought…government is 
being much stricter about issuing travel permits to foreigners than it was before the kidnapping…I 
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have been refused permits for Mekelle [Tigray] and Lalibela [Wollo] in the last fortnight, which 
has been frustrating446.  
However, NGOs were not passive observers. They responded to each of the attacks, with mixed 
results. For instance, Oxfam advised its staff to take maximum precautionary measures447. A senior 
official of Oxfam in the headquarter told the field director that, “…at no time should they [the 
employees] put the work before their own personal security…”448. Moreover, the organisation 
engaged in areas thought to be “safe”. Oxfam analysed the social base of the TPLF in areas where 
it had started water works, and resumed works in areas where the TPLF had no support. For 
instance, Oxfam believed that the TPLF had no popular support in an area called Kwalissa and as 
a result, it resumed its water works there, while  declining to resume water works in areas such as 
Zway Hammused on the grounds that, “…they [TPLF] seem to be more accepted in the villages 
like Zway Hammused further north, and they seem unlikely to leave there for the rest of this dry 
season”449. Nonetheless, by early 1984, Oxfam concluded that water works in Gonder had cost the 
organisation huge resources because of the insecurity. As a result, the Field Director recommended 
that Oxfam should shift its water programme to Wollaita in the south where it would run, “…hand 
dug wells and spring protection without all the interruptions caused by the security problems” 450. 
Insecurity was not a problem in Wollaita province at all. Moreover, Oxfam was assured they would 
have the cooperation of the local administration to assist in running water programmes in the 
Damot Gale district451. Oxfam also negotiated with rebels to avoid damage to its projects, notably 
the KAADP. Initiated in 1976 by GTZ together with the RRC, KAADP had suffered from frequent 
attacks by the TPLF. Oxfam was fully aware of this; however, it took the risk of financing this 
project. The Field Director strongly advised Oxfam headquarters that, “[the risk] should not 
discourage us entirely”452. He rather advised that precautious measures be taken, proposing that, 
“We should inform Khartoum [Oxfam’s office] to persuade the TPLF that this project should not 
be a target”453. This proposal was well accepted at headquarters, and there is no report of any further 
attack to KAADP. The relation Oxfam had with the TPLF was the main factor454.  
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In summary, NGOs survived difficult circumstances by securing the favour of either government 
officials or organisations that they represented. NGOs succeeded in maintaining their space of 
action. The challenge came from the rebels. Rebels threatened NGOs. NGOs overcame the problem 
either by operating in “safe” areas, or by negotiating with rebels. NGOs were concerned that the 
government could identify their links with rebels.  
3.4. Fields of action and NGOs 
3.4.1. NGOs’ fields of action and the response of governments: 1960s–1991  
NGOs complemented the efforts of both the imperial and military governments by providing inputs 
of various sorts, including their technical expertise. Apart from these, neither the imperial nor the 
military regimes would tolerate activities that they considered to have political implications, as 
evidenced e.g., by the action taken against the leadership of the Mecha and Tulema Association by 
the imperial government. The leadership’s frequent discussion of sensitive land issues resulted in 
the dissolution of the Association. The leaders of the Association were accused of conspiring 
against the government and they were sentenced to imprisonment and death455.  
The military government was even worse than the monarchy with regard to the oppression of NGO 
activities. The sensitivity of the military government to issues considered to be political may be 
inferred from the agreement NGOs were compelled to sign with the RRC every three years from 
April 1975. For example, the inclusion of Article IV, No 3 into the agreement was aimed at 
discouraging NGOs from political and controversial activities. The Article stated that, “Its [each 
NGO’s] expatriate staff members [must] refrain from any political or controversial activities and 
shall respect the laws of Ethiopia”456.  
NGOs themselves refrained from any activities that they considered would provoke the military 
government. National NGOs not only took maximum care in avoiding controversies with the 
government but adjusted their fields of action in line with government policies. This was 
particularly true during the first years of the Ethiopian revolution. The revisions that ASE made to 
the syllabus of its socio-economic course exemplified this. ASE had started offering socio-
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economic courses in 1972457. These courses analysed and described the socio-economic conditions 
of rural residents and delivered practical advice and information on how to improve these 
conditions458. The revolutionary change created confusion as to how to continue to run the socio-
economic course. As a document produced in the revolutionary context stated, “The challenge that 
this course [socio-economic] has encountered is that there is fast social, economic and political 
changes taking place in the rural areas; as a result of these changes, the previously planned work 
programme became obsolete”459. In order to cope with the changes occurring in rural areas, ASE 
revised the content of the courses to reflect these changes, or so it believed. In the meantime, the 
government, which planned to expand cooperativisation in socialist Ethiopia, introduced detailed 
guidelines on the formation and modalities of cooperatives. ASE adhered to these guidelines, on 
grounds it had, “…to keep up with developments in rural areas”460.  
The decision of ASE to adhere to these guidelines, and change the way it ran its socio-economic 
courses was part of its standing position to operate according to government policies. The response 
of ASE’s director to a sensitive question raised by NOVIB in 1989 illustrates the extent to which 
ASE operated along government policy lines. NOVIB wanted to know the extent to which ASE 
worked on sensitising project participants to know their basic rights. The executive director of ASE 
told NOVIB that, “…we would like to remind you that ASE is a non-political…organisation. 
ASE’s partnership with NOVIB is based on this understanding”461. The Director further stated that 
ASE ran educational programme in line with existing government policy462. It could thus be 
concluded that while this government pressure did exist, national NGOs deliberately ignored fields 
of action that, they considered, could provoke the military government. This constituted a break 
and perhaps a learning from the imperial period, in which NGOs like Mecha and Tulama had raised 
sensitive issues, though it resulted in the dissolution of the organisation and the death of the leaders.   
Like national NGOs, international NGOs, adhered to those government policies that prioritised 
agriculture and environmental conservation, water, rural development, health, income generation 
and so on. However, for the international NGOs running these programmes in Wollo, where the 
resettlement programme took place, the way the resettlement programme was carried out 
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complicated their activities. As a result, a number of individuals working for NGOs like Oxfam 
attempted to frustrate the resettlement programme. In March 1985, two Oxfam nurses, who had 
observed that the government starved those famine victims who refused to resettle recommended 
that Oxfam withdraw from the region in defiance of the Ethiopian government463. Oxfam rejected 
the proposal on the grounds that Oxfam’s decision alone would not stop the resettlement 
programme; almost all NGOs still operated in the context of forced relocation of people. Angered 
by Oxfam’s response, one of the nurses joined a MSF press conference in London, in mid-
December 1985, and roundly condemned the Ethiopian government464. In early November 1985, 
SCF and Oxfam had suspended their Joint Trucking Operation (JTO) in protest over drivers being 
forced to move settlers465. The RRC was concerned by this condemnation of the government by 
the Oxfam nurse and the suspension of the JTO. As a result, the RRC called upon the Oxfam Field 
Director for clarification. One of the confidential reports circulated at that time documented the 
situation in the following way:   
The authorities in Addis, believing this [the campaign of the nurse as well as suspension of the 
trucking operation] to be the official Oxfam policy, summoned the Field Director [Oxfam] for an 
explanation and there were real fears that Oxfam, too, might be expelled. The Field Director 
recalls that, having listened to the explanation, the RRC appeared relieved. The official…said 
that if Oxfam had joined MSF he would have regarded that as a very serious matter466.     
This came as a shock for Oxfam, which thus refrained from taking measures that could provoke 
the government and from making any public statements. In other words, Oxfam effectively 
endorsed the policy and the activities of the government, even if it had its own reservations. Its 
response to the villigization programme which followed the resettlement programme in Wollo 
province, where Oxfam was operational, is further illustrative of this attitude. Having noted the 
previous response of the government, Oxfam now argued that it had no power to stop any 
government sponsored programme. Concerning the beginning of villagisation programme that 
started in Wadla Delanta and Borena provinces, Oxfam stated that:  
Whatever our feelings about the desirability of this programme or the way in which it is being 
carried out, we have to accept that it is the policy of the Ethiopian Government, and as such will 
be carried out regardless of the attitude of agencies such as Oxfam467.  
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Internal sources show that this submission was informed by the growing sensitivity of government 
officials to the insecurity, especially in Wollo, which was a war zone. Government officials 
cautiously followed any activity that contradicted the government’s policies in Wollo, as reflected 
in this statement by the Deputy Director of Oxfam: “Wollo is a tense place, a war zone where any 
hint of non-compliance with policies is regarded with deep suspicion, where Party and 
Administration officials can find themselves quite literally in the firing line”468.  
In 1988, by contrast, Oxfam openly protested the government’s abuse of power. On February 8th, 
1988, the government used excessive force to resettle famine victims in Korem town and six people 
lost their lives. The Relief Coordinator of Oxfam, Mr. William Day, protested against the actions 
of the security forces469. The administrator of Wollo, Ato Shimeles Alemu, accused Mr Day of 
acting improperly in Korem470. Soon, the field directors of Oxfam and SCF told the RRC that they 
would find it difficult to run their joint transport operation unless forced resettlement was 
stopped471 . They also asked for an assurance that William Day would not be expelled from 
Ethiopia472. Satisfied with an assurance that Mr. Day would not be expelled, Oxfam and SCF 
resumed their activities in the country, albeit the RRC warned Oxfam that Mr Day’s, “…failure to 
do so [to adhere to terms and conditions] on his part would compel us to resort to radical 
measures”473. However, this courageous challenge to government policy was not the result of 
policy change within Oxfam. It was, rather, founded on decisions taken by individuals such as 
Tony Vaux in Oxford and Mr. Nikolas Winer, the new Field Director474.  
To sum up, NGOs operating in Ethiopia either refrained, or were discouraged by the political 
systems from initiating and running programmes that could trigger controversy with the 
government. As a result, they delivered services that went along with the priorities of governments.   
3.4.2. NGOs’ hope, apprehension, dynamism and frustration 
By the beginning of the 1990s, things started to change. The power of the military government was 
waning. The declaration of the “New Economic Policy” in March 1990 was indicative in this sense. 
                                                          
468
 “Memo“ from Stephen Lioyd to Nick Winer and Patrick Mcclay (January 2nd, 1987), Archive of Oxfam in Addis 
Ababa   
469
 Letter from Oxfam to RRC Addis ababa (February 11, 1988), P. 1, Archive of Oxfam in Addis Ababa   
470
 Ibid, P.1  
471
 Letter from RRC Addis Ababa to Oxfam/SCF (February 23rd, 1988), P. 1, Archive of Oxfam in Addis Ababa   
472
 Letter from Oxfam to RRC Addis ababa (February 11, 1988), P. 1, Archive of Oxfam in Addis Ababa   
473
 Letter from RRC Addis Ababa to Oxfam/SCF (February 23rd, 1988), P. 1, Archive of Oxfam in Addis Ababa   
474
 Tony Vaux, The Selfish Altruist: Relief Work in Famine and war (USA and UK, Earthsscan, 2001), P. 65  
103 
 
The policy was intended to guide the transition from a centralised command economy to a mixed 
economy that would involve the active participation of both the state and private enterprises, in 
production, commerce and other areas475. Optimists like the World Bank were enthusiastic about 
the policy476. Likewise, NGOs were encouraged by the general sense of optimism that followed 
the announcement of the policy. Oxfam believed that the announcement marked the beginning of 
a decline in the authority of the government. Thus, it encouraged those of its staff running urban 
development programmes in Addis Ababa to reduce their dependency on the local administration 
and start reorganising project participants477. Other NGOs saw the new policy positively as well. 
For instance, ASE’s project participants in Gamo Goffa and Bale had previously not taken care of 
their own land, largely because they did not have ownership over it; instead, they had carried out 
environmental conservation on reserved hillsides. Now, ASE believed that the new policy would 
give rights to farmers to freely dispose of trees grown on their land. This would in turn encourage 
the “participation” of rural communities in forest activities478.CCRDA, which saw the positive 
reaction of its members to the new policy, hosted a series of workshops on it. In its positive 
response to the new policy, CCRDA stated how the government came by the new policy:  
After a detailed and analytical deliberation on the aforementioned economic and social conditions 
of the country, and after undertaking the necessary process of policy analysis, review and 
evaluation undertaken during 1988–1990, the Ethiopian government adopted the mixed economic 
policy as a guiding principle, on March 6, 1990479  
Regime change in May 1991 removed some of the constraints to the NGOs’ space of action. 
Security was now restored. Tony Vaux of Oxfam visited Ethiopia soon after the fall of the military 
regime. His account shows the general sense of security that prevailed in the country. He said that, 
“The atmosphere in Ethiopia was extraordinarily relaxed and the freedom to travel without 
restriction is a wonderful tonic”480.  
Regime change was followed by a great deal of hope and optimism. Soon after the Ethiopian People 
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) entered Addis Ababa, a group of NGOs’ representatives 
asked the new officials of the RRC to organise a meeting where issues of security guarantees, 
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clearance, visas, and travel permits were raised481. The new commissioner of the RRC assured the 
NGOs’ representatives that, “…things are getting better and secure that NGOs…can start 
operation”482. The commissioner also described that the existing system, with regard to clearance, 
visas and travel permits, would be maintained. However, he promised that “…bureaucracy would 
be avoided”483. In a separate meeting, the commissioner made remarks that built up the confidence 
of prominent international NGOs, notably Oxfam that developed interest to get involved in 
development activities by financing national NGOs. Concerning this, Tony Vaux said that, 
“NGOs…are…welcome to set up programmes [operational or otherwise] wherever they wish”484.  
The optimism soon gave way to apprehension. During the transitional period (1991–1995), the 
government embarked on political and economic liberalisation, including a regionalisation policy; 
wrote a new constitution and set the stage for multi-party regional and national elections485. These 
processes influenced NGOs in many ways. In driving NGOs to take on a long term perspective 
within the newly reconfigured state system, the government issued a new regulation that forbade 
the duty free importation of goods, including food and fuel486. These were privileges NGOs had 
enjoyed since 1975. As a result of the ban, many NGOs that had ordered goods from abroad were 
now in great deficit, as they had to pay customs tax487. Moreover, following the re-registration of 
NGOs in 1996, the government banned 47 national NGOs that, the Ministry of Justice argued, 
failed to meet the requirements488. This was followed by extensive media propaganda that depicted 
NGOs as organisations dampening the self-help spirit of the people. NGOs also were accused of 
lack of transparency in their financial management489.  
The government’s antagonism toward NGOs may be traced back to the early 1980s, when major 
Western NGOs were involved in the “Cross Border Operation”, whereby relief assistance reached 
rebel-held territories in Tigray through Sudan. They helped to relieve the people through the active 
participation of REST, the humanitarian wing of the TPLF. NGO participation in the “Cross Border 
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Operation” violated international and national laws. Officials of the TPLF who were now in power 
were concerned that international NGOs might get involved in similar activities that would 
undermine the government. As a result, the government was anxious to strictly control NGOs, and 
to make use of the flow of aid funds themselves, rather than share it with independent NGOs490.  
Despite this period of apprehension, NGOs developed a great deal of assertiveness during the 
liberalisation process that followed the collapse of the military regime. This growing assertiveness 
may be shown by the actions of CCRDA. During the military period, CCRDA that “represented” 
a substantial number of NGOs in the country491 intentionally underplayed the concerns of NGOs, 
so as not to provoke the military government. For instance, in 1989 the authorities of the Addis 
Ababa city council terminated the work permits of the expatriate staff of Canadian Physicians for 
Aid and Relief (CPAR) and ordered them to leave the country. When CPAR asked CCRDA to 
intervene, CCRDA decided that it, “…would not take any action”492, instead encouraging each 
NGO to negotiate with the government on its own behalf. However, this individual approach 
proved to be unsuccessful. In a petition that they submitted to CCRDA, a group of NGOs expressed 
their frustrations with this individual approach, stating, “We all recall examples of the sometimes 
frustrating effects of the individual approach, not to mention the time and energy lost”493. In order 
to push CCRDA to take a more proactive role, this group of NGOs stated that, “Through elections 
we have given you the mandate to…receive our ideas, views and problems and present them to the 
Ethiopian government, mainly RRC”494. The major problems for members at this time were that 
project permissions were not signed on time; fuel shortages, cumbersome clearance procedures at 
the ports, travel permits, and the difficult nature of the reporting formats that the RRC had prepared 
and required495. With regard to projects remaining unauthorised indefinitely, CCRDA’s Executive 
Committee decided that “…these matters…[be]…best handled by the concerned members”496. 
With regard to even more sensitive issues, such as travel permits and customs clearance, the 
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Executive Committee decided that “…CRDA [CCRDA] members would have to abide by the rule 
of the government”497.  
After the regime change in 1991, CCRDA became more confident and started to debate with the 
RRC, the Ethiopian investment authorities, the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs and the 
Ministry of Justice with regard to improving the environment in which NGOs were operating498. 
The first meeting on the free importation of goods was held on August 10th, 1993, though details 
are lacking on the topic499. The RRC and NGOs also met on November 1st, 1994 on which date an 
agreement was reached that RRC would meet regularly with CCRDA and the Council of Ethiopian 
Voluntary Organisations (CEVO), another coalition of national NGOs 500 . The NGOs saw, 
however, that their effort alone would not bring about the desired change. From 1997 on, they 
approached what later came to be known as Donors Assistance Groups (DAGs). DAGs, which 
started out as a forum for information sharing among bilateral and multilateral organisations in 
Ethiopia, has later come to consider itself as a “community” with a collective voice, and as a partner 
with, respectively, the Ethiopian government, civil society and the private sector501. Oxfam played 
a significant role in establishing this relationship with DAGs through the British Ambassador in 
Ethiopia, who was also a member of DAGs 502 . In the meantime, creating an “enabling 
environment” became a major strategic objective of a number of networks and coalitions, including 
CCRDA, which took on the creation of an “enabling environment” as its strategic objective in 
1997503.  
A meeting held on July 23rd, 1998 was decisive in a number of ways. It brought together NGOs, 
donors and government representatives to discuss the NGOs’ concerns. The government was 
represented by officials from the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Labor Affairs. The 
Ministry of Justice promised that it would shorten the bureaucracy involved in the registration 
process. Details are lacking as to which part of the bureaucracy was cut short, however, the decision 
satisfied the NGOs. A report of the meeting tells us that, “NGOs expressed their satisfaction on the 
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improvement in the registration process”504. However, as the same source stated, “…lack of clarity 
over the registration process remains a concern”505. These concerns were to persist until the early 
2000s. At this time, the government started implementing the civil service reform programme. Like 
every governmental organisation, the Association Registration Office of the Ministry of Justice 
went through a process of reform. Consequently, the Ministry of Justice introduced two reform 
measures. The first one was that NGOs did not have to submit project proposals before they were 
officially licensed. According to the Ministry, this procedure created coordination problems as 
various technical ministries were required to evaluate only part of each project proposal. Moreover, 
even after evaluation, each project proposal was subject to change due to lack of finances and other 
issues506. Secondly, checking the backgrounds of international NGOs by Ethiopian missions abroad 
was no longer a requirement. However, the Ministry of Justice said that it would carefully watch 
NGOs that could undermine peace and security of the country. The vice minister of Justice told 
representatives of governmental organisations that “ከምዝገባ በፊት አስተያየት መጠየቅ በመርህ የቀረ ቢሆንም 
አንዳንድ በአገር ሰላምና ደህንነት ላይ አጠራጣሪ ሁነታዎች ሲኖሩ አስተያየት የምንጠይቅበት ጊዜ ሊኖር ይቺላል።” which 
means that “Though it is canceled in principle, we will ask for opinion [before registration] if there 
is doubt with regard to national security and peace”507. 
These reforms were introduced in response to frequent outcries by NGOs about the proposal review 
and background check processes. These complaints were aired in a meeting held on August 6th, 
2004. The meeting was organised precisely to receive such complaints by NGOs so that they could 
be addressed through the civil service reform programme. One NGO representative told the Vice 
Minister of Justice that “የፈቃድ አሰጣጥን በተመለከተ ችግር አለ። በተለይም ከውጭ የሚመጡትን የሚመለከተው የባሰ 
ነው። በዚህ ተማረው ወደ ሌላ አገር የሚሆዱም አሉ።” which roughly means “There is a problem with regard 
to issuing licenses to [NGOs] to start operation. This is worse with regard to foreign NGOs. There 
are [foreign NGOs] that leave the country because of the problem”508. Another representative 
pointed out that NGOs were seen as “robbers” and “sellers of the country”. As a result of this 
attitude, officials at various levels would not tend to cooperate as much as they should have509.  
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The reform with regard to registration went hand in hand with the growing interest a number of 
NGOs had to work on governance. The World Bank and IMF had negotiated with the Ethiopian 
government as to how NGOs could play a role in bringing about good governance; human rights, 
democracy and peace in the country, all the same fields of action that the government planned to 
work in. The Ethiopian Constitution adopted in 1995 established a multi-party parliamentary 
system of government and recognises most of the human rights endorsed under international law 
The government also reformed domestic laws to harmonise with international human right 
standards, emphasising good governance, in various policies and programmes such as the Plan for 
Accelerated Development to End Poverty (PADEP)510. 
The PADEP, which was prepared jointly by NGOs and the Ethiopian government and ratified in 
June 2002, recognised the role NGOs could play in governance, namely human rights, democracy, 
and peace building. Various documents published after the PADEP also recognised that NGOs 
could work on governance. Alongside contributing to preparing the PADEP, NGOs argued that the 
Ministry of Justice should institute a new legal framework for NGOs in Ethiopia. A series of draft 
proclamations prepared by the Ministry of Justice described how NGOs could work on governance 
issues. For instance, the preamble of the third draft described that:        
ድርጅቶቹ በተለያዩ መስኮች የህብረተሰቡን ግንዛብ ለማሳደግ፣ በዲሞክራሲ ስርአት ግንባታ፣ በሰብአዊ መብት ረገድ 
ያሚያደርጉትን አስተዋጽዖ ማጎልበትና የሚያንቀሳቅሱት ከፍተኛ ሃብትም በአግባቡ የታለመለት አላማ መዋሉን ማረጋገጥ 
አስፈላጊ በመሆኑ...በኢትዮጵያ ፌደራላዊ ዲሞክራሲያዊ ሪፕብሊክ ህገ-መንግስት አንቅስ 55 /1/ መሰረት የሚከተለው 
ታውጇል። 
Intending to promote the organisations’ [NGOs] role in raising awareness of the people, building 
democracy, and in human rights and to ensure that the huge resources they mobilize are spent for 
the intended purpose, the following is proclaimed as per Number 55 (1) of the Constitution of the 
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia511.  
NGOs received the goodwill shown by the government as a significant step, in light of the fact that 
the government had earlier threatened NGOs working on governance issues; no less than three 
member NGOs of CCRDA engaged in human rights activities had been suspended by the Ministry 
of Justice by the end of 1997512. The case of the Ethiopian Women Lawyers Association (EWLA) 
was quite well known; this association which defended the rights of women was banned. The 
chairwoman of the Association expressed her frustration about the way the Association 
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Registration Office of the Ministry of Justice handled the case, saying that, “የማህበራት ምዝገባ ጽህፈት 
ቤት ባለሙያወች ጉዳዩን እነዴት ይዘውት እንደነበር ሳስታውስ ይገርመኛል።” which means “I am sad whenever I 
remember the way experts of the Association Registration Office handled the case”513. The same 
was true with an international NGO called Plan International. Like the EWLA, Plan International 
was banned and its files were confiscated by federal police, only to be returned after eight 
months514. As a result of such cases, NGOs had pursued a cautious approach that, they believed, 
would not provoke the government. They had even tended to enlist governmental organisations 
while advocating for change. For instance, in the summer of 1996, the secretariat of CCRDA 
planned to host a series of training programmes about how to advocate for the rights of women, 
children, the disabled and those with HIV/AIDS. The secretariat asked the executive committee for 
their advice, and since the committee was afraid of the government’s response to such a 
programme, it advised the secretariat to organise the training in close collaboration with the 
relevant government offices such as the Women’s Affairs Office515.  
NGOs became more outspoken in 1998 when the Ethio-Eritrean War broke out. In a meeting held 
on June 8th, 1998, 144 NGOs, coordinated by CCRDA, issued a position statement in which they 
described the human and material losses of the war and its consequence on the overall economies 
of the two poor countries, adding that the war should stop immediately516. A year after its outbreak, 
Oxfam engaged with many other international NGOs to attempt to influence the governments of 
Ethiopia and Eritrea to stop the war. They thus circulated a joint letter addressed to the Prime 
Minister of Ethiopia, Ato Meles Zenawi; the President of Eritrea, Ato Esayas Afeworki and to 
Ethiopian Embassies worldwide517. This NGO advocacy against the war could be taken as a 
preparatory phase of NGOs movement to influence the governance structure to listen to public 
concerns. The government and NGOs jointly prepared the Plan for Accelerated Development to 
End Poverty. NGOs were then to follow the implementation of programmes outlined in the 
document. To that end, CCRDA had set up a Poverty Reduction Strategic Paper Task Force. The 
NGOs were against the way some of the programmes in the document were being implemented. 
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The voluntary resettlement of people from food insecure areas to surplus produce areas was 
included as a strategy to ensure food security, however the way the resettlement was being carried 
out remained a major concern of NGOs. The Task Force issued a statement that reflected the new 
assertiveness of NGOs in criticising the government’s wrongdoings. It stated that:   
The PRSP [Poverty Reducation Strategy Paper] Task Force…draws concern on the 
Government’s resettlement programme, which is designed to relocate farmers from drought 
prone areas to those that are believed to have greater agricultural potential. The way the 
resettlement programme was designed has been described as cause for grave concern. There was 
no adequate preparation for settlers and many of the settlements sites pose serious health threat 
to settlers. There is also profound concern as regards the viability of the sites for rain fed 
agriculture, as they don’t receive sufficient rains518  
NGO advocacy for change gained momentum in the context of the May 2005 elections. The NGOs 
educated citizens about their democratic rights and trained them in how to cast their ballots. 
Realising that they had emerged as significant actors in the election process, the ruling party began 
to show signs of hostility to the NGOs. Remarks that government officials made long before the 
election indicate the kinds of measures that the government intended to take against them. In a civil 
society debate held on September 26th, 2004, for example, senior government official belittled the 
contribution of NGOs. This led nine networks, coalitions, and NGOs to appeal to the Prime 
Minister. They stated that, “…we have been surprised and even found confusing to hear the 
negative statements given at the debate by the EPRDF [the ruling Ethiopian People Revolutionary 
Democratic Front] representative against the NGOs sector”519. On the eve of the elections, the 
ruling party argued that NGOs did not have a mandate to observe the national and regional 
elections. NGOs took the case to court, which decided that NGOs could monitor the elections520.     
Concerned about the growing influence of NGOs, the ruling party took a series of measures in the 
post-election period. The government argued that NGOs supported the opposition parties, using 
state media to accuse NGOs in general and CCRDA in particular of being partisan521. Some 
“independent” press also accused CCRDA of being an instrument of opposition groups. For 
instance, the pro-government newspaper, Eftin, argued that CCRDA could no longer be politically 
neutral522.  
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CCRDA, as one of the prime targets, defended its neutral position. It argued that, like anywhere in 
the world, CCRDA and its members had their own part to play in building democracy and good 
governance in the country. This did not compromise their neutrality523. The media accusation was 
followed by serious reactions by the Ministry of Justice, which first referred to a letter that it had 
written on to CCRDA on March 31st, 1998. The letter listed “permitted activities and programme”. 
On the basis of this letter, representatives of the Ministry of Justice questioned the position 
statement that CCRDA had circulated on June 20, 2005, by raising the following three questions: 
 Is CCRDA mandated to come up with the position statement that it did?  
 Has CCRDA consulted all its members before going to public with the position statement?  
 Does CCRDA have evidences for all the allegations that it has included in its position statement? Are all 
the allegations supported with evidence?524   
CCRDA tried to defend its position. It argued that it was acting in a context in which people were 
being killed, and that as citizens of the country, the leadership of CCRDA had a responsibility to 
stand alongside the people525. Concerning the second question, the leadership of CCRDA stated 
that the Executive Committee was fully mandated by the general membership. As a result, it did 
not have to ask the consent of the membership on specific issues526. As far as evidence was 
concerned, the leaders argued that the government itself had issued voluminous information about 
the number of people killed and detained and that the data on which the Executive Committee of 
CCRDA had based the position statement was public knowledge527. The representatives of the 
Ministry of Justice were not satisfied with the explanation that the leaders of CCRDA gave with 
regard to CCRDA’s mandate, stating that CCRDA worked on issues that the Ministry did not 
allow528. Thus, in a letter written on September 6th, 2005 the Ministry of Justice gave CCRDA a 
last written warning for “breaching” the law of the country529. The Ministry also told the CCRDA 
to cancel the conference it had planned to organise. CCRDA had proposed a national peace and 
reconciliation conference in Addis Ababa, in which it had intended that religious leaders, 
prominent personalities, community leaders, contending parties, donors and so on would 
participate in resolving the conflict in the country530. Moreover, CCRDA was forced to delete 
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vision statements, missions and basic tenets from a new Memorandum of Association that it had 
submitted to the Ministry of Justice for endorsement. In a meeting held among themselves, 
members of the Executive Committee argued that, “…there are unacceptable points forwarded in 
the comments given like the deleting of the Vision and Mission of the CRDA”531.  
As CCRDA was the prime target, its members were also put under pressure by the government. 
Government authorities stopped projects run by these NGOs. Some of these projects were SIDA’s 
Urban Environmental and Sanitation Project in Addis Ababa, Becha Water Supply in Oromia, Risk 
Reduction HIV-AIDS in Addis Ababa, Dugda Bora in Oromia, and Packard’s Promotion of SRHR 
(Women and Adolescent) in Sodo in Gurage532. Similarly, when the ruling party lost the elections 
in areas where Agri-Service Ethiopia operated, NGOs in these regions were accused of 
sympathizing with the opposition parties. A number of NGO staff fled from these areas after they 
were intimidated by local government officials533. The most serious of these repressive measures 
was the targeting of those staff of NGOs who actively participated in monitoring the elections. As 
a member of the Executive Committee of NGOs that coordinated the May 15th, 2005 elections, 
Ato Daniel Bekele, the Policy, Research and Advocacy Manager of Action Aid made a number of 
public statements in the media. On October 22nd, 2005, he was attacked and badly beaten by two 
armed men, who asked him, “Who are you to criticise EPRDF [the ruling Ethiopian People 
Democratic Front]?” 534  Partly because of this attack, Action Aid influenced the Executive 
Committee of CCRDA to hold discussions with the government. In a letter addressed to the 
chairman of the Board of CCRDA, the Director of Action Aid expressed his frustration and called 
for them to take a firm position. He said that: 
It is sad to note that the response we got from the government and particularly from the MoI 
[Ministry of Information] and the MoJ [Ministry of Justice] is seriously disheartening and 
disappointing. I believe that they have neither the reason nor the legal ground to issue public 
statements in the media and demand the removal of our fundamental principles, visions and 
missions and core activities from our Memorandum of Association. They have the right to check 
whether or not our Memorandum of Association is incompatible or in contradiction to the 
established laws of the country and its constitution provisions. The demand made by the 
registration office through the letter sent to CRDA is tantamount to writing Memorandum of 
Association for us. Since such act can strip off the little freedom and public space we gained so 
far we should commit to challenge and argue out case strongly and professionally535. 
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In the meantime, the government came up with the Ethiopian Charity and Society Proclamation 
(No 625/2009). According to its official narrative, the proclamation is intended to defend the 
sovereignty of the country. Officials argue that since Ethiopia is an independent country, it does 
not allow foreigners to do whatever they want. The argument is that because they receive cash from 
abroad, NGOs have become surrogates of Western donors536. The NGOs argue, however, that 
Ethiopians have constitutional rights to organise themselves and that the proclamation stands 
against the constitution. The proclamation also divides NGOs based on the source of their income. 
Any NGO getting more than 10% of its income from abroad is labelled as a Ethiopian Resident 
Charity. This group of NGOs are no longer allowed to work on governance issues such as human 
rights, peace building and conflict resolution, child rights, women rights, democracy and so on537.   
3.5. Conclusions  
NGOs in Ethiopia were bound to adhere to the policies set by the imperial and military 
governments. NGOs worked closely with officials of the two regimes, suggesting that they adhered 
to policies. The collapse of the military government in May 1991 was a landmark in a number of 
ways, as the war that had so disrupted NGO activities came to an end. Moreover, NGOs started 
running new fields of action, such as governance, which they had earlier sidelined or been 
frustrated in by the imperial and military governments.  
However, the government that came to power then only assured NGOs they could begin to work 
on governance in order to satisfy donors. The governance issues that NGOs started to work on had 
deep political implications, which the current government would not allow. Part of the reason for 
this was that officials recalled the involvement of NGOs in the “Cross Border Operation” of the 
1980s which had violated the laws of the country, and these officials were afraid that NGOs would 
again be involved in similar activities. For this reason, the government endeavored to control NGOs 
via controlling registration. The government took a number of decisive actions in 2009 by barring 
foreign organisations from involvement in the field of human rights and conflict. The Ethiopia n 
Charity and Society Proclamation stated that Ethiopian Charity could work on governance so long 
as they mobilise more than 90% of their income locally. If they mobilise more than 10% of their 
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income from abroad, they are called either Foreign Charity or Ethiopian Resident Charity both of 
which could not work on governance.  
It could, thus, be concluded that history and NGOs field of action have remained main factors that 
decided their space of action.  
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Chapter Four  
Expansion and Contraction 
4.1. Introduction  
NGOs expand and contract in terms of territorial scope, and of programme type and scale. Chief 
amongst the determinant factors is the amount of resources NGO can mobilise. Due to constraints 
on raising income locally, NGOs in Ethiopia depend on foreign sources. The volume of resources 
channelled through NGOs has historically been influenced by the relationship between the regime 
type in power in Ethiopia at any given time, and Western donors. Geo-strategic, ideological and 
governance factors have influenced the relations between them. During the military period, 
Western donors sought to channel their resources to Ethiopia through NGOs, rather than handing 
the resources to the regime itself. This was particularly pronounced from the mid-1980s on, and 
this tendency continued even after the regime change of May 1991. While major donors notably 
World Bank and the European Commission channeled most of their aid through governmental 
organisations, a number of donor organisations continued to fund NGOs due to their stated aims of 
fostering liberalism in Ethiopia.    
However, the flow of resources to NGOs has never been a straightforward process. Donors were 
concerned about the authoritarian rule and the ongoing war in the north during the military period. 
Moreover, after the regime change in 1991, the government won the trust of Western donors by 
promising that it would build up democracy and good governance. As a result, the Ministry of 
Development and Economic Cooperation (MeDEC) became a major recipient of donor funding. 
Moreover, a number of new NGOs emerged in the post-1991 period, which resulted in stiff 
competition for resources. Thus, the relations between Western donors and successive Ethiopian 
regimes have offered NGOs in Ethiopia both challenges and fortunes.  
This chapter aims to investigate the flowing of resources to the selected NGOs in the context of the 
relation between donors and the Ethiopian governments. It also investigates how NGO’s choice of 
operation areas has determined programme type and scale of these NGOs.    
4.2. Resource and resource mobilisation  
Resources are a decisive factor to run NGO programmes and sustain NGOs. The majority of NGOs 
in Ethiopia are now dependent on foreign donors, as they have been in recent history. This foreign-
donor dependency is different from the imperial period, when NGOs depended entirely on local 
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resources. The revolution of September 1974 created a situation where national NGOs were put 
under threat and individual contributors declined their assistance, until the fall of the military 
government in May 1991.  
4.2.1. Voluntarism and NGOs’ resource mobilisation in Ethiopia  
Ethiopia has long been the home of a strong philanthropic tradition. This tradition has persisted to 
this day. An Ethiopian has once summed up aspects of this philanthropic tradition and its influence 
on NGOs thus:   
Our country has been known about its virtues from as early as antiquity. A lot has been written 
about its hospitality. Goodwill has certainly been the raw material for the NGO movement and 
we have had plenty of this in our homes and communities. In the Ethiopian normative 
development, with goodness essentially being seen as kindness to all and as an important factor 
in one’s holiness, it has indeed been pervasive538.  
Churches and mosques are expressions of this kindness. Members of the two religious groups 
express the virtue of almsgiving in different ways. Almsgiving includes not only donation of cash 
to the needy; families also prepare meals to feed the hungry. Many take strangers into their homes 
to attend to their needs. Those who have no means for survival go from house to house asking for 
food in the name of one angel or another, and often manage to have their bags full by the time they 
retire for the day. Until recently, certain families used to leave food out by their doors, for the needy 
to help themselves to without having to beg539.  
National NGOs that were active during the imperial period tapped into this traditional Ethiopian 
generosity to support their programmes in various ways. The most common way of collecting cash 
was to approach and register members, and collect money through membership fees. As 
membership fees were their only source of income in this early stage of their existence, national 
NGOs were in competition for members. This competition was quite intense; for instance, between 
the Ethiopian Women Welfare Association and the Ethiopian Women Good Work Association, 
both of which were set up in 1935. In order to encourage both NGOs, many individuals became 
members of the two associations540.  
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The membership fees that NGOs raised varied from NGO to NGO. Some NGOs developed strong 
structures that reached wider sections of the society. The Ethiopian Red Cross Society and the 
Ethiopian Family Guidance Association belong to this group of NGOs. They developed a system 
of recruiting and encouraging members to participate in their activities. Today, both NGOs still 
depend on members for human and material resources. In 2002, for instance, the Ethiopian Red 
Cross Society had over 700,000 fee-paying adult members and about 90,000 youth volunteers541. 
Although the proceeds from membership fees do not make up a significant proportion of the 
organisation’s income, members and volunteers still play a paramount role in the functions of the 
Ethiopian Family Guidance Association. They serve on the national and regional boards and 
participate actively in the various committees assigned to special tasks542.  
Ultimately, however, membership fees alone proved an inadequate and unreliable source of income 
for the majority of national NGOs, which reported the problem of dependency on membership fee 
on many occasions. Describing the inadequacy and unreliability of membership fees as a source of 
income, the vice chairman of The Association for the Destitute (founded in Addis Ababa in 1964 
by a group of young students) stated that:   
ማህበርተኞቻችን የሚፈለግባቸውን የወር ክፍያ በጥንቃቄ ባለመስጠታቸውና አንዳንዶቹ ደግሞ ከተመዘገቡበት ቀን ጀምሮ 
እስከ ዛሬ አንዳች ነገር ያልረዱን በመሆናቸው የማህበሩን ጠቅላላ ገቢ በመቶ 50 ዝቅ አድርጎታል::  
Because our members did not regularly pay their monthly contribution and some had not paid at 
all since the beginning of their membership, the annual income of the Association is reduced by 
50%543.   
The same problem was frequently reported by the Ethiopian Women Welfare Association and the 
Ethiopian Women Good Work Association544.  
These problems with membership fees led NGOs to embark on alternative resource mobilisation 
techniques. This included the organisation of bazaars in Addis Ababa, at which  various activities 
were held; articles of various sorts were sold, food and drinks were served, tenders were organised, 
and the income from these activities were used for charitable purposes545. It was also common for 
NGOs to organise fundraising dinners in Addis Ababa hotels, for which tickets were sold. 
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Government officials, merchants, representatives of foreign governments and foreigners residing 
in the capital would be invited, in the hope that they would donate more money. Organisers also 
tried to minimise the cost involved in organising a dinner programme as much as possible. This, 
however, had its own consequences; sometimes, guests refused to consume what was served. 
Certain of this study’s informants recalled that the Association for the Destitute once organised a 
dinner programme to which a number of distinguished guests were invited. For the occasion, 
leftovers from different hotels were served. The guests refused to eat the food, to the 
embarrassment of the organisers546. The third way by which NGOs used to mobilise resources was 
via the organisation of entertainment programmes. These included dance, drama, and music,  
performed by both Ethiopian and foreign bands. These were especially organised during major 
holidays such as Ethiopian Easter, Christmas, and New Year547.  
The imperial government encouraged NGOs, and itself donated financial and material support to 
them. It also started to give awards, both to NGOs and to individuals for their philanthropic 
contributions. The monarch, Haile Selassie I himself, also got involved in philanthropic activities 
via the Haile Selassie I Foundation548. Conversely, the government also took a number of actions 
that undermined the activities of NGOs. For instance, the Ethiopian Women Welfare Association 
initiated a lottery system which gave the Association a significant income, until the government 
decided to expropriate the lottery system that the Association had developed. The Association 
protested, however, the government remained adamant. The government eventually decided that 
the Association would get only Eth $ 50,000 every year from the Ministry of Finance. In fat, the 
government also allowed the Association to organise what was called a Tombola Lottery once a 
year and to use the income obtained from that549.  
The military government (1974–1991) and its actions greatly affected the contributions that 
national NGOs received from philanthropists. Driven by socialist principles, the military 
government confiscated commercial and production enterprises, and nationalised excess urban and 
rural lands. This confiscation affected many well-to-do individuals who had previously contributed 
to NGOs. Now, they also felt that giving could expose their wealth550.  
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Although it encountered major constraints during the revolutionary period, voluntarism did not 
disappear completely. The establishment of a number of NGOs during the famine that occurred in 
1983–1984 attests to its continued existence. Furthermore, with the collapse of the military 
government in May 1991, voluntarism revived greatly. Individuals with meagre resources took the 
initiative and began to deal with problems in their localities by setting up NGOs. For instance, 
Light for Generation is an NGO set up in 2005 by a group of voluntary college students. Concerning 
its humble beginning, the current executive committee narrates that:    
The founders started with adult and children education. They started the activities with teaching 
adults and children with meager resources from their own pocket. They started teaching the whole 
process by renting a small private house close to which were they able to build a tent made of 
plastic in which they taught adults and children of the poorest sections of the locality….The 
founders used to ask and secure assistance from the locality in which the association was born 
and from the university (Unity University) community551. 
The same was true about Developing Families Together. It was set up by Wäyzäro Kidest and five 
other individuals she mobilised to fight against HIV/AIDS in their locality. As long as they 
managed to secure financial support from foreign donors, they depended on their own pocket 
money552. Extra to such local organisations, a number of NGOs have also been established by 
volunteers since 1991 along thematic, intersecting regional and national lines553.  
The potential for local fundraising once more became apparent in the post-1991 period. Many of 
the newly emerging national NGOs received contributions from philanthropists in the early 
1990s554. As time went on, transparency and accountability became of major concern to those 
individuals who wanted to support NGOs, some of which were accused of serving personal 
interests. As a result, in a significant divergence from the imperial period, NGOs came to be seen 
as venues where corruption of various sorts was committed555.  
NGO leaders knew very well of this public perception of NGOs and they attempted to deal with 
the problem. Led by CCRDA, 178 NGOs signed a Code of Conduct in 1998, intended to make 
Ethiopian NGOs adhere to principles that NGOs uphold globally, such as honesty, integrity, 
transparency, and serving the poor556. Since 1998, NGOs coordinated by CCRDA have organised 
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forums in which the wider public is informed and oriented in relation to NGOs and their activities. 
The most prominent of these is “NGOs’ Day”, a celebration at which NGOs publicly present 
themselves and their activities, with videos and photos as documentation. On the “NGOs’ Day” 
that coincided with CCRDA’s Silver Jubilee, people from a broad section of society met with 
NGOs leaders and were apprised of their accomplishments. Occasions like this one have improved 
the public perception of NGOs. One of the visitors to CCRDA’s Silver Jubilee NGO day stated 
how his own attitude had been changed, saying:  
በጣም ጥሩ ጅምር ነው። በዚሁ ቀጥሉበት። ለመን? የሚለው ጥያቄ ዛሬ በሃገራቺን ለአርዳታ ድርጅቶች ለዩ ኣስተያየት ነው 
ያለኝ፨ በኔ በኩል ለቆሙለት ኣላማ ሳይሆን ወደ ግል ጥቅማ ጥቅሞች የቆሙ ስለሚመስለኝ ነው። አሁን ግን የተሻለ ግንዛቤ 
ላይ ደርሻለሁ።    
It is good beginning. Continue like this. To answer why? I had a different perception about NGOs 
for it appears to me that they stand for personal wealth. Now I have a better understanding557.     
4.2.2. NGOs and trends in foreign-mobilised resources  
The resources that NGOs in Ethiopia have received from abroad have increased in the last decades. 
The interplay between global and national circumstances has contributed to this. Four different 
phases are identifiable with regard to resource flows to NGOs:  
 The earliest phase: covers up to the early 1970s;   
 The second phase covers the period from the outbreak of the 1973 famine and of the Ethiopian revolution that 
followed it;  
  The third phase covers from the early 1980s to the late 1980s and  
 The fourth phase covers the period after the collapse of the military government in 1991.         
During the first phase, which covers the 1960s and early 1970s, NGOs could not mobilise many 
resources. Two main factors explain this. Firstly, major donors, notably USAID, Canadian 
International Development Assistance (CIDA), and the World Bank, preferred governmental 
organisations to NGOs. Resettlement, as envisaged in the Third Five Years Plan (1968–1973), was 
one of the programmes that donors funded. The plan stated that:  
A gradual but accelerating shift in agricultural population will begin to be seen during the Third 
Plan from the present crowded Northern and Central highlands to the lowland areas and in a still 
longer run to the southwestern highlands and those parts of the southern highlands where 
population was not a problem558. 
Agricultural mechanisation, and later, by the beginning of the 1970s, various packages and 
programmes that focused on smallholding farmers, were some of the aspects of the programme that 
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received significant support from foreign donors. These aids were part of a wide range of support 
Western donors offered to the imperial government. This had to do with the alignment of Haile 
Selassie’s government in the international politics. The imperial government was a key partner in 
an effort to contain the spread of communism in the Horn of Africa and at the international level. 
It was, thus, unlikely that Western donors would consider NGOs as conduit through which to 
channel aid to Ethiopia. This had implication on the financial capacity of NGOs. Describing its 
failure to secure funds from Western donors in Ethiopia, ASE reported that, “…a number of 
funding agencies are more…inclined to help more concrete projects as resettlement schemes, road 
building and well digging projects, etc”559. 
As a result, NGOs depended on their capacity to mobilise resources in Europe. The founders of 
ASE made a trip to France in 1965 to mobilise resources. The father of Mr Francois Enguegard, 
one of the founders of ASE, donated his own car to the founders of ASE for them to undertake 
their activities in Wollaita province560. Fr. Henry, one of the founders of ASE, conducted his second 
fundraising tour of France and Germany in 1968. He succeeded in collecting money from the 
Germany Catholic Bishops’ Organisation and Development Cooperation (MISEREOR)561. Then 
for their first project agreement signed on June 6th, 1969, ASE also began to get financial, 
administrative and technical support from INADES-Formation 562 . Donors associated with 
INADES-Formation gave also subsidies to ASE at various times; Peace and Development, French 
Technical Cooperation, CIDA, CCFD (Terre Solidaire), CNSD (Centre National de Coopération 
au Développements) were amongst these563. Similarly, many other NGOs operating in Ethiopia had 
developed permanent structures of their own to mobilise resources from diverse sources. 
International NGOs in particular were known for designing systems of fundraising. For instance, 
Oxfam introduced a fundraising structure that soon identified three sources of funds: membership 
fees, donations from individuals and funds from donor organisations564.  
Despite their efforts to mobilise resources from abroad, NGOs’ programmes in Ethiopia received 
small financial subsidies in this early period. This obviously put both the sustainability of 
individual projects, and that of the NGOs who ran these projects under risk. Concerned about this, 
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ASE reported that, “Financing an organisation such as Agri-Service Ethiopia has always been 
something of a problem”565. The issue was much more complex with regard to international NGOs, 
and the availability of finance was not the only factor that inhibited NGO programmes in Ethiopia. 
The priority that international NGOs accorded to Ethiopia also informed their budgeting. During 
the 1960s and 1970s, the developed countries from which international NGOs originated were 
committed to assisting newly independent countries in Africa to achieve development goals. 
International NGOs went in line with this. As a result, Ethiopia, as a country that had remained 
independent, was not on the priority list of international NGOs. The fact that Oxfam opened its 
first field offices in Basutoland (Lesotho), Bechuanaland (Botswana) and Swaziland shows that the 
organisation accorded primacy to former British colonies 566 . Likewise, the fact that Oxfam’s 
programme in Ethiopia was managed by its Kenya-based East Africa Regional Office shows that 
the organisation gave priority to former British colonies567.  
The famine of 1973–1974 and the revolution of September 1974 increased the finances of NGOs 
operating in Ethiopia. Following the famine, Oxfam, Concern, from Ireland, and the Catholic Relief 
Service from the USA started to fund national NGOs such as CCRDA and the Ethiopian Catholic 
Secretariat. In the autumn of 1973, the media in Europe picked up the Ethiopian famine as a major 
issue and reported extensively about it. A film entitled “The hidden hunger” by Jonathan Dimbleby, 
a British journalist that was screened in October 1973 shocked the European audience. This was 
followed by television and radio appeals to rescue the famine victims568. For the first time, a large 
number of international NGOs carried out extensive fundraising campaigns on behalf of the 
Ethiopian poor and designated Ethiopia as their priority area569. NGOs mobilised resources not only 
for their relief activities, but also for extensive rehabilitation programmes. Concerning the 
willingness of donors, and the readiness with which NGOs could run projects, CCRDA reported 
that:  
We have already received pledges of ongoing support from a number of donor agencies who 
know of the shifts [towards rehabilitation] in emphasis and what it entails. The CRC [Christian 
Relief Committee, precursor of CCRDA] now finds itself in a very strong position to offer viable 
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projects to those and other funding sources. It is important that agreement be reached on priority 
needs because CRC can then approach with greater confidence, its financial sources570 . 
The 1974 Ethiopian revolution was variously received by NGOs and donors. Those donors that 
welcomed the revolution enhanced their financial commitment to NGOs. For instance, ASE, which 
had earlier suffered from financial uncertainty, now found itself in the most comfortable financial 
situation. This was because ASE donors such as INADES-Formation supported the revolution, and 
were committed to enhancing the role of ASE. Imbued with this new level of support, ASE reported 
that, “…of late [since towards the end of 1974] some funding agencies have begun to allot a portion 
of their budget to educational ventures. In any event, funds were fully available for the last year 
[1975] and it seems that they will again be available for this year [1976] and the next years”571.    
As the famine relief operation of the early 1970s diminished and finances flowed on, NGOs stepped 
up their commitment towards addressing other, long-term development challenges faced by the 
country. This required their consortium, CCRDA, to play a role in providing technical support. To 
this end, CCRDA received substantial amounts of financial support from foreign donors who 
believed there was an, “…explicit need of development personnel for technical information and 
advice on appropriate technology for rural development”572. CCRDA was given the responsibility 
of delivering such technical support to NGOs as it, “…represent [ed] the cooperation of most 
NGOs, churches and missions involved in relief and development”573. This programmatic support 
role remained a source of finance for CCRDA574.  
While some donors increased their contributions during the revolutionary period, the majority of 
Western donors withheld their aid to Ethiopia. Initially, it was a protest against the compulsory 
nationalisation of a series of commercial and production enterprises by the revolutionary 
government. From around 1977 onwards, the military government became committed to Soviet-
style socialism575. Major donor governments, chiefly the United States and Britain, sought to 
pressurise the Ethiopian government to weaken its bonds with the Soviet Union, by withholding 
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all bilateral assistance, while encouraging improved relations with the West576. Partly in response 
to this, however, the Ethiopian government only became more xenophobic toward the West, 
moreover accusing Western donors for being responsible for all the country’s problems577. In the 
context of the famine of 1983–1984, a politburo of the Ethiopian government made a conference 
speech in which he blamed Western donors for having failed to provide Ethiopia with the financial 
support to preempt the famine. He said that:  
It is because the necessary funds have not been available for development efforts and for an 
increase in food production in the traditional drought-prone areas of the country that we are now 
witnessing the current tragedy of death and starvation and are unable, from own resources, either 
to prevent famine or to mitigate its effect578.  
Noting that socio-economic conditions had deteriorated, in the early 1980s Western donors again 
started to channel financial support to Ethiopia, only this time through NGOs. This marked the 
commencement of the third phase, listed above, wherein NGOs secured huge resources, while, due 
to ideological differences and human rights issues, Western governments such as that of the 
Netherlands had severed technical cooperation with the military government579 . In 1980, the 
Netherlands government decided to assist selected countries in Africa through Netherlands-based 
NGOs such as NOVIB, ICCO (Protestant background), Bilance (Catholic background), and Hivos 
(humanitarian background). These NGOs signed a “Programme Financing Agreement” with the 
Ministry of Development Cooperation of the Netherlands Government. This agreement authorised 
each of these NGOs to manage their own (government-funded) projects and report on their policies 
and activities to the Ministry of Development Cooperation580.  
According to the “Programme Financing Agreement”, these NGOs were to channel the aid they 
received from the Netherlands Government through their national partner NGOs.  Ethiopia was 
one of the countries in which these four NGOs agreed to invest the aid. In fact, all four NGOs, 
especially NOVIB and ICCO, had financed national NGOs in Ethiopia since 1976. NOVIB’s 
earliest contact with ASE was in 1976. With reference to this date, a document states that, “Since 
the first time of cooperation between Novib and ASE in 1976, the relationship between the two 
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organisations has gradually intensified and expanded” 581 . Likewise on February 7, 1977, the 
representative of ICCO, Mrs Kroemer met the Executive Committee of CCRDA. She told the 
Executive Committee of CCRDA that ICCO, “…is interested in supporting development projects 
especially those which stress self-help”582. As a result of the “Programme Financing Agreement” 
that they signed, NOVIB and ICCO subsequently increased their financial support to national 
NGOs such as ASE and CCRDA. Likewise EZE, which had financed national Ethiopian NGOs 
since 1976, increased its financial support of NGO programmes such as those of ASE and 
CCRDA583.  
At around the same time, as part of their policy of attempting to woo Ethiopia away from the Soviet 
Union, major donor organisations such as the World Bank not only resumed, but increased their 
financial support of the Ethiopian government in February 1981. Indeed, the Bank proposed to 
make Ethiopia, “Africa’s foremost recipient of the Bank’s concessional aid by tripling lending from 
$ 150 million planned for 1982/83 to $ 400–500 million before the end of the decade”584.  
The revival of donors’ interest in the early 1980s motivated those international NGOs that had 
reduced their Ethiopian commitment, due to the anti-Western propaganda of the military 
government, to increase their financial commitments once more. For instance, motivated by the 
growing interest of donors, the leadership of Oxfam argued for Oxfam to increase its financial 
commitment to Ethiopia585. As part of this revival, Oxfam replaced its Field Director in Ethiopia, 
Mr Michael Miller, with Mr Hugh Goyder. Before he was posted to Ethiopia, Mr Goyder had been 
Oxfam’s Field Director in India. Immediately after his arrival in 1980, Mr Goyder revived Oxfam’s 
commitment to fostering self-generative grassroots structures586.  
The outbreak of the 1983–1984 famine gave even greater impetus to the revived interest of NGOs 
and donors. The famine presented one of the best opportunities for NGOs to conduct successful 
fundraising campaigns in Western countries. SCF in Europe and World Vision in the United States 
were the first to begin such fundraising campaigns. NGOs such as Oxfam had earlier 
underestimated the famine. This put these NGOs at a disadvantage. The frustration this generated 
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within Oxfam may be discerned from one of the letters exchanged between its Field Director and 
a senior official at headquarters, following an appreciative media report of SCF activities in Korem. 
This in turn had generated a significant influx of financial support from donor organisations and 
individual contributors to SCF, while, conversely, Oxfam had been criticised for having failed to 
take action with regard to the famine. In this context, a senior official of Oxfam told the Field 
Director that:   
The problem over the Ethiopian situation was of course the unsuspected and sudden showing of 
the television films with the very strong SCF bias. It would have been of great help to us if you 
could have sent us a telex informing us that those films were being made and that they were going 
to be shown very shortly. We were also very taken aback by Mike Woolridge’s wild and 
hysterical statements that we could not ignore587.  
This brought Oxfam into stiff competition with other international NGOs, namely SCF and World 
Vision. To this end, Oxfam sponsored a film by Buerk and Muhammed Amin that was screened 
towards the end of 1984. This film by Buerk and Amin broke the hearts of the international 
community. Since the public was the major source of income, NGOs extended their appeals to 
private contributors. Telephone numbers and/or bank accounts of various NGOs were published 
on TV screens, in newspapers and magazines to help people easily send in their contributions588. 
This was met by significant contributions from the European public. SCF, for example, received 
1000 telephone calls within half a day – a record in its long history. Oxfam, for its part, registered 
400 calls within just an hour. Within five days, public contributions to Oxfam totalled more than 
$1 million. In less than a month, Oxfam and SCF raised £2 million each, while World Vision’s UK 
office collected £160,000 over the same period589. This was the first time that NGOs were able to 
collect such enormous resources. Concerning Oxfam’s fundraising, Graham Hancock explained  
that, “…public donations [to Oxfam] remained fairly static until 1985 when appeals on behalf of 
the starving in Ethiopia multiplied Oxfam’s earnings again – to an all time high of £51.1 million, 
up from less than £20 million in 1983-84”590.   
While international NGOs focused on mobilising resource overseas, large numbers of donor 
organisations channelled their assistance to national NGOs. National NGOs such as CCRDA and 
ASE received a massive quantity of resources. CCRDA in particular received not only financial 
but also material support, including large number of trucks of varying size. The governmental RRC 
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had initially been opposed to the fact that NGOs came to own large trucking operations, however, 
once it became clear that donors were unwilling to donate their resources to the government, they 
ultimately gave way. Minutes in the CCRDA archive document the government’s position on this 
issue, stating that  
The chief commissioner [of RRC] had his own reservation. The commissioner while expressing 
some reservations regarding the implementation of this type of project by a voluntary agency 
[NGO], agreed to the proposed project and offered to make the services of RRC staff available 
in drawing up the project proposal591.  
 
Other major NGOs in the country also acquired large numbers of trucks with various carrying 
capacities. Some of the NGOs that undertook large-scale trucking activities included the joint 
Oxfam-SCF Trucking Operation, the joint Lutheran World Federation-Ethiopia Evangelical 
Church Mekan Yesus Trucking Operation, Mennonite Mission, Catholic Relief Service, and World 
Vision International592.  
NGOs that had acquired sufficient experience in development assistance continued to secure funds 
from donors after the regime change in May 1991. This regime change in fact increased the 
confidence of major donors, who trusted that the new transitional government in Addis Ababa 
would democratise the country. As aid to the country was tightly linked to the dismantling of state-
controlled enterprises and the promotion of the free market, the government started to act in line 
with neo-liberal ideology. At the early stage, donors such as the European Economic Commission 
were disappointed with the pace with which the government proceeded with economic 
restructuring593. Later on, however, donors became satisfied that state-owned enterprises were 
being privatised, and the new government drafted a relatively liberal constitution that, among other 
things, stipulated that periodic elections were to be held on competitive basis, and power would be 
decentralised to federal units that would respect local languages and ethnicity594. As it was keen to 
assert its control over aid flows, the government set its own agenda around the notion of 
development, particularly by designing sector development programme for roads, education and 
health595. The Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (MEDAC) was designated to 
coordinate foreign aid596. 
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Despite the fact that bi-lateral and multi-lateral donor organizations funded the Ethiopian 
government, a number of other donor organizations wanted to fund NGOs. The majority of these 
donors were in favour of the development programmes of national NGOs597,  however, they were 
concerned that these NGOs did not have experience to manage these programmes independently. 
This had two implications. Firstly, donors introduced rigorous criteria when processing project 
proposals submitted by national NGOs. Most national NGOs were unable to meet these criteria, 
since, having emerged recently, they did not have sufficient numbers of qualified staff, the means 
to realise logistics or even strategy. Representatives of those donor organisations that sought to 
strengthen national NGOs became concerned about the stiff competition that national NGOs faced 
for receiving funds. A representative of one such donor organisation who discussed the matter with 
officials of national NGOs reported that donor organisations imposed “unreasonable” demands on 
national NGOs, proposing that, “…for new NGOs there should be some forum to protect 
them…”598. Meanwhile, those NGOs that had acquired experience were favoured, as they often 
continued to get financial support from their “traditional” donors, while, additionally being able to 
convince new donors that they could run development activities, which also proved necessary and 
useful. ASE, for instance, had been financed by both EZE and NOVIB in the past, until their 
financial commitment was influenced by the war between the government and rebels. Indeed, a 
few months after the regime change in May 1991, the Africa Desk officer of NOVIB informed the 
acting executive director of ASE that, “Novib’s policy with regard to Ethiopia was based on the 
reality of the wars”599. NOVIB’s chief concern had been that the ongoing conflict could destroy 
projects that they had financed, especially in war zones such as Gojjam.  The collapse of the 
military government motivated these donors to increase their financial support again; not, however, 
by going back to how things had been before.  NOVIB argued that ASE was too heavily dependent 
on the support of NOVIB and EZE, and that ASE should look for other donors to finance its 
programmes. Also, as will be seen in the next chapter, due to their mistrust with regard to ASE’s 
utilisation of finances, NOVIB and EZE withheld their support from ASE in 1990, and this posed 
a real threat to ASE. As a result, the leadership of ASE took NOVIB’s advice to approach 
alternative donors for support seriously, not only to reduce their dependency on too few donors, 
but also simply to ensure the existence of ASE. ASE’s Board passed a resolution that the long term 
solution to such problems was the diversification of donors. Thus, it advised the management of 
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ASE to review its existing project documents and initiate new ones, to be submitted to potential 
donors600. In 1997, ASE started to get financial support from Action Aid Ethiopia601. ASE presented 
its donor diversification programme as an integral part of its activities. In so doing, the organisation, 
succeeded in securing financial support to run various specific programmes from Troicare, 
KAFOD, Christian Aid, Dan Church Aid, Care Ethiopia, and Oxfam Canada and small scale 
subsidies from a number of donors602.  
These donors’ decisions to fund ASE were based on their assessment that ASE had acquired 
experience and laid down structures at the grassroots levels. The assessment made by Action Aid 
Ethiopia shows the confidence donors had about ASE. Concerning the organisation’s decision to 
fund ASE, Action Aid’s Executive Director told ASE that, “…three decade of grassroots 
experience has built our belief that ASE… [was] a prospective partner in poverty alleviation”603.   
Although they were very much in favour of NGOs with experience, donors did not ignore emerging 
national NGOs altogether. The same donors who funded ASE told the leadership of CCRDA that 
they would like to support sustainable development proposed by emerging national NGOs. ICCO 
and NOVIB from Holland, and EZE from Germany came to the fore with this proposal604. Their 
decision also favoured CCRDA, as donors wanted CCRDA to assist national NGOs to build up 
their capacities605. These donors thus increased their financial support to national NGOs, and made 
use of CCRDA as a channel for fund disbursement as well as to supervise project implementation. 
Conversely, other new donors wanted well-experienced NGOs to run projects, and they also 
designated CCRDA to identify such NGOs, and disbursed funds to them to coordinate projects. 
The designation of CCRDA in this role was the result of donors’ confidence that CCRDA was well 
experienced, both in fund management and in overseeing the implementation of projects. As opined 
by the representative of Partnership for Africa and Canada, one of the new donors organizations, 
“CCRDA is the best mechanism [to channel resources and supervise their implementation]”606.  
Like national NGOs such as ASE and CCRDA, international NGOs operating in Ethiopia also 
continued to win the favour of donors. International NGOs were involved in “cross-border 
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operations”, aimed to relieve victims of famine in those territories which had been under the control 
of rebels since 1983. For this purpose, NGOs like Oxfam secured financial support from the 
European Economic Commission (EEC), sending in financial and material assistance through the 
Relief Society of Tigray (REST), the Eritrean Relief Association, and the Oromo Relief 
Association. After the regime change, these relief organisations secured official NGO status and 
the EEC showed an interest in financing them, especially REST. However, the Commission was 
not confident about their capabilities and thus invited Oxfam to serve as intermediary between the 
Commission and such emerging national NGOs. Oxfam accepted the invitation as this proposal 
conformed to the organisation’s principle of encouraging national NGOs to carry out development 
activities in their respective areas. As soon as the military government collapsed, for example, 
senior staff at Oxfam had discussed the issue, suggesting that, “….we may be able to respond to 
local initiatives, rather than ourselves [Oxfam] to initiate responses”607. However like the EEC, 
Oxfam was also concerned that national NGOs lacked the experience to manage development 
programmes. As a result, Oxfam did not end up disbursing as much as the EEC had planned for 
them to. Concerning this, the organisation also stated in 1995, “…we remain convinced of the need 
to work with and through Ethiopian organisations [national NGOs], but we have restricted the 
number of new ones we engage with”608.  
The situation started to change in the mid-1990s, as Oxfam came to appreciate that Ethiopia was a 
strategic location in which to invest, and locate, more resources. As a senior official of Oxfam 
informed the Minister of Justice, “Addis Ababa is best suited as the location” of Oxfam’s Horn of 
Africa sub-regional office, for example609. This increased Oxfam’s Ethiopian budget. In one of its 
publications, Oxfam stated that, “The Oxfam programme and partners in Ethiopia are expected to 
benefit [possibly disproportionately] from having the additional support provided by regional staff 
and office resources close at hand” 610 . Two more events contributed to increasing Oxfam’s 
Ethiopian resources. These were the outbreak of the Ethio-Eritrean war in 1998 and the occurrence 
of the famine in the eastern and southern provinces in 1999–2000. The war displaced people close 
to the border, and drained the government’s coffers to the extent that the central government asked 
regional governments to return their budgets 611 . Oxfam thus sent out an assessment team to 
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investigate this outbreak of war and famine. The team recommended that Oxfam should increase 
their Ethiopian budget for food aid, water, sanitation, and health612. 
To conclude, the interplay between domestic and global circumstances has determined the flow of 
resources to NGOs. The quantity of resources that NGOs have mobilised in Ethiopia has increased 
in the last decades. During much of the military period, donors preferred to channel part of their 
resources through NGOs. The improvement of inter-state relations after the end of the military 
government diverted some donor resources from NGOs to the government. However, a number of 
those NGOs in operation throughout all three regimes of government were not so affected by the 
decision of donors to channel resources through the government, because certain donors continued 
to prefer to channel their resources through NGOs with ample experiences.   
4.3. Territorialisation and NGOs  
The territories in which NGOs operate have witnessed a great deal of expansion. Successive 
Ethiopian governments have attempted to exercise a high degree of authority over the regional 
distribution of NGOs, arguing that NGO resources must be fairly distributed throughout the 
country. NGOs, however, for their part, have invariably tended to prefer to remain in the areas in 
which they started their activities. This has been for two reasons: firstly, that NGOs felt they could 
secure legitimacy among project participants in areas where they had operated for a long time. 
Secondly, that continuous shifting from area to area involves adjustment problems and additional 
costs. As such, NGOs have often remained attached to specific regions, which have had the result 
of dividing the country into their own spheres of influence. Concerning this manner of division 
during the military period, the ex-chief commissioner of the RRC stated that: 
Consciously or unconsciously, voluntary agencies [NGOs] divided the country into sphere of 
influences [sic]. The American Catholic Relief Service was interested more in the troubled 
northern region of Eritrea and Tigray. UK Save the Children Fund had Korem and the 
surrounding area of Wollo; Oxfam UK took other parts of Wollo; the Lutherans were mostly 
involved in southwestern Ethiopia; World Vision was generally in the north; World University 
Service Canada (WUSC) and Care from the United States were in Harar613             
 
This attachment of NGOs to specific areas was so strong that they refused to shift to other areas of 
greater need. This created controversy with the RRC. As in the case of Save the Children Fund 
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(SCF), the ex-chief commissioner of the RRC wrote: “Save the Children [Fund] had been operating 
for so long in the Korem areas that it was difficult to make individual workers understand that at 
times Korem might not have national priority for certain supplies”614. RRC tried to convince NGOs 
to adhere to priorities set by the RRC, but it was unsuccessful. NGOs even considered these 
attempts of the RRC’s as interventions into their internal affairs. Whenever the RRC attempted to 
persuade NGOs divert supplies to areas of great need, NGOs soon reported this to their 
headquarters. Their headquarters announced it to the media, and it became one more factor for the 
condemnation of the RRC and the Ethiopian government615.       
A certain degree of disagreement also existed between NGOs. This became evident at the regular 
meetings held at CCRDA. As the chief commissioner recalled, “In the field one could see some 
conflicts among the agencies: CRS [Catholic Relief Service] and Oxfam did not get along, nor did 
World Vision and Irish Concern, nor did the Lutherans and the Catholics”616. In areas such as 
Wollo, where multiple NGOs operated, the competition between NGOs to grab projects was high. 
In 1986, an Oxfam consultant documented his experience in Wollo in the following way:   
There…seems to be unofficial competition between donor agencies, where I encountered the 
experience of an Irrigation Scheme being promised for just at the site. The following day after 
my visit – and this is no joke – a giant of some 6 million Birr…[was pledged].  It is against such 
a background that unfortunately we are going to have to try to apply Oxfam’s thinking617 
The competition between NGOs running programmes in adjacent territories constituted a serious 
issue that sometimes resulted in a lack of cooperation and poor coordination of efforts. ASE and 
SOS Sahel, for example, ran programmes in adjacent territories in Bale province. Concerning the 
lack of communication that existed between them and other NGOs, a consultant contracted by 
NOVIB in 1990 complained that, “There is now a small British agency, SOS Sahel, working in 
Balli, north Omo, along the same principle as ASE. ASE Omo project coordinator and I visited 
them. For him it was his first visit to them despite SOS having been in Balli for about a year”618.  
Donors were aware of this lack of coordination between NGOs. For instance, an evaluation 
undertaken in 1976 under the auspices of INADES-Formation pointed out that the lack of 
coordination in Wollaita, where ASE was operational, hindered the effectiveness of ASE’s 
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educational programme. To solve the problem, the evaluation recommended that, “…a formula 
should be sought which would make it possible to coordinate those different programmes [in 
Wollaita]”619. However, a similar evaluation in 1989 also concluded that a lack of coordination 
obstructed the implementation of ASE’s educational programme 620 . The same problem was 
identified with regard to Oxfam, when Oxfam itself noted that the lack of coordination between 
NGOs and governmental organisations in Wollo was one of the primary factors that challenged the 
effectiveness of one of its programmes621. 
Given the competition that existed between NGOs, coordination of efforts was just not possible. 
NGOs rather pursued what could be described as peripheralisation, which means that they 
consciously expanded their operations toward areas that experienced socio-economic and political 
marginalisation. NGOs usually gave moral justifications for their focus on peripheral areas, and 
donors accepted such justifications622.  
Two patterns emerge with regard to NGO expansion towards the periphery: the first is their rural 
bias. NGOs believed that rural areas did not receive sufficient attention from governments. Clearly, 
successive governments in Ethiopia have introduced rural development policies that favoured 
agriculture, however, those of the first two regimes marginalised smallholder agriculture. The 
imperial government pursued a policy that encouraged large-scale commercial farming as a 
strategy to ensure food security in the country623. Similarly, the military government pursued a rural 
development scheme that focused on “modernisation”, the large-scale mechanised production of 
cash crops, particularly in huge state farms, and the formation of top-down hierarchies of 
cooperatives624. In response, NGOs focused on supporting smallholding agriculture in rural areas. 
This pattern was quite apparent to NGOs, donors and governments, and resulted in a perceived 
NGO bias toward rural areas. In a critique of NGOs’ rural bias, one observer in attendance at a 
CCRDA meeting in 1980 stated that, “…while there were needs in Addis Ababa, the welfare 
organisations were concentrating on the rural areas”625.  
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The second pattern has to do with the fact that both the imperial and military governments favoured 
excess-producing regions. In response, NGOs focused on rural areas that remained marginal to the 
national economy. As such marginal areas were many, NGOs introduced a list of criteria that they 
applied more or less flexibly to identify the areas in which they would operate. The major criteria 
that each NGO applied most strictly in selecting its operational areas was the presence or absence 
of other NGOs626. This suggests that NGOs intentionally avoided possible competition with other 
NGOs. This was also because NGOs considered the presence of societal needs that they could 
address, considering that the presence of another NGO indicated that some needs at least were 
already being met; however, they did not apparently believe that any area’s need was so enormous 
that it required the efforts of other NGOs, in addition to its own627. 
It follows that each NGO directed its efforts toward those areas where government services were 
limited and other NGOs were non-existent. Those NGOs that operated in the 1960s directed their 
efforts towards the poorer and most remote areas where the involvement of the rural development 
ministries had been limited or sometimes absent628. ASE and Oxfam, for instance, started to operate 
in those western, southern, and certain central parts of the country that received little attention from 
the imperial government. ASE began its activities primarily in the seven districts of Wollaita 
province in the south, and selected districts of Kenbata-Hadya province in central Ethiopia, while 
Oxfam initiated its first engagement in the Anger-Gutin district of Wollega province in the western 
periphery of the country629. In fact, the areas where ASE and Oxfam began their activities were 
already centres of NGO concentration. Since the late 19th century, NGOs connected to specific 
religious groups had been allowed by the imperial government to establish schools, clinics and 
other small-scale community development schemes in the southern, western and south-western 
parts of the country, where there has been a relatively minimal influence by the Ethiopian Orthodox 
Church. As a result, faith-based NGOs found the south, southwestern and western parts of the 
country favourable for promoting their evangelisation630. 
Some of the NGOs based in the south-west, such as ASE, saw the injustice of the land tenure 
system. As a result, they welcomed the Ethiopian revolution, and took active initiatives in response 
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to the revolutionary development. Driven by the force of the revolution, ASE expanded its 
territorial scope, stating, for example, in 1975 that, “These last few months [1975] Agri-
Service…expanded its correspondence course activities well beyond the limits of the pilot sector 
of Wollamo and Kambatta”631. With the growth of the organisation, the area of operation expanded 
into Western Shoa, Bale, Arsi, and Gamo Gofa in the south of the country632. More importantly, 
the organisation also extended its outreach towards the north, namely in Gojjam633.  
The expansion of ASE towards Gojjam could be taken as the earliest sign of balancing the regional 
distribution of NGOs. However, it was the famine of 1973–1974 that decisively balanced the 
regional distribution of NGOs. When the famine occurred, NGOs that had operated in the areas 
mentioned above extended their scope towards the northern and north-central parts of the country. 
A number of new NGOs also rushed into the north to rescue famine victims. For instance, Oxfam 
extended its outreach towards the north. Qalu province was the first territory in the Wollo 
administrative region in which Oxfam established itself, in October 1973634. This marked the 
beginning of Oxfam’s presence in Wollo, where Oxfam has continued operating until today. The 
presence of Oxfam in Wollo has been significant not just because of the needs prevalent in one of 
Ethiopia’s poorest and most ecologically vulnerable areas, but also because of the British public 
response to, and support of Wollo in past emergencies635. After it had firmly established itself in 
Wollo, Oxfam soon extended operations to the neighbouring province of Tigray. As the relief 
situation diminished in Wollo, in May 1974, “…Oxfam in conjunction with UNICEF was running 
feeding centres in Tigray”636.  
Like Oxfam, a number of other NGOs also established themselves in Wollo and Tigray. This had 
its own ramifications. While NGOs were concentrated in the north and south, hunger and starvation 
also affected populations in the eastern parts of the country. In November 1974, CCRDA received 
a report from the United Nation Disaster Relief Organisation in which it stated that 75,000 people 
in the east needed emergency support. A few NGOs, namely Oxfam, World Vision, and Concern 
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thus extended their presence to the Ogaden in early 1975. Oxfam started relief programmes in 
Degahbour and Gode in the Ogaden637.   
The territorial expansion of NGOs also had certain consequences. To begin with, operational 
expansion often went beyond NGOs’ supervisory capacities. On this basis, ASE had previously 
turned down calls from different regions in the north for it to start programmes. Concerning this, 
an observer tells us that:  
In my stay in the organization [1970], I was impressed. From the beginning, people from Gojjam 
and Bali even requested us to start the same project and at least to send them the materials so as 
to help themselves. At that time the capacity of the organization was limited638. 
As above, in the revolutionary period, however, ASE responded by expanding its territories as far 
as Gojjam in the north. In order to deal with the supervisory problem, ASE then also shifted its 
headquarters from Soddo town, the capital of Wollaita province, to Addis Ababa639. In addition to 
such supervisory problems, the rapid expansion of NGOs created a situation whereby NGOs had 
to negotiate with officials of the RRC on a number of issues. Sometimes these negotiations could 
be frustrating, to the extent that certain NGOs like Oxfam even considered this to be a factor in 
deciding whether to reduce the number of areas in which they operated, as per one senior Oxfam 
official’s recommendation:      
Oxfam is to limit itself to 2 or 3 regions. We were to concentrate on only few areas we might be 
able to build up the right connections to local RRC as well as getting a decent amount of support 
from the RRC head office. I think that one of our major weaknesses is that we have not established 
our own priorities together with the RRC and thus suffer a lot from their indifference to what we 
are doing640.   
Later, the outbreak of the Ethiopian famine in 1983–1984 and the massive rehabilitation efforts 
that followed bolstered NGOs’ presences in their areas and caused some of them to expand their 
territories. However, NGOs sought to focus in the worst-affected areas of the northern provinces 
which secured the most media attention. This inevitably created competition for territory between 
NGOs. One of these worst-affected areas, and thus also the focus of media attention, was Korem 
in Wollo, where SCF had established itself.  Oxfam’s Oxford headquarters recommended that 
Oxfam should also extend to Korem. SCF, for itself, asserted that the region was its domain. The 
Oxfam Field Director told Oxfam in Oxford that, “We…felt there was little point in getting 
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operationally involved in Korem, the town which had received so much world publicity in the last 
week…SCF has been working in Wollo….for the last five years”641. As a result, Oxfam instead 
expanded its territories towards the western districts in Wollo province including Wadla Delanta, 
Kalu, Kobo-Alamata, and Worehimenu642.   
Oxfam also opened up new branches in the eastern part of Gonder that had suffered from repeated 
drought and famine. Oxfam began its activities in Gonder with a conviction that the region had 
been marginalised, not only by the government but also by NGOs themselves. The conflict between 
government forces and the Ethiopian Democratic Union in Gonder, which was fighting to restore 
the monarch, disrupted NGOs. As news about the famine spread, a number of NGOs rushed into 
Gonder. As a result, the competition for organisational hegemony made it difficult for Oxfam to 
gain space in eastern Gonder. As a source tells us, “This is an extremely sensitive area, with the 
Red Cross not wanting any interference from other agency”643. However, Oxfam and Red Cross 
officials discussed the issue in Addis Ababa, and Oxfam gained ground in the region. In a letter he 
addressed to the headquarters, Oxfam’s Field Director stated that, “We are working better with the 
Red Cross now, who in Addis admits to us the incompetence and apparent corruption of their 
Gonder branch”644.  
The eastern part of Gonder was not the only region in which Oxfam established itself. In the context 
in which large number of NGOs were rushing into the country and taking areas of their choice, 
Oxfam extended its outreach to Wonberta district in Eastern Hararghe and to Wollaita province in 
the south, where it started first relief, and then also rehabilitation and development programmes645.  
4.4. NGOs’ territorial contraction: shrinkage and NGOs’ response 
Towards the end of the 1980s, the territories in which NGOs operated were reduced in size. The 
process of territorial reduction went back to 1983, at which time, NGOs operated in conflict-prone 
areas. As a result, the territorial expansion of NGOs contained inherent risk. The earliest real threat 
to NGOs started on May 25th, 1983 when Ibenat in Gonder was ransacked by TPLF646. A number 
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of NGOs that operated in the area were under security threat. In spite of the threat, some NGOs, 
including Oxfam, decided to resume their works. However, the insecurity was so high that the cost 
to the organisation was too much. Thus, by early1984, Oxfam became pessimistic. Its Field 
Director stated that,  “…we should not expect to be involved there [Gonder] after July this year 
[1984], as both the costs and security risks much exceeded the benefits derived from our assistance 
to the area”647. This led Oxfam to withdraw from Gonder and starting to concentrate in Wollo in 
the north-central, and Wollaita in the south-western part of Ethiopia648.  
As before, however, Wollo was a province where NGOs operated in large numbers, and competed 
for territories. Government organisations favoured NGOs that had high budgets, prioritising them 
to operate in areas of their choice. For instance, Oxfam signed an agreement with the RRC, the 
Ministry of Agriculture and the EWWCA and started managing an agricultural project in the Kobo-
Alamata valley. Soon, the Ethiopian Water Works Constructions Authority (EWWCA), the RRC, 
the Ministry of Agriculture started themselves the same programme in the same valley with $25 
million offered by the Italian Technical Cooperation (ITC). Attempts were made to divide 
responsibilities between Oxfam and the Italian-funded project 649 .  However, these were not 
successful because Oxfam believed that as the Italian-funded project was centrally planned and 
capital intensive, it was thus, “… likely to make out smaller initiatives through the KAADP [Kobo-
Alamat Agricultural Development Project] irrelevant”650.  Oxfam, thus, decided to withdraw from 
the area in May 1987651. 
Not only the competition between NGOs, but also their insecurity was intense in Wollo. After 
withdrawing from Kobo-Alamata, Oxfam became extremely pessimistic about its activities in the 
north, notably Wollo. The advance of rebels and the weak response of the government forced 
NGOs to run away from the region towards the end of the 1980s. Because of its military defeats in 
the north, the government declined to give protection to expatriates in Tigray and Eritrea. The 
government set April 8th, 1988 as the deadline for expatriates to leave the two regions652. With few 
exceptions, NGOs including Oxfam duly dismantled and removed their equipment from Tigray653. 
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In 1989, a general uncertainty prevailed within Oxfam over Wollo due to serious security risks. 
Thus, towards the end of 1989, Oxfam terminated its agricultural programme in Wadla Delanata 
district and its water programmes in various parts of Wollo province654. Some of Oxfam’s staff 
were cut off and trapped in Wollo by the advancing rebel forces of the Ethiopian People 
Revolutionary Democratic Front in Oxfam’s project area. Concerning this, the Deputy Country 
Representative of Oxfam reported that, “…the situation in Dessie [the capital of Wollo] is not good 
and all the expatriate staff [of international NGOs] left Dessie for Addis. Two of our project staff, 
Kebede and Ali are cut off in Wogel Tena [the main town of Wadla Delanta district]”655. 
The insecurity that forced NGOs like Oxfam to flee was, indeed, pervasive; no area in the north 
was immune from the influence of the ongoing conflict. Concerned by the fact that the battle in the 
north would destroy ASE’s projects, NOVIB and EZE refused to fund ASE’s educational 
programme in Gojjam, as it was closer to the theatre of war. Moreover, these donors sought to 
finance ASE educational and project interventions in Gamo Gofa and Bale only as they were hit 
severely by the famine of 1983–1984; ASE nonetheless continued to run the same educational 
programmes in Gojjam, Arussi and Sidamo656, until, believing that educational intervention alone 
could not address the profound societal needs of Gojjam, Arussi and Sidamo, ASE terminated the 
Arussi programme in 1989 and the Sidamo programme in 1990657. Meanwhile, a number of factors 
disrupted ASE’s programme in Gojjam and ultimately forced the organisation to leave the region. 
Amongst these factors were the instability that followed the attempted coup of May 1989, the 
confusion that followed the announcement of the “New Economic Policy” in March 1990, and the 
civil war that had been going on in the north658.    
NGOs acted similarly following their withdrawal from the north such as Wollo and Gojjam, 
transferring some of their employees to the east and some to the south. ASE transferred its 
employees to Bale and Gamo Gofa and Oxfam transferred some of its employees to Wollaita, East 
Hararghe and Somalia659. Though security was better in these regions, the government itself was 
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insecure and the RRC refused to renew the project agreements of NGOs in order to reduce the 
movement of expatriate NGO staff. As a result, NGOs were unable to import goods duty free for 
their projects. NGOs such as Oxfam consequently froze projects like the Joint Trucking Operation 
in Wollo, the agricultural programme in Wobera, and the water development programme in 
Wollaita660. 
4.5. Restoration and expansion towards marginal areas 
The situation changed with regime change in May 1991. As peace was restored, NGOs not only 
regained the positions that they had lost, but also became confident that they could expand their 
positions in all directions. At the time, a senior technical Oxfam staff member appreciative of the 
political changes stated that they, “…will increase dramatically the geographical areas in 
which…Oxfam could work in Ethiopia”661.  
During the early 1990s, NGOs revived their programmes in areas from which they had withdrawn. 
Oxfam, for instance, went back to Wollo and Eastern Hararghe where it restored its agricultural 
programme. Likewise, it went back to Wollaita and restored its water programme662.  Moreover, 
the mandate to manage programmes in Tembien in Tigray (through the Relief Society of Tigray), 
in Eastern Hararghe (through the Oromo Relief Association) and in Wadla-Delanta district in 
Wollo (through the Amhara Rehabilitation and Development Association) was transferred from  
Oxfam’s office in Khartoum to Oxfam’s office in Addis Ababa663.  
Like Oxfam, ASE restored its activities in the Adaba and Mendayu districts of Bale, the Boreda 
and Kutcha districts of Gamo Gofa, and the Debay Tilatgin and Goncha Enesse Siso districts of 
Eastern Gojjam664. Although it was still operating in districts in which it had been earlier, ASE 
increased the number of peasant associations within these districts. In 1987, ASE operated with 20 
peasant associations, each of which included 300 rural residents. In 1990, ASE proposed that it 
would operate with 103 peasant associations, however NOVIB, EZE and Welthungerhilfe, a 
protestant German NGO, objected to the plan on the ground that the geographical coverage was 
                                                          
660
 Letter from Mr. Nick, Oxfam’s country representative to Aid Coordination Department of RRC (30th April, 1990) 
661
 “Oxfam Ethiopia Senior Staff Meeting”(October 29th, 1991), P, 1 
662
 Informant, Ato Mesfin Tadesse 
663
 Ibid, P. 7 
664
 ASE, ASE’s 30th…”, P. 39 
141 
 
too ambitious. After the regime change, EZE and NOVIB allowed ASE to manage its programmes 
in 54 peasant associations665.  
There was a great deal of competition between NGOs for resources in the mid 1990s. As before, 
one way of gaining the favour of donors was to select areas that suffered from deep-rooted poverty 
and marginalisation. Initially, ASE’s leaders made use of their own personal experiences to select 
poverty-stricken areas666. Lalo Mama Meder district in the Menz province of the North Shoa zone 
was the first to win a grant. The ex-managing director of ASE recalls having known that poverty 
was rampant in the area when he was vice minister of Agriculture. The ex-executive director of 
ASE, together with a senior official of ASE, went to Lalo Mama Meder to investigate the possibility 
of initiating a project towards the end of 1996. Six months later, a project was initiated with 
financial support from Action Aid Ethiopia and in 1997 ASE started its operation there, after it 
signed an agreement with the RRC667.  
This project in Lalo Mama Meder was the first step of ASE’s territorial expansion towards marginal 
areas. In the early 2000s, negotiations between the government and donors determined that food-
insecure and marginalised areas should be their focus. The government, major donors and NGOs 
set up what is known as the Food Security Coalition. The Coalition identified 239 districts in 
Ethiopia as chronically food-insecure areas. Donors went along with the priorities set by the 
Coalition. In 2000, ASE started a project in Goro in Bale with financial support from Dan Church 
Aid, after the regional RRC proposed Goro for the project. As the head of the Bale RRC told ASE, 
“There is an opportunity to implement a full-fledged IRDP [Integrated Rural Development 
Programme] in Goro woreda [district]”668. ASE first ensured that there was no other NGO operating 
in the district669. Then, with financial support from a number of donors, such as Trócaire (an Irish 
NGO) and CAFOD (a Catholic NGO) in England and Wales, in 2000 ASE started running the 
same programme, as in Goro, in Amaro in the south670. From 2005 on, ASE expanded towards 
Borena, a pastoral area in Oromia regional state; the Debate district in Benishngul Gumuz regional 
state; the Dasenech and Yangatom districts, bordering with Sudan in the Southern People, Nation 
and Nationality regional state; Itang district in Gambela regional state,  and the Ambassel and 
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Tehuleder districts of Wollo province in the Amhara regional state671. All these areas are considered 
to have remained marginal to the national economy, and both donors and the government want 
NGOs to focus on areas of the same type. Concerning this understanding that the government and 
donors reached, as well as its impact on ASE’s territorial expansion towards marginal areas, one 
of this study’s informants stated that:  
In the first place, the government policy stipulates that we [NGOs] should work at least in five 
regions.  This means that since they claim to work on development, NGOs should work at least 
in five regions. The donors themselves are urged by the government to do so, especially to choose 
less developed areas. In the urban centers, the government can do its project. So the government 
urges them to help finance NGOs in underdeveloped areas672.  
Like ASE, Oxfam welcomed the idea that development was to focus on areas that suffered poverty 
and marginalisation. As soon as the new government was established in 1995, the Resident 
Representative of Oxfam in Ethiopia announced the new territories to which the organisation would 
expand, also stating that:        
Of itself, this event [the formation of new federal government] does not call for a change of 
priorities for Oxfam, but we need to bear in mind at least two issues for the future. One is to do 
with the government policy of regionalization, which is now embodied in the Constitution. In 
time the policy is likely to result in changes of emphasis for Oxfam in regard to geographical 
areas of greatest need. Also issues to do with minorities and human rights are likely to come to 
the fore673  
Oxfam duly expanded towards new poverty-stricken areas. The areas into which Oxfam expanded 
were pastoralist and semi-pastoralist regions such as Afar, Somalia, Borena, and Benishangul674. 
Oxfam’s expansion to these marginal areas went along with the views of both donors and the 
government675.  
From towards the end of 1990s, NGOs showed a marked progress with regard to inter-agency 
cooperation. This was in response to their strategic shift towards “empowering” project participants 
to claim their rights. NGOs formed and participated in either one or more of the 25 coalitions and 
networks operational in the country on the eve of the 2005 national parliamentary elections. These 
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coalitions and networks dessiminated information, articulated and aired collective voices with 
regard to the interests of the NGOs themselves as well as of society676.  
To summarise, territorialisation was not a spontaneous process. NGOs expanded towards areas that 
received little support from successive governments. This went along with the philanthrophic 
principle that NGOs are supposed to uphold. However, NGOs’ expansion towards marginal areas 
served as a means to secure resources. This is shown by the fact that there has been stiff competition 
between NGOs for resources and areas of operation.  Inter-agency relation between NGOs has 
witnessed marked improvement since the late 1990s as NGOs formed and participated in many of 
the networks and coalitions.     
4. 6. NGOs’ programmes: sectoral diversity and volume 
4. 6. 1. Introduction  
Marginal areas in which NGOs have operated in large number are vulnerable to drought and 
famine. As a result, famine relief and rehabilitation dominated NGOs’ programmes in Ethiopia. 
Once the two famines had gone, NGOs extended their ad hoc interventions of the famine years 
without further modification.  
The country began to have better prospects in terms of food availability from towards the end of 
the 1980s. However, NGOs had tended to maintain their relief programmes as relief was considered 
to bring about more resources. Donors and the Ethiopian government that took over power in 1991 
were against this relief orientation of NGOs. This led NGOs to adopt long term perspectives. This 
is not to suggest, however, that NGO programmes other than emergency relief had only started at 
the end of 1980s.  
NGOs had launched large-scale multi-sectoral programmes in the context of the 1980s famine. 
Unlike their programmes initiated in the famine context, NGOs demonstrated marked progress 
with regard to approach from the late 1980s on, adopting an integrated approach to tackling 
poverty, mainly in rural settings.  
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Although they drove NGOs to adopt a long term perspective, neither the government nor donors 
influenced NGOs to select a particular approach or programme contents. Asked about the influence 
of donors on their programme types and approach, a senior official of Oxfam in Ethiopia said the 
following, indicating that the organisation sticks to its principles:  
We do not formulate projects for the sake of getting fund. But if a project adds value and meets 
the need of a particular people, we formulate it. We do not formulate [a project] for the sake of 
money because donors have trust in us. After that we have to implement it.  When we implement 
it, we are not allowed to compromise the standard set by Oxfam. Whatever the cost the project 
requires we should invest in it, otherwise we are not allowed to compromise the quality of the 
project. If you do so and satisfy the needs of the stakeholders, then you will win their trust. These 
needs are also evaluated from different angles such as from quality and timely point of view, and 
how did you behave, and treat as human being677.       
Similarly, a project informant stated that ASE sets its own programmes and that it turns down any 
demand from donors that stands against the purpose of ASE. The informant went on to state that 
donors knew very well the position of ASE on issues of integrity. ASE donors such as INADES-
Formation on the one hand and EZE and NOVIB on the other, have disagreed on some strategic 
issues, which very disagreement, said the informant, gave ASE the chance to choose the 
programme types that, it believes,  best responded to the Ethiopian situation678.   
Though they might choose programmes that they themselves prefer, NGOs’ ambitions to undertake 
large-scale programmes are also always subject to the availability of resources. From the mid-
1980s, though they continued to be influenced by various events, NGOs’ programmes were 
diversified to a large extent and saw significant expansion. With regard to the diversity as well as 
the scale of programmes run by NGOs since the mid-1980s, two distinct phases may be discerned. 
The first phase covers the period from the outbreak of the Ethiopian famine in the middle of 1980s 
to the middle of the 1990s. In defining this phase, it is also necessary to investigate NGOs’ 
programmes prior to the mid-1980s. The second phase extends from the middle of the 1990s to the 
promulgation of proclamation No 621/2009. 
4. 6. 2. Relief and rehabilitation programmes  
4.6.2.1. Relief programmes 
The food crises that occurred in the 1970s and the 1980s decided the nature of NGOs’ programmes. 
The famine was so serious that even those NGOs that considered themselves to be developmental 
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organisations got involved in emergency operations. This was because their activities were 
disrupted by the famine situation. For instance, though the scale of its emergency relief operation 
remains unclear, ASE claimed that during the 1973–1974 famine, it, “…had to decelerate its 
activities [education and training]…to engage itself in relief distribution”679. Likewise, during the 
famine of 1983–1984, ASE could no longer carry out its educational programmes in Bale and 
Gamo Gofa provinces. One of its major donors, NOVIB, thus proposed that ASE had to relieve 
famine victims in the two provinces. ASE accepted the proposal and started to distribute food to 
the people in four districts in which the organisation operated680.  
While NOVIB and EZE were in favour of relief operation, INADES-Formation stood against 
ASE’s decision to carry out relief operations, arguing that relief operations were beyond the 
mandate of ASE. This attitude is apparent in a letter from an official of INADES-Formation 
addressed to the Executive director of ASE, which states that:       
You [the Executive Director of ASE] tell me that…it [the famine] distracted your activities in 
training…I would have thought it was rather the job of NGOs specialized in relief operation to 
deal with the problem…This is the policy we followed in Chad when it was famine stricken in 
1984-85681  
Like ASE, a number NGOs were forced to consider relief activities. Driven by their developmental 
orientation, NGOs such as Oxfam and CCRDA at first tended to avoid relief programmes during 
the 1983–1984 famine. In the midst of the critical famine situation, Oxfam initially decided that it 
would not run relief projects682. Likewise, CCRDA failed to take a pro-active measure when the 
famine first occurred in 1983–1984683. When the famine reached its critical stage towards the end 
of 1984, CCRDA issued a statement of concern about the famine684. At the same time, Oxfam 
started to run relief programmes685. 
Eventually, with the flow of resources that the famine caused, like all NGOs, CCRDA and Oxfam 
started to run relief programmes. The type and scale of these relief programmes in the 1980s was 
different from those of the 1970s. During the 1970s famine, CCRDA had coordinated the relief 
operation and disbursed financial support to member NGOs. Oxfam initially showed its support by 
financing CCRDA itself. Its first grant to CCRDA amounted to £1000 was made on May 20th, 
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1973686 and from then until October 1973, Oxfam donated ₤12,000 to CCRDA687. As the famine 
reached a critical stage, Oxfam started two “selective feeding” centres in the Qallu district of 
western Wollo. Selective feeding presupposed that the government should take responsibility for 
distributing family rations688. As a result, the Oxfam relief programme was modest. In October 
1973, Oxfam mobilised 30 tons of milk powder, 2 tons of clothing and 5000 blankets from 
Britain689. Later, the organisation bought 8 tons of enriched soya and wheat flour, 1000 cartons of 
Faffa and 30 tins of edible oil from the Ethiopian Nutritional Institute690. Oxfam applied the same 
supplementary feeding technique wherever it carried out relief operations. In early 1975, 20,000 
children were put under the joint Oxfam and UNICEF selective feeding programme in Tigray691. 
Also in 1974, Oxfam sent out two medical teams that fed malnourished children in the Degahbour 
and Gode districts of Ogaden. On average, each of the teams treated 300 children per day until the 
programme came to an end in the summer of 1975692.  
When famine broke out again in 1983–1984, Oxfam initially commenced to supply the same 
supplementary feeding programme. Soon after the famine was reported, the Field Director of 
Oxfam stated that, “…for Oxfam… we must try to get some kind of supplementary feeding 
programme going”693. However, the magnitude of the famine as well as the context in which the 
relief operation was carried out required a massive deployment of grain, not just supplementary 
feeding.  Oxfam thus set up supplementary feeding centres, first in Ibnat in Gonder, and then in 
Bora and Wogel Tena in Wollo. In doing so, Oxfam trusted that the Ethiopian government would 
distribute family rations to those in need. However, the government failed to get food from the 
Western donors. Two years after the first report was heard about the famine, the Food and 
Agricultural Organisations (FAO) promised to donate 250,000 metric tons (mt). However this food 
was not delivered on time694.  In response, NGOs increased their aid to Ethiopia. Oxfam bought ₤3 
million worth of wheat and shipped it to Ethiopia. This was the largest relief item that Oxfam had 
ever shipped to any country. As Black tells us, “This marked the transition for Oxfam into an 
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unprecedented league of disaster response-and not just for Ethiopia but for any major 
emergency”695.  
The grain that Oxfam shipped to Ethiopia was delivered directly to the RRC for distribution. It was 
not clear as to how this grain was distributed to famine victims. Certainly, people in Bora and 
Wogel Tena in Wollo, where Oxfam set up supplementary feeding programmes, did not receive 
food from the RRC. The situation was the same in the whole of Wollo, in that the starving people 
did not receive food. This was because the government used food aid as an instrument to force 
people to go to new settlements. This threatened Oxfam’s supplementary relief programme in 
Wollo. Two of the nurses in Wogel Tena supplementary programme argued that people died of 
hunger because the government used food aid to achieve the objective of its resettlement 
programme, and that Oxfam should import grain and distribute it directly to the starving people. 
The two nurses were joined by the entire staff of Oxfam in Wollo, who stated that if Oxfam failed 
to import and distribute grain in this way, they would quit their jobs696. Oxfam increased the scale 
of its relief programme in response. Firstly, Oxfam dispatched 6000 metric tones grain to the RRC 
in Wollo. The RRC assured Oxfam that a reasonable proportion would be allocated to Bora and 
Wogel Tena, each accommodating about 30,000 famine victims697. Secondly, Oxfam, together with 
SCF, set up Oxfam-Save the Children Trucking, employing trucks of varying size in order to 
distribute grain to selected locations before a crisis of one type or another was reported. The 
objective was to discourage migrations of people whenever famine occurred. This too signalled the 
fact that relief had become a major programme for Oxfam698. 
Oxfam’s increased relief programme was part of the overall expansion of relief programmes by 
NGOs. NGOs not only acquired massive amount of foods and non-food items from donors, but 
also a number of trucks that improved the profile of NGOs. The programme expansion of CCRDA 
shows that the famine that occurred in 1983–1984 improved the profiles of even small NGOs. 
CCRDA was set up to coordinate the relief operation in 1973–1974, and soon became a forum 
where issues related to the famine were discussed. Over time, two main motives of member NGOs 
emerged, respectively those of international and national NGOs. International NGOs wanted 
CCRDA to focus on negotiations with the RRC, so that administrative and bureaucratic bottlenecks 
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could be tackled. On the other hand, what concerned national NGOs was that CCRDA should 
develop project proposals that reflected the priorities of member NGOs and submit them to donors 
for funding. In 1985, the chairman of CCRDA summed up the two main interest groups of their 
member NGOs by stating that, “While the main problem of larger organisations [international 
NGOs] is negotiations with government, the problem of smaller organisations [national NGOs] is 
to find the funds to run their programmes”699. Some of the programmes CCRDA funded were 
expensive. For instance, CCRDA funded transportation of grain that donors had donated to NGOs 
and the RRC from the ports to various grain stores. However, inflation, which was high after the 
Ethiopian revolution, became a major challenge. Concerned by the rising inflation, the executive 
committee, in its meeting of February 7th, 1977 passed a resolution that asked member NGOs to 
cover a share of the cost of grain transport. The minutes of the organisation documented that:  
The question of payment of transport of donated items from Assab to Addis Ababa was discussed. 
Transport costs had now risen from 6. 75 to 10 birr [Ethiopian currency] per quintal and it was 
becoming difficult to fund consignments. It was recommended that in future receipts be asked to 
pay a prorate share of the cost of transport700. 
CCRDA made further attempts to solve the transport problem by proposing to purchase its own 
trucks. However, representatives of international NGOs rejected this proposal on the ground that 
this was beyond the mandate bestowed to CCRDA701. When the famine of 1983–1984 became a 
major concern, CCRDA approached its donors and a telex it circulated on September 9th, 1983 
resulted in a big success. The Ecumenical Consortium Church World Service, Lutheran World 
Relief and Catholic Relief Service agreed to fund the purchase of a fleet of 65 trucks of varying 
carrying capacity. CCRDA’s secretariat, led by the Coordinator played a pivotal role in this. Fr. 
Doheny in his memoir stated that, “Bro. Gus O’Keeffe [the Coordinator]…has become a legend in 
the organisation, with a fleet of sixty five trucks on the road bringing food to all the stricken parts 
of the country”702. A number of trucks were also donated by EZE from Germany, ICCO from 
Holland and many others, and by the end of the 1980s, CCRDA had 158 trucks of different sizes703. 
Like CCRDA, other major NGOs in the country such as MEDEA, LWF, Oxfam Great Britain, 
SCF, and Christian Relief Society (CRS) approached donors for funds and acquired trucks that 
delivered food and non-food items to areas of great need in the country704.  
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CCRDA also started its own relief programme. While CCRDA had previously supplied foods and 
medicines to NGOs running relief programmes, the severity of the famine in 1984 led CCRDA to 
get directly involved in relief activities. In 1985, the chairman of the Association described the 
context in which CCRDA became operational. He told representatives of member NGOs that, 
“When most of you were not around and when people were dying like flies there was nothing else 
to do but to be operational”705. CCRDA recruited and deployed medical personnel who started 
managing 17 relief shelters, running from late 1984 into early 1986 in the Yefatna Temuga, Chebo 
and Gurage, and Merahbete provinces of Northern Shoa, and Wollaita province in the Sidamo 
administrative region706. 
4.6.2.2. The rehabilitation programme 
NGOs were aware that the recovery of the agricultural sector, which had suffered so many shocks 
in the 1970s and 1980s, would rely heavily on the provision of basic inputs such as seeds, plough 
oxen, hand tools, insecticides and pesticides707. The rehabilitation programme that NGOs undertook 
in 1986 and 1987 was their largest yet in terms of scale, however NGOs had previously managed 
a number of rehabilitation programmes in the aftermath of the 1970s famine. In 1974, for instance, 
Oxfam distributed oxen valued at Eth $ 25,000 to farmers in the Qallu district of Wollo708. It also 
initiated and financed a handicraft project in Alamata town to rehabilitate those women who had 
lost their property due to the famine. Oxfam’s budget for running the handicraft programme was 
Eth $ 50,000709. CCRDA’s rehabilitation programme in famine-ravaged areas in the 1970s was the 
largest of any NGO’s. During its first three months alone, from early June 1974, CCRDA financed 
17 different projects that cost $ US 325, 000. Of these, ten were in Wollo, five in Tigray, one in 
Kaffa and one in Gamo Gofa province710.     
NGOs rehabilitation activities continued with the resettlement programme that the military 
government started in the post-famine period. In 1975, the RRC closed eleven relief shelters in the 
Ogaden and moved the people to the Wabi Shebele River at Gode West, Kelafo, Imi, Mustahil, and 
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Burkur 711 . A number of NGOs in the country showed their interest to get involved in this 
programme. In August 1975, Mr Malcolm, Oxfam’s East Africa Regional Director, advised Oxfam 
that, “…with the general condition of the camp improving the maximum effort must be switched 
to rehabilitation”712. In the short term, NGOs such as Oxfam and Concern financed agricultural and 
engineering713. They also set up a mobile workshop for vehicle repairs714. In the long run, NGOs 
put in place rehabilitation programmes that contributed to the self-sufficiency of project 
participants. However, NGOs had a dilemma. On the one hand, they recognised that there was a 
profound need in the region. Mr Malcolm, for example, enumerated the activities that needed to be 
undertaken in the Ogaden. He proposed the deployment of agricultural extension officers in each 
district to make surveys on each province of the Ogaden region, to use tractors, to distribute hand 
tools and seeds, and to implement small scale irrigation works on the Webi Shebele River715. On 
the other hand, due to the revolution having created such uncertainty in the country, Oxfam pursued 
an approach that kept its programmes minimal. Thus, the same person who proposed a wide range 
of activities to be undertaken in the region, Mr Malcolm, also opined that, “…We should not err 
on the side of instigating too large a project”716.  
Unlike Oxfam, CCRDA consistently financed the rehabilitation programmes that other NGOs and 
the RRC undertook. In early 1977, CCRDA disbursed its earliest support (Eth $ 30, 942.48) to 
Concern to purchase and distribute oxen to the newly settled Somalis717. CCRDA also always 
welcomed the requests of the RRC. At the beginning of 1978, the RRC asked CCRDA to finance 
a list of requirements in connection with the moving of 120,000 people from Wollo and Tigray to 
new settlement areas. The response of CCRDA shows that the organisation considered resettlement 
as amongst its priorities. CCRDA also stated that, “…it should not be necessary to deal with 
requests on an emergency basis but that CRDA [CCRDA] should plan its inputs well in 
advance…”718  The main factor was that CCRDA noted that the conditions of resettlers were 
deteriorating as the government’s capacity to assist them was challenged by other national 
priorities. As stated by a recent publication:  
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During this period [1977-1980], CRDA was much focused on assisting resettlers from Wollo and 
Tigray who were resettled in Assosa, Bale, Ogaden and other places following the drought in the 
early 1970s. The situation of settlers was deteriorating owning to reduced assistance from the 
government, and most settlers were at high risk”719 
 
Regardless of the position they took about the prevailing political situation, NGOs increased their 
rehabilitation programmes. This was because the famine of 1983–1984 had devastated the 
economic basis of farmers. The geographical focus, the type and scale of rehabilitation programme 
varied from NGO to NGO, depending on the amount of resources that they could mobilise. NGOs 
like CCRDA, which commanded huge resources, carried out massive rehabilitation programmes. 
With resources that it mobilised from member NGOs and a variety of international donors, CCRDA 
distributed 5,980 metric tons of a variety of seeds that amounted to Eth $ 5.1 million in 1985 alone. 
It also delivered 99,655 agricultural tools, valued at Eth $ 716,536. In addition, 1,959 heads of 
plough oxen valued at Eth $ 791,800 were purchased and distributed to farmers of drought-affected 
regions720. Likewise, the organisation distributed 16,700 metric tons of seeds of various types, and 
delivered 437,000 tools to farmers in 12 administrative regions in 1986. While CCRDA’s 
rehabilitation programme covered 12 out of the 14 administrative regions of the country, Wollo 
administrative region received the most assistance due to the severity of the drought and famine 
there. For instance, in 1986 farmers in Wollo received 6,272 tons of seeds, which accounted for 
one third of the total seeds that CCRDA distributed in all. Similarly, 145,000 hand tools were 
distributed to farmers in Wollo; one fourth of the total number of hand tools distributed by CCRDA. 
Shoa administrative region was the second most assisted region. Farmers there received 3,798 tons 
of seed (a little less than one fourth of the CCRDA total) and 109, 288 tools (more than one fourth 
of the total number)721.  
CCRDA delivered its inputs via its own member NGOs. In 1985, 20 member NGOs were involved 
in distributing agricultural inputs to farmers. In 1986, the number rose to 32722. NGOs themselves 
mobilised resources from their own donors for rehabilitation purposes. Oxfam was the first of the 
NGOs to start a rehabilitation programme. Oxfam believed that whenever disaster occurred, the 
maximum effort should be taken to encourage famine victims to stay at home. When people started 
to migrate to the shelters in May 1983, Oxfam offered Eth $ 20,000 to the RRC branch in Gonder, 
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to take advantage of the major rains to cultivate crops723. After it was forced to withdraw from 
Gonder in 1984, Oxfam carried out massive rehabilitation works in Eastern Hararghe and Wollo. 
In 1986, Oxfam distributed seeds (beans, barley and wheat) to 20,000 farmers in Kon, Bora, Tsehai 
Mewcha and Harawa in the Wadla Delanta district of Wollo724. Oxfam also carried out the same 
programme in the Wonbera district of Eastern Hararghe725. In the meantime, the RRC and the 
Ministry of Agriculture argued that free distribution of agricultural inputs would stifle the self-
reliance of farmers, and that distribution of agricultural inputs should be undertaken on a loan basis. 
As these minutes of Oxfam stated, “As told by the RRC and the MoA [Ministry of Agriculture]…it 
is not good just to give seed to farmers. It is better to give to them in the form of loans”726. NGOs 
accepted this argument. Oxfam thus introduced an agricultural recovery programme that included 
diverse components such as seed bank development, soil and water conservation, tree nurseries, 
and credit facilities, first in Wonberta district727. The programme was aimed at bringing back 
farmers to pre-famine status. A year later, income generation was included into the programme. 
This aimed at assisting farmers to have more income, in order to resist disasters. Concerning the 
importance of income generation, a consultant of Oxfam stated that:         
It was the absence of supplemental income which placed households in a food crisis…The key 
to new programmes in highland Hararghe will be to find means of diversifying the local economy 
through income generation, crop diversification, and the general intensification of agriculture728.    
Oxfam set out to replicate the agricultural programme begun in Wonberta in Wollo. To that end, 
in July 1986, Oxfam sent out a consultant to Wollo, “…to find out those possibilities where Oxfam 
can participate in development actions”729. The consultant proposed that a reasonable number of 
Service Cooperatives were to be assisted to tackle four or five constraints730. The constraints 
identified were water development, vegetable production, oxen, soil conservation, expansion of 
tree nurseries, and distribution of improved rams731. He advised further that this was not to be a 
package programme but rather an approach to solving critical problems, similar to that employed 
by the Ministry of Agriculture and peasant associations, and with less involvement by Oxfam732.  
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Like Oxfam, a number of NGOs carried out massive rehabilitation programmes in their areas of 
operation. Indeed, there was no NGO in the country that did not undertake rehabilitation activities. 
For instance, ASE, which basically ran education programmes, received massive amounts of 
financial support from its donors, such as NOVIB and EZE. It subsequently financed six 
cooperatives in Gamo Gofa to the tune of Eth $ 600,000. In addition, 2470 Qts of maize seeds were 
distributed to Gamo Gofa, and 3245 Qts to Bale. Service cooperatives in Tigray, Hararghe, and 
Arussi also received financial assistance from ASE. The total number of project participants who 
benefitted from this support was 35,066, at a total cost of Eth $ 684, 935733.  
To summarise, both relief and rehabilitation activities have featured prominently in NGOs 
programmes in Ethiopia. This was due to the famines that occurred in the country in the 1970s and 
1980s. The emergency situation diminished significantly towards the end of the 1980s. This had a 
profound effect on NGOs’ long term programmes. The pages that follow discuss how the 
diminishing emergency reduced the income of NGOs and hence drove them towards long-term 
programmes.       
4.6.3. The Rise of multi-sector development programmes 
4.6.3. 1. Diminishing of relief situation and its impact on the programme of NGOs 
The necessity for relief programmes had lessened significantly by the end of the 1980s. This gave 
NGOs a greater impetus to adopt long term perspectives. NGOs were driven towards adopting long 
term perspectives due to the influence of donors, and the government that seized power in May 
1991. Certainly, the famines of the 1970s and 1980s had provided NGOs with massive resources. 
NGOs screened images of the starving people to mobilise resources. Although it was not introduced 
to serve this purpose, supplementary feeding programme itself had public relation potential that 
kept the flow of donation to NGO by way of evocking public emotions. At a time when the famine 
of 1983–1984 had reached its most critical stage, Oxfam published a paper in which it stated that, 
“….from a public relation point of view a supplementary feeding programme was an attractive 
proposition”734. The reason, as stated in the same report, was that, “The media tends to take less 
interest in water projects and plastic sheeting during a famine than in pictures and descriptions of 
starving people”735.  
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NGOs, thus wanted to maintain their relief and rehabilitation programmes even after the emergency 
situation had diminished markedly. This triggered debate within each NGO and between NGOs 
and their donors.  For instance, ASE planned to include relief as part of its programme. Donors 
such as NOVIB opposed it. Donors knew that the relief operation had taken the, “…energy and 
attention from the management of ASE [and] that it jeopardises the quality of training 
programme…”736 In a situation where there was no emergency need, NOVIB found it irrelevant 
for ASE to include a relief programme amongst their activities. In fact, NOVIB pursued a policy 
that allowed for the financing of emergency programmes only if the emergency in question 
hindered the regular activities of its implementing partner organisations737. In April 1986, a NOVIB 
consultant recommended that ASE should not be involved in relief programmes in the country 
again, as this would endanger its current and future programmes738. As a result, ASE did not carry 
out relief operations after the end of the 1984–1985 crises in areas beyond its operationa areas. 
There were localised food shortages in the areas in which ASE was operational. Thus, ASE ran 
relief programme in Gamo Gofa province in 1988 and 1994, and in Enebse Sar Mider in Gojjam 
province in 2002/2003739. 
Likewise, the running of relief programmes in the post-relief situation generated debate within 
Oxfam. Towards the end of 1988, the Relief Manager of Oxfam argued that now the relief situation 
had diminished, Oxfam had to focus fully on preventive programmes. However, the Wollo-based 
Deputy Director of Oxfam did not agree with the Relief Manager. In a memo addressed to the 
Resident Representative of Oxfam, she stated, “I don’t quite share John’s [the Relief Manager’s] 
view that there is not enough emergency related work…I feel, and I told him [John Seller] so, that 
he could look at his work with a wider perception and take a more active approach…”740. However, 
as the so-called relief situation decreased, donors diverted their resources to other parts of the 
world. Towards the end of 1988, the Executive Director of CCRDA met the Minister of Dutch 
Foreign Affairs and reported back that, “…it will be very difficult for Ethiopia to obtain major 
Dutch donations for relief. Most of the relief financing will be diverted to Sudan this year”741.   
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The new government that came to power in May 1991 also argued that NGOs should leave off their 
relief operations and focus on long term development programmes. As a result, NGOs downplayed 
their relief activities742.  
Good harvests in the country coupled, with the government’s policy, left large numbers of NGO 
trucks almost idle. CCRDA tried to upgrade the performance of its trucks, to make them 
competitive in the transport market743. However, the vehicles were so old that their maintenance 
took about 53% of their total income744. Out of desperation, CCRDA’s Executive Committee 
decided to discontinue 43 of the old trucks745.  
4. 6. 3. 2. The rise of multi-sector development programmes 
4. 6. 3. 2.1. Type and scale of NGO programmes in the post 1983–1984 famine period 
NGOs diversified their programmes and increased their scale of operation in the post 1983–1984 
famine period. This programme expansion was not only because of the agricultural crisis that the 
country saw in the 1980s. While some NGOs reappraised their programmes and introduced 
programmes that they considered were responsive to the Ethiopian situation, a number of NGOs 
expanded their programmes primarily as a means to appease the Ethiopian government. Soon after 
the famine occurred, the leadership of ASE, for instance, made the assessment that education alone, 
unless otherwise supported by other programmes, would not address the problems of the rural poor. 
In a letter addressed to the Ministry of Agriculture in July 1985, the Executive Director of ASE 
described the impact of the famine on the effectiveness of ASE’s educational programme. Part of 
the letter reads:   
The drought that hit Ethiopia in the last few years and the mass starvation that came in its wake, 
by limiting the effectiveness of AE’s training programme have induced ASE to involve in long 
term preventive and development programme. Moreover, ASE is convinced that it should create 
preconditions by which its target groups can readily implement what they have been trained746.  
On the other hand, most international NGO operated in areas under the control of the government, 
and rebel-held areas; their operations in rebel-held territories were undertaken with the assumption 
that the government had no means to know about them. While their relief operations were 
underway, NGOs noted the need to increase their development programmes in government-held 
                                                          
742
 CRDA, Management Committee Meeting Minutes (October 24, 1988)     
743
 CRDA, Management Committee Meeting Minutes (October 31st, 1989) 
744
 CRDA, Executive Committee Meeting Minutes (February 16th, 1989) 
745
 Ibid 
746
 Letter from ASE to the Ministry of Agriculture (July 15th, 1985) 
156 
 
areas as a pre-emptively means to appease the government, should they ever find out. Like many 
international NGOs, Oxfam ran relief programmes in both rebel and government-held territories. 
Initially, in fact, Oxfam disbursed much more money to relief operations in rebel-held areas than 
in the government-held territories, as reported in the summer of 1983 by the Field Director of 
Oxfam, who stated that, “We have in fact given more to the other side [£130,000 to rebel-held 
territories] than to Ethiopia [£ 80,553]” 747 . Consequently, Oxfam was concerned that the 
government might interpret this as Oxfam assisting the rebels. In order to prevent possible actions 
that the government might eventually take in response to that perception, Oxfam decided to 
increase the scale of its programme in government-held areas. As the Field Director of Oxfam in 
Ethiopia recommended to the senior officials of Oxfam in Oxford, “…an expanded programme 
here [government-held territories] seems essential if we wish to remain in Ethiopia after the drought 
is over”748. 
As before, NGOs expanded the type and scale of their programmes in the post-famine period. The 
geographical focus, type and scale of these programmes differed from one NGO to the other, 
depending on their expertise, experiences, and history, as well as resources. Wollo was the focus 
of Oxfam’s post-famine programmes. Oxfam started by financing a multi-sector project called the 
Kobo-Alamata Agricultural Development Project (KAADP). GTZ and the RRC had initiated and 
been financing this project since 1976. When GTZ stopped financing the project, Oxfam showed 
an interest to, “…assist the farmers in the KA [Kobo Alamta] valley to get a partial harvest next 
year [1985]”749. Oxfam soon granted an initial budget amounting to Eth $ 54,212 for the purchase 
of fertilisers, maintenance and spare parts for tractors, fuel for irrigation pumps and building 
stores750. This was to help farmers solve the problems that the famine had created751. Oxfam found 
out that the project was managed by the project’s employees, with little interference from the 
RRC752. The organisation also saw that with the financial assistance from GTZ, the project had 
developed various infrastructures such as water pumps, irrigation channels, tractors and so on. The 
Field Director noted that, “…only the KAADP had the infrastructures to assist them [the 125,000 
farmers in the valley”753. In other words, the project was cost-effective. As a result, Oxfam, agreed 
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to finance the project in 1985, which amounted to Eth $214,269, and 30 tons of grain for the food 
for work programme754. Finally, Oxfam agreed to fund an agricultural and water development 
programme in the same valley with Eth $ 1,235,434 for fifteen months from 1st February 1986755. 
The total amount of cash Oxfam invested in the Kobo Alamata Agricultural Development Project 
was much bigger than the total resources the organisation had committed to agricultural 
development in Ethiopia since the organisation started its operations there. Oxfam disbursed 
approximately Eth $617,876 for agricultural development in Ethiopia from 1964 to June 1979756. 
The rapid expansion of Oxfam’s programme had to do with the resources that it mobilised. Oxfam’s 
appeal in 1985 had multiplied Oxfam’s earnings to an all time high of £51.1 million, up from less 
than £20 million in 1983–1984757.    
Due to the competition that it faced from the RRC, the Ministry of Agriculture and EWWCA, 
however, Oxfam withdrew from the KAADP, and launched two programmes of its own. The first 
was the Wadla Delanta agricultural recovery programme, which in the early 1990s evolved into an 
integrated agricultural development programme758. Secondly, Oxfam started to negotiate with the 
National Water Resource Commission [NWRC] to upgrade its emergency water supply into a 
strategy of water development in Wollo759. NWRC warmly welcomed the new proposal. The two 
operational arms of the National Water Resource Commission, i.e., the Water Supply and Sewerage 
Authority (WSSA), and the Ethiopian Water Works Construction Authority (EWWCA), which set 
up branches in Kombolacha in 1985, required, “…substantial institutional strengthening…for the 
offices to undertake various responsibilities being placed up on them”760. NWRC proposed a project 
that cost Eth $ 2.4 million for the joint Oxfam/NWRC water development programme. Oxfam 
initially rejected the proposed amount but in the end it agreed 761 . As with the agricultural 
programme, the decision of Oxfam to allocate Eth $2.4 million marked a significant increase in 
terms of resources per programme. Oxfam originally started working on water development in the 
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Qallu district of Wollo in May 1974762. A year later, Oxfam set up the Water Development Support 
Unit in Addis Ababa to technically assist NGOs running water programme in Ethiopia763. The Unit, 
“…basically concentrate[d] on areas within a 150-200 kilometers radius of Addis Ababa”764. 
However, the scale of this early Oxfam water development programme was quite limited. The 
financial records shows that from May 1st 1974 to April 31st 1976, Oxfam spent £ 47,801 on its 
water development programme, and the scale of this Oxfam water programme soon declined 
substantially 765 . This was because of the extensive anti-western propaganda of the then-
government, whereupon in 1982, the Unit was incorporated into the Ethiopian Water Works 
Construction Authority766. Oxfam’s water programme was revived due to the famine of 1983–1984, 
however, when the provision of water was Oxfam’s top priority. When Oxfam realised that famine 
was threatening the country, it stated that, “….Oxfam [will] concentrate on developing ground 
water resources in the affected areas”767. By recruiting water engineers and mobilising the people 
in the locality, Oxfam initiated a water programme that undertook to hand dig fifty water wells, 
every year for two years, in the Ibenat district of eastern Gonder768. However, the security risk made 
the water programme a difficult one. Oxfam’s Field Director recommended that the same 
programme was to be initiated, but elsewhere, by shifting the material and human resources of the 
project from Ibenat. As a result, an emergency water supply was initiated in Wollo that gradually 
evolved into the water development programme (discussed above). The same programme was soon 
begun in Wollaita in the south769. 
As in Wollo, the water works in Wollaita was started as an emergency measure. It began by the 
transportation of drinking water, by lorry, to the different points of relief distribution in Wollaita. 
Oxfam’s water activities in Wolliaita could be divided into the relief phase [1985–1986], the 
rehabilitation phase [1987–1988] and the development phase [1988–1994]770. From the emergency 
through to the rehabilitation stage, the number of wells constructed increased greatly. During the 
emergency, Oxfam dug only two shallow wells for two peasant associations, while by the 
                                                          
762
 Fantahun Ayele, “NGOs’…”, P. 25. 
763
 "Ethiopia: Bulletin No 4“ (20th June, 1983), P. 1   
764
 CRDA, “General Membership Meeting” (February 7th, 1977), P. 4  
765
 Fantahun Ayele, “NGOs’…”, P. 26 
766
 "Ethiopia Bulletin No 4“ (June 20th, 1983), P. 1  
767
  "Ethiopia Bulletin No 2“ (nd), P. 1 
768
 Hugh Goyder, "Report on a visit to Libo Awraja, Gonder Drought: February 15-16, 1984” (nd), P. 1 
769
 Ibid, P. 1 
770
 Tegegne Teka, International…, P. 143   
159 
 
rehabilitation phase it had managed to dig 48 wells771. Oxfam was later put under pressure by 
regional authorities to upgrade the rehabilitation programme into water development, and an 
agreement between Oxfam, the RRC and Water and Sewerage Authority was duly signed in 
1989772. The project aimed to develop safe and sufficient drinking water for 52 peasant associations 
and to undertake the training of 104 selected trainees who would maintain the waterworks773. 
In what could be described as a rare decision, Oxfam also began a multi-sector urban development 
programme in the post-famine period. NGO bias towards rural development had been quite 
apparent, up until the early 1980s, when this changed. In a meeting organised by CCRDA, an 
observer commented that, “…like any large city in the world, there were poor people in [Addis 
Ababa] in need of assistance…For some, fuel for cooking is a problem”774. Redd Barna [Save the 
Children Norway] soon responded to the critique. In 1981, Redd Barna started construction of 
access roads, and aimed to improve urban health, water supplies and so on775. The Tekle Haimanot 
area where in 1986 Oxfam initiated an urban programme with a budget of Eth $5 million was one 
of the areas in which Save the Children Norway had operated. As a result, Oxfam copied many of 
Save the Children Norway’s programmes, such as construction of access roads, water supply, 
health education. Oxfam also introduced the construction of communal kitchens, latrines, income 
generation projects and so on776.  
Like Oxfam, the majority of NGOs also developed a wide range of multi-sector rural development 
programmes in the post 1983–1984 famine period. As before, also in the post 1983–1984 period, 
NGOs adjusted their programmes in a way that fostered long-term development. Earlier, this had 
not been possible due to the emergency situation in the country. For instance, CCRDA had 
coordinated the relief operations of its member NGOs throughout the period 1973–1980777. In the 
interim, however, the leadership had also attempted to prioritise long term developmental projects. 
The fact that the organisation changed its name from the Christian Relief Committee to the 
Christian Relief and Development Association on March 17th, 1975 suggests the orientation of the 
organisation towards long-term programmes778.  However, this orientation was threatened by food 
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insecurity even after the famine of 1973–1974 was over. As a result, although CCRDA had planned 
to promote development projects, the chairman advised CCRDA to prepare to respond to sporadic 
famine. He advised that:      
I would say that the Christian Relief Committee while pressing ahead with development projects 
should be prepared to meet the relief needs which could be expected to arise during the coming 
years779. 
 
Towards the end of the 1970s and into the early 1980s, the relief situation diminished. This 
prompted CCRDA to give more attention to the causes of poverty in Ethiopia, to de-emphasise 
relief in favour of mobilising and allocating resources to development programme780. This is well 
reflected in the table below that shows that finances allocated to development projects from the 
late 1970s into to the early 1980s saw significant increase. 
 
Table 4 Cash mobilised and expended by CRDA: 1975-1982 
Year Relief/Rehabilitation Development 
Cash Kind  
1975  872, 180 - 267, 370 
1976  467, 250  - 226, 270  
1977 355, 150  - 316, 670  
1978 1, 115, 71  - 671, 020  
1979  851, 30  - 201, 120  
1980 1, 777, 94  - 423, 850 
1981  855, 380  - 884, 790  
1982  1, 171, 07  - 854, 740  
 
Source: "CRDA Resource Allocation by Type of Programme, 1973-2005” (2007) 
With these funds, the organisation encouraged specific programmes. CCRDA itself funded two 
programmes. The first of these was to provide technical support to member NGOs. To that end, 
CCRDA took on the management of the Appropriate Technology Unit, and the Unit commenced 
its activities in May 1975781. The Unit offered NGOs technical advice and information with regard 
to development in Ethiopia782. The second CCRDA-funded programme concerned the variety of 
programmes that member NGOs implemented. CCRDA favoured the funding programmes such as 
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water development, preventive health, and environmental conservation783. In keeping with the 
emphasis it placed on development projects from the end of the 1970s, CCRDA funded income-
generating activities. Its first grant to income-generating activities was made in 1981. In April 
1981, the Yilma monastery in Shoa province submitted a project to CCRDA that focused on the 
purchase of a vehicle and a grinding mill. CCRDA approved on the grounds that the mills could 
generate income, declaring that, “…if members wished to implement this type of projects through 
a credit programme, CRDA would consider requests for funds”784. 
Before a successful transition towards development, the 1984–1985 famine struck. Unlike before, 
however, CCRDA now introduced a system whereby project holders closely linked relief with 
long-term development programmes. The NGOs that received funds from CCRDA were 
encouraged to see relief as a supplement of development785. This suggests a qualitative change with 
regard to the contents of NGOs programmes. Moreover, due to the increase of donors’ support, the 
programmes CCRDA ran through NGOs were expanded, and while relief programmes continued, 
the share of development assistance increased from 1984 on. The table below shows the 
comparative increase of CCRDA’s financial allocation to relief and development programmes.   
Table 5: Cash, in Eth $ mobilised and spent by CRDA: 1983–1993 
 
Year  Relief/Rehabilitation  Sub Total  Development  
Cash  Kind  
1983  2, 328, 440 1, 540, 080 3, 868, 520 904, 240 
1984  - 5, 082, 450 5, 082, 450 4, 677, 70  
1985  6, 005, 240  42, 329, 810 48, 335, 050 10, 584, 940 
1986  6, 581, 950 14, 382, 380 20, 964, 330 21, 811, 340 
1987 6, 523, 680 3, 556, 180 10, 079, 860 12, 709, 950 
1988  7, 622, 750 - 7, 622, 750 15, 565, 870 
1989 8, 425, 960 10, 608, 680 19, 034, 640 7, 547, 590 
    
Source: "CRDA Resource Allocation by Type of Programme, 1973–2005” (2007) 
In the post-famine period, CCRDA prioritised new programme components such as food 
production, cottage industries, vocational skill development and so on786. 
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Although they experienced marked expansion in the post 1983–1984 period, NGOs’ programme 
types and scale were influenced by a number of factors in relation to donors. Certainly, as explicitly 
set out in many NGO publications, NGOs wanted to expand their programmes in order to ensure 
the sustainability of their organisations as much as they wanted to reach as many project 
participants as they managed. As a senior official of CCRDA told his colleagues, “Without a good 
number of projects, it will be…difficult to obtain support for the administrative budget”787. The 
same was true in the case of ASE. In preparing for programme expansion in the mid-1980s, ASE’s 
stated organisational position was that, “Within 17 years ASE has not changed its structure. There 
was a slow growth and this has to be improved”788. In fact, however, ASE’s programme had 
expanded markedly in terms of providing informal education. ASE was offering more informal 
education than any NG in the country. For instance, impressed by its massive educational 
programme, Oxfam offered funds to ASE to run what was called the Soddo Zuria education project. 
The project aimed to enable farmers get the theoretical background necessary to understand the 
shortcomings of “traditional” methods of farming and enlarge their knowledge to become 
innovators789. The project included all resident members of the Chila peasant association in Soddo 
Zuria district. During the first year, the project cost about Eth $16,500790. Oxfam’s Field Director 
appreciated the massive anti-illiteracy programme in Ethiopia. After visiting an anti-illiteracy class 
in Gonder province, he informed Oxfam officials in Oxford that:  
All members of the cooperative had been attending literacy classes and some had already passed 
their first exam. I was shown literacy classes in progress; it is obviously a source of pride and 
rightly so, for those involved in the programme that so much is going on and that so much interest 
is being shown by farmers and their wives in attending those classes791       
However, senior Oxfam officials in Oxford started to reject financial requests for informal 
education on the grounds that it was being used as a platform for political indoctrination. Once 
Oxfam received a request from officials of the Ministry of Agriculture to fund an informal training 
programme for farmers in Wollaita. While a senior official of Oxfam accepted in principle that the, 
“…idea of appropriate non-formal training being made available to rural people seems 
attractive”792, however, Oxfam believed that the programme itself was imposed by the central 
government. Consequently, the Oxfam official stated that, “Unfortunately, as ever in Ethiopia, this 
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is not a local initiative, but Wollaita’s bit of a national programme of adult education for which the 
ministry of education is responsible”793. Unlike Oxfam, ASE conformed to the standards of the 
socialist government, agreeing with officials of the Ministry of Agriculture that, “It [education] can 
be acquired not only at school but also at home”794. As a result, ASE consistently expanded the 
scale of its programme. ASE started its activities with an agricultural course in 1969. A year later, 
it introduced gender-oriented lessons that focused on hygiene for women 795 . In 1972, the 
organisation also introduced socio-economic courses that advised project participants on how to 
improve their socio-economic conditions796.   
The scale of ASE’s educational programmes thus increased steadily, also thanks to its founders. 
Concerning the role played by individuals, an evaluation report has the following to say:       
While it has been possible to implement the programme to a larger extent despite a fairly critical 
financial situation at the outset, that must be attributed above all to the determination, devotion 
and competence of the principal originators and direct staff of the undertaking797. 
ASE depended on educated volunteers who also played an active part in the increasing the number 
of project participants. Literate volunteers were assigned to teach peasants who were organised 
into groups. ASE found this group approach to be feasible. The development view of the 
organisation itself also encouraged this approach. As stated in one of the documents:  
This advancement we are seeking to foster [education] must…be social in the sense that it must 
not be individuals that make progress but groups. The family must develop together, the district 
and the nation must progress as a whole. As we agree with a famous writer that “no one is an 
island”, we believe the advancement of the Ethiopian farmer must be social798. 
This ambition was matched by a growing number of project participants as shown in the table 
below.   
 
 
 
 
                                                          
793
 Ibid, P. 5-6  
794
 ASE, "Situation…”, P. 5  
795
 Ibid, P. 15 
796
 Agri-Service Ethiopia, “Annual Report of 1977 (Part II): ASE Annual Work Programme”(Addis Ababa, January 
1978), P, 3 
797
 Ibid, P.8  
798
 ASE, "Situation…”, P. 3  
164 
 
 
Table 6: Number of project participants from 1970 to 1974 
Year Project Participants 
1969 - 
1970 213 
1971 468 
1972 650 
1973 150 
1974 752 
 
Source: Marjam van Reisen, "Agri-Service Ethiopia: Programme Evaluation, 1989” (July 26th, 1989), p.15 
The abrupt decline in 1973, as shown in the table above, had to do with the famine that erupted in 
1973–1974, causing ASE to slow down its educational activities799. The subsequent rise of project 
participants a year later in 1974 was related to the beginning of a new educational component called 
home science, designed by ASE to target women800.   
Rapid territorial expansion during the revolutionary regime resulted in an exponential growth of 
project participants. For example, the number of project participants in agricultural programmes 
alone registered 600% growth in 1975–1976. The following table shows the actual number of 
project participants in agriculture, home science and socio-economic courses.  
Table 7: Number of project participants from 1975 to 1976 
Programme Year Project 
Participants 
Remark  
 
Agriculture 
1975 1450  
1976 2086  
Home 
Science 
1975 604  
1976 53   
Hygiene 1975 -  
1976 -  
Socio-
economic 
1975 70  
1976 253  
 
Source: Marjam van Reisen, "Agri-Service Ethiopia: Programme Evaluation, 1989” (July 26th, 1989), p.15 
 
 
Evaluating its programme in 1976, ASE aimed to reach an even larger number of people through 
the use of the radio801. In 1977, ASE, the Ministry of Agriculture and the Wollaita Rural Radio 
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Programme set up 29 listening centres in Wollaita, each of which had 25 project participants802. 12 
more centres were soon added, making the total number of centres 41803. Towards the end of 1981, 
the Rural Radio Forum (RRF) programme was evaluated as being effective: “The programme 
[Rural Radio Programme] has the effect of raising the economic standard and living conditions of 
the forum members in particular and the surrounding in general”804. Motivated by this, the report 
recommended the expansion of the geographical scope of the programme. Funded by financial 
grants of Eth $ 55,000 from MISERIOR in Germany805, 493 centres were set up in five regions of 
the country. The following table shows the distributions of RRFs across regions.  
 
Table 8: Distribution of Rural Radio Forums from 1981 to 1984 
No Areas Centers Remark  
Region  Province  
1 Sidamo Wollaita  41   
 
 
Each consisted of 25 
project participants  
2 Arussi  Chilalo  92  
3  Bale  Mendayo  62  
Genale  27  
4 Gojjam  Debre Markos  62  
Bechena  62  
5  Shoa  Kenbatana Hadeya  85  
Jibatena Mecha  12  
Total  493  
 
Source: ´“Yegolemasoch Yäradio Program Madmächa Maekälat i.e. Adult Rural Radio Programme Listeners 
Centres” (nd), p.1 
The famine of 1983–1984 put the relevance of informal education into question. Even ASE, which 
had emphasised the value of informal education, started to challenge the idea that education alone 
was sufficient to the Ethiopian situation, unless supported by project intervention. Donors such as 
NOVIB and EZE supported ASE’s assessment, and concomitant shift of emphasis. In a letter 
addressed to the Ministry of Agriculture, the Director of ASE described how, “The willingness and 
insistence of its [ASE’s] funding partners to fund rural development activities has…been 
instrumental in reorienting ASE’s activities”806.  
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The leadership and entire staff of ASE agreed that project intervention should thereafter dominate 
their approach. As a result, they hoped for a major shift in policy. Initially, one of their major 
donors, INADES-Formation, objected to any change being made to the educational programme of 
ASE. And while NOVIB and EZE, also major ASE donors, rejected INADES-Formation, position, 
they also rejected the ASE leaders’ desire to place the primary emphasis on project intervention, 
arguing that projects to be financed were to be supportive to the training program807. Speaking on 
behalf of NOVIB, a Mr France warned ASE’s staff that, “There is a danger to handle micro and 
macro projects which may dominate AOTP [Action Oriented Training Programme]. So, ASE 
should function as a training organisation implementing micro projects supportive to AOTP”808. 
Donors also did not want to fund ASE to operate in five regions, but only in Bale and Gamo Gofa. 
This shows that donors’ decision was partly influenced by the famine, which had depleted the 
resource base of farmers in Bale and Gamo Gofa far more than in Gojjam, Arussi and Sidamo. EZE 
and NOVIB thus opted to fund ASE’s Action Oriented Training Programmes in agriculture and 
women’s education; village water supplies, and forestry, soil and water conservation in the Boreda 
and Kutcha districts of Gomo Gofa809. They also funded Action Oriented Training Programmes, 
and Maintenance and Operation Training Programmes for village water supplies in Mendayo and 
Genale provinces810. The total budget allocated for the programmes that would run between 1987 
and 1989 was Eth $10, 598, 210811.  
As above, NOVIB and EZE did not want to finance ASE’s programmes in Gojjam, Arussi and 
Sidamo. The ongoing war caused NOVIB and EZE to restrain their financial commitment812. In 
1990, ASE submitted a project proposal for a multi-sector programme that required $13,854,150. 
ASE introduced a number of new programme components and expanded the number of villages in 
which it planned to manage programmes. Donors expressed their resistance to the proposed project 
on a number of grounds. One of these was that financing projects in Gojjam, where war was going 
on could be risky. Thus they questioned the proposal in the following terms:                                             
Is it justified to invest a very substantial part of the budget [more than 1.2 million Eth $] in this 
risk prone project. Since security problems are impossible to predict, it is very difficult to 
recommend any particular strategy. But even if the security situation may also deteriorate in 
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ASE’s other operational regions, this is more likely to occur within the near future in Misrak 
Gojjam813. 
 
To summarise, the famine of 1983–1984 was a landmark with regard to the beginning of diverse 
and large-scale NGO programmes. While some NGOs enlarged and diversified their programmes 
out of concern to address the devastation of the famine of the 1980s, NGOs that were involved in 
“Cross-Border Operations” also started multi-sector programmes to appease the government. The 
famines of the 1970s and 1980s both devastated the economic bases of farmers and the demands 
in different parts of the country were almost the same. The majority of the new programmes that 
NGOs began to administer were on agricultural development, water supply, income generation, 
and environmental conservation. NGOs sought to have as many projects going on as they could 
manage. This was to ensure their organisational sustainability as much as assisting farmers who 
had suffered from the devastation of the Ethiopian famines of 1970s and 1980s. However, donors 
refused to fund as many programmes as NGOs sought them to, largely out of concerns about the 
ongoing war. Moreover, due to the improvement of the availability of food in the country, donors 
diverted their assistance to some other disaster prone areas in Africa. The government that seised 
power in May 1991 also discouraged the orientation towards relief. The interplay between all these 
factors led NGOs to adopt a long term perspective.    
4. 6 .3 .2. 2. Regime change and NGOs’ programmes 
Regime change in May 1991 changed the scale and geographical distribution of NGOs’ 
programmes and approaches to a certain extent. Conversely, NGOs showed a strong interest in 
maintaining the types of programme that they had run since the mid-1980s. As soon as the new 
government was established in August 1995, for example, the Resident Representative of Oxfam 
stated that, “…this event [formation of the new government] does not call for a change of priorities 
for Oxfam”814.   
However, NGOs did see marked change with regard to scale as well as geographical distribution. 
A major factor in the increase of NGOs’ scale was that the regime change, and the peace that 
followed, built up the confidence of donors. A few months after the regime change, Mr Marc 
Couwenbergh of NOVIB, for instance, told the acting Executive Director of ASE that, “Now… 
[that] it looks that there is peace, we have to reconsider our policies [the policy that had limited the 
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financial pledge]”815. NOVIB thus sent out the consultant Jennie Street to Ethiopia to assess the 
situation and recommend possible measures to NOVIB. She recommended that NOVIB should 
increase its budget to fund programmes with a wider geographical coverage816. As a result, NOVIB 
expanded its partnership with a number of national NGOs. From then until 1996, NOVIB funded 
the programmes of nine new organisations, and also resumed its earlier partnership with ASE, 
REST, Oromo Relief Organisation (ORO), and the Eritran Relief Organisation (ERO)817. ASE was 
the prime beneficiary of NOVIB’s increased engagement. NOVIB first offered DFL (Dutch Florin, 
Dutch currency) 500,000 in 1991 and DFL 261,827 in 1992 to ASE to run programmes that evolved 
from the mid-1980s818.  Also, NOVIB contributed DFL 2,000,000 to finance a new multi-sector 
programme for the years 1993–1995. During the same period, EZE allotted a budget of DM 
(Deutsch Mark, German Currency) 1,700, 000 for the same programme for two years. EZE also 
promised that, “A separate EZE grant for the third year will be made [available]. In addition, we 
will try to raise ECU 140,000 with the European Community for each of the years: 1994–1995"819. 
The programme was the same multi-sectoral programme that ASE had run since the mid-1980s; 
most importantly environmental conservation, water development, income generation, and 
vegetable gardening were programme components. Those donors who had initially turned down 
funding the programme in Gojjam due to insecurity now agreed to finance it. Also, with financial 
assistance from Action Aid Ethiopia, in 1997 ASE started running a further programme in Lalo 
Mama Mider in Northern Shoa which had environmental conservation, water development, income 
generation and vegetable gardening components820.   
Many NGOs, such as ASE, still focused in rural areas. ASE argued that, “…development from 
within and rural based…is morally justifiable”821. On the other hand, those NGOs that emerged 
following the regime change focused on urban areas. In becoming CCRDA members, these NGOs 
changed CCRDA’s membership profile. In 2000 they made up 36% of the regular membership of 
CCRDA, while the number of NGOs running programmes in rural areas made up only 23% and 
the remaining 41% shuttled between both urban and rural areas822.  
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The type of programmes CCRDA began to fund in urban areas were similar to those it funded in 
rural areas. In October 1991, the Executive Committee set up a sub-committee to study which of 
those urban programmes CCRDA could finance. The sub-committee recommended water supply 
projects, income generating activities (food processing, weaving, tailoring and injera baking 
centres); health (general medical care, mother and child services, building of health infrastructure 
such as clinics and related services); informal education, public works (access roads, sewerage 
disposal ditches and canals, drainage facilities and public latrines); and child and family support823.      
NGOs also saw significant progress in the 1990s with regard to programme approach. Although 
they had diversified their programme types and increased their scale of operation, NGOs had not 
seriously considered their approach until that point. In July 1986, a senior Oxfam official visited 
Oxfam’s programme in Wollo. Concerned about their anticipated critique, the Field Director of 
Oxfam asked Oxfam’s Deputy Director, “How well can water work be integrated with other Oxfam 
activities?”824 This was a reminder that the organisation needed to develop its approach to tackling 
rural poverty. NGOs began to adopt more integrated approaches from the end of the 1980s on. A 
major factor in this was the improved food prospects in the country. When NGOs had fully 
withdrawn from their relief activities, they started to discuss their development approach. As the 
executive director of CCRDA told NGOs’ representatives at this point, “….integrated development 
activities will have to be taken into account as Ethiopia moves to a stage where NGOs will be 
turning their attention from rehabilitation to development”825. Member NGOs and donors warmly 
welcomed this approach. Mr Laparte, a representative of the donor organisation Partnership for 
Africa and Canada (PAC), commented that, “…it is this type of project [integrated approach] that 
corresponds very closely to PAC’s priorities”826. Member NGOs themselves thus adopted more 
integrated approaches. Concerning the integrated rural development programme that it adopted, 
ASE stated that, “…whenever the number of components are added the possibility of attacking the 
problems holistically increase”827.  
However, NGOs’ integrated approaches faced practical challenges when it came to 
implementation. The main challenge was that while the areas in which they operated were still 
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vulnerable to drought and famine, multi-sectoral integrated rural development programmes were 
devoid of relief food aid as NGOs pursued a policy of moving away from direct food distribution 
and focusing on tackling the causes of food insecurity828. Whenever food shortages occurred, NGOs 
lobbied the Ethiopian government to distribute food. However, this was not always successful, as 
the government hoped that NGOs would distribute food in their areas of operation. Like the 
government, project participants also expected NGOs to distribute food. In a situation where NGOs 
did not distribute food, the legitimacy of NGOs was questioned. In the mid-1990s, Oxfam noted 
this problem, stating:   
Given the overall historical food aid needs of the country and Oxfam’s profile in Ethiopia, the 
role played by Oxfam was very limited and focused in one region [Tigray]. This limitation had 
a negative implication on Oxfam particularly on its relationship with communities in the food 
insecure areas where Oxfam runs development projects. Furthermore, Oxfam’s limited role in 
food aid has reduced its lobbying role in the food aid sector829.   
 
Thus, while NGOs had re-evaluated the programmes that they had run since the mid-1980s and 
oriented their programmes towards ensuring food security – for instance, Oxfam, intending to carry 
out, “...a wide range of activities… which…help people feed themselves and their families”830, had 
divided its operational areas into two areas: highlands and lowlands, with highlands comprised of 
Wollo, Eastern Hararghe and Tigray – Oxfam did introduce food aid into its programme in the 
highlands 831 . Overall, however, Oxfam’s programme now focused on asset building and 
diversification of income to assist project participants earn income to ensure their food security. In 
order to deal with the environmental degradation, Oxfam also carried out soil management, forage 
development, pest control management and small scale irrigation and horticultural development 
projects832. The Lowlands area included the pastoralist areas and areas where minority groups live 
of Afar, Somalia, Borena, and Benishangul Gumuz. As these people depended on their livestock, 
in 2003 Oxfam launched a pastoralist programme that included animal disease control, conflict 
resolution and hygiene. Unlike in the highland areas, rather than food aid, Oxfam provided water 
and pasture in time of stress in pastoral areas. As stated in an Oxfam document, “…relief does not 
necessarily mean food in pastoral areas…”833   
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Oxfam’s programme orientation towards food security launched an overall trend at the national 
level. Under the auspices of CCRDA, NGOs set up what is called the Rural Development and Food 
Security Forum, wherein NGOs discuss the strategic importance of food security. Moreover, the 
government and donors tacitly agreed that development in the country had to focus on food 
security. The establishment of the Food Security Consortium in Addis Ababa in the early 2000s, 
in which donors, NGOs and the Ethiopian government all participated, attests to the priority food 
security has gained. Influenced by ideals disseminated at the Rural Development and Food Security 
Forum and Food Security Consortium, and noting the chronic food shortage in their own 
operational areas, NGOs revised their programmes in ways intended to ensure food security. ASE, 
a participant in the Forum and the Consortium, came to believe that food security is a key strategic 
factor in at least reducing poverty. This assessment was not solely the result of influences from the 
Rural Development and Food Security Forum and the Food Security Consortium. It was also an 
assessment informed by ASE’s own observation that poverty was becoming severe. After assessing 
the deterioration of food security and its link with poverty, ASE stated that, “….the link between 
poverty and food security, poor social services and environmental degradations becomes evident 
[now] than ever before”834. According to ASE, food security is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for adequate nutrition (utilisation). In some cases, malnutrition may be caused by 
inadequate health care. As a result, ASE approached food security in an integrated way, calling its 
programme an integrated food security programme835. Like Oxfam, ASE launched both on-farm 
and off-farm activities including the provision of training, loans and technical advice. Though it 
still operated in four food-insecure regions, namely Enebse Sar Mider in eastern Gojjam, Lalo 
Mama in northern Shoa, Goro district in Bale, and Amaro in southern Ethiopia, ASE increased its 
financial commitment to these food insecure regions. NOVIB and EZE also increased their 
financial commitments to ASE. For instance, EZE approved DM 2,925 million and NOVIB Dutch 
Guilders 3 million (Eth $ 22, 7 million in total) for the 2001–2003 period836. 
 4.7. Conclusions  
Expansion and contraction have featured prominently in NGOs’ programmes and operational 
areas. Resources have remained NGOs’ programme and territorial scale.. Throughout their 
existence, at least those NGOs operational in Ethiopia for quite a long time have enjoyed opportune 
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moments with regard to access to resources. The strained relationship that donors had with the 
military government, as well as the worldwide philanthropy that the Ethiopian famines of the 1970s 
and 1980s generated, are major factors that have assured NGOs have had access to resources. 
NGOs were also able to mobilise resources after the regime change in May 1991 due to renewed 
interest on the part of donors that had previously funded NGOs, as well as the emergence of new 
donors.  
Despite the fact that they had secured resources to run their programmes, NGOs were concerned 
about the sustainability of their programmes as well as their organisations. As a result, they choose 
peripheral operational areas, largely because donors were morally compelled to finance areas that 
receive insufficient attention from the government. On the other hand, these peripheral rural areas 
in which smallholding farmers lived suffered from deep-rooted poverty that manifested itself in 
recurrent famines. As a result, relief and rehabilitation dominated NGOs programmes. Although 
they had tended to avoid engaging in these programmes at the early stage, NGOs sought to maintain 
relief programmes once they were up and running. This was because famine evoked public emotion 
that enabled NGOs to mobilise resources.   
Although relief and rehabilitation dominated their programmes, NGOs did not ignore long-term 
development programmes. In fact, long-term programmes can be said to have co-existed with the 
relief and rehabilitation programmes of NGOs, and indeed NGOs large scale, multi-sectoral rural 
development programmes emerged in the context of the 1980s famine. While some NGOs started 
such programmes out of concern to deal with the depletion that the famine had inflicted, another 
motivation, on the part of those NGOs which had been involved in “cross-border relief operations” 
was to pre-emptively appease the government. Towards the end of the 1980s, the relief situation 
diminished significantly, at which point many donors diverted their resources to other vulnerable 
regions of the country such as Sudan. This raised resource-related issues for NGOs. Moreover, the 
new government that took over power in May 1991 discouraged the relief orientation of NGOs. 
NGOs thus slashed their relief programmes and started to seriously consider their long-term 
development programmes. Although they did not alter their programmes components, such as the 
agricultural development, environmental conservation, health, water development, and income 
generating activities that they had carried out, NGOs now came up with integrated rural 
development programmes. NGOs such as CCRDA also started integrated multi-sector 
development programmes in urban areas. This had to do with the rise of urban-based NGOs.       
173 
 
Despite the fact that donors and the Ethiopian government influenced NGOs to adopt a long-term 
perspective, especially from the end of 1980s onward, NGOs still had the autonomy to determine 
the type of programmes that they ran. NGOs’ orientation towards ensuring food security from the 
mid-1990s is a testimony to this. Having assessed food shortages, NGOs evaluated their 
programmes and oriented them in a way that they believed could address food insecurity. However, 
the scale of their programmes depended on the availability of resources. Due to the insecurity that 
prevailed in the country, donors did not want to finance as many programmes as NGOs sought 
them to. This changed with regime change in May 1991. Donors that had shown marked restraint 
then started to finance NGOs large-scale, multi-sectoral programmes.    
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Chapter Five  
Structuring and Restructuring 
5.1. Introduction 
New managerial thinking and approaches have occurred at the global level over the last couple of 
decades. Participatory decision-making and flexible work structures of organisations have come to 
be considered as essential to promoting democracy, sustainable development, and good 
governance837. 
Pro-NGO authors argue that NGOs have participatory decision-making structure that assists their 
personnel to accomplish multiple responsibilities838. However, case studies have shown that NGOs 
don’t have as much democratic and participatory management as their supporters argue. For 
instance, Kassahun Berhanu, who has studied management traditions within a number of NGOs in 
Ethiopia, tells us that:  
The founder-directors of many NGOs are vested with overwhelming powers which enable them 
to make decisions single-handedly. The internal modus operandi of several NGOs is therefore 
undemocratic when it comes to allowing participation and divergent views839.  
Many other researchers go along Kassahun’s argument. Asheber has revealed that many founder-
directors have centralised decision-making power and authority within NGOs in Ethiopia. Asheber 
states further that many of the founders of NGOs carry out most of the activities, while the staff 
are almost idle840.   
Certainly, NGOs had rigidly centralised management systems for a long time since their 
establishment in the 1960s. However, decentralisation is a relative concept. It does not refer to the 
absence of centralisation, but denotes the degree to which decision-making authority is shared 
within the hierarchy of NGOs. Decentralisation is also “…the process of assigning the decision-
making authority to lower level of an organisational hierarchy”841.  
The process of assigning the decision-making authority to lower level has been been visible within 
NGOs in Ethiopia since the mid-1980s. This was in response to internal and external dynamics. 
Internally, there were arguments and counter-arguments between power-holders on the one hand, 
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and those who did not have power and authority on the other hand. Individuals who set up NGOs 
controlled decision-making structures. However, this was always questioned by other individuals 
within the same NGOs. Moreover, new concepts such as “participation” and “partnership” gained 
prominence among NGOs that required a decentralised management style. Externally, the global 
rhetoric about democracy and decentralised management has gained prominence in the last 
decades. NGOs could not be immune from this influence. This chapter explores mainly internal, 
and to some extent external, factors and investigates how they influenced NGOs to change their 
management style, from rigidly centralised to decentralised management systems. Before 
discussing the shift from centralisation to the decentralisation of power and authority, let us 
highlight the way decision-making authority was structured within NGOs such as ASE, CCRDA 
and Oxfam  
5.2. Structures, centralisation and decentralisation of decision-making authority    
5.2.1. Structures of decision-making authority 
The Ethiopian legal frameworks have stipulated how NGOs in Ethiopia should organise their 
decision-making structures. The 1960 Civil Code conferred major decision-making authority to the 
general assembly of an NGO842. A general assembly would select the board of directors who would 
oversee the implementation of decisions and policies put in place by the general assembly843.  
The decision-making structures within different NGOs were thus similar with regard to the way 
authority was distributed. A group of individuals held key positions within the structures of NGOs 
and they used to “make and break things” for each decision. For instance, an agreement signed on 
June 6th, 1969 between ASE, INADES-Formation and the Ministry of Agriculture stipulated that 
a groupof individual would form a Board that would have authority over ASE. This did not, 
however, materialise as the “indigenisation” of ASE did not proceed as fast as the founders of ASE 
had anticipated. As a result, the heads of the Agricultural, Women’s and Socio-Economic Sections 
within the structure of ASE, coordinated by the Executive Director, came to have ultimate authority 
over policy, organisational orientation, and inter-agency relations844. In 1978, INADES-Formation 
took over these powers from ASE. INADES-Formation, which supported the Ethiopian revolution, 
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pushed ASE to operate alongside the new Ministry of Agriculture. To that end, INADES-
Formation asked for an agreement to be signed with the Ministry. Prior to that, INADES-Formation 
had signed an agreement with the Executive Director of ASE in April 1978. This agreement 
cancelled the autonomy that the Ethiopian legal framework had previously conferred on ASE. 
Concerning this, a representative of INADES-Formation stated that, “The autonomous status of 
ASE granted by its registration with the Ministry of Interior as a non-profit making association is 
repealed”845.  
The agreement signed in April 1978 changed the structure of decision-making authority. To begin 
with, Articles 3 and 4 gave the President of INADES-Formation the authority to appoint the 
Director and Assistant Director of ASE846. Moreover, INADES-Formation could appoint a person 
as representative of INADES-Formation besides the Director to supervise financial and technical 
matters847. Secondly, ASE could no longer establish partnerships with governmental and donor 
organisations without the consent of INADES-Formation’s President848. This was to discourage 
ASE to formulate policies that could contradict those of INADES-Formation. Article 7 stands to 
serve this purpose. It states that “INADES-Formation would be informed of any project to be 
launched before it is due for implementation”849.  
The President of INADES-Formation was responsible to the Governing Council of INADES-
Formation. The Council was composed of nine elected members from the General Assembly and 
they would follow up the implementation of decisions passed by the General Assembly. The 
General Assembly, in turn, was composed of individuals and organisations that supported the 
objectives of INADES-Formation850. 
Like ASE, the structure within CCRDA and Oxfam gave individuals in executive positions 
enormous authority, leaving policy issues to the upper structure. The general membership of 
CCRDA had earlier been a monolithic structure that used to decide collectively on issues related 
to the 1973–1974 famine. However, decision-making by the general membership was found to be 
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inefficient. As a result, the Executive Committee was introduced in December 1973. It was 
authorised to assess projects submitted for funding. The Executive Committee had under it the 
Project Committee, the Personnel Committee and the Finance Committee 851 . The Executive 
Committee then had to submit its decisions to the general membership for endorsement852. A 
Secretariat that included a Coordinator and his/her staff was also set up. However, the Secretariat 
had less authority than the Executive Committee. The 1977 annual report summed up the duty of 
the Secretariat. It states that, “The coordinator, with the help of the CRDA [CCRDA] staff carry 
out the decisions of the general assembly, dispatches monthly reports to donors and is responsible 
for the overall supervision of the work”853. Like that of CCRDA, elected members of the Executive 
Committee of Oxfam decided on projects submitted for funding from different areas854. In 1957, 
the Executive Committee set up a Grants Sub-Committee that used to meet to consider proposals 
and allocate funds855 . In 1963, Oxfam established regional desks that served as intermediary 
between the newly-opened field offices in different parts of the world (mainly in Africa) and the 
Grants Sub-Committee856. Projects were thus filtered at three levels. The field offices received, 
filtered and sometimes initiated project proposals; regional desks amended proposals prior to 
submission of those projects deemed acceptable, and the grants subcommittee used to assess 
whether projects matched Oxfam’s priorities and budget. Field directors assigned to different 
countries formed the frontline of Oxfam’s contact with the people whom it aimed to work with; 
they controlled the programme of Oxfam’s policy at the local level and acted as filters through 
which project applications were submitted for funding decisions857. 
The decision-making structures outlined above remained intact until the early 1990s when NGOs 
started to restructure themselves. ASE carried out major restructuring in 1992. Consequently, ASE 
endorsed a new Memorandum of Association that took over ultimate decision-making authority 
from INADES-Formation and bestowed it on the newly established General Assembly. The 
General Assembly came to have authority over the organisation’s policies, programme, 
organisational orientation and so on858. The Memorandum of Association also set up the Board of 
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Directors and conferred on it the authority to follow up on the implementation of policies and 
organisational orientation set by the General Assembly859. This structural change was due to the 
argument of EZE and NOVIB. NOVIB and EZE told ASE that it should terminate any structural 
relation with INADES-Formation because they believed that national NGOs should have internal 
autonomy in order to effectively manage sustainable development. This called for the new 
Memorandum of Association that established the General Assembly and the Board of Directors860. 
Like ASE, CCRDA and Oxfam carried out major restructuring from the middle of the 1990s. 
However, restructuring within those NGOs was aimed at shifting the decision-making authority to 
emerging structures. This was in the nature of decentralisation. 
5.2.2. Centralisation of decision-making authority 
Centralisation, seen as the absence of delegation of authority, marked the management system of 
NGOs in Ethiopia for a long time. Centralisation was usually preferred because it was believed to 
assist the efficient carrying out of decisions. In 1977, for instance, CCRDA stated that the (highly 
centralised) “Decision-making … [within CCRDA]…on development projects is… efficient”861. 
However, centralisation within NGOs like CCRDA remained problematic. This had to do with the 
inherent conflict of interest between the Executive Committee and the General Assembly. 
Members of the Executive Committee were representatives of NGOs that were members of 
CCRDA. They were, thus, entitled to apply to CCRDA for funding. Moreover, CCRDA was 
divided within itself between NGOs connected to Catholic and Protestant Churches. Members of 
the Executive Committee were, thus, accused of favouring their own NGOs, or one group of 
member NGOs, at the expense of others862. Initially, the Executive Committee underestimated this 
mistrust. The Committee once stated that “They [member NGOs] share the difficult decisions about 
project funding and policy matters”863.  
The mistrust within CCRDA became apparent in 1983–1984 when famine erupted. NGOs rushed 
into Ethiopia in large numbers to rescue famine victims, and they soon became members of 
CCRDA. These new members challenged the decision-making structure within CCRDA. At least 
20 member NGOs submitted a petition in which they discussed a lack of transparency in decision-
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making. As a result, the Executive Committee went back and discussed the longstanding mistrust 
between the Executive Committee and the general membership.  In a memo circulated to the 
members, the chairperson of the Association regrettably described that, “There has always been 
some grumblings in some quarters that CRDA [CCRDA] funds are going to certain groups of 
organisations”864.  
CCRDA introduced some changes to restore the confidence of members. The chairperson of 
CCRDA came up with a proposal that had two important components. The first component was to 
put limits on the tenure of the Executive Committee. In this regard, he suggested that a member of 
the Executive Committee would serve for four years after which s/he would “retire” for at least one 
year. He also suggested that the chairperson could be elected only for two consecutive terms, after 
which s/he would have to “rest” for at least one year.  The second component of the proposal was 
making sufficient finance available. To that end, he proposed that CCRDA should only fund 
projects submitted by member NGOs; CCRDA had also funded projects submitted by 
governmental organisations and non-member NGOs up until that time, as members did not cover 
all areas that required assistance865.  
The first two proposals put forward by the chairman of CCRDA were accepted. The membership 
endorsed that the tenure for an Executive Committee would be for one year and an Executive 
Committee member could stand for re-election for another three more years, after which s/he must 
“retire”. The general membership also accepted that the chair and vice-chair of the Executive 
Committee would be elected for one year and they could stand for re-election, after which they 
must “retire” for at least one year before they were re-elected again866. The introduction of the limit 
on the tenure of the Executive Committee and of its members was accompanied by an appeal 
system. The decisions of the Executive Committee had earlier been binding. Now it was decided 
that “…decisions of the Executive Committee and other committees may be appealed to the 
membership general meeting”867. 
However, the measures taken do not suggest that members of the Executive were willing to respond 
to the demands of members of CCRDA. For instance, although it was introduced as a matter of 
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principle, the appeal system did not function properly. This was because the Executive Committee 
did not allow it to operate. Members of the Executive Committee were concerned that once the 
appeal system started operating well, it would be difficult to handle the appeals of members868. As 
a result, complaints and gossips within the members were rife. Thus, the Executive Committee 
proposed on September 29th, 1987 the establishment of an Appeals Committee. The General 
Assembly approved the proposal on October 5th, 1987. However, member NGOs rejected the fact 
that members of the Executive Committee were members of the Appeals Committee869. As a result, 
the Appeals Committee performed poorly. Three years after its establishment, the Appeals 
Committee had not reviewed a single case 870 . The intention of the Executive Committee to 
centralise the decision-making process was so strong that it repeatedly rejected the demands of 
member NGOs for participatory decision-making within CCRDA. In July 1989, for instance, the 
Secretariat presented the demand by member NGOs that stated that members of the general 
assembly were to be elected to serve on the project selection committee. Initially, the Committee 
accepted the proposal. The minutes that documented the full consent of members of the Executive 
Committee is worth quoting here. It reads as follows:  
It was pointed out that while this would reduce the work of the Executive Committee, it would 
have [the] added…advantage of involving more members in the work of the CRDA [CCRDA]. 
It was proposed that this committee having studied requests would approve, defer, and reject 
requests….The members having discussed the proposal agreed that it was a good idea, as it would 
increase the involvement of the members in the work of CRDA871.  
The Executive Committee soon rejected the proposal on the ground that the appeal system did exist 
and that the creation of another committee was redundant872. Members did not accept this. In 
August 1990, member NGOs suggested that the decision-making process was to be reviewed. They 
also suggested the establishment of an Ethics Committee to oversee the decisions of the Executive 
Committee. The Executive Committee agreed that two Executive Committee members, together 
with the Secretariat, would review the decision-making process873. The Executive Committee soon 
rejected the idea of setting up an Ethics Committee, however, on the grounds that there was already 
an Appeals Committee and that there was no reason to set up another committee. The Executive 
Committee also decided that members could submit all their concerns to the Executive Committee 
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that was directly responsible to the General Assembly874. Moreover, the Executive Committee 
decided that the review of the decision-making process was not necessary and ruled against the 
exercise altogether875. The last attempt was made in March 1993. The Deputy Executive Director 
of CCRDA who had been in contact some members of the organisation, proposed to the Executive 
Committee that they set up a Programme Committee that would include members of the association 
with ultimate decision-making authority. The Executive Committee “…agreed to study the 
proposal in more detail in the future”, and there is no trace of the issue thereafter876.    
It is thus apparent that CCRDA itself, which claimed to represent NGOs, was highly centralised 
with regard to decision-making. The same culture of decision-making was clear within NGOs 
operating in Ethiopia. What made centralisation within these NGOs worse was that while they had 
established regional offices since the early 1980s, the regional offices did not have authority. Most 
NGOs in Ethiopia had had not establishement strong regional offices. What complicated the relief 
operation during the 1983–1984 famine was partly that NGOs had not developed sufficient 
structures at the regional level. When the relief operation had gone, NGO representatives appraised 
their relief operation. An NGO representative pointed out how the absence of strong structures in 
the regions had complicated the relief operation. He regretfully said that “…organizations [NGOs] 
who were small before beginning the operation [famine] basically had no structure regarding 
personnel, policies etc.”877.  
NGOs’ programmes suffered from lack of proper supervision at the regional level. Though it used 
to fund a wide range of programmes, Oxfam failed to follow up their implementation. Concerning 
Oxfam’s projects in Gonder, the field director stated that, “The real problem is the lack of follow 
up of grants made, either by us or the RRC”878. Likewise, donors realised that ASE, which had 
concentrated its staff in Addis Ababa, failed to supervise its programme in the region. Explaining 
the reason about lack of proper supervision, an evaluation carried out under the auspices of donors 
described that, “…the upper structure of the organization was well organized and project 
participants were not”879.      
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To follow the implementation of projects closely, NGOs regionalized their offices from the early 
1980s on. In 1980,  Mr Jan Russenaars, the Africa Desk officer of NOVIB, informed the Director 
of ASE that, “Generally it is not our custom to support all African programmes or organisations 
because their activities are remote from what Novib calls target group policy” 880 . ASE thus 
introduced a “top down” approach that involved putting structures in place closer to project 
participants. To that end, ASE embarked on a regionalisation policy. The organisation started 
opening regional offices in strategic locations. In 1982, ASE revitalised its office in Soddo 
(Wollaita province), from which it had shifted its headquarters to Addis Ababa in 1976. It also 
opened two more offices in Chencha (Gamo Goffa province), and Robe (Bale)881. Regionalisation 
has remained a distinguishing characteristic of ASE sinec then. The organisation opened regional 
offices in the Bichena district of Eastern Gojjam in 1986 and in the Molale district of the Northern 
Shoa administrative zone in 1997882. In 2008, ASE had six regional offices and in 2012 it had 12 
regional offices883.   
The policy of regionalisation became a trend that a number of NGOs pursued. Oxfam, like ASE, 
also set up regional offices in the early 1980s, induced by the existence of massive emergency 
needs. The first emergency activity in that period was related to a rehabilitation programme in the 
Ogaden in which Oxfam was involved. After the Ethio-Somali war of 1977–1978 had siezed, 
NGOs started programmes to rehabilitate the Somali community. Oxfam was selected by UNHCR 
to participate in the rehabilitation programme. Thus, Oxfam’s Field Director requested the 
headquarters to open a regional office in Dire Dawa town, the capital of Eastern Hararghe. In 
response, in 1982 the headquarters sent Mr Gerry Salole to establish Oxfam’s regional office in 
Dire Dawa to supervise all Oxfam’s activities in the region 884 . The Field Director himself 
considered the decision as a significant progress for Oxfam. In his letter, the Field Director 
informed the Chief Commissioner of the RRC that “…the decision to open a field office in one of 
the regions marks a new initiative for Oxfam and one that we hope will contribute to the overall 
development of the country”885. The famine that occurred in 1983–1984 spurred the regionalisation 
process. At this time, most NGOs opened up regional offices in famine-prone areas such as Gonder, 
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Wollo, and Tigray. As soon as the news was heard about the famine, Oxfam’s Field Director visited 
the eastern parts of Gonder in February 1983 and appealed to the headquarters to send an 
emergency team to initiate a supplementary feeding programme886. Furthermore, the Field Director 
assigned a programme advisor to Gonder887. The programme advisor soon argued that Oxfam 
should set up a local structure in Gonder to address problems in the region. Concerning this, he 
stated that, “…the question now really is to find the appropriate structure through which we can 
best work to start some of the small scale projects at peasant associations and woreda [district] 
level that I think should be possible”888. The programme officer proposed to Oxfam that the same 
approach be pursued in Eastern Hararghe. He stated that someone was needed to work,  “…closely 
with the Ministry of Agriculture at all levels and recommending small grants to Hugh [the Field 
Director of Oxfam] in Addis Ababa would seem to be one of the best ways of starting this small 
scale work…”889. Before this materialised, however, Oxfam withdrew from the area due to security 
concerns. The same person who had worked as Oxfam’s water engineer in Gonder was now 
transferred to Wollaita, where in 1984 he opened Oxfam’s regional Wollaita office that exists 
today890.  Oxfam also opened a regional office in Dessie town in Wollo province891.  
Regionalisation was not, however, accompanied by a restructuring of decision-making power and 
authority with NGOs. NGOs believed that central management was essential to carrying forward 
their corporate vision. For instance, the agreement signed in 1978 that integrated ASE with 
INADES-Formation contributed to a centralisation of decision-making. As stated earlier, the 
agreement gave major decision-making authority to INADES-Formation. Moreover, the Executive 
Director became accountable to INADES-Formation. Thus, it was unlikely for the Executive 
Director to drift from the policy direction of INADES-Formation. Despite these limitations, the 
Director had full authority over the management of finances and of the organisation as well as the 
implementation of projects. However, to carry this out, the Director would establish a Management 
Committee and develop rules that would be submitted to INADES-Formation for endorsement892. 
The Management Committee, which involved department heads, neither intended to delegate 
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authority to regional offices nor to empower them to manage their activities. NOVIB argued that 
regional offices were to have clearly defined authority, power and clear lines of responsibility to 
execute their programme. To that end, in 1982 it sent out an ASE delegation to scrutinise how the 
decentralised offices of INADES-Formation functioned in Cameroon. The report of the delegation 
that the Executive Committee endorsed shows that the Executive did not allow regional offices to 
have as much power and authority as NOVIB sought. Concerning this, the report stated that, “The 
recommended ASE branch offices will not be so autonomous with so many employees as Bameda 
[one of the regions in Cameroon visited by ASE’s delegation]”893. At the early stage, the refusal to 
allow decentralised management had to do with the desire for branch offices within INADES-
Formation to realise corporate vision894. However, centralised management persisted even after 
ASE rejected the influence of INADES-Formation in the mid-1980s. The organisational culture in 
Ethiopia that fostered hierarchy, centralisation and bureaucracy nurtured the persistence of central 
management. An observer who had herself experienced this organisational culture within ASE 
reported that:  
There does not seem to be a culture of sharing information even within ASE; several interesting 
materials which I gave either to the Director or to the Omo project coordinator for dissemination, 
I found several days later had not been seen by any other staff. This is a worrying habit probably 
reflecting the hierarchical nature of Ethiopian bureaucracy rather than an organization which 
claims to espouse participatory and information sharing principles and practices895.       
 
Like national NGOs, international NGOs pursued highly centralised management. Like national 
NGOs, international NGOs such as Oxfam believed that central management was essential to 
realising their corporate vision896. As a result the regional offices of Oxfam, like those of ASE, 
retained no authority. Instead, the field directors of Oxfam would review projects and recommend 
them – or not – to the Grants Sub-committee in Oxford for funding. This remained intact even after 
Oxfam opened regional offices in Dire Dawa, Gonder, Wollaita and Wollo. Regional officers used 
to assess the needs in their respective areas and actively seek projects that Oxfam could finance, 
but could not commit Oxfam to any action unless authorised to do so by the Field Director, to 
whom requests for help should be sent. They were also advised to avoid direct negotiations with 
any other organisation; again, they were to refer any such cases to the Field Director. Finally, 
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regional officers should not make any public statement unless specifically authorised to do so by 
the Field Director897.  
Just as regional officers did not have much influence, the Field Directors’ influence over the 
decision of the Grants Sub-Committee in Oxford remained minimal. The Grants-Sub-Committee 
wanted to make sure that field directors had no influence on its decision. This could be shown by 
one case that occurred in 1982. Fr. Gannon, the head of the Catholic Mission in Arba Minch which 
had received funds from Oxfam since 1976, flew to England. The Field Director asked officials 
from the headquarters to meet with Fr. Gannon to discuss issues connected with projects funded 
by Oxfam. The arrival of Fr. Gannon coincided with the meeting of the Grants Committee to decide 
on projects submitted for funding. Fr. Gannon was not allowed to meet Oxfam officials before the 
meeting. The reason given was that “…the committee can’t easily do them justice and the schedule 
of committee meetings have become tighter and tighter”898.  
Central decision-making within Oxfam had its own ramifications. One of these had to do with 
responsiveness of the decisions to local circumstances. Oxfam had maintained a fair balance 
between relief and development until the early 1980s899. Then, a new team took over the leadership 
in Oxford that aspired chiefly toward aiding long-term development. This did not take into account 
the immediate circumstances in Ethiopia. During this time, the country was experiencing a serious 
food crisis, but while various other NGOs rushed into Ethiopia to relieve the famine victims, Oxfam 
decided in March 1984 that in Ethiopia, “…relief projects should be avoided and development 
projects sought”900. This was because Oxfam considered itself as a developmental organisation. 
The British media confronted Oxfam for its decision to eschew the famine relief operation. Oxfam 
was thus forced to reverse its decision901.  
The rapid programme expansion that followed the reversal of Oxfam’s decision encouraged the 
headquarters to monitor even the technical implementation of programmes more strictly than ever. 
The Emergency Department Head in Oxford, Mr Brian Pratt, offered the expatriate staff of Oxfam 
in Ethiopia reasons for why the Ethiopian programme was to be under the strict supervision of the 
head office, telling them that close supervision of Oxfam is, “…not only related to our 
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responsibility to account for our handling of resources for such a large programme but also to our 
permanent quest to improve our overseas programme” 902 . Moreover, the political context in 
Ethiopia contributed to this. Oxfam operated in areas controlled by rebels and the government. 
Moreover, the government’s resettlement programme complicated Oxfam’s activities. The two 
factors necessitated active decisions to be made in the field. In early 1983, officials at the Oxfam 
headquarters decided to work on famine relief in rebel-held territories without sufficient 
consultation with the Field Director in Ethiopia, who declined the decision. In a letter he addressed 
to Oxford, the Field Director pointed out that ,“…we need to review all our policies in this region 
rather critically”903. However, this was rejected by Nigel Walsh, who was mandated to oversee 
Oxfam’s programme in the region. As he informed the Field Director, “We will not hold up or 
change our present policy for aid to all those who are suffering at present…”904 In order to avoid 
the anger of the government, Oxfam’s officials in the head quarter pursued a cautious approach. 
Given the politicisation of the relief operation, this approach sometimes did not work out. The 
government manipulated food aid to force famine victims to go to selected settlement camps in 
1984. Two Oxfam nurses protested against this, and argued that Oxfam had to withdraw from 
Ethiopia. Olwyn Gillespie, who had recently been sent by headquarters, told the nurses that, 
“…before any decision was made about the future of the programme, there would have to be 
discussions in…Oxford [where the headquarters of Oxfam was located]”905. The issue was referred 
to Oxford, and the Assistant Emergency Director of Oxfam took the case seriously. After the 
Assistant Emergency Director of Oxfam decided that Oxfam would not withdraw, the two nurses 
resigned and they were replaced by others906.  
Certainly, centralisation of authority within Oxfam was much more rigid than in any other NGOs 
in the country. In June 1990, an evaluation was made of Oxfam’s programmes. The evaluation 
report compared the decision-making authority of Oxfam with that of SCF. In 1986, together, 
Oxfam and SCF had set up the Joint Tracking Operation. While the Save the Children Office in 
Ethiopia had full authority to decide the fate of the Joint Tracking Operation, Oxfam’s office in 
Ethiopia was not sure about the fate of the programme, which it did not have the power to decide. 
The report stated that:     
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Though both [Oxfam and SCF] recognize the JTO’s strategies usefulness there is an ambivalence 
and uncertainty from Oxfam on its future roles in providing services and training, SCF/UK seem 
to have the freedom to make policies and decisions from the field office regarding JTO whereas 
Oxfam’s decisions come from the head office. For SCF/UK the continuation of the JTO is no 
longer an issue and they plan to support, expand and strengthen its capacities. Indeed, it is viewed 
by SCF Ethiopia field office as a key contribution to support development projects, provide 
training in commodity and transport management and running efficient workshop907.     
To summarise, centralised management remained the most salient feature of the management of 
NGOs in Ethiopia. This remained true even after NGOs regionalised their structures. The 
justification presented consistently by those who wanted to maintain the status quo was the 
efficiency and achievement of corporate vision through central management. The difference lay in 
the degree of centralisation within each NGO. In this regard, CCRDA was responsive in that it took 
some measures as a response to demands. This had to do with its accountability to the membership. 
ASE and Oxfam pursued rigidly centralised management as they were closely integrated with the 
structures of head offices. Cultural factors that fostered bureaucracy and hierarchy also influenced 
the management style of ASE.    
5. 2.3. Decentralisation of decision-making power and authority 
There has been a shift from the centralised management to the decentralised management of NGOs 
in Ethiopia. Internal and external factors contributed to this. Debates within NGOs played an active 
role in the decentralisation of power and authority during the early phase that covered the late 1980s 
and early 1990s. During the next couple of years, NGOs were put under immense pressure due to 
a series of decentralisation measures by the government. Moreover, decentralised management by 
other NGOs induced international NGOs in particular to do the same. This section discusses the 
different phases of decentralisation that the selected NGOs carried out in Ethiopia.   
5.2.3.1. The quest for decentralisation within NGOs 
Decentralisation of power and authority derived from centralization during the first phase. The 
holders of power could no longer be the only decision-making bodies from the end of the 1980s. 
Power-holders reached where they should decentralise power and authority to alternative structures 
within their organisations. The way decentralisation came into existence differed from NGO to 
NGO. While members of the Executive Committee of CCRDA were willing to share authority with 
its Secretariat, the Management Committee of ASE was unwilling to delegate authority to other 
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structures within the organisation such as regional offices. As a result, the delegation of authority 
came about through open conflict.  
Towards the end of the 1980s, NGOs faced serious financial shortages. As the emergency situation 
had diminished, a number of donors diverted their aid to other disaster-prone countries in Africa. 
This led NGOs to compete for resources. NGOs like CCRDA that had easily mobilised resources 
now started to compete with each other. CCRDA stated that, “….it had become evident that CRDA 
[CCRDA] must compete with other agencies for the attention of donors…CRDA [CCRDA] will 
need to sell itself more aggressively to implementing members as a source of funds if it attract 
income from donors…”908. Through the Management Committee, the Secretariat started playing 
an active role in lobbying donors for financial assistance. This gave the Secretariat a degree of 
legitimacy to claim decision-making authority909.  
Like the case of CCRDA, financial uncertainty undermined the capability of decision-makers 
within ASE. NOVIB and EZE used to fund ASE without seriously questioning the way the 
organisation was being managed. However, they came to know that centralisation had undermined 
the performance of the organisation. NOVIB began to argue for decentralisation. This was 
particularly true from 1986 on when ASE combined training with “macro” and “micro” projects. 
In order to assist ASE manage this programme, NOVIB contracted two advisors910. The two 
advisors noticed that the headquarters did not sufficiently communicate with regional offices911. To 
make things worse, most of ASE’s staff was concentrated at the headquarters. In a confidential 
memo circulated at the time, an anonymous observer revealed that:  
It is surprising for a grassroots organization to have so many staff at head quarter level, and 
certainly at least half of them could be based in the project areas and be more effective. For 
example, Action Aid Ethiopia only has personnel and finance staff in Addis Ababa. Even the 
director lives in the central town of the project areas912. 
The two advisors warned that in a situation where power and functions were concentrated at 
headquarters, this lack of communication put ASE at risk913. Part of the problem was that the 
Executive Director failed to control the activities within the organisation. As a result, improper 
codes of conduct prevailed within ASE. Senior technical staff at the headquarters and some 
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regional coordinators became highly corrupt. The former Executive Director remembers that the 
coordinator of the Gojjam project coordination office was settled permanently in Addis Ababa, 
putting aside his official responsibility914. He narrates also that technical personnel held senior 
positions in the structures for which they had neither the experience nor the educational 
qualifications. Moreover, office holders were tempted to embezzle money ASE had secured from 
donors915. The Director lost control due to personal and family problems. Informants narrate that 
he had political problems with the military government. Moreover, his wife, who had gone to 
Europe to study, refused to return to Ethiopia, fearing for her life due to her Eritrean origin. As a 
result, he remained under strict surveillance by the government916. The interplay between these 
factors finally led him to fly to Europe and the recently established Board of ASE came to realise 
that he would not come back to work917.  
The departure of the Director triggered competition for power within ASE. The Board confirmed 
the delegation that the outgoing Director had given to the head of the Finance and Administration 
Division918. However, ASE lacked a clear personnel policy, which complicated the nomination 
process. To overcome the problem, the Board set out its own criteria to nominate an acting 
managing director. Some of the criteria were educational background, work experience, positions 
held at present and in the past. The Board referred also to a letter which ASE had submitted to the 
Ministry of Agriculture on January 21st, 1977 in which it stated list of criteria to appoint an 
assistant executive director. Surprisingly, the criteria reflected neither the status of ASE as it stood 
then nor were they measurable. The letter stated that for someone to be an assistant executive 
director, he/she should have experience in pedagogical materials preparation and a thorough idea 
of distance education. S/he should also have very good knowledge of the Ethiopian rural 
population, the ability to manage the whole organisation, and knowledge of ASE919.  
The Board studied the profiles of six members of the Management Committee920. Based on the 
criteria set, and due to his long experience in deputising, the Board appointed Ato Wold Gebreal to 
be the acting Executive Director of ASE. Those who were also nominated, as well as the staff who 
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stood behind those nominees, challenged the decision. They argued that Ato Wold Gebreal did not 
have the educational qualifications. They accused him also of corruption, authoritarianism and 
inefficiency. The Board of Director itself was accused of favouring Ato Wold Gebreal. They 
pointed to the friendship which the chairman of the Board had with Ato Wold Gebreal921. The Board 
of Directors defended its decision. With regard to Ato Wold Gebreal’s education status, the Board 
concluded that his postgraduate degree in development studies qualified him to lead the 
organisation922. The Board dismissed also the accusation that the acting managing director was 
corrupt, authoritarian and inefficient.  The Board insisted that the accusations were, “…reflections 
of personal advantages and vested interests”923.  
The Board realised that personal greed and desire for power motivated senior staff. In an 
assessment it made, the Board stated that, “…there is a struggle for power within ASE between 
members of the Management Committee”924. The Board noted that the ultimate reason behind the 
competition within ASE had to do with the centralisation of power for quite a long time in the 
hands of the ex-Executive Director. Concerning this, the Board stated that:  
All management duties, i.e. directing, executing, administrating and controlling were entrusted 
solely to the Ex-managing director for quite a long time and with little delegation of 
responsibilities. Unfortunately this state of affairs has left a legacy of disruption in the 
management and the bad image partly reflected by the organization’s current administrative and 
managerial activities. Instead of playing an exemplary role in standing up to what has been 
expected of him in meeting his duties and responsibilities, the ex-managing director has also 
taken observatory role while rules and regulations were violated in ASE925.                 
 
The employees of ASE opposed senior members of the Management Committee. This was because 
senior members of the Management Committee marginalised employees at the lower level. Asked 
why they did not like to consult staff at the lower level with regard to the affairs of ASE, two of 
the senior staff of ASE stated that, “…they would come up with silly suggestions”926. As a response, 
employees, many of which were at the lower level of the hierarchy within ASE, set up a Complaints 
Enquiry Committee that nominated its own candidates927.  
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In the midst of the arguments within ASE (between the Board of Directors, senior management 
staff and employees) and CCRDA (between the Secretariat and the Executive Committee), a third 
actor emerged. The general membership of CCRDA supported the Secretariat and donors 
supported the employees of ASE. A consensus was reached within CCRDA and ASE that changes 
were to be introduced with regard to the distribution of power and authority. The next issue was 
the responsibility for the process of change. While it was easily decided within CCRDA, the issue 
with regard to the responsibility of the restructuring process within ASE remained problematic. 
The Secretariat was entrusted to study the decision-making process within CCRDA and submit a 
proposal. Within ASE, employees of ASE at the lower level were opposed to the role of members 
of the Management Committee in the process of change. The employees were concerned that they 
may not be consulted. Interviewed about their opinions, some of the staff at lower levels said that 
they would, “…only be able to see the organogram once it has been devised by the management 
team alone”928. Moreover, they believed that members of the Management Committee would work 
out the organogram in a way that would not challenge their own power. This was because the 
Management Committee was not prepared to lose power in any way.  One of ASE’s staff at the 
lower level was asked about this and his response was shocking.  He commented, “It [the 
Management Committee] is like the Dergue [Derg, i.e. the military government]. How could you 
expect them to reform themselves, and lose power”929. Aware of the mistrust, and with a view to 
building up the confidence of the staff and the Management Committee, the Board promised that 
regular consultative meetings would be held930. Moreover, it took over the recruitment of the new 
Executive Director as well as restructuring of ASE931. The Board contracted a consulting firm called 
Management Consultancy International (MCI) that studied how best to restructure ASE932. Based 
on their findings, MIC produced an ASE Finance and Accounting Procedure Manual, a Cost 
Accounting Manual, a Material Management Manual,  a Computer Operation System Manual and 
so on933.  
This study by the consultant showed that the proposed restructuring within ASE was much more 
profound than the change proposed within CCRDA. The Secretariat of CCRDA focused on the 
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decision-making process with regard to funds within CCRDA. The Secretariat proposed that a 
committee would be set up at three of CCRDA’s departments. The Development Secretariat 
Committee would decide on development projects that cost up to Eth $30,000. The Rehabilitation 
Secretariat would decide on requests for the purchase, supply and transport of seeds, tools and oxen 
up to Eth $30,000 and The Material Aid and Relief Secretariat would allocate supplies from the 
CCRDA store and approve funds for the purchase and transport of supplies up to Eth $30,000,934 
while the Executive Committee would review and decide on all requests that cost over Eth 
$30,000935. The Executive Committee accepted the proposal936. As a result of inflation, the amount 
of money on which those decision-making bodies could decide was increased in 1993. Thus, 
thereafter the three committees set up under the Secretariat could then decide up to Eth $75, 000, 
while the Executive Committee could decide on projects that cost up to Eth $200,000937.  
The institution of decision-making on funds at various levels of the kind that CCRDA carried out 
was just an aspect of restructuring at ASE. In line with the recommendations of the restructuring 
study, regional coordination offices evolved into regional management offices with authority to 
manage their budgets938. However, the restructuring process was not solely to allow regional offices 
to manage their budgets; it created structures that could accommodate a wide range of functions at 
the regional level. The restructuring study pointed out that the organisational structure that had 
previously persisted was top-heavy, and the personnel distribution was to the disadvantage of the 
regional offices939. Moreover, the structures within the organisation did not support the orientation 
that ASE had adopted since the mid-1980s. For instance, though the organisation was engaged in 
project implementation, the Teaching Material Development and Production Unit (TMDPU) still 
featured prominently at the core of the organisation. It included the Women’s Education Section, 
Agricultural Section, Audio-Visual and Printing Section940. The TMDPU became an obstacle to 
developing region-specific programmes941.  
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The basic change amounted to strengthening regional offices, with new posts created for 
decentralisation purposes, and a reduced number of staff at the headquarters. At the head office, 
the position of Programme Coordinator was created and five senior experts with different fields of 
specialisation were assigned under the Programme Coordinator942. The core function of regional 
offices was put under the Technical Support and Extension Division, which coordinated the 
Forestry, Soil and Water Conservation Section, Water Supply Section and the Training and 
Extension Service Section943.   
The restructuring study proposed new positions, personnel requirements, and placements, and 
recruitment944. The staff newly assigned to the regions argued that their placement in the regions 
would affect their socio-cultural lives. A committee chaired by the new Director responded that 
placement was done based on the qualifications and work experiences of staff, and that the process 
was meant to satisfy the interests of ASE945. A plea made by a finance officer who had worked in 
the head office to the Committee, and the response he got, shows the tension between the 
perspective of employees and the leadership of ASE. He protested against the socio-cultural 
consequences of being placed in Bale management office. The committee responded that:     
በዝውውሩ ምክንያት በግል ኑሮዎ ላይ ችግር የሚያስከትልብዎ መሆኑን ገልጸው ያመለከቱ ቢሆንም፣ አዲሱ ተጠንቶ በቀረበው 
መዋቅር መሰረት ባለዎት የትምህርት ደረጃና ልምድ ሊመጥኑ በሚቺሉበት የስራ መደብ ላይ የተመደቡ በመሆኑ ከዚህ ውጭ 
የተለየ አማራጭ ባለመኖሩ ያቀረቡትን ጥያቄ ኮሚቴው ያልተቀበለው ስለሆነ በአስቸኳይ ወደ ምድብ የስራ ቦታዎ እንዲሄዱና 
በአዲሱ ስራዎ ላይ ተገኝተው ሪፖረት እንዲያደርጉ አስታውቃለሁ። 
 
Though you applied that the transfer would cause problem on your personal life, the Committee 
does not accept the request for the placement is made according to the study carried out on the 
new structure and thus I notify you to go to the new job and report946 
Regardless of the staff turnover that resulted from the new placements, the restructuring process 
increased the staff profile of regional management offices and decreased the size of the head office 
staff. Prior to the restructuring process, two thirds of the staff (60 out of 91) had worked at the head 
office. After the restructuring, only 30 staff remained at the head office and the remaining 61 staff 
members were placed in regional management offices947. 
To summarise, decentralisation of power and authority in the late 1980s and early 1990s was mainly 
an internal process, influenced to a certain extent by external factors such as financial availability.  
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5.2.3.1. The government’s regional policy and NGO decentralisation  
In the 1990s, NGOs adopted the strategy of “participatory development“. This was partly in 
response to the altered political context, as for instance, the institutional environment in which 
NGOs operated saw major change in the 1990s. During the military period, NGOs had been 
coordinated centrally by the RRC in Addis Ababa948. The RRC was now decentralised and regional 
Relief and Rehabilitation Bureaus were empowered to coordinate NGOs in their respective areas. 
The decentralisation of the RRC was an integral part of the overall devolution of administration 
and line bureau functions949.  NGOs were to be coordinated by regional Relief and Rehabilitation, 
and other line Bureaus at regional levels, and they started signing project agreements with these 
regional organisations950.  
The decentralisation process was carried forward in the early 2000s. In 2001 the government began 
the decentralisation of power and functions to districts. The main goal of decentralisation at this 
time was to bring development efforts closer to the local community and to make service delivery 
more efficient and effective. Districts became the focal point of development planning and 
programme implementation. Each prepared and controlled its own budget, formulated its own plan 
based on the community’s needs and managed its own programme951.   
In order to adjust to this institutional change, NGOs started to strengthen their regional offices. 
Even those NGOs that had pursued centralised management like Oxfam started to change the status 
of their regional offices. In August 1995, the Resident Representative of Oxfam pointed out that 
one of the changes Oxfam would consider had, “…to do with the government policy of 
regionalisation, which is now embodied in the Constitution” 952 . Moreover, Oxfam started to 
evaluate its own management and its effect on the performance of regional offices. The Resident 
Representative pointed out that, “In Ethiopia support to POs [project offices] has been poor in the 
past with very little training and or institutional guidance”953. Different views emerged as to how 
to change the situation. Senior officers in Oxford were of the opinion that training could boost the 
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capacity of regional offices, and proposed new posts to be opened up in Oxford.  However, Oxfam’s 
officials in Ethiopia objected to the proposal. In a letter addressed to the head office, the Resident 
Representative stated that the creation of new posts in Oxford was insensitive, and pointed out that 
“The problem has arisen because of poor management of POs [project offices] by CRs [country 
representatives]954.  
In order to reduce the burden on the staff of its head office in Addis Ababa, Oxfam started to 
upgrade the status of regional offices. However, Oxfam pursued a cautious approach. Though they 
were involved in project implementation, regional offices had never yet taken financial as well as 
managerial responsibility. Oxfam, thus, saw the need to start consolidation of regional offices as a 
pilot project. Due to its historical connection with Wollo, Oxfam started to upgrade its office in 
Dessie to the North and North East Regional Coordination Office, responsible for overseeing 
Oxfam’s programmes in Wollo, Tigray and Afar, where 70% of its investment was located. The 
office was delegated to accomplish two main duties. Firstly, it was supposed to manage Oxfam’s 
multi-sector programme in the Delanta district. Secondly, the office was to coordinate the Relief 
Society of Tigray, Farm Africa in Tigray and the Afar Relief Association in Afar, which had 
received financial support from Oxfam. The office also took on responsibility to identify partner 
NGOs that could run projects with financial support from Oxfam. To that end, the Coordination 
Office developed into a Programme Office, capable of managing its own affairs including 
overseeing its own employees and managing its own budget. The office demonstrated in practice 
that it could manage its own affairs, including proper management of finances. A consultant wrote 
that, “The Dessie office is efficient in financial management”955. Senior staff of Oxfam went along 
with this assessment. One senior officer pointed out that the assessment was true especially, “…in 
handling the day to day transactions and in maintaining the routine posting of transactions”956. 
However, he pointed out also that there were gaps in the areas of analysing, reconciling and 
producing financial reports that met the donor requirement in time957. 
Despite the apparent problems in relation to financial management, Oxfam’s decision to devolve 
some responsibilities to its regional office was a response to the changing national political context. 
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Other NGOs operating in the country responded to this change as well. CCRDA was one of these 
NGOs. The fact that the relief operation had diminished significantly caused the Secretariat to 
argue that the Executive Committee should focus on policy matters with a view to pushing the 
organisation towards long-term development. Thus, by the end of 1991 the Committee decided 
that, “…at least one Executive Committee meeting every three months be devoted to discuss policy 
issues”958. The government introduced a number of legislations to influence NGOs to reduce their 
relief orientation, which called for serious discussion about policy matters. Also, CCRDA had 
previously negotiated with the RRC and other line ministries in Addis Ababa. When the 
government decentralised its own offices, CCRDA found itself in a very critical situation. Having 
no regional offices, CCRDA found it difficult to fulfill its responsibility959. Thus, in November 
1995, the Committee agreed that all meetings be divided into two parts: part one dealing with 
minutes and other routine matters while part two would deal with policy issues960. In a meeting 
held on September 17th, 1996, the Committee discussed the future direction of the organisation for 
the first time, and the members were satisfied with the discussion.  The minutes of that particular 
meeting stated that “The committee appreciated today’s meeting since it had time to discuss some 
policy issues”961.  
The Secretariat and the entire membership argued that the Executive Committee had to make policy 
deliberations its sole responsibility, leaving decision-making on financial matters to the Secretariat. 
A strategic planning exercise created a series of forums where this argument was put forward. 
Asked for their opinions, members pointed out that, “…the Executive Committee…involved itself 
on matters that could be handled by the Secretariat”962.  
The Executive Committee accepted these demands. A new Memorandum of Association was 
drafted that delineated a clear line of authority between the Executive Committee and the 
Secretariat. The Executive Committee came to have the authority to recommend policy issues to 
the General Membership, to direct and follow up the directions of the Secretariat in the overall 
management of the organisation and to recommend to the general membership full and associate 
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membership of applicants963. The Secretariat emerged as a structure that had the authority to decide 
on various issues. The Secretariat was now authorised to, “…initiate policy dialogue on 
development issues relating to socio-economic issues at national and regional level…” 964 . 
Moreover, the Secretariat had the mandate to issues related to funding and material assistance in 
accordance with the appropriate guidelines965. Finally, the Executive Committee could no longer 
appoint the Executive Director who would be appointed by the General Assembly966.  
5.2.3.2. Participatory development and NGOs decentralisation 
Throughout the 1990s, concepts like “participation” and “partnership” gained wider acceptance 
among NGOs. Though they claimed to carry out “participatory” development, mobilisation of 
project participants for action had remained limited. There were a number of reasons for this. 
Firstly, NGOs’ attempts to have free access to project participants were blocked by government 
officials. NGOs were, thus, bound to depend on the goodwill of local officials. Local officials who 
expected large-scale investment argued that mobilising the people was difficult because, “…there 
is not much done to attract residents”967. Secondly, project participants believed that NGOs could 
solve all their problems. The problem was serious in areas where food was distributed for free. An 
official of ASE who saw the situation in Wollaita advised his colleagues that, “We should 
encourage people to depend on themselves rather than external bodies”968.  
Regime change in May 1991 built up the confidence of NGOs that they could manage 
“participatory development”. Soon after the regime change, senior staff at Oxfam who anticpated 
govermental policy change to follow came to an agreement that, “Change in government policy 
ought to assist us to deal with developing a truly participatory approach with communities”969.  
An important concept that was linked with “participatory development” was “partnership”. Oxfam 
believed that “participatory development” could move forward when Oxfam responded, “…to 
local initiatives, rather than ourselves [Oxfam] to initiate responses”970. The kind of enthusiasm 
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that developed within Oxfam was also apparent among those NGOs that had operated under the 
military regime. Soon after the collapse of that regime, ASE, which had remained under the 
influence of the Ministry of Agriculture, reaffirmed that the participation of project participants 
would be enhanced in the new political environment so that development could be sustained971.  
Though “participation” and “partnership” gained wide acceptance, their implementation by NGOs 
remained difficult. NGOs found out that changes in management that they had carried out were 
inadequate to move “participation” and “partnership” forward. For instance, ASE had decentralised 
some decision-making authorities and assigned a number of employees to regional management 
offices. However, a lack of capacity at the regional level challenged the decentralised process.  A 
year after the decentralisation was carried out, reports came out that show that, “…regional offices 
don’t have full-fledged bookkeeping and they can’t properly follow their financial status against 
the annual budget”972. ASE was thus engaged in building the capacity of regional offices by offering 
educational opportunities to employees; financing the higher education of some of its employees, 
some in institutions in Ethiopia, some sent abroad to pursue their MA and PhD973.  
In the meantime, however, ASE realised that professionalisation could create a manner of technical 
orientation that to some extent undermined “participatory development”. ASE had sufficient 
experience that staff orientation towards professionalism could not help project participants to use 
their potential to change their socio-economic status. In a report produced in 1975, ASE expressed 
its concern about the technical orientation of its field workers. Thus, it suggested its field workers 
change their orientation. It stated that:     
Agri-Service has repeatedly detected a tendency to teach, not to animate. And it believes that 
rural populations should be animated rather than taught or handled. In other words, real 
development comes when the people themselves become aware of their problems, seek ways 
themselves (of course, sometimes they need information) of overcoming them, decide on a course 
of action and carry it out. Once the population is on the move, spirit of development has come to 
life974 
 The organisation identified the same tendency towards the end of the 1990s. It argued that social 
and cultural considerations are equally essential ingredients for the smooth implementation of 
“people-centred” and “participatory” rural development programmes as professionalism975. The 
organisation thus considered how to reconcile professionalism with socio-cultural factors, toward 
                                                          
971
 “A Brief Note on Agri-Service Ethiopia” (1992), P.2   
972
 ASE, “Integrated Rural…”, P. 90 
973
 Informants, Ato Getachew Worku and Ato Amanueal Assefa  
974
 ASE, “Situational…”, PP.21-22  
975
 Negussie Hailu, “NGO Management…”, P. 45 
199 
 
delegating much more power and authority to regional management offices so that they would run 
“participatory development”976. 
Many other NGOs also changed their management traditions to carry out “participatory 
development”. The dilemma between “participatory development” and central management had 
been debated within Oxfam since the early 1990s977. Moreover, Oxfam, even more than national 
NGOs like ASE, was influenced by the global trend towards the decentralisation of power. The 
strategic review that gave guidance to the decentralisation of Oxfam described this trend as well as 
its implying its desired influence on Oxfam in the following way:  
At a time when many organizations are promoting flattened hierarchy and multi-disciplinary 
teams to achieve the same ends, Oxfam's extensive hierarchy and cumbersome vertical reporting 
lines consume valuable management time and discourage cross- departmental divisional 
collaboration, and individual and team initiative978  
 
Both Oxfam and ASE went through the decentralisation processes in a way that suited their 
situations. A comparison shows that ASE was ready to decentralise much more power and authority 
than Oxfam. ASE appraised the decentralisation that it had done in the early 1990s and came up 
with the conclusion that, “As opposed to the initial intention of decentralization…the 
organizational structure has given the head quarter…the task of providing technical back up and 
other general support services to the RPOs [Regional Programme Offices]”979. As a result, regional 
management offices depended on the Programme Coordination and Support Service department at 
the headquarters in Addis Ababa for administrative and technical support980. To readdress the 
problem, ASE dissolved the Programmes’ Coordination Department that had centralised its annual 
programme, budget and technical matters. Now it was replaced by one that became responsible 
only for programme formulation, monitoring and evaluation of programmes, annual planning and 
budgeting, and the preparation of periodic reports981. This Community Training, Extension and 
Education Department came to manage the core activity of ASE, and took over some responsibility 
from the former Programmes Coordination Unit982. Moreover, the division of power and functions 
between the headquarters and regional management offices based at the district level was also 
carried out. The core functions of the headquarters included policy and strategy development; 
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programme formulation, ongoing and terminal evaluation; research and networking; fundraising 
and administration; the signing of project agreements with governmental organisations;  capacity-
building of programme management offices, and provision of printing services. Other functions 
included supporting project offices in conducting and analysing baseline surveys; the recruitment 
of project managers and those accountable to project managers; the provision of operational 
guidelines, internal and external auditing functions and fund raising983. The programme offices 
would manage finances (budget administration, maintaining accounts, audit preparation). In 
addition, they would have the following functions: 
 Personnel recruitment except the programme manager and those accountable to the Programme manager;  
 Prepare project proposals within the framework of the programme objectives under implementation as may 
be deemed necessary;   
 Whenever necessary, revise the programme under implementation to fit with the changing situation;  
 Conduct and analyze baseline survey;   
 Networking at regional, zonal and district levels and  
 Report preparation and submission to head quarters, governmental organizations and donors. Report to donors 
would be sent through the head office984.  
Like ASE, Oxfam’s head office in Oxford conducted a series of reviews in the mid and late 1990s. 
The aim was to bring a selection of decision-making powers closer to the site of programme 
implementation985. These new powers were considered to enable lower-level staff to play a more 
active role in defining programmes and projects within the policy framework that Oxfam called 
Strategic Change Objectives (SCOs)986. The new management structure was drawn up in such a 
way that the country offices came under the bureaucratic control of regional offices, which, in turn, 
would be accountable to Oxfam’s office in Oxford987. To that end, Oxfam divided the areas in 
which it operated into eleven regional management centres. The Horn of Africa Regional Center, 
with its seat in Addis Ababa, came to be a sub-region of the Horn, Eastern and Central Africa 
Region with its seat in Kenya. Like any regional office, the Horn, Eastern and Central Africa 
Region came to have a strategic role in the international programme, supporting regional 
programmes designed to maximise the learning and impact of locally-based initiatives988. Regional 
management centres, on the other hand, would take corporate responsibilities including but not 
limited to:  
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 Communicating Oxfam’s corporate image and message, while establishing a distinctive   regional profile 
 Meeting agreed targets with the centre in key areas, such as programme development, strategic planning, 
financial management, communications, fund-raising etc. 
 Operating cost-effectively against central benchmark989 
 
The role of the centre became more focused and reduced, with the following tasks:  
 to set strategic directions and allocate resources;   
 to ensure quality through professional support and supervision;  
 to coordinate resource-raising;   
 to promote advocacy in the developed world;   
 to coordinate responses to emergencies;  
 to develop policy990   
 
The rationale for division of power was presented in two ways, reflecting concerns about grassroots 
participation on the one hand and corporate management on the other. For instance, Oxfam’s chair, 
Joel Joffa, portrayed the change in 2000/2001 as follows: “…by managing the programme this 
way, our input will be more accountable at the local level, and more able to respond to national and 
regional demands”. The 2003 Oxfam’s Partnership Programme Agreement with DFID emphasised 
that the new management aimed at, “…creating regional coordination, identity and consistency in 
programme delivery, elements which required a degree of top down control to achieve”991. This 
last intention was reiterated by the 1998 strategic review of Oxfam. The Strategic review document 
stated, “This is not a call for another restructuring of Oxfam. The review is keenly aware that large 
scale reorganizations don’t in themselves bring about the new ways of working or changed 
behaviour”992.  
The Horn of Africa sub-regional office came to have effective management over Oxfam’s 
programme in Ethiopia. This had to do with inter-state and intra-state conflict in the region. Earlier, 
the Horn of Africa sub-regional office had held the mandate over the management of programmes 
in Ethiopia, Somalia, Eritrea, Sudan, and Djibouti. Addis Ababa was chosen to serve as the seat of 
this sub-regional office. Oxfam’s Africa Director told the Ethiopian Ministry of Justice that, “Addis 
Ababa is best suited as the location for the regional office to serve Oxfam’s Horn of Africa 
programme”993. However, the conflict going on in and between countries in the Horn of Africa 
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made the free movement of Oxfam’s employees difficult994. As a result, the Horn of Africa office 
was concerned basically with Oxfam’s programme in Ethiopia and it remained under the umbrella 
of Oxfam’s Horn, Eastern and Central Africa regional office with its head quarters in Kenya.  
Like any of its programme offices, Oxfam’s programme office in Ethiopia came to have a great 
deal of power and authority. However, it exercised this power and authority in the framework of 
the Strategic Change Objectives (SCOs) set by Oxfam’s office in Oxford. These Strategic Change 
Objectives aimed to promote the right to a sustainable livelihood, the right to health and education, 
right to life and security and right to say995. In the framework of these objectives, a governing 
structure was authorised to decide over policy. It has also been authorised to administer budget and 
its employees. The governing structure was composed of the Country Programme Manager and 
two of his deputies, as well as senior staff heading the three departments, namely long-term 
development, humanitarian intervention, and policy and advocacy. Programme implementation 
was the responsibility of the staff within Oxfam. However, staff were encouraged to engage with 
the governing structure. Concerning this, a document stated that, “The staff structure should play 
a positive role in policy and decision by the governing structure”996. The governing structure always 
advised the staff to make use of all the available opportunities to gather and process information in 
order to engage with the governing structure on policy and strategic issues997. To that end, the 
organisation created a number of forums where the staff and other stakeholders aired their views. 
To begin with, the staff at different levels started to participate in monthly management meetings 
and offered their views on issues they thought were important. Interviewed about this, the staff 
expressed that the monthly meeting assisted them to develop a sense of belonging at Oxfam998. 
Moreover, in 1998 Oxfam launched an annual conference in which a number of partner 
organisations, notably national NGOs funded by Oxfam; governmental organisations, donors and 
Oxfam itself participated. Issues of common concern were discussed and the governing structure 
within Oxfam in Addis Ababa passed decisions on important issues999. 
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The decentralisation of Oxfam gave impetus to the delegation of power and authority to regional 
offices. Oxfam upgraded its four offices in the regions from project offices to Programme 
Coordination Offices. Thus, there were Programme Coordination Offices in Dire Dawa 
(coordinating programmes in eastern Hararghe), Jijiga (Somali), and Soddo (coordinating southern 
programmes). These offices could decide programme components in line with Oxfam’s Strategic 
Change Objectives according to the budget allocated to them. They were also authorised to manage 
their internal affairs including finances1000. In addition to their own operational programmes, these 
offices could oversee and assist the national NGOs that Oxfam funded. These national NGOs 
expressed their appreciation of Oxfam’s flexibility. One of the studies conducted based on the 
views of the representatives of 12 national NGOs funded by Oxfam states that, “Oxfam is flexible 
in its budget utilization allowing partners to shift budget from one budget line item to the other 
when the need arises”1001.      
5.3. Challenges to decentralised management 
Though well-intentioned, the decentralisation process suffered from serious shortcomings. Firstly, 
though a big structure was put in place, there were limited staff with limited skill at the district 
levels1002 . NGO staff were thus forced to get directly involved in project implementation, as 
opposed to the original plan of their providing technical back-up, and building the capacity of the 
staff of partner governmental organtions1003. Moreover, regional programme offices of NGOs often 
found it difficult to carry out the advocacy work that had been decentralised to districts. An 
evaluation report shows that, “It is hard to imagine a situation where the relations between an NGO 
and regional government would be robust to allow criticism of national policies”1004. This created 
a situation whereby NGOs centralised activities related to policy advocacy1005. The second factor 
that challenged regional management offices is that they were unable to purchase the materials they 
needed to run their programmes as well as their organisations, because it was difficult to find items 
that met the required specifications. As a result, they delegated their head office to purchase what 
they needed from Addis Ababa1006. The head offices set up Procurement Committees1007. However, 
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the procurement process that involved finance officers was complex and triggered frustration. 
Concerning Oxfam’s procurement system, an observer commented that:  
An aspect of the Addis office is that internal procedures appear to have different departments 
regulating each other-thus instead of the Logistic department being expected to carry out its own 
monitoring by checking of ordering procurements etc., this is carried out by the committee system 
and checks by finance. It seems unnecessary to establish such a system for a day to day 
operational monitoring unless it turns out that each department actually is functioning as a corrupt 
cabal of mutual self-interest that is!1008          
5.4. Conclusion 
A historical approach is of great relevance for understanding the management traditions within 
NGOs. It shows the changes NGOs have undergone in the ways they have managed their 
programmes. By looking at the examples of these three NGOs in Ethiopia, this chapter has explored 
the management systems of NGOs, and changes to them. The chapter has argued that both 
centralisation and decentralisation have existed within NGOs, however, the centralisation of NGOs 
has remained a bone of contention. NGOs pursued rigidly centralised management systems for 
more than two thirds of their existence in Ethiopia.  A group of individuals holding key positions 
within the structures of NGOs used to “make and break things”. Centralisation of power was 
initially preferred for the realisation of corporate vision as well as to carry out NGOs activities 
more efficiently. It was apparent also that NGOs leaders were influenced by organizational culture 
in Ethiopia that fostered hierarchy and bureaucracy. However, individuals within the NGOs who 
did not have real power eventually sought redistribution of power and authority. Although it was 
occasionally expressed, for some time, the demand for decentralisation remained latent within a 
number of NGOs such as ASE and Oxfam, whereas the centralisation of decision-making had been 
resisted by the general membership of CCRDA from the beginning. The Executive Committee was 
responsive to this demand. This was because the Executive Committee was accountable to the 
General Assembly. Thus, CCRDA was the first to start the decentralisation process, especially 
from the end of 1980s. The Management Committee of ASE turned down repeated demands for 
decentralisation. The sudden departure of the Executive Director brought the conflict into the open. 
The decentralisation that followed was a response to this conflict. It could thus be argued that 
decentralisation at the first phase was the result of internal dynamics.  
Decentralisation was a continuous process. From the mid-1990s to the early 2000s, the government 
introduced a number of policies that affected NGOs. Moreover, it decentralised the RRC and other 
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line ministries. This had profound impact on the management tradition of NGOs. NGOs such as 
CCRDA demarcated clear lines of authority between the Executive Committee, the Secretariat and 
the General Assembly. NGOs that had worked with governmental organisations in Addis Ababa 
were now to work with regionally-based RRC and technical governmental organisations. To that 
end, they consolidated the power and authority of regional offices.  
In spite of a great deal of commitment, the decentralisation process suffered from serious 
shortcomings. The availability of human and material resources as well as the difficulty involved 
in certain activities such as advocacy at the district level created a situation whereby regional 
offices were bound to delegate some power and authority to their headquarters. The headquarters 
themselves were sometimes inefficient, especially with regard to recruitment of the staff, as well 
as the purchase of materials required in the regions.    
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Chapter Six  
The impact of NGOs in Ethiopia 
6.1. Introduction  
The contribution of NGOs in Ethiopia is a contested subject. NGOs contend that they have 
supported the effort against poverty. NGOs support their argument by citing the fact that they 
mobilise 20% of the total foreign aid Ethiopia gets per year1009. The figure they cite has been 
confirmed by the National Bank of Ethiopia, which has also confirmed that the total earnings NGOs 
attract are higher than the country’s total earnings from the export of coffee, Ethiopia’s largest 
exportable item. In 2006/07, for instance, fund transfers to NGOs were USD $537.4 million while 
coffee earnings were USD $424.2 million1010.  
While their resource mobilisation is unquestionable, government authorities as well as individuals 
working with NGOs have argued that NGOs have failed to bring about substantial improvement in 
the livelihood of the communities they worked for. Informed by this assessment, government 
authorities and individuals working with NGOs have used strong words to describe NGOs. In his 
critique of NGOs, one government official dubbed NGOs “Lords of Poverty”1011. Employees of 
NGOs, interviewed for this research, have offered similar critiques. One NGO employee who asked 
for anonymity said angrily that, “I would have been happy if NGOs had not existed in this country 
[Ethiopia]”1012. His premise is that NGOs have been unable to bring about major change, despite 
their long years of existence 1013 . Even pro-NGO researchers have taken a similar position. 
Dessalegn is one of those who has expressed his disappointment about the contribution of NGOs. 
He stated that:    
I believe the overall impact of NGOs, measured against the resources they have mobilized, is 
quite disappointing. Development projects run by many NGOs have done little to improve the 
livelihood of the communities concerned1014.  
Assessment of the impact of NGOs has inherent weakness. It refers to neither specific matrix nor 
contexts. This weakness is apparent when we take into account the context in which NGOs in 
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Ethiopia started their operation. Most NGOs began their operations in Ethiopia during the famines 
of the 1970s and 1980s. When the famines diminished, NGOs shifted their resources to address the 
very factors that caused the famines. Some development-oriented NGOs had in fact already been 
running long-term development projects prior to the occurrence of these famines, and only when 
the famines occurred did they shift their resources to rescuing famine victims. However, reaching 
a conclusion that such NGOs failed to prevent the occurrence of famines in Ethiopia would be 
fallacious. This is because the famines were caused by a range of factors over which NGOs had 
little influence. Although they had little control over factors that created famines in the 1970s and 
1980s, NGOs played a leading role in relieving famine-stricken people. When the famines of 1973-
74 and 1983-84 had gone, NGOs shifted their resources to deal with what they considered were the 
root causes of the famines. This implies that relief and development do, in fact, co-exist in NGOs. 
It is, thus, logical to discuss relief, rehabilitation and development activities as a continous process 
rather than as separe fields of action of NGOs. Only when we duscuss these fields of action in 
continuum that we are closer to the role of NGOs in shaping community they worked for.   
It should, however, be assumed that each famine was time/region specific. The southern provinces 
in which NGOs existed in large number were much less affected by food crises during the imperial 
period. In what appears to be a paradox, the region suffered from long-standing structural poverty, 
resulting mainly from the land tenure system. Stunned by the lack of development in the region, 
progressive government officials together with NGOs put in place efforts to address land shortages, 
and NGOs managed to secure the participation of project participants.  
Ultimately, however, NGOs did not maintain this momentum. The development organisations of 
the revolutionary government on which NGOs depended pursued a top-heavy approach. NGO 
plans to increase their impact by reducing NGOs’ reliance on these organisations were not 
successful. This had to do with the “dependency syndrome” that stemed from free distribution of 
food challenging the participation of project participants. Then, however, both the famine and the 
unpopular policies of the military government attracted global attention. As a result, NGOs 
mobilised substantial resources, and saw some marked effects at the grassroots level, mainly as the 
result of their investments.  
NGOs began to work to address the structural causes of poverty from the end of the 1990s on. They 
started to get involved in the formulation of policies concerning different sections of society. Above 
all, against a background of elections, NGOs educated the wider public to increase its demand-
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making capacity. In the context of elections, NGO advocacy and the impact they had created had 
profound political implications. As a result, the government introduced the Ethiopian Charity and 
Society Proclamation (Proclamation No 621, 2009) that diminished the influence of NGOs. This 
chapter investigates the attempt of NGOs to address symptoms of poverty in Ethiopia throughout 
much of their existence. It also investigats how NGOs emerged as a meangful social actor from the 
late 1990s on, capable of causing the public to demand their rights and how that influence 
deteriorated.     
6.2. Participation      
Research has shown that development is sustainable only when project participants can actively 
participate at every stage of the development process1015. Participation in this sense has been nicely 
summed up by Cohen and Uphoff.  According to these authors, participation refers to “...the 
involvement of a significant number of persons in situations or actions which enhance their 
wellbeing e.g. their income, security and self-esteem”1016. The two authors make two distinctions 
with regard to participation, viz “development participation” and “political participation”. The first 
refers to the attempt to place more emphasis on decentralised development; the second has to do 
with electoral processes like voting, campaigning and lobbying1017.  
Participation takes place in specific context. This changing context provides opportunities and 
obstacles to participation. This chapter investigates these opportunities and obstacles in three steps: 
first, it will look at the interventions of the Ethiopian state in rural society and economy and enquire 
as to their influence on the possibilities for, and interests of, the peasants to participate to change 
their status. Secondly, famines will be taken as a kind of focal lens through which the effects of 
governmental and NGO activities are made visible. The third step is to look at NGO interventions 
to address specific socio-economic problems through a project approach and to deal with the 
structural causes of poverty.  
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6.3. The State, the society and the economy in the 20th century  
6.3.1. The imperial period: Until 1974  
The monarchical state system persisted until 1974. Haile Selassie was an influential figure from 
1930 on, when he became the king of kings and henceforward held the authority to appoint all state 
officials1018.  
During his reign, Haile Selassie also intensified the land tenure system, which impoverished the 
majority of the people. The land tenure system had previously had a communal character, in that 
farmers had usufruct1019. This communal character underwent drastic changes in the south, after its 
conquest in the late 19th century.  The northerners who had conquered the south confiscated about 
two thirds of the land, which was quickly disposed amongst claimants from the north. The 
remaining land became state land, and land grants continued to be made, particularly after the 
liberation from Italian rule in 19411020 . From liberation to 1960, 55, 338 gašas of land was 
granted1021.  In the process, one third was divided among the indigenous population1022; however, 
“…in most cases those lands were not distributed among members of the entire community but 
were shared by the newly made Ballabats [chiefs] or former chiefs and their relatives…”1023   
The unfair distribution of land created large number of tenants, “…[who] led a life close to or 
resembling serfdom”1024. Tenancy and landlessness were widespread in the south. Towards the end 
of the 1960s, about half of the population of the region was tenants1025, who led miserable lives as 
they had to pay to meet a wide range of obligations. Nega and Markakis have enumerated the range 
of tributes that each tenant had to pay, thus:   
He [a tenant] was required to pay tribute to the landlords ranging from one-third to half of the 
produce. He was also obliged to pay the land tax amounting to one-tenth…Extensive labor service 
was demanded, far in excess of what was the custom in the north, as well as numerous other 
impositions unknown there…1026  
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Thus, tenants found it unlikely to improve their agricultural productivity. In fact, they sometimes 
had to expend all their produce to fulfil these obligations, such that they were left with nothing to 
sustain themselves. In response, they began to migrate to urban areas in search of jobs1027. Tribute 
payment in the south was so exploitative that even some land owners left their lands uncultivated. 
Hodson who visited some areas of the south and south-west reported that:  
The districts of Kambata [Kämbata], Wolamo [Wällamo] and Baroda…are extraordinarily fertile 
and productive, but enormous areas are left uncultivated on account of the exactions of the 
Abyssinians…This inevitably tends to prevent the people from growing more than is essential 
for themselves1028.        
The socio-economic status of peasants was as bad in the north as in the south, albeit that, due to 
the Rest system, a northern peasant family might own a piece of land that it inherited from its 
ancestors, which made for fewer tenancies in the north than in the south. However, population 
pressure in the 20th century fragmented land holdings, as every member of a family claimed a 
piece of land. This population pressure was the result of the northern revival following the crises 
of the “great famine” of 1888–1889, and the Mahdist intrusions of the last quarter of the 19th 
century1029. Moreover, as in the south, the peasants in the north were being exploited by local-level 
elites. The tendency of local officials to exploit the peasants was so strong that they frustrated the 
state’s endeavour to systematise tax administration. McCann stated that: 
During the 1920s and 1930s…pressure on institutions for the assessment, collection, and 
distribution of taxes, as well as the judicial process, became a field for the clandestine 
accumulation of wealth by rural class who controlled political office. At all level, officials who 
participated in the political judicial and fiscal role of government squeezed extra revenue out of 
already overburdened producer population1030  
6.3.2. The military period: 1974–1991  
The military government (1974–1991) that seized power in 1974 introduced the rural land 
proclamation on March 4th, 1975. The proclamation removed the economic basis of the old 
regime’s ruling class and redressed the highly unfair land tenure system, especially in the southern 
part of the country1031. This reform enabled every household to have access to a piece of land. 
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Furthermore, the rent and taxes that the landlords had been extracting ceased. As a consequence, 
food production appears to have risen fairly sharply in the two years after the reform1032. 
Regardless of the outcome of the land reform, class difference still persisted. The richer peasants 
who owned means of production (oxen and agricultural tools) benefited most from the land 
redistribution1033 . Richer farmers also held political power at the local level. They held key 
leadership positions of the peasant associations that implemented the land reform1034 . These 
political and economic elite formed classes on which the regime depended for making the peasant 
associations serve its political and military objectives. Soon after they were created in 1975, peasant 
associations ceased to be centres of local power and were turned, “…into subordinate extension of 
the Ministry of Interior”1035. The peasant associations underwent a further transformation in 1977. 
This had to do with the ongoing war. As a result, Dawit tells us that, “The primary preoccupation 
of the state now became the recruitment of an army of hundred thousands to suppress this 
explosion”1036.      
Conscription of the peasants strained their relation with the governance structures. This relation 
deteriorated further from 1983, when military service became compulsory for males between the 
ages of 18 and 30, while those aged 30–50 were required to enlist for reserve duty1037. Youths ran 
away every time they heard rumours of military conscription. In 1987, a group of Oxfam employees 
went to a village in Delanta in Wollo, where, as was everywhere the case, there was a rumour that 
government cadres would “hunt” youths for military training. The overall psychological condition 
of the people in rural Ethiopia is reflected in the report that they submitted, in which the Oxfam 
team reported that, “…people ran away when we appeared until we became known”1038.  
The massive involuntary relocation of rural residents in Tigray and Wollo, especially from 1984 
on, and the villagization programme that followed, increased the resentment of rural residents and 
emboldened them against the peasant associations that served as instruments of brutality1039. 
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Although they carried the burden of unpopular policies and practices, small-holding farmers did 
have limited opportunities to improve their production. This, again, was the result of the 
government’s economic policy. The escalating cost of the civil wars compelled the state to press 
for an increase in its share of the agricultural surplus, which threatened to bring it into conflict with 
precisely that stratum of the richer class that controlled the peasant associations. The regime’s 
solution to this dilemma was to set up the Ethiopian Marketing Corporation, which imposed quotas 
on smallholding farmers, and to promote the development of producers’ cooperatives and state 
farming, so it could control the surplus more directly1040.  
In 1979, the formation of producers’ cooperatives was defined as the basis for the transformation 
of Ethiopia into a socialist society1041. These could not be established, however, by mobilising the 
poor peasants – who potentially would have had the most to gain from them – for fear that this 
would undermine the political power of the rich and middle income peasants. Instead, rich and 
middle income peasants were encouraged to form producers’ cooperatives via various financial 
incentives. Cooperative farms had two main privileges. Firstly, they had easy access to various 
state loans. To cite an example, of the loans provided by the AID Bank to the agricultural sector in 
1985, the share of the private poor farmers was only 0.07%. The second privilege was that they 
could buy fertilisers from Service Cooperatives at lower prices than individual cultivators. 
Surprisingly, private farmers nonetheless contributed 90% of the country’s food production1042. 
The preference accorded to state farms was even more substantial. State farms covered 
approximately 3.7 percent of all cultivated lands and employed about 30,500 permanent, and 
180,000 seasonal workers. Although state farms accounted for less than 5% of national grain 
production, in 1982, 80% of agricultural credit disbursed by the government went to state farms, 
which also took up 82% of the fertiliser imported in 1980/81. It was also to this sector that foreign 
aid was directed1043. For the government, this policy was justified because it increased the surplus 
at the disposal of the state. Of the state’s grain purchase in 1981/82, state farms provided 80% of 
wheat, 85% of maize and 60% of sorgum. What this figure shows, an Ethiopian writer concluded,  
Is the strategic role that state farms have played in the supply of certain crops to key consumers 
such as government employees, the armed forces and certain segments of urban dwellers. 
Although this important functions has been accomplished at very high financial costs, it is 
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important to remember that for states the meeting of certain political and economic targets at 
certain critical junctures are far more important than the consideration of the efficient allocation 
of resources1044 
While the government was favouring producers’ cooperatives and state farms, production by 
smallholding peasants was declining. In 1978, it declined by 13% and in 1979 by 10% from the 
1977 level1045. The connection between these declines and the lack of investment was established. 
A report published by the Food and Agricultural Organisation in 1985, “…reveal[ed] that there 
was almost nothing done in the plateau where 92% of the population live”1046.  
To summarise, governments influenced the socio-economic lives of the rural poor to a large extent. 
The imperial and military governments created socio-economic structures that impoverished the 
poor peasants. This poverty manifested itself in the form of the famines that frequented the country. 
However, the regimes made the famines a political issue. The next section discusses the political 
aspect of famines in Ethiopia.   
6.3.3. The Politics of Famine 
Governments in Ethiopia have remained reluctant to admit the occurrence of famine. Concerning 
this, Mesfin Wolde Mariam has stated that, “…when crop failure occurs in vulnerable regions, 
famine very often is allowed to take its natural course without government interventions, until it 
was too late”1047.  
Whenever famine has occurred, government officials have underestimated its magnitude. In early 
1973, a senior official of the imperial government gave an interview to the Ethiopian Television 
about the migration of destitute people to Addis Ababa. He began the interview by saying that, 
“Ethiopians have a right to movement”1048. In riposte to rumours of famine, the official went on to 
say that, “….the exaggerated rumours seems to arise out of light-heartedness rather than 
seriousness”1049. To make things worse, he blamed victims for having failed to inform their own 
local authorities about the droughts that occurred in their regions1050.  
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Government officials were in fact aware of the looming famine of the 1970s, as shown by an 
intensive exchange of letters between officials about the food crisis, particularly in Wollo, dating 
from 19711051. When the famine reached its critical stage, the monarch himself stated that, “Rich 
and poor have always existed and always will. Why? Because there are those that work and those 
that prefer to do nothing. Each individual is responsible for his misfortune” 1052 
Political factors were behind the underestimation of the famine. In early 1973, UNICEF compiled 
a report on the magnitude of the famine and approached government officials to ask for 
international assistance. The government rejected the proposal on political grounds. The Vice-
Minister of Planning told a UNICEF representative that:  
If we have to describe the situation in the way you have in order to generate international 
assistance, then we don’t want that assistance. The embarrassment of the government is not worth 
it. Is that perfectly clear? 1053 
While the government was refusing to ask for support to rescue famine victims, a lot of people 
were dying. While the official estimate of the RRC suggested that only 10,000 people died over 
the period from June to August, 1973, a UNICEF study puts the figure at between 50,000 and 
100,0001054. 
The military government that took power in 1974 blamed the imperial government for failing to 
respond to the famine, and this became part of its propaganda to delegitimise Haile Selassie’s 
government. To that end, the military government screened a film by Jonathan Dimbleby that 
showed horrifying pictures of famine victims, intercut with images of the comfort in which Haile 
Selassie I and his family had been living1055. 
Ironically, the military government did the same thing in the 1980s that the monarchy had done ten 
years ago. While the people of Wollo and Tigray were dying in 1983–1984, the military 
government was most concerned with propagating a positive image of the results of the Ethiopian 
revolution of 1974. The RRC insisted to the president of the Republic that the government had to 
make the famine public in order to mobilise international assistance. In response to this, however, 
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the president argued that imperialist powers would use it as grounds upon which to mock the 
government’s effort to build a strong socialist Ethiopia. Moreover, the government was planning 
to celebrate the 10th anniversary of the Ethiopian revolution of 1974, and anything that would 
tarnish the ceremony was to be put aside1056.    
Foreign donors themselves were also not ready to assist the relief effort, as Ethiopia had firmly 
placed itself in the Soviet camp1057. Thus informed by the ideological alignment of the Ethiopian 
government, western donors had turned down the repeated calls of the RRC for aid. The situation 
finally started changing towards the end of 1984 when massive relief aid started flowing to 
Ethiopia1058. In the interim, however, one million people lost their lives1059.   
6.4. NGOs and relief operations  
The famines of the 1970s and 1980s hit wide sections of rural society in Ethiopia.  Having noted 
the horror at the grassroot level, NGOs conducted successful advocacy work that caused dominant 
actors to rescue famine victims. While the relief operation of the 1970s went relatively well, that 
of the 1980s was disrupted by wars and insurgency and counter-strategy measures associated with 
it.       
6.4.1. The 1970s famine and the NGOs’ response  
6.4.1.1. Desperation and advocacy  
Tigray, Wollo and Northern Shoa were hit severely by the famine of 1973–1974. 2 out of 4.2 
million people in Tigray and Wollo were victims of the famine and 1.2 million people required 
immediate food assistance1060.  
In Wollo, where NGOs operated in larger number, the famine struck two different sections of the 
populace: Afar camel herders in the lowlands, and smallholding tenant farmers on the escarpment. 
Both groups were poor and marginalised and had been subject to the depredations of both the 
landowning class and the state, including the widespread confiscation of land1061.  
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The Awsa province, where the Afars were living, suffered much more than any other province. A 
primary document describes the agony in the region in the following way:   
The people in this area are learning well the meaning of the word starvation as they see the thin, 
gaunt faces of adults, as they count without difficulty the ribs of children as they smell the 
carcasses of dead animals which litter the streets. Young people become old, three years old 
children look like babies of three months and babies are mere skeletons, once fit people are now 
carried on the back of the fitter ones, and old people lie and wait, hope and pray that someone 
will bring them food1062.   
The number of people that suffered agony of the kind mentioned above was so large that it 
threatened the capacity of NGOs to respond adequately. In its report to CCRDA, the Red Sea 
Mission Team, an NGO described their resource constraints in relieving victims of famine in the 
Awsa lowland. The report stated that:   
We did not actually reach the river as a number of Danakils [Afars] were waiting with their 
empty grain bags. Later we came to a standstill as 3000 Danakils confronted us, men, women 
and children. This was the biggest gathering we had seen thus far, but of course they knew we 
were coming and quickly news spreads in the Danakil areas. We wondered how far our bags of 
grain would last, it seemed so small with much great need1063.   
NGOs in different parts of Wollo were distributing their resources thinly. For instance, the Red Sea 
Mission Team started providing each person with one bowl of grain per week. Some of the people 
had refused to take their share on the grounds that the portions were too small. However, as the 
Red Sea Mission Team reported, “…this was the only fair way of assuring that each person received 
some grain”1064.  
Large numbers of starving people left the Awssa area for nieghbouring Yeju province. The 
Ethiopian Evangelical Church Mekan Yesus (EECMY) admitted these and other people to its 
hospital in Woldia town. They were served bread at breakfast, and nifro at lunch and dinner1065. 
Like the Red Sea Mission Team in Awssa province, the EECMY was threatened by the increasing 
number of famine victims. In response to this increase, an American volunteer, Cow Baur, is said 
to have sold all her property, including her car, to support the famished people. Because of this, 
people started calling her a saint1066.  
Like the Red Sea Mission Team in Awssa and the EECMY in Yeju province, urban residents took 
desperate actions to rescue famine victims. In early June 1973, famine victims got together in 
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Kombolcha town as they had heard rumours that food would be distributed there. When food was 
not forthcoming, many of them went back home, until only a few of them remained in Kombolcha 
town1067. In order to support them, a committee composed of town volunteers was set up, and began 
distributing one kilo of flour per day to each adult. CCRDA donated Eth $1500 to the committee 
to buy blankets. It also donated Eth $5000 to build shelters to house the destitute people1068.  
The efforts underway were not, however, commensurate with the magnitude of the food crisis. 
Reports received by NGOs from different regions show that people were dying in large numbers. 
For instance, 50 people died in Kombolcha town in July 1973 alone1069, and the death rate was 
higher in areas where access was impossible due to rugged terrain1070.  
A film screened in September 1973 was a landmark with regard to the relief operation. Shot 
secretly, with the involvement of NGOs, the film was aimed at putting pressure on the Ethiopian 
government, and donors to fulfil their responsibilities. NGOs had been lobbying government 
officials to admit the existence of famine and take concerted action, but government officials had 
repeatedly rejected the proposal put forward by NGOs to make the famine public, instead asking 
NGOs to increase their contributions. The government had likewise been ignoring calls to action 
by pressure groups such as university students1071.  
NGOs that had lost all hope of convincing government officials began to consider ways to sensitise 
the international community to the famine. Minutes compiled by CCRDA played an important role 
in this regard. CCRDA had begun compiling detailed minutes of its weekly meetings and 
circulating them to Western embassies in Addis Ababa, which then sent them to their governments, 
while member NGOs sent the minutes to their respective headquarters overseas. The minutes thus 
circulated, convoyed the grim sense of spreading disaster, and journalists started engaging with 
CCRDA officials. One of these was Jonathan Dimbleby from Britain1072. Guided by CCRDA, 
Jonathan Dimbleby came to Ethiopia to report on the famine in early September 1973. The founders 
of CCRDA guided Mr Dimbleby as to which areas he should go to. Fr. Doheny, one of the founders 
of CCRDA, played a particular role in this regard. In his memoir, Fr. Doheny states that:   
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When he [Dimbleby] arrived I told him where to go, who to meet, and how to get the story out 
to the world. He made his way to Dessie, the centre of the famine and met my friends the 
Capuchin Fathers, who brought him into the camps and showed him the real suffering1073.  
Mr Dimbleby used great caution in getting the film out of Ethiopia. He first passed through the 
security check in the airport with a film that did not have the real pictures on it. Having made sure 
that the security personnel did not monitor films, Mr Dimbleby told his assistant to pass through 
the security check with the real film that contained pictures of the starving people1074. Thus by 
September 1973, the famine was no longer a secret. The film was screened with the title “The 
hidden hunger” through TMS and the story was picked up by a number of television stations around 
the world, showing the misery in Wollo in all its ghastly detail1075.   
The film shocked Ethiopians studying abroad and foreign donors. Ethiopian students shared their 
fellow citizens in Ethiopia what they had seen on TMS television. As a result, foreign donors and 
Ethiopians started to act to respond to the famine. Concerning the impact of the film on Ethiopians 
and foreign donors, an early publication of the RRC itself stated that:  
የቴምስ ቴሌቪዥን ድርጅት ባልደረባ ጆናታን ዲምብልቢ የ  “ተደበቀው ርሃብ” የሚለውን ፊልም አንስቶ 
ዜናው ለአለም ህብረተሰብ እንዲናኝ በማድረጉ የውጭ መንግስታት በጎ አድራጊዎችና ኢትዮጵያውያን 
ችግሩን ለመቇቇም እንዲሳተፉ አድርጏል። 
Because of the news broadcasted to the international community through a film known as “The 
hidden hunger” by Jonathan Dimbleby, a colleague of TMS Television, foreign government 
donors and Ethiopian participated in dealing with the problem [famine]1076.     
The film also put a great deal of pressure on the government to take more initiative in mobilising 
resources and coordinating relief operations. Concerning the impact that the film had on the 
imperial government, the same source quoted above stated that:   
ቀድሞ የነበረው መንግስት የወሎው እልቂት ዜና በመሰማቱና የችግሩም ክብደት ከቁጥጥሩ ዉጭ ሆኖ ስላገኜው የእህል እጥረት 
ኮሚቴ የሚባል በህዝባዊ ኑሮ እድገትና በማህበራዊ ጉዳይ ሚኒስቴር ስር አቋቁሞ ከውጭ የሚመጣውን እርዳታ ማስተባበር 
ጀመረ። 
The old regime started coordinating the international assistance by establishing the Grain Deficit 
Committee under the Ministry of Community Development and Social Affairs as the news about 
the catastrophe in Wollo was circulated and as the problem grew beyond a manageable 
proportion1077 
The establishment of the Grain Deficit Committee was decisive in itself. This was because a 
number of NGOs called for a designated governmental office that would coordinate the relief 
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operation. This was urgent largely because NGOs in Europe and the USA that had seen both the 
full extent of the famine and the shabby attempts of the government rushed into Ethiopia and 
opened offices to rescue famine victims1078. The Grain Deficit Committee now directed NGOs 
towards provinces of Wollo such as Qobbo-Alamata, Kalu, Awssa and so on where people had 
been dying in large number1079.  
With massive deployment of food and non-food items, NGOs stopped the deaths. The Catholic 
Relief Service distributed $ 23,572 worth of grain to the famine victims in Kobo, Alamata and Afar 
between 1974 and 19751080. Concern put a well-organised medical team in place in Qobbo on 
December 1st, 1973. By the end of 1974, the total number of volunteers that Concern had 
dispatched reached 431081. Likewise, Oxfam started a programme in neighbouring Qalu province. 
Like Concern, Oxfam focused on medical services. The two medical teams that Oxfam deployed 
worked to diagnose those who were suffering most, and started feeding them with nutrient-rich 
foods1082. Moreover, Oxfam distributed 8 tons of Soyya and wheat flours, 1000 cartons of Faffa 
and 34 tins of edible oil in Addis Ababa1083.  
However, NGOs did not cover all of the areas that required assistance. The Grain Defisit 
Committee left these areas under the responsibility of local administrations. This was because the 
Committee did not have its own structures to coordinate the distribution centres in e.g. Wollo. 
Unlike the NGOs that were distributing aid to those who needed it, local authorities took the aid 
for their personal use or that of their relatives.  In the summer of 1974, the Haile Selassie I Famine 
Relief Committee sent a group of faculty members to Lasta, one of the worst-affected parts of 
Wollo. Their report shows the frustration of the starving people about this corruption, stating that:  
The people accuse the local authorities publicly that they use their offices and positions to enrich 
themselves at the expense of the famine stricken ones. The drought and famine situations is said 
to present a welcome opportunity for them to enrich themselves1084     
The same report shows that these local authorities either took grains and clothing for themselves 
and/or distributed them to those whom they favoured. On the other hand, they charged money to 
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register impoverished farmers for admission to relief shelters1085. Famine victims complained that 
they were unable to gain admission, although they really needed assistance. An old man who had 
been denied admission to the shelters complained that, “I am old and tired. My family, my wife, 
and children are dead. I was wondering to be admitted to this shelter for three months, but I was 
not admitted. I would still like to be admitted and to be taken care of”1086.  
Life in the shelter was not as comfortable as might have been expected by those who asked for 
admission. The shelter population was not offered sufficient food or medical services. The medical 
service and food that each person got per day was only 21 cents worth of relief1087. As a result, 
farmers in the shelter tended to ask to leave the shelter as soon their condition started showing 
improvement. They were encouraged in this by the rains that started in the summer of 1974. Asked 
about going back home, a farmer in a shelter in Gura Wurke in Wollo stated that:  
We are eagerly waiting for the government for rehabilitation. What we really need is oxen and 
seed. Right now it is time for farming. We should be sowing sorgum and teff. We have already 
missed the Belg harvest, the time when we should have planted “shimbera” [chickpeas]. If we 
should also miss the Kremt [main rain], we will again be, helpless and dependent on the 
government for everything1088.            
This keenness to leave was in the interest of the government and of NGOs. The government had 
been encouraging local administrations to keep famine victims in their localities. Thus, when the 
rain started in the summer of 1974, the government quickly took to rehabilitating the people in the 
shelter. A study had been carried out on the number of oxen that farmers needed immediately. The 
study showed that farmers in Wollo needed 34,572 oxen. As soon as the rains started, 794 oxen 
were distributed; this marked the beginning of discharging people from the shelter, and it continued 
until all the people had left the shelter towards the end of 19741089.  
NGOs obeyed the government. Once farmers had recovered from the famine, NGOs notified 
farmers that they could no longer carry our relief activities. For example, in April 1974, Oxfam 
told the RRC that from May 1974 it would no longer conduct any nutritional or medical activities 
in Wollo because the emergency period was over 1090 . Likewise, CCRDA stopped its relief 
programmes and shifted to rehabilitation. Referring to this shift, the organisation stated that, “…one 
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year and three months after being set up, CRC [Christian Relief Committee] is turning its energies 
more to rehabilitative programmes as a natural consequence to relief activities”1091.        
Though it had diminished in Wollo, however, famine then occurred in the Ogaden. In November 
1974, 72,000 people required relief assistance in the region1092. The RRC was unable to operate 
alone due to the seriousness of the famine. A team composed of employees from the Ethiopian 
Nutritional Institute and a journalist reported that, “…when we talk to people from the towns 
[Degahbur and Aware] they tell us that the drought problem is daily increasing. In Aware, for 
example, 3 persons were dead in the morning when we were there and 4 persons the other day due 
to famine”1093. NGOs themselves reported the catastrophe that they witnessed as soon as they 
arrived in the area. Oxfam tells us, for example, that from two to five persons were dying per day 
in one shelter1094.  
The RRC together with the Ethiopian Red Cross Society, the Ethiopian Catholic Secretariat and 
Oxfam set up thirteen feeding shelters1095. The NGOs received grain from the RRC and started 
distributing rations to the people in the shelters. Moreover, Oxfam, Red Cross and the Ethiopian 
Catholic Secretariat set up two joint supplementary feeding centres in Degahbour and Warder 
where 400 malnourished children were being fed and treated1096. The relief programme improved 
the nutritional status of the shelter population. Four months after the programme was started, 
positive progress was visible with regard to the nutritional and medical status of the people in the 
shelter. Concerning the children, one of Oxfam’s documents stated that:  
The diet is well accepted by them [children], though the endemic shortage of sugar has forced the 
supervisors to halve the sugar content-there was some fear that, with sugar being a very basic 
ingredient of the Somali dishes, this would cause a problem1097.  
The same progress was apparent with regard to the nutritional and medical status of able-bodied 
men. Mr Harper, who visited the Ogaden in July and August 1975, described how, “Generally 
speaking, the relief situation in the Ogaden appears to be soundly based. I understand that the RRC 
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and the Red Cross medical teams cover almost all the shelters between them, assisted by Society 
of International Missionary, World Vision and others in some of them”1098. 
6.4.2. The 1980s famine and NGO relief operations in Ethiopia  
6.4.2.1. Donor indifference, NGO advocacy and global sympathy 
The relief operation in the 1980s took place during the Cold War when altruism was mixed up with 
global politics. As a result, international donors were initially indifferent to acting to rescue famine 
victims. The situation started changing when NGOs carried out extensive advocacy work. The 
NGOs’ advocacy created worldwide sympathy that influenced donors to act in rescuing famine 
victims in Ethiopia.   
The military government noted that the absence of disaster preparedness had cost human lives 
during the famine that occurred in1973–1974. To prevent further disaster, the RRC presented a 
proposal to donors to set up a national stock of food reserves in 19751099. The plan was to reserve 
80,000 tons of grain over a period of four years. This was to support 3.72 million people for four 
months at the rate of 400 grams of cereals per day per person1100. After four years of hesitancy, 
donors started responding. In 1978, WFP donated 12,000 tons to the RRC to build up the stock1101. 
Likewise, the Dutch government pledged 5,000 tons. The Ethiopian government also provided a 
budgetary sum of Eth $5,000,000 to cover the cost of storage, preservation and half the cost of the 
transport of stocks1102.  
The the effort to build up food reserve stocks was soon frustrated. In June 1978, the Ethiopian radio 
broadcasted an alert that 5 million people in Northern provinces faced starvation, and that 400,000 
tons of food aid was needed. The response from the West was almost nil, despite a warning from 
WFP’s experts that Ethiopia was, “…one of the most likely sites for the world’s super-famine”1103. 
In November 1978, President Mengistu Haile Mariam publicly called the situation “frightening”, 
and the RRC claimed that some two million people were at risk in Wollo province alone. The RRC 
issued an alert for international food aid to counter the impact of “drought and war”. Little was 
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forthcoming1104. The RRC published its annual report in February 1983, which showed that 1.3 
million people were already in relief camps. By early 1984, this figure had risen to 4.5 million and 
by August 1984, 6 million people required emergency food. In late 1984, the total number of people 
at risk had risen to 8 million. 2 million refugees had already fled to neighboring countries1105. 
NGOs were concerned about the indifference of Western donors. They thus started alerting donor 
governments to the magnitude of the famine and the need to act to save million of lives, especially 
in Northern provinces. In its appeal to the American government, the Catholic Relief Service 
(CRC) stated in May 1983 that:  
More than 2 million men, women and children face starvation in the next months unless massive 
food supplies start arriving in the draught plagued region of Northern Ethiopia. Hundreds of 
thousands of people are already on the road searching for food1106.  
In November 1983, Kenneth Hacket of the CRS stood before the House Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, Africa Subcommittee and told members of the Committee that because of lack of food, 
people had begun eating anything they could find in their localities.  However, there was no 
substantial pledge1107.   
SCF and Oxfam were doing the same job in Europe that CRS was doing in USA. In May 1983, 
Save the Children Fund invited a television crew led by Mike Wooldridge who reported on the 
looming famine, especially in Korem1108. Like SCF, Oxfam was engaged in bringing the magnitude 
of the problem to the international community through its monthly reports and press releases. 
Finally, a Oxfam-sponsored film made by Michael Buerk and Muhammed Amin moved the 
international community. Michael Buerk, a British journalist was contracted by Oxfam to go to 
Ethiopia and shoot a film. On October 23, 1984, Michael Buerk released the film that he had shot 
in Korem through the BBC. Its footage was subsequently shown by 425 of the world’s broadcasting 
organisations with a potential audience of 470 million people around the world1109. This was 
followed by exposure on the front pages of newspapers, magazines, and radio bulletins around the 
world that publicised the catastrophe that was traumatising the Ethiopian poor. This publicity 
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influenced global thinking so as to respond to the crisis1110. Also, the wider public in Europe and 
USA started putting pressure on their own governments. This had significant impact on donor 
governments, which started donating their own massive food and non-food item relief to 
Ethiopia1111. 
6.4.2.2. War, the relief operation and NGOs 
The civil war challenged the relief operation in two ways. Firstly, relief shelters were targets of the 
ongoing conflict. This disrupted the emergency operations in which NGOs were involved. 
Secondly, the government relocated large numbers of people from the Northern provinces as a way 
of dealing with rebels. NGOs served as important channels through which food reached the people, 
in large part because donors were against the government that was using aid as a tool to implement 
its counter-strategic measures.        
As soon as the RRC issued its report in February 1983, NGOs rushed into the Wollo, Tigray and 
Gonder provinces where the civil war was intense. NGOs thus took a great risk in doing so. In 
order to reduce the risk, NGOs agreed to operate together. Concerning the importance of acting 
together, NGOs agreed that, “…it would be better for NGOs to act together through CRDA 
[CCRDA] in assisting Mekelle [the capital city of Tigray], rather than the agencies [NGOs] acting 
independently”1112.  
In early 1983, NGOs set up a joint supplementary feeding programme that started running well in 
Mekelle and Korem in Tigray, Ibnat in Gonder and many other places. Assisted by Oxfam, SCF 
set up a child feeding programme in Korem town. In August 1983, 613 children were getting 
nutritional and medical assistance and 261 children were under intensive medical and nutritional 
care1113. Soon, however, diarrhea and measles started killing children1114. With medical assistance 
from Oxfam, SCF started treating the epidemic and soon got the diseases under control1115. SCF’s 
employees had profound experience of managing emergency operations, as per one of Oxfam’s 
officials comment that, “SCF are great at emergencies and poor at development in Ethiopia”1116.  
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As in Korem, NGOs started operating jointly in Gonder. In February 1983, NGOs flocked into 
Ibnat in eastern Gonder1117. The NGOs that first arrived set up shelters for children. The feeding 
programme was not as systematic in Ibnat as in Korem. Two of Oxfam’s medical officers who 
arrived in the region later were shocked by the way the children were being fed. One of their reports 
tells us that, “When we arrived [in Ibnat]….it was feeding a random sample of children of many 
areas from a small tent with no system of selection or registration”1118. Oxfam stepped in to 
improve the way in which children in the shelter were being cared for. Fed with nutrient-rich foods, 
children could recover significantly1119. Likewise, the distribution of main rations to famine victims 
saw also progress at the early stage. As elsewhere, RRC took the responsibility to distribute the 
main rations to able-bodied men both in the relief shelters as well as in the villages. Due to grain 
shortages, the RRC could only supply food containing 1,100 calories to each person. NGOs, 
notably Oxfam, argued with RRC officials that the amount was much less than the daily personal 
requirement and that RRC should increase the grain to at least 1,750 calories worth1120. The 
proposal was accepted. The distribution of the increased ration recommended by Dr Shears, 
Oxfam’s medical officer, began in Ibnat on May 22nd, 19831121. Having observed that the RRC 
was understaffed, Oxfam contracted six school-leavers to assist RRC to distribute food to 15,000 
people in May 1983. A great deal of work and responsibility was placed on the shoulders of those 
school leavers who proved to be, “….invaluable and worked efficiently and consciously 
throughout”1122. 
While it continued in major urban areas, namely Mekelle, due to the heavy security presence there, 
the emergency operations on the periphery of Tigray were disrupted by the civil war. Korem was 
the first to suffer from heavy attacks. In April 1983, Korem was ransacked by TPLF; the Field 
Director of SCF was kidnapped and taken to the Sudan.  The relief operation that SCF had started 
was thus now disrupted, and famine victims were dispersed1123. However, the government soon 
rebuilt the relief shelters. This was because the government wanted to cause the starving people 
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stay in Korem in relief camps indefinitely. It also encouraged more famine victims to migrate to 
Korem, all of which was aimed at depriving TPLF of social support1124.  
The government pursued an opposite policy with regard to relief shelters in Ibnat than they did in 
Korem, discouraging famine victims in Ibnat not to leave the shelter of their homes, while NGOs 
were trying to help the people to go home with rations. In their discussion with the regional RRC, 
NGOs realised that transportation to move food from Bahr Dar, Addis Zemen and Gonder to Ibnat 
was a major problem 1125 . NGOs pooled cash amounting to Eth $200,000 to finance the 
transportation of grain to Ibnat1126. This did not work out. TPLF ransacked Ibnat town on May 
25th, 1983 and took about 20 Ethiopian hostages connected to various NGOs. The RRC thus told 
NGOs that grain stores in Addis Zemen were the nearest point to which the people could travel to 
collect their ration. It took six days to travel from Ibnat to Addis Zemen on foot1127. Exhausted by 
the famine, the people were unable to travel, so NGOs under the auspices of CCRDA tried shuttling 
food using donkeys and mules. This did not work out either as the animals collapsed while 
travelling1128. In the meantime, regional government and party officials reported to the RRC that 
the shelter had been infiltrated by anti-government forces, and that, “The TPLF, EPLF [Eritrean 
People Liberation Front] and EDU [Ethiopian Democratic Union] were using the relief rations for 
their forces”. Thus the regional Party Secretary, Ato Melaku Tefera, ordered the closure of the 
shelter. Then excepting the intensive feeding unit and warehouse, the shelter was burned down and 
the refugees were forced by the local militia to leave the camp. The shanty town composed of straw 
huts housing 20,000 people was completely destroyed1129.  
Another aspect of counter-insurgency measures was the abuse of aid by the government to force 
the starving people, mainly those from Wollo and Tigray, to go to new settlements. Certainly, 
donors and NGOs contributed to this. Donors had long been arguing that the government would 
abuse food intended for the starving people. Concerning this, the former American ambassador to 
the United Nations, Jeane Kirkpatrick told reporters that, “The diversion of relief goods by a large 
number of people between the donors and the intended recipients is a very big problem 
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in….Ethiopia”1130. Under pressure by the media, international donors started channelling their 
resources to the government. NGOs were in favour of this, believing that distribution of food was 
the responsibility of the RRC. This was the reason why NGOs had been assisting the RRC. In 
October 1982, CCRDA financed the transportation of unspecified amount of RRC grain from 
Addis Ababa to Tigray. It also supplied the RRC with foods, blankets, soap, and funds to construct 
relief shelters in Mekelle1131. CCRDA also encouraged its members to support the RRC. Motivated 
by CCRDA’s assistance, Oxfam’s Field Director stated that Oxfam, “…will try and work through 
the…RRC”1132.  
However, placing trust in the government had profound consequences for the relief operation, as. 
Oxfam’s experience shows. Oxfam placed excessive trust in the RRC and it expressed its 
appreciation in many ways. At a time when Wollo was imminently to experience tragic death rates 
in the next couple of months, upon visiting parts of Wollo in early 1983, Oxfam’s Senior Medical 
Advisor reported that, “…it does seem that at present a famine situation has been averted by the 
effective RRC grain distribution programme”1133. Oxfam only started taking serious food relief 
action towards the end of 1984, and this was due to the media influence1134. Up until that point, the 
supply of water had been Oxfam’s priority for their relief operation in Wollo, which had to do with 
the scant attention that the RRC gave to water. In early 1983, Oxfam had criticised the 
administration of the feeding shelter in Ibnat, saying that, “Supply of water to the shelter [was] not 
the priority of the shelter administration”1135. Oxfam supplied clean water to feeding centres run 
by NGOs throughout Wollo province1136. Reports show that Oxfam drilled shallow water wells for 
42 feeding shelters in Wollo province1137.  
However, the priority Oxfam accorded to water assumed that the RRC would provide food to the 
starving people in Wollo including Bora and Wogel Tena in Wadla Delanta district where Oxfam 
had set up supplementary feeding programmes. However, the RRC was manipulating food aid to 
force the people to go to new settlements. Oxfam was well aware that the people were receiving 
dangerously inadequate grain rations, but it had accepted the RRC’s argument that lack of trucks 
                                                          
1130
 “Ethiopia’s Famine: The Politics of Food Aid”, Miscellanea No 4 (nd), 51  
1131
  Letter from Libby Grimshaw to Walsh (October 4th, 1982), P. 1, Archive of Oxfam in Addis Ababa  
1132
 Letter from Goyder to Walsh (September 1, 1982), P. 1, Archive of Oxfam in Addis Ababa    
1133
 “Report on Paul Shears Visit to assess and implement drought operation in Ethiopia: 14.03.83-8.4.83” (nd), P. 3 
1134
 Robert Dodd, “Oxfams Response to Disasters in Ethiopia and the Sudan” (nd), P. 124  
1135
 Paul Shears and Jenny Deakin, “Ibnat, Gonder: Relief Health Programme Report 1” (Ibnat, 22.03.83), P.2       
1136
 Robert Dodd, “Oxfam’s Response to Disasters in Ethiopia and the Sudan” (nd), P. 123 
1137
 Ibid, P. 123 
228 
 
made the transportation of grain difficult. However, this was far from the truth. By the time it 
realised the manipulation of food aid that was underway, Oxfam regretted that, “…more time was 
not spent enquiring into RRC distribution pattern in Wollo at that time and that detailed information 
was not gathered from the experience of other NGOs working in Wollo”1138.   
The nutritional status of the people in Bora and Wogel Tena was deteriorating. As a result, families 
were starving their children in order to keep them in the supplementary feeding programme. A 
report documented the situation in the following way:   
Supplementary food intended for the child was diverted to the rest of the family. Indeed, since 
children come off the programme if they gain weight, there is an obvious incentive to divert food 
to other members of the family and keep the child with in the category of that qualifies for help1139        
The people travelled to nearby areas where they could get food. However, this often did not work 
out. For instance, in July 1985, at Bora where Oxfam was operating, a crowd of 2000 people who 
had walked over 15 kilometres were turned away from the store by militia men armed with rifles 
because there was insufficient grain to make a complete distribution1140.  
In the meantime, the field staff of Oxfam threatened that they would resign unless Oxfam started 
distributing food to families.  Oxfam thus imported 6000 tons of grain with which it started feeding 
the starving people in Bora and Wogel Tena1141.  
This supplementary feeding and grain distribution by Oxfam eventually brought the nutritional 
status of the people back to normal. In November 1985, 13,661 people were receiving grain from 
the shelters1142. The number dropped gradually until January 1987 when there was no nutritional 
problem in the area at all1143. Because of this, Oxfam closed the Wogel Tena and Bora feeding 
shelters towards the end of 19861144.  
Oxfam got the grain it distributed to the starving people easily from donors who had noted the 
manipulation of food aid by the government. Donors started using all NGOs for distribution, 
regardless of the mandate for which they stood. CCRDA, the NGO coordination body and the 
educational organisation ASE were two of these NGOs. CCRDA received a report that showed that 
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people in Shoa and Sidamo in the south-west, “…were dying like flies”1145. NOVIB, CEBEMO 
and ICCO consigned 6000 tons of grain to CCRDA , with which it began an intensive feeding 
programme in November 1984, as well as distributing rations in three districts in Northern Shoa 
and one district in the Sidamo province1146. 208, 805 people came to depend on the food that 
CCRDA was providing in 17 feeding centres. By the time tensions emerged between CCRDA and 
its members about CCRDA’s mandate, and whether such activities exceeded it, the chairman of 
the Association spoke confidently, saying that, “CCRDA in doing all this [relief operation] was 
becoming rather successful”1147. CCRDA’s newly employed workers also showed a great deal of 
dedication. Fekerte tells us that, “…the dedication of Ethiopian and international team was 
instrumental in saving the lives of people who otherwise would have been at the risk of slow and 
tortuous death”1148. So, on the one hand, CCRDA directly saved this number of people. The 
negative side, however, was CCRDA’s direct relief operation challenged its capacity to coordinate 
the operations of its members. As a result, members argued that CCRDA should withdraw from 
the relief programme forever. Concerning the extent to which direct involvement stifled the 
coordinating capacity of CCRDA, a representative of SCF stated that  
The administration of the programmes heavily over-stretched the physical capability of the 
Secretariat, but direct operational involvement had compromised CRDA’s role as an impartial 
coordinator and mediator. And has seriously undermined its credibility as an independent 
spokesman for NGO community1149   
CCRDA soon withdrew from the relief operation1150. CCRDA had carried out the relief operation 
according to the assumption that saving human lives was to be the top priority of NGOs. The 
chairman of CCRDA told members that, “In principle CRDA [CCRDA] should not be operational 
but this should not be at the expense of the welfare of the people” 1151. This course was taken by 
other NGOs as well. One of these was ASE, which had considered itself to be a developmental 
organisation. Towards the end of 1984, however, project participants reached the stage where they 
could not attend ASE educational programmes.  A NOVIB representative who visited Gamo Gofa 
and Bale was shocked by the agony of the people. ASE thus received 1500 tons of grain from 
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CCRDA and distributed food directly to the starving people, mainly in Gamo Gofa and to some 
extent in Bale1152. As stated earlier, CCRDA’s excellent staff made the relief operation successful. 
One of the reasons for this was that CCRDA drew experienced medical and nutritional expertise 
from its own member NGOs, while ASE staff had limited experience with regard to relief 
operations. Concerning this, ASE stated that, “Its [ASE’s] experiences in the field of relief 
activities have made the task [relief operation] arduous”1153. While it did manage to relieve a 
number of people in its operational areas, ASE faced a great deal of resistance from INADES-
Formation. Considered itself as a “parent” of ASE, INADES-Formation was opposed to ASE’s 
decision to engage directly in the relief operation. Especially as the relief operation was extended, 
INADES-Formation expressed its frustration, driving ASE to pull out of the relief programme. In 
a letter to the Executive Director of ASE, an official of INADES-Formation wrote:  
You tell me that NOVIB asked your office to do something to alleviate the famine situation in 
Gamo region and that it detracted from your activities in training for some time. I would have 
thought that it was rather the job of NGOs specialized in relief operation to deal with the problem. 
This is the policy we followed in Chad when [it was] famine stricken1154.      
6.4.3. Free gifts and disempowerment  
Ethiopia received one of the highest levels of food aid from the Western world throughout the 
1970s and 1980s. The table below shows the amount of food aid Ethiopia received from 1972–
1973 to 1982–1983.   
Table 9: Total cereal food aid to Ethiopia: 1972-73-1982-83 (in 000 tons) 
1972/73 1973/74 1974/
75 
1975/
76 
1976
-77 
1977/
78 
1978
/79 
1979/8
0 
1980/
81 
1981/82 1982/83  
1.8 96.1 54.1 86.6 74.7 76.0 162.5 111.5 227.9 189.7 344.0 
 
Source: Dessalegn Rahmeto, "Food Aid and Food Dependency in Ethiopia”, Miscellanea, Miscellanea 2, IES, AAU (1986), 
P. 10 
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According to an estimate, between January 1984 and the beginning of 1986, 1.7 million tons of 
food aid was pledged to Ethiopia to help feed the starving population, which in early 1985 
numbered over 10 million1155.  
As with any form of aid, donors had the power to decide not only the amount of food aid they 
would donate, but also the purpose for, and the channels through which this aid was to be delivered. 
Until early 1985, most of the food aid was delivered through the RRC and the Ministry of 
Agriculture1156. In early 1985, donors received reports from NGOs that the RRC were using food 
aid as an instrument to implement resettlement policies1157. As a result, donors started channelling 
their food aid through NGOs. This upset senior officials of the military government. The president 
of the Republic himself angrily asked the commissioner of the RRC, “…why it was not possible 
for donors to give aid directly to the Ethiopian government and leave the distribution to us”1158.  
NGOs started distributing food and non-food relief items to the starving people in relief shelters 
and at distribution centres. By April 1985, there were over 45 shelters, 280 distribution centres and 
150 feeding centres set up in the country1159.  
The RRC attempted to enforce guidelines about the amount of food a person was to receive per 
week. The guidelines that the RRC had been applying since 1974 stipulated that a person whose 
age fell between 1 and 5 years was entitled to get 3 kgs of grains; those between 6 and 15 would 
get 7.5 kgs, and those over 16 would get 15 kgs per week1160. However, the RRC did not have the 
courage to force NGOs to adhere to these guidelines, afraid that pressing NGOs hard could cause 
donors to stop the flow of aid. The NGOs themselves would take any action of the RRC as a 
provocation, and they used to inform donors whenever this happened1161. After a long period of 
indecision, in July 1986 the RRC addressed a letter to NGOs in which it stated that NGOs had to 
reduce the amount of food they were distributing to recipients1162.  
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The people in the shelter grew comfortable with the amount, as well as the quality of foods that 
they were receiving from NGOs. As a result, they refused to leave the shelters even after they had 
recovered from the famine. The then Chief Commissioner of the RRC wrote in his memoir that, 
“…the people who had recovered from malnutrition…did not want to go home. They tended to 
feel more secure and comfortable in the shelters than in the uncertain, grueling labor of tilling their 
land”1163  
This “dependency syndrome” became very serious in some parts of the country, namely in Wollo. 
Some food recipients went to the extent of attacking and beating up NGO workers when they were 
forced to leave the shelter, such as happened when Oxfam was about to close one of its shelters in 
Wollo. The minutes of the organisation documented that, “One [Oxfam worker] from Tsehy 
Mewcha had been beaten up by some recently discharged recipients”1164.   
NGOs sometimes went to great lengths to extend the time recipients could stay in the shelter. One 
of the more surprising reasons why they did so is well summed up by the ex-Chief Commissioner 
of the RRC, who said that:   
Some volunteers [working for NGOs]….refused to cooperate with us in closing shelters. Work 
in the shelters had been the most fulfilling event in their lives; it had been exciting, a learning 
experience, and they regretted giving it up and going back to their usual jobs. It was too soon, 
they said, always too soon1165.  
The comfort of recipients, coupled with their extended stay in the shelters had long-lasting 
consequences. One of this was the development of “dependency syndrome”. The dependency 
mindset gained ground to the extent that it came to feature in societal proverbs. Describing the 
relative generosity of NGOs over the government and RRC, one of these proverbs stated that:  
ደርጉ ዳመና ነው፤ 
ደርጉ ዳመና ነው፤ 
ኮሚሽን ካፊያ ነው፤ 
የሚያጥለቀልቀው መካነ ኢየሱስ ነው። 
The Durgue is cloud;  
The Durgue is cloud;  
The Commission [RRC] is drizzle;  
The one that floods is Mekan Iyesus [an NGO]1166.  
 
However, dependency was neither fully accepted, nor acceptable, as shown by other proverbs 
such as this one:  
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ተው አይሆንም በሉት እጁ ለሰለሰ፤ 
ከባህር የመጣ ዳቦ እየገመሰ። 
Tell him [a peasant] that his hands get soft 
As he eats bread that comes from overseas1167. 
To summarise, the food crises of 1973–1974 and 1983–1984 grew beyond the local capacity. 
Respective governments allowed each of these famines to take their natural courses, believing that 
reports about the famines would call into question their legitimacy. Western donors themselves 
who had assisted the imperial government handle the food crisis of the 1970s became indifferent 
largely due to the ideological orientation as well as the global alignment of the military period. 
Millions of people lost their lives as a result of the indifference of the imperial government in the 
1970s and Western donors in the 1980s.  
The catastrophes were reversed only after NGOs took initiatives. Having realised that these famines 
had grown beyond the local capacity to relieve them, NGOs brought the case to the attention of the 
international community. In so doing, they made use of the media, which created worldwide 
sympathy for the famine victims during both the 1970s and 1980s famines. 
While the impact of NGOs’ advocacy is unquestionable, their actual relief operations, especially 
in the 1980s, were influenced by the insurgency and counter-insurgency measures. Though they 
had initially failed to realise the government’s manipulation of food to force resettlement that was 
an aspect of its counter-insurgency strategy, NGOs served as channels through which food reached 
the starving people, because their donors questioned the manipulation of food aid by the 
government. However, the way NGOs distributed food did not take into account the long-term 
effect of free-gifting. By feeding the starved people over a long period, NGOs ended up instilling 
a sense of dependency in some people, meaning, by dependency, an excessive expectation on the 
part of the rural population that NGOs would tackle their concerns alone. This added an unexpected 
dimension to the structural problems encountered by NGOs, which posed further challenges to 
their effort to mobilise project participants to act to address their socio-economic problems, and 
the changes that occurred in this regard from the end of the 1990s on.        
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6.5. NGOs and the challenges of sustainable development 
6.5.1. Introduction  
NGOs admitted that it has been difficult to reduce poverty in rural areas. NGOs have often been 
frustrated by the kind of poverty that they have witnessed, as one ASE report describes, stating, 
“Not only do these [deep instances of poverty] require a great deal of effort to bring about change, 
but they…sometimes lead to frustration”1168.  
Land shortages and a variety of financial obligations peasants had to meet were a major cause of 
poverty in the southern parts of Ethiopia during the imperial period. Tackling these land issues was 
of key strategic importance in motivating people to become active participants in NGO projects, 
and efforts were made in this regard. Some government officials even took personal initiatives to 
address land shortage. Some NGOs also attempted to address land shortage by clearing forests and 
bringing those lands under cultivation. These efforts generated profound enthusiasm amongst 
project participants and NGOs exploited this enthusiasm to move their own programmes forward. 
Despite efforts made, and this early enthusiasm, land issues continued to have a stifling effect on 
the participation of a significant number of very poor project participants. Moreover, despite the 
rural land proclamation of March 4th, 1975 that the new revolutionary government issued, the 
initial public enthusiasm that NGOs had witnessed did not maintain its momentum. Those 
organisations of the new military government with which NGOs started operating pursued a top-
heavy approach that ignored the perspectives of project participants. Project participants thus 
responded in ways that frustrated these interventions. The intentions of NGOs to increase their 
impact by applying “participatory” methods from the early 1980s on did not bring about much 
change. This was due to the fact that the free distribution of food of the early 1980s led project 
participants to ask for payment for their participation. Moreover, corruption at various levels stifled 
projects managed by NGOs and frustrated NGOs themselves.   
NGOs enhanced advocacy for change from towards the end of the 1990s. This caused NGOs to 
identify the concerns of the society closely. To that end, NGOs created various networks that aired 
collective voices, actively participated in influencing the government to formulate pro-poor 
policies of various kinds. Above all, they sensitised the public to – and the public developed – its 
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claim-making power, as was seen in the context of the national and regional elections that took 
place in 2005.  
The main argument of this chapter is that while poverty in Ethiopia has entrenched structural 
causes, NGOs have expended much of their resources on addressing its symptoms, via short-
sighted, project-based approaches. NGOs registered visible success from the late 1990s when they 
started working on the real causes of poverty. This was, however, stifled by the government. To 
continue with this argument, it will be discussed how a sectoral approach had been pursued up until 
the early 1990s, as NGOs enlisted specific rural populations for specific projects. From the early 
1990s, joint efforts were put in place by NGOs in an attempt to create a better impact. This will be 
discussed here as a continuation of the sectoral approach.      
6.5.2. Environmental conservation and agriculture  
6.5.2.1. Land, participation and results  
Agriculture is the mainstay of the country. Thus, agricultural development has been the top priority 
of governments and NGOs. The imperial government argued that agricultural development was 
crucial to eradicate poverty. In a speech that he made in 1955, Emperor Haile Selassie I declared 
that:  
A country and a people that become self-sufficient by the development of agriculture can look 
forward with confidence to the future. Agriculture is not only the chief among those fundamental 
and ancient tasks which have been essential to the survival of mankind, but also ranks first among 
the prerequisite to the industrial and other development1169  
The monarch’s speech prompted the first planned intervention that began in 1957. This set the 
general context in which provincial governors put in place efforts to tackle socio-economic 
bottlenecks of development. Wollaita was one of these provinces that suffered from a serious land 
shortage created partly by high population. As a result, structural food shortage has remained a 
hallmark of the region1170.  
Population pressure and hence landshortage have historical roots. Travellers in the early 20th 
century witnessed Wollaita’s high population, noting also that farmers had started cultivating 
hillsides in the 1930s, indicating the growing shortage, then, of land1171. The land tenure system 
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during the imperial period contributed to this land shortage. A study conducted in Bolosso district 
in 1971 shows that 23% of rural households were tenants, 12% owner-tenants and 65% were land 
owners. This was also true of the other six districts of Wollaita province1172.   
Governors of Wollaita were concerned about the socio-economic problems of the rural population. 
Ato Germame Neway made the earliest attempt to tackle the shortage of land. This originated from 
his personal conviction that the economic bottlenecks could be solved only by the full participation 
of a population freed from exploitation and permitted, under wise leadership, to act in its own self-
interest1173. However, this idea and its attempted implementation proved to have deep socio-
economic and political implications that went far beyond its specific context. As a result, it was 
stifled in its bud. When Ato Germame started distributing government holdings to the landless, this 
sharply reduced labour supplies, causing local landowners to ask the monarch to remove Ato 
Germame from his post. Germame explained to the emperor that it had been his responsibility as 
governor to end the suffering of landless people in the province. Unable to openly criticise such 
public-spirited concern, Haile Selassie chose to transfer Germame to administer the pastoral 
Somalis of Jijiga1174.    
Ato Gemame’s replacement, Däjjazmač Wolde Semaita, had similar concerns to his predecessor 
about the socio-economic problems in Wollaita. As a result, Däjjazmač Wolde Semaita carried 
forward certain of the efforts that Ato Germame had initiated. Differences did exist between the 
two governors: Ato Germame had a socialist perspective, thus, he had organised farmers into 
cooperatives. Däjjazmač Wolde Semaita, on the other hand, believed private ownership of land to 
be a key factor for development. He has continued to hold this position. In an interview that he 
gave, Däjjazmač Wolde Semaita asserted that, “Farmers should own their land in order to develop 
and protect it. Development is actually associated with owning more be it material or 
intellectual”1175. The second difference between the two governors was (thus) in the approaches 
that they pursued. While Ato Germame had started distributing government lands in a way that 
undermined the interests of the land owning class, Däjjazmač Wolde Semaita pursued a cautious 
approach, in consultation with the monarch. In his first tour of the province upon taking up his 
post, he visited the rural areas of Wollaita and was struck by the dense settlement of the rural areas. 
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After consulting with the monarch, he came up with resettlement as a solution to tackle land 
shortage. He resettled landless peasants from the Wollaita highlands and the northern provinces at 
the Abela settlement in the Humbo lowland; the second resettlement site was at Bele in Kindo 
Koysha, involving mostly Wollaita peasants from the highlands1176.  
Alongside reducing the shortage of land, Däjjazmač Wolde reformed the judiciary and 
administrative structures1177. He also provided Wollaita with a telephone service, electricity, banks 
and roads linking all the districts1178. A number of schools, clinics and several water supply systems 
were also constructed during his administration. A number of efforts were also put underway to 
improve agricultural productivity. For the first time, the agricultural extension service was put in 
place; new varieties of maize and other crops were introduced, along with the use of chemical 
fertilisers1179.  
Like his predecessor, Däjjazmač Wolde Semait believed that the rural population had to participate 
to change their socio-economic status, and this was practically demonstrated; in fact many of the 
tasks mentioned above were accomplished through the active participation of the rural people of 
Wollaita. The participation of the rural people took two different forms. The first was financial 
contribution. Each household willingly contributed an amount ranging from Eth $0.50 cents to one 
Birr every year towards the “development fund”. The money was scrupulously managed and used 
for the purpose for which it was collected. According to the records, a total of Eth $1.22 million 
was raised through this means from 1963 to 1970, of which all except Eth $ 45, 797 – i.e. only four 
percent – was used to pay salaries and per diems for essential staff. The second form of participation 
was that everyone was required to participate in the “development” work being undertaken, by 
providing labour and other assistance1180.   
The rural people thus developed the confidence that they could improve their situation if supported 
by their leaders as well as development organisations. NGOs began their activities in this context, 
where people had already developed a great deal of enthusiasm. This created an opportune moment 
for NGOs like ASE. ASE stood to impart technical skills through education so that peasants could 
address their own development problems. Clearly, ASE did not stand to address the land shortage 
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and population pressure in Wollaita directly, however, ASE’s agricultural education programme 
was welcomed by local authorities. This was because its programme was believed to complement 
efforts put in place to address the major land shortage and to develop the province. Concerning the 
complementary role of ASE, Däjjazmač Wolde Semait described how, “ASE added another 
dimension to the overall development effort when it started there in 1969”1181.   
The agricultural courses offered by ASE were well-received by project participants as well1182. 
ASE carried out a number of preparatory tasks to ensure this, firstly by translating the agricultural 
course prepared by INADES-Formation from French into Amahric. This course had originally been 
formulated in a way that responded to the socio-economic realities of Francophone African 
countries. ASE believed that a literal translation of these educational materials would not be 
relevant to peasants in Ethiopia. It thus recruited Ethiopians who knew the socio-economic lives 
of the rural population to adapt these educational materials to the rural Ethiopian context1183. This 
was carried out successfully. Project participants themselves told ASE that the contents of the 
agricultural courses were of great relevance to their agricultural activities1184. The second task that 
ASE carried out was to tackle the challenge of illiteracy. Like elsewhere in the country, most 
project participants had low levels of literacy. In fact, the anti-illiteracy programmes of UNESCO 
and the National Army of Letters had resulted in some literacy amongst farmers in rural Wollaita. 
ASE, assisted by the extension agents of the Ministry of Agriculture, organised project participants 
into groups and identified literate farmers to assist illiterate members of the groups1185. Project 
participants themselves could also visit the extension officers of the Ministry of Agriculture 
whenever they needed assistance1186.  
ASE registered these early positive outcomes, though the project had its own shortfalls that 
originated from structural bottlenecks. Like any educational venture, ASE’s programme had dual 
effects. The first one was related to broadening awareness; the second was the acquisition of 
technical skills. ASE intended to make project participants aware of their value and that agriculture, 
in which they were engaged, was a worthwhile task. ASE thus told its project participants that, 
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“Farming is a noble occupation. Feeding others is certainly as noble an occupation as healing them, 
pulling out their teeth or clothing them”1187. Messages like this that reached project participants did 
indeed build up their confidence that their agricultural occupation was, in fact, a human invention 
that deserved respect. One of the founders of ASE who witnessed this change of attitude reported 
that, “…we could see as soon as ASE began to walk, that farmers’ steps were backed and their 
ambition enlightened through their becoming more conscious of their own value….of the real value 
of their own wisdom”1188.  
The early success of ASE surely resulted from a structured educational venture wherein ASE 
fieldworkers were assisting project participants. Project participants not only engaged with ASE’s 
fieldworkers but also literate farmers assigned to help them as well as extension agents of the 
Ministry of Agriculture. Fascinating discussions took place between these semi-professionals 
(extension agents of the Ministry of Agriculture and fieldworkers of ASE) and project participants, 
however, project participants inevitably had a number of queries which were beyond both the ASE 
fieldworkers and extension agents of the Ministry of Agriculture. As ASE officials reflected, some 
of their questions, “…[were] not always easy to answer”1189. Some of these questions were:  
 How can we distinguish the male papaya-tree from the female papaya-tree at planting time?  
 Certain vegetable wither when the rainy season comes? Why?  
 Why don’t mules reproduce?  
 Why does the coffee tree dry up when we dig around its roots to pull out weeds?  
 Why does it not rain in winter?  
 How come some flowers are red, others are blue and still others yellow? Don’t they all eat the same food?1190   
Though their numbers are not precisely known, informants saw project participants starting 
ventures of their own, assisted by the agricultural skills that they had acquired from ASE. This 
encouraged project participants’ close relatives and neighbours to start similar activities. For 
instance, Ato Berhanu Seboka became an ASE project participant in Wollaita in 1970. Assisted by 
the education that he received, Ato Berhanu started poultry production and cattle fattening. 
Concerning the overspill effect of ASE’s programme, he stated that, “The education I received 
from Agri-Service brought a change in my life and financial capacity. It had a multiplier effect on 
my family, relatives and neighbours”1191. Vegetable production, poultry, and cattle fattening and 
bee-keeping were some of the activities that project participants started in Wollaita province. Cattle 
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fattening was the major venture which many project participants started up. However, their 
problem was that oxen grazed wajima (Trifolium spp) that kills cattle. ASE trained project 
participants how to deal with the problem.  One informant explained how once upon a time, his 
cattle became sick after they had eaten Wajima grass. Their bellies swelled and they began to fall. 
He learned from ASE how to deal with the problem, referred also to the training manual he was 
given by ASE. He measured part of the bellies of the cattle and he pierced with an awl. As a result, 
the cattle were relieved and they started breathing well and stood up immediately1192. 
Ultimately, rich farmers were the prime beneficiaries of ASE. Whenever richer farmers who owned 
relatively larger areas of land were active participants in the ASE educational programme, tenants, 
the landless and small scale land owners either declined from the outset to become project 
participants, or dropped out soon after they were enlisted. ASE believed that illiteracy was a major 
factor that prevented peasants from being active participants, declaring that, “The high rate of 
illiteracy limits the number of subscribers”1193. ASE did not, however, note that illiteracy was 
highest among the poor farmers, whereas those rural residents who had sufficient land of their own 
had often attended the anti-illiteracy programmes of UNESCO and the National Army of Letters. 
Moreover, the land tenure system, as well as the tribute payments associated with it, also prevented 
poor farmers from being active participants of ASE’s programme. Like elsewhere in the south, 
poor farmers entered different forms of agreement with landowners. They either rented lands from 
the landowners or accepted sharecropping. These agreements forced poor farmers to commit a 
substantial part of their harvest to fulfil their obligations, and they were left with little of their 
produce as the price of land rent increased from the early 1960s on1194. This was the prime factor 
that discouraged poor farmers from being active participants of ASE’s educational programme. A 
document ASE produced in 1975 noted the reasons why the poor people had failed to participate 
in its educational venture. It stated that:  
It would appear….to be a question of the consequence of certain constraints of a social and 
economic nature which have always burdened the life of this population and which the events of 
1974 [the Ethiopian revolution] were to bring sharply to the fore1195.  
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To make things worse, ASE imposed fees on project participants, based on the assumption that 
while all project participants were poor, they were not beggars1196. Though it did not state as much 
in any of its publications, ASE asserted that, “…the token fee is often reduced and sometimes 
overlooked completely and deliberately”1197. This was done to keep project participants in the 
educational programme. Though ASE thus pursued it with caution, the fee imposed discouraged 
poor project participants from attending the educational programme of ASE1198.  
The poor farmers also declined to participate as ASE did not attempt to solve their major concerns. 
Whenever NGOs did introduce programmes that addressed their major concerns, even poor 
peasants demonstrated active participation. This was demonstrated in the case of Solidarité et 
Développements, which, financed by Oxfam, started a venture in Anger-Gutin in eastern Wollega 
that covered an extensive stretch of land conducive for agriculture1199. This pilot agricultural 
development project in Anger-Gutin involved the distribution of land to tenants and landless 
peasants. The project started with a small number of participants, settling 300 tenants and landless 
peasants who brought 160 hectares of land under cultivation. The enthusiasm of project participants 
to improve their status was impressive. On the other hand, the project refused to accept the 
applications of large numbers of tenants and landless people from Gojjam, Shoa, Wollega and 
Wollaita, for reasons detailed below. Commenting on the number of applications submitted on 
October 8th 1973 alone, the organisation stated that, “This morning, around 60 people applied for 
a place at the centre; they came from Wollega, Shoa, and Gojjam provinces. During the past 
months, applications to join the project have risen sharply. Yet there was no announcement that 
there would be place for new candidates”1200.              
Solidarité et Développements declined to accept the applications of large number of applicants. 
The organisation criticised the way settlements were being carried out in Ethiopia, usually in 
response to emergency situations. Solidarité et de Développements argued that the relocation of 
people was not, by itself, development. Development occurs, Solidarité et de Développements 
argued, “…when deeper-going and often expensive measures give the needed follow up to the first 
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phase emergency settlement”1201. To that end, Solidarité et de Développements limited the number 
of project participants. The project argued that, “…many failures in such schemes in other African 
countries warns us to be extremely cautious with this type of settlement and to limit it to the strict 
minimum”1202.   
The plan of Solidarité et de Développements to limit the number of project participants had two 
consequences. Firstly, project participants came to have a variety of privileges, namely housing, 
medical services, administration and so on. Project participants themselves were able to improve 
their production year after year, backed as they were by the project. Cotton, sunflower and 
Michigan beans were tried in 1971 and 1972 with a satisfactory result of 10.5 quintals per hectare 
of cotton, 24 quintals of sun flowers per hectare, and 23.5 quintals of Michigan beans per hectare. 
Production in 1973–1974 was even better than in the proceeding years1203. Project participants had 
been concerned that the vergin land might not yield results. Thus, the earliest settlers had asked 
Solidarité et de Développements to pay them for the work they would be doing, as social security. 
Solidarité et de Développements agreed that the amount to be paid would be deducted from the 
income of the farm from crop production. In fact, project participants were able to generate income 
that exceeded the production costs1204. The second consequence of the caution pursued by the 
project was that the news about the success of the project encouraged a great number of applicants. 
Turned down by Solidarité et de Développements, applicants now started their own settlements on 
the other side of the Anger-Gutin valley. Seeing the emergence of settlements, as well as the risks 
involved, the project reported that:  
Some wild settlements in some corners of the project area has been noticed. The project staff is 
not in a position to prevent such wild settlements. However, it is felt to be dangerous because of 
the imminent danger of cattle tryponozomosis, social disorder, human disease and inadequate 
financing and technical possibilities to promote development1205 
6.5.2.2. NGOs, from optimism to pessimism  
The revolution of 1974 brought with it a great deal of optimism. The land reform was one of the 
sources of this optimism. Conversely, the revolution brought to power a handful of junior military 
and non-commissioned officers who applied a top-heavy approach to tackle socio-economic 
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problems. As a result, the free participation that NGOs had, to a certain extent, experienced during 
the imperial period deteriorated soon after the occurrence of the revolution.  
The land reform proclamation of March 4th, 1975 gave every household a piece of land. The reform 
had a far-reaching effect in the south where it released the peasantry from the extortionist rents 
charged by landlords which had taken between half and three-quarters of the peasants’ produce1206. 
In the north, the reform was implemented in only a few areas as most of the countryside was under 
the control of rebels, who carried out their own reforms1207. 
Landless peasants and tenants well received the land reform. NGOs themselves supported the 
reform, hoping that access to land would encourage project participants to participate in improvinf 
their conditions1208. A set of measures planned by NGOs attest to their optimism toward increasing 
their contributions. ASE, which welcomed the revolution with a great deal of joy, planned a wide 
range of tasks with a view to increasing its contributions to project participants. One of its plans 
was that of diversifying its educational methods. The organisation argued that a comprehensive 
educational method could rapidly transform the habits and attitude of farmers more effectively than 
a single method. The organisation drew on experiences from other developing countries, stating, 
“Experience has shown in other developing countries that the diversification of teaching methods 
(institutional training of farmers, demonstrations, extension, group discussion, support by the radio, 
etc. makes it possible to rapidly transform the habits and attitudes of farmers”1209. The second 
aspect of the plan was making available educational materials in the local languages of project 
participants. This was made possible by the Ethiopian revolution. Like governmental organisations, 
ASE had been using Amahric as the single medium of instruction. This had discouraged the 
participation of some project participants. The new government allowed that ten languages could 
be used for rural educational purposes. Thus, ASE translated its educational materials into 
Oromigna, Tigregna and Wollaitegna1210. The third aspect of ASE’s plan was to offer project 
participants a number of incentives. Its purpose was, “…to reinforce the motivation of the 
participants…”1211. The last aspect of the plan was to increase visits to project participants. ASE 
                                                          
1206
 Fred Halliday and Maxine Molyneux, The Ethiopian Revolution (Servic Filmsetting Ltd, Manchester, Britain, 
1981), P. 99    
1207
 Paul Kolemen, “The Politics…”, P. 12  
1208
 "Supplementary Note…”, P. 7 
1209
 Ibid, P. 8 
1210
 Mirjam van Reisen, "Programme…"  , P. 6 
1211
 "Supplementary Note…”, P. 7 
244 
 
stated that, “…visits are moral boosters or incentives [for project participants] to continue, because 
a personal rapport is established between the organisation [ASE] and its subscribers [project 
participants]”1212.  
Certainly, there was no NGO in the country that was so responsive to the Ethiopian revolution as 
ASE, as indicated by its post-revolutionary plans. Though none so much as ASE did, other NGOs 
also responded to the optimism that prevailed during the revolution. Partly financed by Oxfam, 
Solidarité et de Développements was one of these. Solidarité et de Développements showed its 
commitment to terminating its pilot phase and thereafter to enlist as many settlers as its capacity 
permitted, for which it was promised support by Oxfam. In fact, the timing of the prevailing 
revolutionary optimism coincided well with the organisation’s scheduled plan. As early as 1973,  
Solidarité et de Développements had stated that, “The objective of the second phase…is to dig 
deeper, to make the definitive move to real development and create all prerequisite services needed 
to effect larger scale development as from the middle of 1976”1213.  
NGOs’ plans to increase their impact went hand in hand with other prospects in the country. To 
begin with, the land reform resulted in marked improvements in the economic positions of peasants. 
The landless received land and, and the extraction of rent and taxes by landlords ceased1214. 
Secondly, the Northern provinces recovered from the 1973–1974 food crisis, due in large part to 
the fact that the region received sufficient rains in 19741215. The agricultural product harvested the 
year after, in 1975, greatly diminished the emergency situation. A bulletin published by RRC two 
years after the occurrence of the famine tells us that:  
 በአሁኑ ጊዜ በወሎና በትግራይ ክፍላተ ሀገር በድርቁ ምክንያት የሚታየው ሁኔታ የዛሬ ሁለት አመት ከነበረው በጣም የተለየ 
ነው። ዛሬ በርሀብ ሳቢያ ወሎና ትግራይ የሚሞት ሰው የለም።   
The drought condition in Wollo and Tigray two years ago is quite different from now; today, no 
one dies of hunger in Tigray and Wollo1216   
Despite these factors that generated optimism amongst NGOs, the top-heavy approach taken by 
the government was damaging the prospects of project participants, and NGOs tacitly endorsed 
this approach until the early 1980s. From the mid 1970s, NGOs and governmental organisations 
worked on food security, after the food crisis of 1973–1974. The basis of this focus was the mid- 
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and long-term environmental and agricultural programmes that RRC prepared in early 19751217. 
NGOs were involved in both resettlement and the environmental conservation efforts undertaken 
in drought-prone areas that were a part of the mid-term programmes. The RRC attempted to resettle 
people from famine-prone regions to areas where there was relative fertility, using raw force. The 
RRC started its forced resettlement programme in the Ogaden, in Hararghe province. The Somalis 
who lived in the Ogaden were pastoralists who had suffered in the famine of 1974–1975. In early 
1975, when discussions between NGOs over the future of the shelter population in the Ogaden got 
underway, there were 40,000 Somalis in 11 relief shelters there.  Oxfam, which was heavily 
involved in the relief operation in the region, proposed a rehabilitation programme should 
commence. As Oxfam’s East Africa regional director, Mr Malcolm suggested, “…with the general 
condition of the camp improving the maximum effort must be switched to rehabilitation”1218.  
A number of NGOs, such as CCRDA, the Red Cross Society, the Catholic Relief Service, and 
World Vision agreed with Oxfam’s proposal. The RRC came up with a plan to resettle the shelter 
population, and NGOs offered material and financial assistance to make the settlement habitable. 
The plan was to settle the Somalis along the Wabi Shebele River, in Gode; Kelafo, Imi, Musthil 
and Burkur, however, these pastoralists were openly opposed to adopting the new sedentary way 
of life that was being proposed to them. The RRC tried to convince them, ignored their resistance, 
and continued with the plan. The ex-Commissioner of the RRC has written about what happened 
next, on August 16th, 1975:  
Early in the morning some of the drivers who had been sleeping in their trucks near the shelter 
came rushing up to me in absolute shock. The camp was deserted. The Tukuls [the Somali shelter] 
had been quickly and silently dismantled and over 10, 500 people had vanished, leaving behind 
only the very old, the weak and sick – 234 people. There was something eerie in the way they 
had managed to reach a consensus and disappeared unnoticed by any of us. We learnt they had 
crossed the border into Somali1219 
The resettlement that the RRC had tried to effect in the Ogaden had strong political motives. The 
Ogaden remained a bone of contention between Ethiopia and neighbouring Somali. The 
government had thus wanted (and failed) to secure the loyalty of the Somali. The ex-Commissioner 
tells us that:  
The nomads posed a problem for a country attempting to develop its economic potential. Their 
wondering way of life made it impossible for us to educate them or to incorporate them into the 
work force of the nation. They were always on the move with no concept of time or place. They 
wondered with no sense of border between Somalia and Ethiopia. It was particularly difficult for 
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our young revolutionary government because Somali clamed sovereignty over the Ogaden. If we 
were to demand loyalty from the nomads, then Ethiopia had to care for them, educate them, 
provide them with opportunities1220             
Despite its failures, resettlement continued with increased intensity. An indication of this intensity 
was the establishment of the Settlement Authority in February 1976, which took under its 
supervision 28 settlements that a number of organisations had been running since the 1960s, in 
which settlements, 12,990 households were living. These settlements tripled, and from 1976 to 
1979 the number of households living in them grew to 20, 2981221. 
The Settlement Authority criticised NGOs for settling only small numbers of settlers at too much 
cost, and subsequently began expropriating settlements that NGOs had previously been managing, 
such as that run by Solidarité et de Développements. The Authority criticised Solidarité et de 
Développements for the “luxury” it offered to just a very few settlers in the Anger-Gutin valley. 
The Authority thus terminated the work permit of Solidarité et de Développements, and Oxfam 
stopped financing the project. The Authority then launched large-scale and involuntary 
resettlement programmes in Anger-Gutin, mainly of people from Wollo and Tigray. In fact, some 
resettlers, mainly those from Wollo, said that they had accepted the government’s offer of 
resettlement. They mentioned the scarcity of farm plots and land degradation as factors for their 
acceptance, such that their resettlement was not forced1222. The majority of those settlers in the 
Anger-Gutin who came from Tigray, however, were coerced to resettle. One informant narrated 
that there had been neither drought nor land scarcity in Tigray to justify the relocation. The 
resettlement of the Tigrayans was, rather, carried out for political reasons, aimed at containing 
insurgent activities in the area1223. As such, forced settlers from Tigray took every opportunity to 
escape the settlement. In response, the government placed militia and other armed personnel there, 
however, this failed to stop the high rates of desertion. One report shows that from 1978 to 1982, 
the desertion rate from the Anger-Gutin agricultural and settlement project was 62%1224.   
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The top-heavy approach and escalation of the anti-Western propaganda of the government towards 
the end of the 1970s bound NGOs to reduce their commitments1225. Conversely, the government 
urged NGOs to increase their commitments to justify their existence. In this context, NGOs 
diverted their resources to financing environmental conservation effort that the RRC started in 1975 
as part of the mid-term programme to boost prductivity. Environmental conservation programme 
received attention by NGO leaders not only due to its alleged contribution to enhance productivity 
but also because it secured the appreciation of major donor organisations. This appreciation was 
again related to visible environmental conservation works carried out in post-1973-74 famine. 
Concerning this visibility, an official of Oxfam referring to the impression held by donors, reported 
that, “…Ethiopia is one of the few places where… [environmental conservation effort] 
is…successful”1226.  
Western donors provided grain and NGOs partly financed shipping grains to areas where the 
environmental concervation works were carried out by the Ministry of Agriculture1227. In so doing, 
NGOs, including Oxfam, were of the impression that they effected visible changes. With  
enthusiasm, an Oxfam official told his colleagues that, “I agree that our contribution to these 
projects [environmental conservation] by clearing the bottle neck of local grain transport has been 
very useful and worthwhile” 1228 . Certainly, Oxfam’s contribution kept the environmental 
conservation effort going well particularly in Gamo Gofa province where the Catholic Church, a 
partner of Oxfam in the region, together with the Ministry of Agriculture followed the 
implementation of the conservation project. Stating the importance of Oxfam’s support in Chencha, 
Ezzo, Boreda and Gomaida in Gamo Gofa province, the Catholic Mission stated that, “This food 
for work will assist the families to have more food available through improvement in their areas of 
reafforestation, terracing, irrigation etc”1229. Oxfam agreed with the Catholic Mission, and thus 
financed the transportation of food from Arba Minch, the capital of Gamo Gofa province, to 
Chencha, Ezzo, Boreda and Gomaida1230. Although a comprehensive list of them does not exist, 
the role Oxfam’s contributions kept the conservation efforts going. Recognising the role that a one-
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off Oxfam grant of $12,500 had played in 19821231, for example, the Ministry of Agriculture stated 
that, “Had this not received your support a major breakdown would have occurred in the final but 
most important stage of implementation of the work”1232.  
Environmental conservation works were, however, being carried out in a context in which the 
freewill of project participants was stifled as the environmental conservation project was used for 
a purpose for which it was not designed. The Ministry of Agriculture used environmental 
conservation work as a forum through which peasants were told about any new restriction imposed 
on them. For example, extension agents of the Ministry had to enforce quotas system that the 
Agricultural Marketing Corporation imposed on the peasantry. Also, extension agents collected 
taxes and implemented the unpopular resettlement and villagization programmes 1233 . Rural 
Residents were also urged to participate in activities ordered by peasant associations. These 
activities undermined the agricultural activities of farmers. A survey of the time that peasants were 
to spend on activities other than their own farming was undertaken in the Dawi Rahmedo district 
of Wollo, where environmental conservation work was intense, stating in summary that:          
On average, there are two meetings…6 hours each to be attended by everyone in the FA [farmer 
associations]. In addition there are extraordinary meetings for FA chairmen, vice-chairmen and 
officials called by the woreda [district] administrator and others for issues such as livestock 
vaccination, national army conscription, recruitment for cotton picking, grasscutting for 
villagization schemes... Since these officials, and the kebelle militia, are called away from their 
land for these duties, the community are expected to work the land of the officials either as 
ordered, 6 hours per day, or on a rotation basis of 6 hours every week….Taken together with 
religious festivals, the number of days from the farm are considerable and certainly add up to 
more than the time available for the farmer to work on the land is, of course, even more 
important1234 
 
This hostile condition questioned the attainability of the objectives of the conservation programme. 
The programme was intended to assist project participants in food insecure regions get additional 
food. However, project participants reduced their commitment as the amount of grains that they 
were getting was, “…too low and they have to work too many days in order to feed the 
families…which prevents them from attending their fields properly”1235. The programme also 
intended to dessiminate techniques with which project participants would conserve their own 
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farms. In what appears to be a paradox, farmers did not have the right to own land. As a result, they 
had no security to protect their own farms. In 1982, Oxfam sent out a consultant to evaluate an 
environmental conservation project in which it was involved in Southern Shoa and Wollaita. One 
encounter the consultant had with a project participant attests to the way rural residents looked at 
their farms. As reported by the consultant, “One farmer was hoeing steep land by stream, clods of 
earth rolling down and splashing in the water. What did he think of the problem of soil erosion? 
No problem he said he would get the pepper harvested before all the soil disappeared”1236. 
Unlike non-landowning private farmers, members of cooperatives developed higher level of 
security so that they took the initiative to apply the skills offered by NGOs. This was evident in 
ASE’s projects. A survey done in Sidamo in 1981 shows that 50% of ASE’s project participants 
applied contour ploughing, 47.6% implemented line sowing, 33.3% used improved seeds and 4.8% 
used modern methods of grain storage on their farms1237. The survey cited above also shows that 
most of project participants who implemented these skills were members of producers’ 
cooperatives. Conversely, non-cooperative members did not have much interest to attend ASE’s 
educational programme. However, it was obligatory to attend the revolutionary government’s rural 
education programme, and ASE’s programme was considered to be part of it1238. Nonetheless, by 
putting forward lame excuses, the majority of private project participants declined to participate in 
ASE’s programme. An evaluation carried out in 1982 described regrettably that, “ASE did not 
select its trainees. If more motivated people would have been selected, the impact might have been 
more”1239.    
6.5.2.3. The quest for a new approach and its failure 
In the early 1980s, NGOs planned a new approach that, they argued, would motivate project 
participants. This section takes an overview of these plans and identifies factors that frustrated 
them. In the early 1980s, NGOs concluded that their programme had performed poorly. Their 
evaluations show that the environmental conservation works had suffered from a number of 
weaknesses. In its critique, Oxfam stated that, “The present system of Food for Work (FFW) is 
cumbersome, economically judged against wages, reliant on RRC food and encourages too large a 
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labour force”1240. The organization, thus, designed a new conservation plan that slashed payment. 
The rationale was that payment dampened the self-help spirit of project participants. In early 1983, 
Oxfam stated that it wished to run a programme with a different approach, which, it was hoped, 
“…will encourage an approach to soil conservation which is participatory, avoids food aid, 
improves productivity and promotes agro-forestry”1241. Oxfam argued that this approach could be 
scaled up in the country. The Field Director of Oxfam stated that, “…we would be very happy to 
show anyone from the RRC how in practice we believe this can be done through a short visit to 
one of the sites where the Ministry of Agriculture is currently working”1242. To that end, Oxfam 
strengthened its organisation to reduce dependency on the Ministry of Agriculture. Most NGOs in 
the country strengthen their organisations to reduce their dependency on governmental 
organisations in rural areas. ASE, for instance, planned to carry out an even more radical 
restructuring of its organisation than Oxfam, in order to reduce its dependency on rural-based 
governmental organisations1243.   
NGOs reorganised project participants in their respective operational areas to implement their 
plans. However, food for work scheme that evolved since the end of the 1973-74 famine and free 
distribution of food during the relief operation of 1984-1986 caused project participants to ask for 
payment for the work they would be doing. This was pervasive in Wollo and Wollaita where the 
relief operation had been intense. Rural residents subsequently came to think of NGOs as 
distributers of free food. Prior to starting its water programme in the post-famine context, an Oxfam 
document describes how children too held the belief that NGOs were a distributor of biscuits, for 
example, in Wollo:   
It is to be hoped that the new water programme manager in Wollo will not be haunted by the 
perturbing call of children on arrival at a new site when the name of Oxfam is heard or the symbol 
seen and the synonymous cry goes up: “Biscuit, biscuit!”. 
The same was true in Wollaita. The Executive Director of ASE once went to visit Wollaita with a 
senior officer. These two persons, having personally witnessed the high expectations that project 
participants now held of ASE, recommended that:  
We should encourage people to depend on themselves rather than external bodies. Since people 
have been provided [with] food stuff and other materials during the rehabilitation programme, 
the targets particularly in Wollaita province, Damot Gale region, expect ASE or other external 
body to bring them everything to solve their problems. They feel to be dependent on others. 
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Thereafter, awareness of the situation should be created among them. Their attitude and mentality 
is to be changed to help them solve their problems1244   
NGOs started environmental conservation and agricultural recovery programmes in various parts 
of the country, including the Delanta, Wonberta and Shashemene districts, only to find it 
impossible to manage these programmes by mobilising project participants. As was always the 
case, NGOs were not sure when relief operations would end and development would begin. As a 
result, in early 1986, they were distributing food in the form of payments for work on the 
environmental conservation projects. By the time they decided to try and enlist people’s 
participation in these efforts for free, NGOs faced profound problems. Conversations between 
NGOs and their project participants during this period reflect these difficulties. For instance, in 
early 1986, Oxfam’s Field Director proposed that project participants should carry out 
environmental conservation works in Wonberta district without receiving food payments. 
Following the discussions with project participants, however, the Field Officer told the Director 
that, “At the moment if we stop giving food to do work like terrace, nursery, road 
construction,…the farmers will not be willing to do it by themselves without being paid…”1245. 
The situation was much more serious in Delanta, which suffered from extreme environmental 
degradation. Concerning environmental conditions in Delanta, one report woefully described that, 
“….most of the woreda [Delanta district] is eroded due to floods and over-grazing and the fertility 
is very low…”1246 Though they knew of the environmental degradation, project participants were 
not willing to participate without payment. Since 1974, environmental conservation based on “food 
for work” had been underway throughout Wollo. Most NGOs accepted payment as the only way 
to mobilise project participants. This posed a serious problem to NGOs like Oxfam which wanted 
to rehabilitate the environment through the active participation of project participants, while 
ceasing to distribute food aid. As Oxfam, bound to accede to the demands of project participants, 
reported back, “…there is a long history of FFW [Food for Work] in this area, and it seems 
unrealistic to expect that the practice can be dropped suddenly”1247. 
Oxfam was compelled to pay project participants. To make things worse, Oxfam incurred deficits, 
especially in the Wonberta district due to corruption committed by local officials. Oxfam’s 
paradoxically naive approach contributed to this.  Oxfam always argued that its strategic objective 
                                                          
1244
 “A Brief Report on the Field Trip to Gojjam and Sidamo Regions” (1987), P. 4  
1245
 Girma Tilahun, “Report on Hararghe Region” (June-August, 1986), P. 13 
1246
 Letter from Nigel Walsh to Marie Korner (13th July, 1988), P.1, Archive of Oxfam in Addis Ababa 
1247
 Report to Oxfam Africa Committee” from Tony Barnett, Africa Committee (July 21, 1987), P.3 
252 
 
was to help, “…the poor to see their predicament more clearly, building their confidence and 
supporting their initiatives so that they may be able to strengthen their position”1248. Paradoxically, 
Oxfam believed that Service Cooperatives 1249  could be used as a channel to reach project 
participants1250, even while the officials of Service Cooperatives were networked with senior party 
officials and engaged in embezzling resources, directly against participants’ interests. Oxfam 
eventually realised the alignment between Service Cooperatives and party officials, reporting that, 
“They [Service Cooperatives] have become long arms of a government bureaucracy led by a 
powerful political party at the apex of state power….This had brought about the gradual separation 
of the office holders in the Service Cooperatives from the rank and file members”1251. 
Self-interested Service Cooperative officials frustrated Oxfam’s oxen credit scheme entirely. 
Oxfam had distributed oxen to peasants to rehabilitate them after the famine. The oxen credit 
scheme was formulated together with other components of the agricultural rehabilitation 
programme. The idea was that Service Cooperatives would give cash to project participants on a 
loan basis. However, Service Cooperative and party officials conspired to embezzle the cash. 
Oxfam financed four Service Cooperatives; one of these was Burka Telila SC. An audit report 
covering the period from May 21st, 1989 to October 6th, 1989 shows that this cooperative had a 
deficit of Eth $35, 834.80 of which Eth $ 22, 373.87 was unaccounted for, and Eth $6, 883.41 was 
to be recovered from individual debtors of whom there was no available record1252. Each of the 
other three cooperatives that Oxfam financed also misappropriated approximately the same amount 
of cash as Burka Telila SC1253.  
Corruption was also committed within NGOs themselves. For instance, ASE received Eth 
$6,660,550 in donations between 1985 and 1991. It registered deficits that amounted to Eth 
$2,009,181 during this time period. The ex-Executive Director of ASE asserts that this missing 
cash was embezzled by senior officials of the organisation1254. 
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Corruption disrupted NGOs and/or their projects. In protest against the oxen credit scheme 
embezzlement, the Oxfam Project Manager resigned, disrupting the scheme even further1255. The 
consequence of corruption within ASE was more serious. Aware of the scandal, in 1990, donors 
withheld their support, putting ASE and its projects at risk. This, however, was just one of the 
factors that challenged ASE’s projects. In some parts of the country, ASE’s programme had 
performed poorly. ASE had assumed that project participants would use their own resources to 
apply the knowledge and skills that they had acquired from ASE. In the post-famine context, this 
assumption failed to work out in Gojjam, Arussi and Sidamo. Project participants told fieldworkers 
that education alone was irrelevant and ASE was to provide them with resources with which they 
would implement their skills. Project participants pointed out what appeared to them to be a 
paradox. While they were being educated about environmental conservation, project participants 
had asked for seedlings, pickaxes and so on. Fieldworkers referred these requests to the head office, 
but, the situation remained unchanged because donors were unwilling to finance projects in these 
regions. The programme, thus, failed to register any meaningful change at all. An evaluation report 
stated that, “Regrettably ASE’s achievements and the effect of its programme…don’t seem to 
comply with its age or its stay in the areas” 1256 . ASE reappraised its programme in 1989, 
consequently withdrawing from Arussi and Sidamo in 1990 and deciding to maintain the project 
in Gojjam alone1257.  
Conversely, ASE’s programme performed much better in Gamo Gofa and Bale due to massive 
investment. There, ASE purchased and distributed oxen, seeds, fertilisers, utensils and farm 
implements to 35,066 project participants, in Gamo Gofa, Bale, Tigray, Hararghe, and Arussi1258. 
These resources, together with the prospects of the new projects, motivated project participants to 
get involved1259. In 1987 the organisation started forestry, soil and water conservation projects, 
mainly in Gamo Gofa in which project participants showed a degree of participation1260. From 
1987–1989, 2 millions seedlings were planted in community woodlots in the highlands as well as 
in the backyards of peasants in Gamo Gofa and Bale. The survival rate of these seedlings was 
                                                          
1255
 Dessalegn et al, “Oxfam Country Review” (1990), P. 24             
1256
 Mulugeta Tamire et al "Reappraisal of the ASE Programme in Misrak Gojjam: 1987-1992 (Addis Ababa, 1992), 
P.3  
1257
 ASE, “Integrated Rural Development…”, P. 1  
1258
 Project No, d.4, p. 103) 
1259
 Infromant, Ato Getachew Worku 
1260
 ASE, “Annual Report: 1988” (Addis Ababa, 1989), P.10 
254 
 
impressive. A report tells us that, “…the performance of the planted seedlings has shown a 
reasonably high rate of survival”1261.  
Likewise, ASE enlisted women in its income generating activities. 300 women in the Kutcha 
district of Gamo Gofa organized themselves to cultivate vegetables for sale1262. ASE built the 
Kutcha Day Care Centre in the same district, which admitted 120 children, relieving these women 
of the burden of childcare1263. ASE also set up the Barera vegetable gardening and Adaba Oil 
Expeller Projects in the Adaba district of Bale province1264. The projects, especially vegetable 
gardening, not only began enabling project participants to get additional income, but also motivated 
other non-project participants to start similar initiatives. A donor organisation’s representative 
stated that, “I am very happy to see that, due to the women’s group of Hasen Barera, other people 
in the peasants’ associations start growing vegetable around their backyards” 1265 . ASE 
fieldworkers, recruited from the residents themselves, played a pivotal role in advising project 
participants on the growing of vegetables. In 1990, ASE intended to expand the same type of 
programme to Gojjam. The proposal covered the years 1991–1994, but it was not effective because 
of the corruption that forced donors to withhold their money1266.  
Like ASE’s programmes in Gamo Gofa and Bale, NGOs’ massive investments in famine-prone 
areas improved the performance of agriculture and resulted in a number of environmental 
conservation efforts. While these efforts went well in Eastern Hararghe, they failed to bring about 
visible change in Wollo. The difference lay in both the amount of investment, and the local 
responses to NGOs’ efforts. In Wonbera district, there were only a few operative NGOs, many of 
which were engaged in relief operations1267. Oxfam was the only of those NGO’s present that was 
tending to address the agricultural crisis. As a document tells us, “Unlike…others, Oxfam has been 
addressing deeper problems”1268. Oxfam was trying to deal with the environmental degradation 
and rehabilitate the agriculture. In 1986, it distributed fertilisers, agricultural equipment, and oxen 
to project participants in five Service Cooperatives. This motivated agricultural activity. Asked 
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about the role of this input of resources from Oxfam, one of the project participants responded he, 
“…could not otherwise planted”1269. Project participants who planted were able to increase their 
agricultural production by 12%. The fertiliser and oxen were the main factor for this growth1270.  
Though it depended entirely on making payments to participants, the environmental conservation 
effort performed as well. A source tells us that, “impressive amount of terracing and bunding were 
done and forestry plantation sites developed on formerly denuded hill tops and sides”1271. To that 
end, a nursery site was developed at Lelisa and Legachefe Service Cooperatives where 11 types of 
tree plants and 15 types of fruit tree seedlings were introduced. In 1987 alone, Oxfam distributed 
800, 000 trees to the rural residents1272. An evaluation carried out in 1990 described the overall 
progress of Oxfam’s environmental conservation effort and the role of project participants:  
The interest by individuals on acquiring tree seedlings, the development of community forests 
along hill tops, the interest in new variety of fruits and vegetables crops, and the response to 
techniques of soil conservation and bunding indicate that inputs and new ideas into the household 
farming systems is still a viable strategy1273.  
 Oxfam’s programme in Wollo did not progress as much as that in Wonberta. A variety of factors 
contributed to this. Firstly, the famine had depleted the resources of project participants in Wollo 
much more than in Wonbera. Moreover, Oxfam selected Service Cooperatives that had suffered 
most from the famine, such as Gosh Meda, Chinga Chewkuter Service Cooperatives. As a result, 
project participants asked for a wide range of resource inputs, including fertilisers, oxen, seeds and 
so on1274. However, Oxfam did not plan to provide all of these. A consultant who was overwhelmed 
with the profound needs of the region stated that, “I am afraid that to design projects at SCs level, 
unlike in other areas, may look like creating privileged islands”1275. Though Oxfam did offer 
assistance of various sorts, such as seeds, its soil conservation programme dominated. This was 
aimed at enabling project participants to have food security and to recover their most fragile 
environmental resources. Like many NGOs, Oxfam started terracing, bunding and afforestation. 
The project faced three important challenges. Firstly, project participants were opposed to the fact 
that many of the hills were enclosed for soil conservation/afforestation, which denied rural 
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residents access to their grazing land and water points1276. Secondly, project participants were not 
satisfied with the amount of payment they received for the work they were doing. They argued that 
they had to work too many days in order to feed the families, which prevented them from attending 
to their fields properly. However, Oxfam found it difficult to increase the amount as the RRC 
strictly monitored the amount of grain received by project participants1277. Thirdly, the project, 
which was started within the war zone, remained under threat from the advancing rebel forces. 
Ultimately, like all NGOs in the region, Oxfam left in 1989 because of the war, before any visible 
changes were observed with regard to the environment1278.    
To summarise, agriculture and environmental conservation programmes have been top priority of 
NGOs. NGOs recognised the importance of enlisting the participation of project participants, 
however the levels of participation were often compromised by structural factors. Though 
structural problems were quite apparent, the participation of project participants was quite 
forthcoming during the imperial period. This project participation that NGOs had experienced 
during the imperial period deteriorated during the next two decades. The top-heavy approach of 
governmental organisations was the prime factor for this. NGOs’ plans to improve the situation 
were constrained by two factors. The first one had to do with the exaggerated expectations of the 
people that partly come from free distribution of food during the 1984-86 famine relief operation, 
and the second one had to do with corruption committed at various levels. Despite this, massive 
investments were made, NGOs were able to rehabilitate the performance of agriculture, particularly 
in Wonberta and Gamo Gofa, and Bale. They also carried out a number of environmental 
conservation efforts. In areas where their investment remained limited, however, their impact was 
also limited.  
6.5.3. NGOs and water  
Provision of water supply became an arena of interactions between NGOs, governmental 
organisations and project participants since the early 1970s. The three actors tacitly agreed that 
provision of water was a top priority in rural areas as only 10% of the rural residents had access to 
clean water1279.  
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NGO involvement in water works began in 1973–1974 to supply water to drought and famine hit 
regions. Their involvement by financing the governmental National Water Resources Commission 
which drilled water wells using sophisticated technology. This approach was considered 
worthwhile due to the severity of the drought. Oxfam was a pioneer in financing the NWRC. In 
1974, Oxfam signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Commission. This was followed 
through by financial support from Oxfam, amounting to US $15, 275 for conducting a study of 
water potential in Tigray and Wollo. The study was the basis for the water works that the 
Commission carried out in the two provinces in the post-famine period1280. Oxfam also financed 
well-drilling projects in different parts of Wollo and Bet Mera town in Tigray, to the cost of Eth 
$60,8291281.  
The main reason for them to fund the NWRC was that NGOs did not have the capacity or 
experience to manage water works themselves. In March 1975, the Seventh Day Adventist and 
Catholic churches planned to carry out water works in a place called Tesa in Shoa. This was the 
first time NGOs had planned to manage water works of their own. As they had no experience, they 
asked CCRDA to look for water engineers. CCRDA duly contracted water engineers to advise on 
how to dig and cast water wells1282. In order to solve problems of this kind, Oxfam set up the Water 
Development Support Unit in 1975/76. However, the Unit did not have much capacity. Oxfam told 
NGOs that the Unit would assist with water works located within a radius of 150 kilometres from 
Addis Ababa, but the role of the Unit remained unfulfilled1283. Firstly, the Unit did not receive 
sufficient budget, and thus depended technically on the Commission (NWRC). Secondly, the 
dilemma originating from the increasingly anti-Western and xenophobic attitude of the government 
caused Oxfam to downplay its commitment. The Unit reduced its activities until its dissolution in 
19821284.   
The famine that occurred in 1983–1984 revived NGOs’ interest in managing water works. At this 
time, NGOs recognised that water works that did not enlist the participation of project participants 
would be costly and unsustainable. The drought condition appears to have an important been a 
major factor to motivate the people. Speaking of the seriousness of the water problem in the eastern 
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parts of Gonder, one observer tells us that, “Even in good years, water is very scarce at this time of 
the dry season, and people manage with what appears impossibly small amount [of water] or long 
distance to travel [to get water]”1285. The seriousness of the water shortage is reflected in Oxfam’s 
statement that, “…we can [at least] ensure that the water they do find at the end of a long walk is 
of reasonable quality”1286.   
Project participants offered free labour, sand and stone to water works carried out by Oxfam in 
Ibnat in Gonder. The plan was to dig 30 water wells per year in the Ibnat district1287. Coordinated 
by a water engineer, Oxfam built 8 water wells in May 1983. Encouraged by the participation, 
Oxfam committed itself to continue operating in Gonder, despite threatening security concerns in 
the region1288. After repeated disruptions, Oxfam decided that the conflict made its water works 
too costly and it withdrew from the region. Concerning the positive impression it had made, Oxfam 
stated that, “On the positive side the needs are enormous and we have had much cooperation both 
from the local officials and from the people generally”1289. Oxfam soon enhanced water works in 
Wollaita and Wollo where massive relief operations had been carried out1290.  
The first problem that Oxfam faced was how to start water development programmes. Oxfam had 
deployed water engineers and technicians who instantly installed water pumps to supply water to 
relief shelters in Wollo. In the post-famine period, Oxfam planned to upgrade this emergency water 
supply into a strategy of water development. In practice however, Oxfam found it impossible to 
build its water development upon the emergency water works. The organisation stated the difficulty 
in one of the documents, thus:    
It has been a difficult task to begin a development programme out of an emergency water 
programme. In emergency work, supplies are installed quickly, with little time to assess what are 
the neediest areas or to involve the community [who at the time is starving anyway] in the work. 
Successful development work requires more time to establish a programme, and more time and 
staff to work with the community in identifying project sites and organizing community 
involvement. In retrospect, it would have been useful to have at least a 6-month lead time before 
commencing construction in order to properly establish survey and liaison work1291.  
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The same was true with Oxfam’s emergency water supply in Wollaita. Oxfam had relocated its 
staff from Gonder, initiated the emergency water supply by contracting lorries and soon started 
digging water wells in selected sites closer to relief shelters. Oxfam found it difficult to upgrade 
this emergency water supply, also, into a strategy of water development1292.  
Oxfam thus dismantled emergency water equipment as relief shelters were closed1293, and began 
instead developing reliable water resources, taking social factors and community needs into 
consideration. Project participants told Oxfam that water was, in fact, their perennial problem. 
Women and children used to walk up to six hours to fetch water in the western districts of Wollo1294.  
However, project participants who had received food and non-food items for free openly rejected 
free participation. Regardless, government authorities told NGOs to consider all labour as 
“community labour” (i.e. free and done by all)1295. A district administrator in Wollo stated that he 
would, “force them [project participants] to work”1296. District administrators instructed peasant 
associations to cooperate with NGOs by urging project participants to participate in water works. 
This created tension between district officials and peasant associations. When Oxfam’s water 
project started in February 1986, Delanta district administrator found out that one of the chairmen 
of one of the peasant associations was not cooperative. As a result, he sent a letter, “…threatening 
to put him in prison if he did not cooperate”1297. The chairmen in Wollo declined to cooperate 
largely because they were unable to get the consent of their residents. Rural residents told their 
chairmen that they had lost their properties during the famine and that they wanted to replace them 
by getting additional income. A source that documented the dialogue between two local level 
officials tells us that, “The chairman and vice chairman of kebelle 014 would argue long and loud 
concerning the difficulties of organising voluntary participation, bringing up all the legitimate 
issues [issues project participants voiced]”1298. 
Oxfam sympathised with project participants and stood against the intention of government 
officials to force them to undertake free labour1299. Oxfam, thus, proposed both paid and unpaid 
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and work. Unpaid work was the collection of sand and stones. Paid work was well digging and 
road construction1300. Payment was initially made in grain, however, the price of grain got lower 
as NGOs made massive amounts of grain available for rehabilitative work, and as a result, project 
participants asked to get paid in cash. In September 1986, Oxfam started paying each project 
participant Eth $3 per day1301.   
Costs were high, especially for road construction. Wadla Delanta, Kalu and Borena were extremely 
mountainous, with difficult access to communities, which were often divided by very deep gorges 
containing seasonal rivers1302. Oxfam started its water works by building roads to have access to 
peasant associations in Wadla Delanta. As the cost was so high, road construction was stopped and 
Oxfam resorted to accessing project sites using mules, horses and donkeys1303. In this way, Oxfam 
built 144 water wells in Wadla Delanta, Kalu and Borena in1986–19891304. Oxfam also funded the 
Ethiopian Water Works Construction Authority (EWWCA) to dig water wells in the rest of 
Wollo1305. Their relationship started during the relief operation, when Oxfam had donated a variety 
of spare parts to the EWWCA to facilitate water supply to relief shelters. Prior to the end of the 
relief period, Oxfam’s officials had seen the importance of financing the EWWCA. As a senior 
technical expert of Oxfam reported, “We strongly felt that the fullest support of EWWCA is the 
most realistic method of reaching as many people as possible”1306. After the emergency period was 
over, Oxfam and the EWWCA divided Wollo geographically between them to supply its water; 
while Oxfam focused on the areas discussed earlier, the EWWCA concentrated its efforts in the 
remaining nine provinces 1307 . Oxfam observed that new settlements were favoured by the 
government, and so tried to direct its own resources towards those other areas that had been 
marginalised, and succeeded in doing so in Wadla Delanta, Kalu and Borena. Oxfam had hoped 
that the EWWCA would also focus on areas that were marginalised, but failed to influence the 
EWWCA to do so. As one Oxfam water engineer put it, “Oxfam would…like to see EWWCA put 
more emphasis on supplying good quality water to those smaller peasant communities who in the 
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past have tended to take a back seat in favour of larger settlements or areas easier of access”1308. 
However, the EWWCA was a governmental organisation, and as a result, was driven towards 
digging water wells in new settlements as the government was determined to meet criticisms with 
evidence that the new settlements were operating very well. Thus, the EWWCA focused its 
attentions on settlements in Wollo. This played a particular role. Regardless of its rhetoric as to 
how new settlements were favoured, the government had neither made the requisite preparations 
nor had the resources to supply water. New settlements in the country were set up without due 
regard to the supply of water and other infrastructure1309. Although it was not initially the intention 
of Oxfam, EWWCA, thus, came in and put thing rights. In most new rural settlements, as Mr Vaux 
relates in his memoir, “it [Oxfam] was the only aid agency active in the provision of water”1310.   
In terms of cost, one third of the money was spent in payment for the labour offered by project 
participants. However, project participants have also said that they spent much of their wages on 
purchasing and contributing grain to the Agricultural Marketing Corporation. The Corporation 
imposed quotas on farmers requiring them to contribute grain, even at times when the Ministry of 
Agriculture and the RRC were appealing for food aid to relieve these same farmers1311.     
Oxfam’s water programme in Wollo influenced its water programme in Wollaita. After its initial 
attempt to enlist free participation in Wollo, Oxfam had accepted that it would have to offer 
payment as an incentive. Like in Wollo, Oxfam enlisted free labour for collection of sand, stone 
and other local resources and paid for well digging1312. In this way, Oxfam completed 156 water 
points, i.e., three water wells in each of the 56 peasant associations in Damot Gale district between 
1987 and 19911313.  
Like Oxfam, national NGOs such as ASE succumbed to the demands of project participants by 
providing payment. There were, infact, differences between water projects of Oxfam and ASE in 
terms of timing, scope and scale and efficiency. While Oxfam’s water works went back to the early 
1970s that of ASE started in the mid-1980s. ASE observed that severe drought caused water 
shortage in their operational areas and planned to carry out water works. However, ASE’s major 
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donors NOVIB and EZE declined to fund ASE’s planned water works in Gojjam, Arussi and 
Sidamo, even while ASE fieldworkers were educating project participants about the importance of 
clean water. Project participants asked ASE to dig water wells, questioning the relevance of 
education alone1314. NOVIB and EZE were, however, willing to fund ASE water works in Gamo 
Gofa and Bale, and so to that end, in 1986 the consulting firm SAWA was contracted to study 
water conditions in Gamo Gofa and Bale. The SAWA study showed that water shortage was a top 
priority in Gamo Gofa and Bale. However, donors then questioned the technical capability of ASE 
to manage water works. This, together with the sluggish procurement of construction materials 
from overseas, delayed these water works for quite long time. Two years after the study was carried 
out, ASE reported that, “The progress of RWS [rural water supply] activities was largely affected 
by the delay in the procurement of materials ordered from overseas, logistic problems and the 
terrains of the area of operation”1315.  
In the meantime, ASE began recruiting a number of highly professional staff members whose task 
was basically to convince donors that the organisation could handle water works1316. ASE started 
water works in 1988. Offered grain, project participants carried out trench excavations, 
construction of access roads1317. However, the water works in Kotcha and Boreda were frustrated 
due to the outbreak of an epidemic. ASE together with local Ministry of Health staff transported 
the people for treatment and organised a vaccination campaign1318. Project participants strove to 
avoid contagion and it was difficult to bring them together. As a result, ASE employed day 
labourers to finish the Zefine water supply scheme and the Awesto Dana gravity scheme alone1319. 
Later, in the early 1990s, ASE built the Agamna water supply in Debay Telat Gen district in Eastern 
Gojjam. Altogether, these water works supplied water to 2000 residents. However, they were 
technically intensive and financially expensive to realise, as per an evaluation carried out in 1995, 
which says the following:      
Although rather expensive, the large-scale gravity schemes in Semie Omo (Awesto Dana) and 
Gojjam (Agamna) are highly efficient, appropriate and commendable in that the most productive 
and reliable water sources was identified and made available for many peasant associations1320  
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To conclude, NGOs in Ethiopia namely Oxfam and ASE, supplied clean water. The two NGOs 
began establishing water works at different times. Provision of water was Oxfam’s earliest priority, 
whereas ASE started working on water supply towards the end of the 1980s. As it mobilised greater 
resources than ASE, Oxfam supplied water to peasant associations, mainly in Wollo and Wollaita. 
Conversely, national NGOs such as ASE supplied water to only limited number of rural residents 
in Gamo Goffa, Bale and to some extent in Gojjam. Financial investment was the decisive factor 
for the scope of water works. None of the NGOs managed to secure the free participation of project 
participants; project participants asked for payment for most of the work that they did. This resulted 
from the free distribution of food during their emergency operations. This led NGOs to pursue a 
technical/financial approach. Donors also contributed to this approach by causing national NGOs 
to be technically strong.      
6.5.4. NGOs and Health              
Unlike their agricultural, environmental conservation and water projects, NGOs registered much 
less success on health. NGOs argued that prevention was the best strategy to ensure the health of 
people. They also believed that prevention was cost-effective. In a statement that reflected the 
position of most NGOs in the 1960s and 1970s, ASE opined that, “In health, preventive health care 
can be taught, and this requires no great technical and financial inputs. Thus even by themselves, 
farmers can do something through learning” 1321 . The question here is how far this strategic 
intervention brought about any visible change in the level of health consciousness. Certainly, a 
number of socio-economic factors have stifled the impact of this preventative health strategy.   
NGOs differed in project participant selection for health programme. While some of them enlisted 
selected section of rural society, others included all members of it. ASE exemplified this first group 
of NGOs. ASE, which pioneered preventative health care, identified women as project participants 
because of their decisive role in family life. The organisation launched a women’s education 
programme that prioritised personal and environmental hygiene courses. While the programme was 
proceeding, however, ASE received complaints that women were being prevented by their 
husbands from attending the courses. The main reason for this was that women had to do a lot in 
their homes and on their farms. This influenced the women’s education programme by causing 
drop outs. Due to this, ASE saw no change between project participants and non-project 
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participants. An evaluation report conducted in 1975 stated that, ASE, “…could not see any impact 
from the home economics and hygiene programme; no difference was observed between domestic 
upkeep of participants and non-participants [in Wollaita and Hadyana-Kembeta]”1322.  
In order to encourage women, ASE began engaging with men. This improved their attitude. ASE 
reported that there was, “Improvement in the family unit, closer links between husbands and 
wives”1323. As a result, women were allowed to attend “face to face” training. Faced with the 
problem of illiteracy, ASE began to work via pictoral presentations; project participants were 
provided with series of drawings, and discussions took place from there. Other ASE fieldworkers 
who had been influenced by the extension agents of the Ministry of Agriculture in the revolutionary 
context applied the lecture method. The leadership of ASE told fieldworkers that, “Agri-Service 
has repeatedly detected a tendency to teach [women], not to animate”1324. A Number of project 
participants told ASE’s leaders that they were unable to cope with that approach. Providing 
appropriate responsiveness was also a major problem, as project participants often told the 
fieldworkers of ASE that they had serious health problems for which they needed treatment1325.  
Responsiveness concerned those NGOs operating in famine-prone areas as well. The NGOs such 
as SCF, Oxfam, and CCRDA contracted 14 medical personnel to work in 14 districts of Wollo, 
both to assess the health and nutritional status of the people and to educate them about how to make 
their environment healthy in order to control disease. However, this health and nutritional 
educational programme was of secondary importance to project participants who were hungry. The 
minutes of CCRDA document the experiences of one of the fieldworkers assigned to Wadla 
Delanta:  
In Gazobelay [Wadla Delanta] the fieldworker spends his time trying to give advice to people 
about “good” nutritional practices. However, he admits ruefully, “this is somewhat difficult when 
the main complaint of the people is lack of food1326.   
The priority NGOs accorded to preventative health care increased with the commencement of water 
works. In August 1983, Oxfam planned a preventative health programme in the Gonder region, 
“…preferably in the same areas where our [Oxfam’s] water project will be starting”1327. Due to 
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insecurity, however, this was not realised in Gonder, but Oxfam did work to integrate health 
education into its water programme elsewhere, mainly in Wollo. To that end, Oxfam seconded a 
Community Participation and Promotion Officer (CPPO) who had been recruited and trained by 
the Ethiopian Water and Sewerage Authority (EWSA); NGOs could apply to EWSA for the 
secondment of a CPPO as long as they agreed to pay the officer’s salary. It was supposed at first 
that the CPPO seconded to Oxfam would educate water project participants about general health. 
However, the topic was too broad to be covered by a CPPO.  As a result, she was told to focus on 
the proper use and protection of water 1328 . In July and August 1988, the CPPO organised 
separately-run health education sessions for women, men and children in the Gosh Meda and El 
Weha Service Cooperatives. The CPPO reported that project participants were more fascinated by 
the slide projector than the health education itself, the technology having diverted the attention of 
project participants1329. However, the main factor that arose as in need of address was the priority 
that project participants accorded to water. Project participants accorded priority to access to water 
much more than access to safe drinking water. Worried by this, a Oxfam report described how:         
It can be seen that the general trend is for less water to be collected from the well and springs 
[during the rainy season] than during the dry season. This is hardly surprising news, as most 
peoples’ priority is to reduce walking distance, and if surface water is available nearer to their 
home then they will collect that….water quality is not a high priority for people, and our health 
education programme will take many years before it has much of an impact1330.  
Like Oxfam, ASE prioritised health education, influenced by the water works mainly in Gamo 
Gofa. As soon as health education started, an epidemic erupted in the region. ASE developed a 
project that included health care as one of its major components, including the construction of 
clinics. ASE donors outright rejected health programmes that included treatment1331, however, 
believing that this was the responsibility of the government1332. The situation in other operational 
areas such as Gojjam, Arussi and Sidamo was even worse. Project participants wanted the health 
educational programme to be supported by concrete projects. For instance, ASE trained project 
participants how to maintain personal hygiene. How, they enquired, were they to keep up their 
personal hygiene in the situation where there was no water in their localities? The organisation also 
trained project participants about the use of toilets to prevent diseases. They then asked for 
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resources with which to build toilets in response. Let alone creating impact, the repeatedly unmet 
demands of projects participants for concrete assistance, in relation to health care and other related 
issues shattered the image of ASE in the eyes of project participants, especially in Gojjam, Arussi 
and Sidamo provinces. An evaluation of the situation revealed the risk involved,  stating that, “The 
cumulative effect of these and other similar reasons had and continue to have serious negative 
repercussion on the reputation and acceptability in and around the current operational areas”1333. 
To conclude, those NGOs that emerged in the 1960s applied a prevention strategy in an attempt to 
keep project participants healthy. However, it failed to register any tangible result, mainly due to 
the fact that project participants found it unresponsive to their situation.   
 6.5.5. NGOs and the sustainability issue  
Sustainability was a major problem of NGOs in Ethiopia. Referring to the problem, a senior official 
of the government stated that, “NGO projects [in Ethiopia] have not been designed and 
implemented in such a way that their sustainability is ensured”1334. This reflects the narrow, project-
oriented perspective adopted by NGOs. Since their earliest interventions, NGOs have applied a 
project approach that, per project, has a clear beginning, middle and end and requires plans, 
contracts, budgets, reporting schedules and evaluations1335. CCRDA, which was supposed to assist 
member NGOs to take longer term perspectives, stated in 1974 that:  
The CRC [Christian Relief Fund, precursor of CCRDA] will not be in a position to carry costs 
that will be recurring unless the projects become self-supporting or unless a church or mission 
[NGOs] is prepared to carry its finance a minimum period related to the life of the project or 
unless a project becomes integrated with the national exchequer financing1336.  
 
Likewise in 1990 a team of consultants addressing Oxfam’s approach recommended that, “Oxfam 
should develop and feel comfortable with a long term perspective. [It should] move away from the 
‘hit list’ project method to the development of a program of inputs and components that have been 
long range behavioral and attitudinal changes as well as short term material inputs and 
objectives”1337.  
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The project approach implied withdrawal from operational areas at any given time. With this in 
mind, NGOs did not fail to understand the value of transferring knowledge and skills to project 
participants. CCRDA kept reminding member NGOs that projects in which they were involved 
should, “…strive towards local self-reliance through a transfer of knowledge and skills to people 
[project participants]”1338. NGOs accepted the advice offered by CCRDA, and they integrated this 
approach into their project proposals. For instance, concerning the objective for which its water 
programme was initiated, Oxfam stated that, “…one of the most important developments of this 
programme will be to spread the skills needed for the digging of wells with minimum supervision 
as quickly as possible amongst members of PAs [peasant association]” 1339 . Likewise, ASE 
welcomed the transfer of skills and knowledge as the most important strategy to ensure the 
sustainability of its projects. ASE believed that its educational programme would impart the skills 
needed to sustain the projects that it had started in the period after the 1983–1984 famine1340.   
During the first decade of the military period, NGOs had believed that governmental organisations 
were structures capable of transferring knowledge and skills to projects participants. To that end, 
CCRDA was always urging its members that, “…close liaison be maintained…with the 
government at all level” 1341 . Governmental organisations very much welcomed NGOs as 
counterparts. However, they did so more out of organisational interests than out of genuine concern 
to tackle rural poverty1342. They showed interest in working with NGOs on condition that they 
would get financial and material support from them. Whenever NGOs declined to fund 
governmental organisations, their projects faced sustainability problems. In 1980, Oxfam funded a 
poultry project run by a cooperative in Gonder. A committee composed of representatives of 
Oxfam, the RRC, the Ministry of Agriculture, and the cooperative was set up. The Ministry took 
the responsibility to transfer the technical and managerial skills by training project participants 
about modern poultry. The cooperative monitored by Oxfam took financial responsibility. Gaining 
no financial incentive, the Ministry ignored the project that Oxfam planned to expand to other 
regions in the country. Oxfam was dissatisfied, informing the Ministry that:  
There should be no further inputs from us to this project unless the ministry of Agriculture can 
give more time to it. Further requests for poultry projects elsewhere in the country should be 
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looked at carefully in relation to the technical advice available to the group wanting to start such 
project1343.  
The complex techniques that NGOs needed to carry out water works in particular caused NGOs to 
seek the partnership of governmental organisations. During the relief operation in 1983–1984, 
NGOs had installed water wells with mono hand pumps to supply water to relief shelters in Wollo 
and Wollaita1344. Even after the relief operation was over, mono hand pumps continued to be the 
main technology to get water. However, there was no local capability to repair water works. A 
study conducted by Oxfam in 1987 showed that 50% of the 300 hand pumps in Wollo were not 
operational. The study shows also that the main problem had to do with lack of maintenance and 
inappropriate installation1345. As a result, because water wells were often sealed off when pumps 
were fitted, the situation was now worse than before the well was improved1346.  
Oxfam tried to put three important things in place to better sustain water works. Firstly, Oxfam  
changed its water technique in 1988. Rather than mono hand pumps, it started using simple rubber 
buckets to extract water. A document reported that, “Previously, various more complicated 
technologies were used, but this has been abandoned in favour of the simpler, less expensive and 
more easily maintained rope and rubber bucket system…Hand pumps are no longer installed, as 
maintenance is extremely difficult in such remote communities”1347. Secondly, Oxfam assigned a 
CPPO to establish water committees by enlisting project participants. The water committees that 
she set up were dominated by local government officials of the peasant, women’s, and youth 
associations. Oxfam was opposed to the presentation of such officials in the committee. However, 
that was just how things worked. Oxfam itself noted that, “All other community activities are 
organised in this way, and one can’t bypass the FA chairman”1348. Thirdly, Oxfam encouraged the 
EWWCA to set up mobile crews to repair and maintain water wells. EWWCA responded that it 
did not have the budget. The EWWCA depended heavily on Oxfam. Oxfam was always against 
this dependency1349. A senior official of Oxfam cautioned that, “I thought…that if EWWCA were 
given the impression that we were pulling out in – say – two years it would act as a spur to them 
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to put their houses in order”1350 Thus though it proposed the establishment of mobile crews, Oxfam 
refused to provide financial support to the EWWCA.  
The situation was similar in Wollaita. The Ethiopian Water Supply and Sewerage Authority 
(EWSSA) in Wollaita had a maintenance programme, funded by CIDA and UNICEF1351. Oxfam 
doubted the continuity of the programme, however, due to its reliance on donors1352 . It thus 
contemplated training what were called “community pump maintenance people”. They were 
trained by UNICEF in Awssa town. However, Oxfam objected to the proposal on the ground that 
community pump maintenance people were urban-based professionals having nothing to do with 
rural residents1353 .  Oxfam then came up with a proposal to provide a fairly small amount of 
additional support to the EWSSA maintenance system1354. However, the support that the EWSSA 
was receiving from Oxfam was too small to maintain the 1500 water wells in 58 peasant 
associations in Wollaita that were installed by a number of NGOs1355. The result was that by the 
beginning of 1990s, 40% of the mono pumps were out of use1356.  
Dependence on governmental organisations meant that grassroots structures did not emerge as an 
alternative. This was also because official governmental organisations were actively against 
alternative grassroots structures, as they would compete with them for resources. In order to assist 
project participants to subsidise their income, Oxfam included saving and credit services into its 
urban development programme in Addis Ababa. Residents expressed their joy when the scheme 
was started1357. Oxfam informed residents that it could hardly enlist all residents due to budget 
constraints1358. A committee was, thus, set up by residents to identify project participants by 
applying a list of criteria1359. The Committee developed into a cooperative, recognised by the 
National Bank. Moreover, it started performing very well. 108 clients, many of whom were day 
labourers, could save Eth $2, 939, an average of about Eth $ 27.00 each over the period of six 
months1360. The local administration was against this. Oxfam had discussed the credit and saving 
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scheme with the local administration. Government officials had told Oxfam that the administration 
was unable to satisfy the demands of residents, and that they wanted to increase the administration’s 
income by increasing the capacity of the cooperative shops of the administration. Oxfam, however, 
told administrators that Oxfam would not finance governmental organisations. As a result, the 
administrators were waiting for opportune moments to show Oxfam that the credit and saving 
scheme would not work out. The cooperative started experiencing defaults1361. The administration 
had a Judicial Committee that used to adjudicate default cases. As a result, Oxfam brought two 
cases of default to the local administration. The Judicial Committee declined to see the case. One 
of the sources shows that this was part of their:   
deliberate tactics to justify the kebelle opposition towards the scheme when they suggested that 
the budget for house-hold loans should be added to the kebelle [administration] income 
generation budget. They wanted to prove that our populations which are the poorest of the poor 
could not repay their loan1362.  
The cooperative itself had internal problems. Firstly, some members of the committee were as 
corrupt as officials of the administration. As a result, as one of the sources shows, “…they have 
had to be pushed out”1363 by Oxfam. Secondly, due to the criteria that it applied, Oxfam’s project 
participants were mostly illiterate and lacking basic skills in accounting and management. A source 
that noted this problem stated that, “Part of the reason is that there is very little tradition of 
organisational leadership amongst poor urban people, and in part most clients are illiterate and 
poor”1364.  
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, issues of national and civil stability put the sustainability of NGO 
projects into further question. In 1989, almost all NGOs withdrew from Wollo and Tigray, leaving 
behind their projects, due to the rapid advance of rebel movements. A year later, the “New 
Economic Policy” of March 1990 brought the tension between rural residents and the military 
government out into the open. Rural residents throughout Ethiopia demolished a variety of 
organisations. In some localities, the peasantry started also chasing out government officials and 
employees. Describing the situation in the Bolloso Sore district of Wollaita province, for example, 
an evaluation report documented that, “…many extension agents were chased out of the rural areas 
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after the reforms were heard by peasants”1365. The peasants were motivated by their grievances that 
arose from unpopular policies such as government cooperativisation, villagization, resettlement, 
etc. The dissolution of the rural organisations on which NGOs had based their projects put big 
question mark on their sustainability. With regard to Oxfam’s projects in eastern Hararghe, one of 
the sources described that:      
This is a time of unpredictable change and transition. The collapse of the producer cooperatives, 
the slowdown and uncertain nature of the Service Cooperatives and even the PA structures 
themselves resulting in the loss of much of Oxfam’s inputs i.e. seed, credit, etc. means that Oxfam 
will eventually have to start from scratch in devising another strategy if it wants to stay in the 
area1366  
The dissolution of rural organisations affected all NGOs in the country, regardless of the nature of 
their projects. Though, it did not lose as much of its resources as Oxfam, above, ASE’s educational 
programme was frustrated by the confusion that prevailed in its operational areas. The peasant 
associations and Service Cooperatives on which ASE depended for mobilising project participants 
were dissolved and ASE reached the stage where it could not have any contact with its project 
participants1367.     
To summarise, grassroots structures did not emerge due to the influence of official governmental 
organisations. Part of the reason was that official governmental organisations presented themselves 
as the only structure capable of sustaining projects. However, they were more interested in gaining 
resources than in sustaining projects per se. From the end of the 1980s and into the 1990s, 
governmental organisations themselves started collapsing due to broader socio-political factors in 
the country, putting at serious risk the sustainability of the projects of NGOs.  
6.5.5. NGOs and governance 
NGOs picked up on the agenda of “empowerment” following the collapse of the military 
dictatorship in May 1991. Empowerment was intended to enhance human agency, including the 
expansion of individual capabilities and voices, enabling the poor to become active in socio-
economic and political processes in the country1368. Due to this, empowerment had profound 
political implication. This together with the participation of international NGOs during the “Cross-
Border” relief operation of the 1980s caused the new government that seized power in 1991 to look 
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at NGOs in contempt and suspicion. Senior government authorities argued that NGOs that 
encapsulated their activities by empowerment were driven by the interest of Western powers. In 
1997, Ato Meles Zenawi, the Prime Minister himself commented that “I don’t think the activities 
of these organisations can be seen as being apart from the countries that claim to be donors”1369.  
Certainly, the conviction that NGOs were directed by donors underestimated the internal dynamics. 
Ethiopia’s monarchical rule and the military dictatorship that were both marked by highly 
centralised state power stunted the civic engagement of citizens. From the early 1990s, different 
sections of the society who organised themselves around a variety of issues showed a great deal of 
resurgence, motivated by a series of measures that the new government introduced. NGOs were in 
a position to closely observe this resurgence, and sought to sympathise with them. CCRDA issued 
a statement in a political tension that occurred following the 2005 elections in which it described 
how close NGOs were to the daily lives of citizens. This, the statement argued, placed NGOs, “…in 
a privileged position to witness the day to day living of communities, their feelings as well as their 
aspirations”1370.  
NGOs saw that the people sought not only financial and other inputs but also public space to have 
role in the socio-economic and political lives in the country. NGOs noted these aspirations partly 
due to a series of decentralization of power and authority that enabled their regional offices to 
appraoch the people closely. This process gained impetus in the early 2000s when NGOs carried 
out “constituency building” that intended to closely observe the aspirations of project participants 
and to moblise them to realise these aspirations. Identification of these aspirations and mobilisation 
of the people resulted not only from the implication of the new strategic direction (empowerment), 
but also from the influence of political activists whose political background went back to the 
Ethiopian students’ movement of the 1960s and 1970s. These activists drew the attention of NGO 
leaders to governance. In its appeal to NGOs, the Press Digest, an Ethiopian weekly edited by 
prominent politicians in the opposition, namely Dr Hailu Araya, pointed out that NGOs’ attempt 
to address the symptoms of poverty was over, stating that addressing governance was a key agenda, 
“…if NGOs are to contribute to the…nation’s development process”1371. Likewise, another active 
participant of the Ethiopian students’ movement addressed a strong message to NGOs through 
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CCRDA, stating that Ethiopians remained poor due to poor governance1372. This person expressed 
also his frustration over the failure of NGOs to hold to account those government officials 
responsible for impoverishing the people. He stated:  
በርካታ ምሁራን የተስማሙበትን የልማት ጵንሰ ሃሳብ ትርጉሙን በማስተማር ህዝቡ በልማት ባለመቤትነት መብቱ ተጠቃሚ 
እንደሚሆን ባለመደረጉ የህዝቡ የልማት መብት በጥቂት ፖለቲከኞች ሲረገጥ የትኛውም በልማት ተግባር የተሰማራ ድርጂት 
ከልማት ከእድገት ከተሳትፎ ደረጃዎች ጵንሰ ሃሳብ ትርጉም በመነሳት ሳይንሳዊ ትንታኔዎቺን በማስቀመጥ የህዝብን የልማት 
መብት መረገጣቸውን በማሳየት ከድርጊታቸው እንዲቆጠቡ ሲደረግ ማድመጥም ሆነ ማየት ኣልቻልኩም። 
I did not see and listen to any development organization [NGO] that formulate a scientific 
analysis on the basis of the concept of development, progress and participation to prevent a 
handful of politicians denying the people their rights to development and oppressing1373.    
Certainly, call outs of this kind shaped the thinking of NGO leaders in Ethiopia. In his address to 
a meeting held in Addis Ababa, the Deputy Director of CCRDA, Ato Akalewold Bantirgu spoke 
of concerns of the kind stated above and argued that, “NGOs…[in Ethiopia]….need to focus 
on…policies and practices if they have to bring about a lasting change in the lives of the 
people”1374.    
NGOs’ intention to address governance problem was recognised by dominant actors in the early 
2000s. The World Bank and the IMF negotiated with the Ethiopian government to recognise NGOs 
as a social actor, an advocate negotiating with the dominant actors in the socio-economic and 
political lives of Ethiopians. This set the context in which NGOs developed a great deal of 
confidence and enthusiasm to undertake a number of activities to negotiate with the Ethiopian 
government. One of these was the creation of new networks and coalitions and consolidation of 
the existing one. Until 1991, CCRDA was the only consortium of NGOs in Ethiopia. A couple of 
networks emerged in the early 1990s. In the 2000s, Pact Ethiopia took network creation as a key 
strategic objective to build up sufficient capacity in dealing with the government. The result was 
that, 25 networks and coalitions were operative on the eve of the 2005 national and regional 
elections1375.   
The networks and coalitions seized the opportunities offered by the preparation of the Poverty 
Reduction Strategic Paper (PRSP) to push forward their cause. NGOs noted that the PRSP was to 
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be prepared jointly by the government and NGOs. The government argued that policy formulation 
was the sovereign prerogative of the government. NGOs coordinated by CCRDA then started 
discussing issues to be included in the PRSP without the consent of the government. This, 
“…forced the government to allow a measure of participation” 1376 . This suggests that the 
government no longer had monopoly over the formulation of policy matters. The PRSP document 
shows that the government became aware that poverty reduction required the participation of 
NGOs. Quoting the PRSP document, a joint letter that NGOs addressed to the Ministry of Justice 
stated:           
መንግስት በዘላቂ ልማትና ድህነት ቅነሳ ፕሮግራም ኣማካይኝነት ልማትን የማፋጠን ድህነትን የመቀነስና ዲሞክራሲን 
የማጠናከር ኣላማወቹን በራሱ ተቋማትና ፕሮግራሞች ብቻ እንደማያሳካና ከሌሎች የልማት ተዋያን ጋር በቅርበት መስራት 
እንዳለበት መገንዘቡንና ይህም ቀደም ሲል ከነበረው የልማት ሂደቱን በብቸኝነት ጠቅልሎ ከመያዝ ኣመለካከት ተላቆ ከንግዱ 
ህብረተሰብና ከሲል ማህበረሰቡ ጋር ሽርክናን ወደ መመስረት መሸጋገሩን ኣመላካች ነው።   
The government realized that it could not accelerate development, reduce poverty and consolidate 
democracy through the intermediary of Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction 
Programme with only its own organizations and programmes and that it realized the importance 
of working with other development actors and this shifts the tendency from the one that 
encourages monopoly of the development process to the tendency that encouraged partnership 
with the civil society and trading community1377    
This change of attitude was demonstrated practically. With the participation of NGOs and other 
stakeholders, the government formulated HIV-AIDS, population, and women’s affairs policies, 
and health and education programmes 1378 . The government also expressed its dedication to 
implementing these policies, adding that the constitutional rights of citizens would be respected. 
Also, for the first time, the government officially allowed NGOs to follow up on the 
implementation of policies, and to advocate for the respect of the political and human rights of 
citizens1379. 
The positive attitude shown by the government led NGOs to raise an important issue of public 
legitimacy. NGOs felt that they required public legitimacy to advocate on their behalf.  Motivated 
by this new, relatively liberal attitude of the government authorities, and concerned about their own 
legitimacy, NGOs, led by CCRDA and Oxfam, came up with the concept of constituency building. 
A study sponsored by CCRDA and Oxfam described the importance of constituency building in 
the following way:    
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In order to be heard in their advocacy for democratic change, NGOs should have reliable and 
sound constituencies of some segments of the society. Therefore, it is important that NGOs should 
invest in cultivating and building their constituencies1380.       
Constituency, Oxfam argued, was about, “…membership and identification of firm groups of 
people within the society who share the mission and vision of NGOs/CSOs and come to its support 
in all respects”1381.  
Certainly, not all NGOs took up the new direction, which had profound political implications. One 
of the questions raised while discussion on constituency building was underway was that of the 
mandate of NGOs. For a significant number of NGOs, constituency building was a task that 
political parties should carry out, and was not relevant for NGOs, who would address public 
concerns on an ad hoc basis. The proceedings documented their view:  
NGOs are not political parties. As such, the only thing that they can do is generate discussions 
around, or lobby about, certain timely issues. And after those issues have been addressed, they 
may want to raise other pertinent issues, but they may have to do that with the backing of a 
different constituency. So why should they be expected to have a constituency on a permanent 
basis1382.    
The majority of NGOs, however, firmly believed that constituency building is a key strategy to 
address the people’s aspirations for good governance. A distinction is to be made here between 
national and international NGOs. Though they believed in tackling the bottlenecks of governance 
in Ethiopia, international NGOs unlike their national counterparts did not intend to enlist 
constituencies. Conversely, however, national NGOs’ representatives argued that, “Constituency 
building ought to be taken up by all NGOs, not only by national NGOs”1383. 
However, constituency building did not proceed easily at the local level. This had to do with the 
way NGOs were perceived. The majority of people believed that NGOs were either guilty of 
embezzlement or agents of evangelisation1384. This had an impact on NGOs’ attempts to build up 
constituencies. In the early 2000s, ASE went to the Enbse Sar Medir district of Gojjam to design a 
project. Mapping began with a stick to scratch the soil to mark boundaries of the villages in which 
ASE planned to operate. While mapping was in progress, two clergymen stood up, drew their 
crosses from their chest pockets and showed them to the persons around. The process was stopped. 
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The two men told the team that, “… you know [that] our country and society belongs to Christians. 
If we use this stick and scratch the soil on Sunday our farm will be damaged by hail”1385. This was 
because projects participants had heard that ASE was an NGO set up by Catholics and its objective 
was to convert Orthodox Christians to Catholicism. A further problem was that project participants 
did not understand why ASE had asked for their participation. While the discussion was underway, 
a project participant wondered, “We are lay people, it is you who are educated. You know much. 
Why don’t you draw the map and show us instead of killing our time”1386. 
As time went on, ASE established cordial relations with project participants, which enabled the 
organisation to articulate ideas of good governance, democracy, human rights and peace building. 
This was also a trend elsewhere in the country. In the early 2000s, 120 NGOs were registered by 
the Ministry of Justice to work on these issues among different sections of society. Also, 37 
“advocacy and human rights” NGOs were registered in various regions, although no such 
organisations were reportedly active in Afar, Oromia, Tigray or Benishangul1387. Relative to the 
size of the country, the number of NGOs working on good governance, democracy, human rights 
and peace building was small and hence their outreach was limited. This was particularly true in 
rural areas1388.  
Despite this, the NGO contribution in this role was highly visible. The national and regional 
elections of May 2005 set the context in which the NGOs’ role was visible throughout the pre-
election, election and post-election periods. The elections of May 2005 were different and in many 
ways quite an improvement on those of 2000. The reasons for this were many and varied, but 
among them was the active engagement of NGOs, which made an important contribution to the 
success of the elections. Evidence suggests that NGOs active in voter education programmes 
reached 10 million people in the period leading up to polling day, the great majority of whom were 
peasants in the countryside1389. The election campaign became heated, due to the role played by 
NGOs and the opening of the media to campaign debates and opposition candidates. A massive 
grassroots interest in the elections that had not been apparent in 2000 was quite evident in 2005. 
The result was that a high level of voter registration took place throughout the country. Nearly 26 
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million voters registered for the elections, of which 48 percent were women. This was at least 30% 
higher than in 2000. 90% of those registered turned out to cast their ballot on election day1390. 
During election day, CCRDA sent out 104 observers from different NGOs. They had been trained 
by CCRDA to observe the elections in Addis Ababa and the Oromia, Southern and Amhara regions. 
They observed the elections at 236 polling stations1391. In the urban areas where NGOs observed, 
the ruling party lost the seats. For instance, the ruling party lost all 23 seats in Addis Ababa. The 
situation started deteriorating when the Prime Ministry announced a controversial state of 
emergency, and became frightening when youngsters went out onto the streets against vote rigging. 
The set of measures that the government took thereafter reversed what had been significant 
advances. The enactment of the Ethiopian Charity and Society Act in 2009 was one of these 
measures, undertaken in response to the impact that NGOs and opposition politicians had created. 
While the draft of the proclamation was under review, Oxfam issued a document that rightly stated 
the rationale behind the proclamation. It stated that:   
The draft CSO law can be interpreted as a reaction by the government to growing individual and 
community empowerment, and evidence that change can occur in non-coercive ways i.e. from 
bottom up, through peaceful advocacy of government and donors, by working with these actors, 
through building capacity and confidence so that people are able to participate and claim their 
rights1392       
 
6. 6. Conclusions 
 
Poverty in Ethiopia has had structural causes. These structural causes have stifled the 
potential of project participants to act and address their problems. The land shortage, the 
populational pressure, taxation etc were some such factors during the imperial period. 
While NGOs could mobilise their project participants during the imperial period, this 
momentum could not be maintained as the military government set in place different 
structures and approaches that traumatised the rural population. The attempts of NGOs to 
improve the situation failed to bring about major change due to the dependency mentality 
that emerged from the relief operations as well as corruption. The success of some of the 
activities NGOs carried out in agriculture and environmental conservation, water supply 
and health care was mainly the result of financial investment that followed the flow of 
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resources in the context of the Ethiopian famine of 1970s and 1980s. The situation started 
changing when NGOs started working on the root causes of the problem. During this time, 
they addressed the governance issues that caused poverty in the country. This approach 
had its roots in the two famine periods, when NGOs carried out successful advocacy work 
that saved many lives. However, NGOs were unable to maintain the success that they 
registered in the early 2000s when they were involved in policy debate as well as 
mobilising the public for their rights due to the hearsh reactions of the government.  
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Chapter Seven  
General Conclusions 
7.1. Review of findings  
Ethiopia has been one of the poorest countries in the world. The country has suffered from frequent 
drought and famine since the 1960s. Successive governments have put in place efforts to develop 
agricultural productivity to tackle poverty. NGOs have complemented these efforts. However, 
there has not been a major breakthrough as regards the lives of ordinary citizens. A number of 
scholars have proposed possible explanations as to why efforts put in place failed to improve the 
lives of the majority of the people. This research studied development visions of a group of NGOs 
and their translation into action.      
NGO leaders rightly pointed out the ultimate causes of poverty in Ethiopia. Like many NGOs 
elsewhere in the world, ASE, CCRDA and Oxfam were established and led by groups of 
individuals who had not only goodwill but also access to education and information. Access to 
education and information enabled these groups of individuals to broadly understand the 
environment where poor people lived and developed ways to improve their environment. The 
leaders of the three NGOs believed that the relationship between the governors and the governed 
was the ultimate cause of poverty and they intended to redress this asymmetrical power distribution 
by “empowering” poor people. Concepts chiefly of democracy drove NGOs from the early1990s 
to envision an Ethiopia where human and democratic rights of citizens are respected. The analysis 
that looked at the causes of poverty through the lens of power relations has remained valid. The 
most unfair land tenure systems, emerging during the imperial period, and the highly authoritarian 
and exploitative structures of the military government were the basis to understand the nature of 
poverty in Ethiopia. Although the country has recently registered an appreciable macro-economoc 
growth, the living standard of ordinary people has changed little following the collapse of the 
military period.        
However, the translation of ideals that NGOs articulated was mediated by broad political contexts. 
This research has analysed how the three different forms of government Ethiopia has experienced 
over the last 50 years have looked at NGOs and their visions. Both the imperial and the military 
governments have shown time and again that NGOs could not take independent actions to advance 
their cause. NGOs were, thus, considered as a security threat. NGOs, for their part, distanced 
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themselves from anything that could provoke governments. Put differently, NGOs subordinated 
themselves to the policies of the different governments.  
The retreat of NGOs from their radical ideals has raised a key issue related to their impact in 
practice. This study has assessed the impact that NGOs left behind. The fact of retreat from radical 
idea meant that NGOs left behind missed out the very cause that created rural poverty and that they 
focused on tackling only the symptoms of poverty. NGOs were, thus, overwhelmed and sometimes 
frustrated while they operated to address the symptoms of poverty. However, against this 
frustration, NGOs carried out a number of environmental conservation measures, some agricultural 
activities, and also water works (albeit these were carried out by project participants for pay).    
The impact NGOs left behind saw an extraordinary momentum from the early 1990s. The new 
order that came into being following the collapse of the military government appeared favourable 
to NGOs. In this context, NGOs were drawn into debates on issues of national significance due to 
changes within themselves. These changes had two aspects. The “indeginisation” process aiming 
at increasing the Ethiopian representation in NGOs reached a high level in the mid-1990s due to 
the anti-foreign attitude of the government. A new generation of Ethiopians defined a new role for 
themselves, and improved the relations between NGOs that had remained tense due to competition 
for resources. Secondly, a series of decentralization measures created harmony within NGOs and 
brought their structure closer to project participants. The changes transformed NGOs from 
organisations providing goods and services to people in need to advocates of rights and interests. 
NGOs had advocated these already during the famines of the 1970s and 1980s, as indicated by 
some crucial media events. The film shot by Mr. Dimbleby in October 1974 in which NGOs were 
involved exposed the attempt of the imperial government to hide the famine. The anger that 
followed the film triggered the overthrow of the same government. Similarly, the film shot secretly 
by Mohammed Amin and Michael Buerk that NGOs sponsored discredited the military period and 
caused a global movement that brought in massive resources that rescued million of lives. The 
advocacy that NGOs carried out from the mid-1990s is a continuation of that earlier advocacy 
during the times of famine. A number of pro-poor policies were formulated in that period, with the 
inclusion of NGOs, signaling that state no longer had monopoly over the formulation of policies. 
This gained even more momentum in 2005 when elections took place. NGOs educated voters who 
later turned out in large number to cast their ballots, monitored the elections and protested against 
the repression during the post election violence. Thus, advocacy as well as its outcomes was a 
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function of changes within NGOs as much as it was a response to changes that followed the collapse 
of the military government.    
NGOs were drawn into advocacy against the goodwill of the government. This could be learned 
from the reactions of the government. The government promulgated the Ethiopian Charity and 
Society Act in 2009 with an intention to depoliticise NGOs. In so doing, the government made its 
hostility against NGOs clear. This hostility can be traced back to the early 1980s when a number 
of international NGOs established relations with the TPLF, then a rebel organization. Many NGOs 
channeled massive resources through the Relief Society of Tigray, the humanitarian organisation 
of the TPLF, to rescue famine victims. Officials of the TPLF, in power since 1991, believed that 
NGOs could carry out similar subversive activities. NGOs’ advocacy since 1991 gave government 
officials a proof that NGOs, in fact, could pose a threat to the regime. The government finally 
issued the proclamation mentioned above to frustrate NGOs.   
The link between the actions of the government and the relation NGOs established with the rebels 
who now controlled this government calls for a historical approach. The present study has 
positioned NGOs within a more political or historical setting and explained how they related to the 
state, donors, project participants. Actors were identified on the basis of the influences that they 
exerted on NGOs and their activities. These influences were brought to light by investigating the 
interests, intentions, interpretations and strategies of those actors.  
7.2. Wider implications of the results 
NGOs are social actors that operate to tackle socio-economic and political concerns. In doing so, 
they interact with the state, with their donors, and with the project participants. It is only when we 
position NGOs in the midst of these actors that we understand NGOs and their efficiency and 
effectiveness with regard to development. This requires an examination into the perspectives and 
actions of actors that have interest in NGOs’ activities. This study has done an inquiry into the 
multi-level relationships that NGOs established with all these actors.  
Although this study has mainly focused on three examples, ASE, CCRDA and Oxfam, some 
conclusions may be drawn that have validity to NGOs in Ethiopia in general, and to those in 
countries with a similar history of centralised governance. As shown in the main text, the founding 
leaders of ASE, CCRDA and Oxfam GB analysed contexts in which they lived and acted 
accordingly to relieve poor people from the quagmire of poverty. To that end, NGOs mobilised 
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resources from foreign donors. This makes NGOs part of the aid channel and hence subjects them 
to influences that stem from the global development discourse. This discourse has provided NGO 
leaders with the lens through which they analysed the dynamics of poverty. However, it would be 
flawed to argue, as some authors have done,1393 that NGOs are either opportunistic pretenders or 
subservient to foreign donors.  
To conclude that NGOs are not actors in their own right simplifies the complicated relationships 
that exist between NGOs, on the one hand, and a variety of actors on the other. Before reaching a 
conclusion about the integrity and autonomy of NGOs, an investigation into the internal dynamics 
of NGOs should be made. The investigation that this study has conducted into ASE, CCRDA and 
Oxfam shows that they have considered in their analysis the unique context in which the poor 
people lived in Ethiopia. For instance, they have pointed out that the people could never count on 
local [development officials, as they were part of a highly centralised power hierarchy. This was 
part of the quest for democracy that NGO leaders aspired to especially from the early 1990s. This 
quest for democracy has remained strong in Ethiopia. Although it can be traced back to the student 
activism of the 1960s and 1970s, the quest for democracy in Ethiopia gained momentum since the 
end of the military regime in May 1991. This was due to the optimism that followed the collapse 
of the military government. The new government that seized power seemed willing to satisfy this 
aspirations. The endorcement of a new constitution in 1994 that emphasised the rule of law, free 
press, multi-party democracy etc was considered as indicative of the willingness of the new 
government to drive Ethiopia along a new path. All these encouraged a number of citizens to be 
active to advance their respective causes. It was more in response to aspirations of these citizens 
that NGOs aspired to democracy than to be subservient to donor organisations.                 
However, it would be equally flawed to underestimate the influence of foreign donors. The ideals 
of NGOs in Ethiopia coincided in principle with the changing interests of international donors. 
During much of the Cold War period, major international donors were interested more in frustrating 
the bond that some socialist countries established with the Soviet Union. As elsewhere in Africa, 
major international donors in Ethiopia went to a larger extent to influence the socialist regime of 
Ethiopia to cut ties with the Soviet Union. To that end, they used financial leverage. When it did 
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not work out, international donors channeled much of their resources through NGOs. The objective 
was to assist the rural poor people who suffered from drought and famine. The interest of 
international donors witnessed marked change from the early 1990s. With the end of the Cold War, 
international donors were interested to model the African states upon neo-liberal ideals. To that 
end, they sought to reduce the power of national African governments by promoting civil society, 
of which NGOs are a part. Until 2009, Western donors exercised their financial and political 
leverage to influence the government to tolerate NGOs to operate freely.  Their influence on the 
government and the opportunity that this presented to NGOs should be determined. The first few 
years of the 1990s were a continuation of the imperial and the military periods as the transitional 
government set up in 1991 suffered from lack of legitimacy. Firstly, prominent multi-national 
political groups that had soperated since the 1960s were excluded from the political process. 
Moreover, ethnic-based political parties such as the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) withdrew from 
the Transitional Government and resolved to continue the armed struggle. Proclamations of a free 
and independent press and judiciary were tempered by accusations of control and interference. 
Independent observations of election processes, although generally positive, were qualified1394. 
Western donors, for their part, were concerned about grand reforms such as the privatisation of 
state enterprises and decentralisation. NGOs thus took the initiative themselves to enlist and 
network with Western donors to create an “enabling environment”. Thereafter, seizing the 
opportunity that the preparation in 2002 of the Poverty Reduction Strategic Paper by the Ministry 
of Economic Development and Cooperation offered, NGOs emerged as powerful new social actors.         
It follows that the capability to analyse the nature of poverty, to understand the relationship between 
state and donors and the seizing of the opportunity that this relation created, to mobilise resources 
to advance their cause – all thesequalify NGOs to be actors in their own right. As social actors, 
NGOs did have a certain amount of power to influence dominant actors such as the state. This 
influence, however, depended on contexts. Despite their visions that required NGOs to redress the 
power imbalance between the governing and the governed, NGOs had nonetheless provided inputs 
and techniques to assist project participants to solve their “felt needs” during the imperial and the 
military periods, i.e., treating symptoms rather than causes. Their endeavour to also carry out 
environmental conservation and agricultural activities, water development and to some extent 
health work during this time was commendable. However, poverty in Ethiopia has structural 
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causes, and NGOs, in the early 2000s, acted to tackle these structural factors by getting involved 
in policy debates on behalf of the poor. They also educated the general public about their rights, 
who in fact amply demonstrated their assertiveness. The visible impact of NGOs’ activities to 
demand and get involved in policy formulations and to educate the public about rights, all this 
suggest that NGOs were social actors with a certain power to influence the course of change. 
Ultimately, however, NGOs have always remained subject to the domination of the state – at least 
in the case of Ethiopia. The government’s promulgation of the Ethiopian Charity and Society 
Proclamation (No 621/2009) seems to show that NGOs previously had in fact a significant 
influence on the government, which the Proclamation served to curtail in large part. Thus, we may 
conclude that in countries like Ethiopia where the state dominates political life, NGOs have great 
difficulty to bring about the sustained development as stated in their visions. 
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List of Informants 
No Name  Place of Interview Date of 
Interview 
Remark 
1  Ato Amanuél 
Assefa  
 
In his office At ASE, 
Addis Ababa 
 
October 
20, 2012  
 
He joined ASE in 1992 and he had 
profound memory about ASE and 
its activities. He narrated events 
and activities not only in 
connection with ASE but also the 
trajectories of NGOs in the 
country. As a technical staff of 
ASE, he discusses well the 
modality of ASE’s operation 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
Prof. Bahru 
Zewdé 
 
 
 
 
Former office of Forum 
for Social Studies around 
the main Campus of 
Addis Ababa University  
 
 
 
 
December 
4, 2007  
 
He is a professor of History at 
Addis Ababa University. He was 
one of the members of the first 
Executive Council of the 
Association for the Destitute. The 
interview that the researcher 
conducted with Prof. Bahru on 
December 4, 2007 is referred in 
this study 
3 Gétačäw 
Minas  
Lem Hotel, Addis Ababa   Active member of the Association 
for the destitute.  
4 Mengisu 
Jänbäré 
In his office in Färänsay 
Lägasiyon, Addis Ababa  
September 
2007 
He served as vice president of the 
Association for the Destitute  
5 Ato Abeyu  In his office At ASE, 
Addis Ababa 
 
July 12, 
2013 
He is a junior staff of ASE. In his 
capacity as human resource 
manager, he knows the 
management aspect of ASE as well 
as the distribution of power and 
authority within ASE.  
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No Name Place of Interview Date of 
Interview 
Remarlk 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
 
Ato Gétačäw 
Worku  
 
 
 
 
 
In a cafeteria around Bolé 
 
 
 
 
June 12, 
2013  
 
He was Vice Minister of the 
Ministry of Agriculture. He is now 
a private business owner. He was 
the Executive Director of ASE 
from 1993 to 2013. As an 
executive director of the 
organisation, he was involved in 
many of the decisions within ASE 
and hence a good memory of 
events and activities that occurred 
during his tenure. Moreover, he is 
skilled in putting events in 
sequence.  
 
 
 
 
7 
 
 
 
 
Ato Alemu 
Gebrewold  
 
 
 
 
Cafeteria of ASE, Addis 
Ababa  
 
 
 
May 12, 
2013 
He is one of the founders of ASE 
who worked for ASE. He had good 
memory about the conditions of 
project participants. He also had 
good memory about the 
personalities of the founders of 
ASE.  
8 Ato Abate 
Worku  
In his office at CCRDA November 
29, 2013 
He was employed as an assistant 
driver in 1992 and he narrated the 
activities in transport activities of 
CCRDS 
9 Ato Semu 
Terefe  
In his house around Asko 
in Addis Ababa  
October 
19, 2013 
He served a number of NGOs, 
including CCRDA that is part of 
this work. He discussed the overall 
environment in which NGOs 
operated in Ethiopia 
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No  Place of Interview Date of 
Interview 
Remark 
10 Ato Million 
Kebede 
In his office at CCRDA November 
8, 2013 
He narrates issues internal to 
CCRDA. He assisted the 
researcher to a larger extent 
11 Ato Metiku 
Gebregirgis   
In his office at CCRDA November 
21, 2013 
He served CCRDA for two 
decades and in particular knows 
the relation the organisation had 
with the government  
12 Ato Fikadu 
Bizuneh  
In a Cafteria around 
Sedest kilo  
November 
10, 2012  
He narrates wrongdoing within 
NGOs in some depth  
13 Ato Sebsebe 
Sema   
In his office at ASE November 
28, 2013 
He served ASE in the last two 
decades and he remembers to some 
extent how ASE evolved 
14 Ato Fantahun 
Alemu  
In a Cafteria arounf 
Qedeste Mariam  
November 
10, 2013 
He served a number of NGOs and 
discussed general issues especially 
the relation between NGOs and 
donors 
15 Ato Elias 
Mamo and 
Zenash 
Ketema  
In the office of Ato Elias  November 
10, 2013 
They reflected on the Ethiopian 
Charity and Society Act, 
representing the government 
16 Ato Wolde 
Hawariat 
Gebre 
Selassie  
In his office  November 
8, 2013  
He made brief remarks about the 
Ethiopian Charity and Society 
Proclamation as well as its 
usefulness as representative of the 
government.  
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